Uploaded November 2023 | Updated September 2026, 11 hours ago
Speaker: Ramzy Mardini
Despite the territorial demise of the Islamic State, threat assessments over the prospect of its resurgence remain divorced from a rigorous investigation into how it came to establish de-facto statehood in the first place. What explains how a single armed group out of many came to achieve such an astounding hegemonic feat, let alone in such short order? To the extent a consensus exists on its territorial success, conventional opinion emphasizes organizational sources of rebel power – hard, soft, and institutional – combined with the structural permissiveness of the environment. But contrary to widespread belief, the Islamic State was not established as a result of military victory. Instead, it was borne out of a unique and rapid acquisition of a pre-existing Iraqi rebellion, awarding it with a rebel monopoly in Iraq and an autonomous zone of territorial control to enact statehood. This model of consolidation was made viable in 2014 as a result of the organization’s complex embeddedness within Iraq’s Sunni community – a condition that had not existed in its participation in the Syrian rebellion or for its organizational predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the earlier years of the Iraqi rebellion.
Speaker: Ramzy Mardini
Despite the territorial demise of the Islamic State, threat assessments over the prospect of its resurgence remain divorced from a rigorous investigation into how it came to establish de-facto statehood in the first place. What explains how a single armed group out of many came to achieve such an astounding hegemonic feat, let alone in such short order? To the extent a consensus exists on its territorial success, conventional opinion emphasizes organizational sources of rebel power – hard, soft, and institutional – combined with the structural permissiveness of the environment. But contrary to widespread belief, the Islamic State was not established as a result of military victory. Instead, it was borne out of a unique and rapid acquisition of a pre-existing Iraqi rebellion, awarding it with a rebel monopoly in Iraq and an autonomous zone of territorial control to enact statehood. This model of consolidation was made viable in 2014 as a result of the organization’s complex embeddedness within Iraq’s Sunni community – a condition that had not existed in its participation in the Syrian rebellion or for its organizational predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the earlier years of the Iraqi rebellion.
