Uploaded September 2026 | Updated November 2026, 5 minutes ago
In 2024, researching and scraping over 50TB of industrial software from 40+ vendors and discovered several “genetic” links in the DNA of Operational Technology (OT). In many instances, the evidence of shared heritage was extremely strong, especially in portfolios where M&A activities and global growth were common. And in other instances, strong links were discovered between how an LTE driver was added to an industrial gateway device (which was on the GSA), and the foreign developer who added it. In other words, there is a history in software, and many products despite a different OEM – they have relationships to one another which could be utilized by a malicious actor directly and indirectly.
In 2025, and with the prevalence of drones, not only for warfare, but in consumer markets and industrial scenarios, Ron wondered if by analyzing a few common Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and performing complete teardowns, could he answer the following questions:
Do our assumptions when comparing OT systems hold true in Drones? What about FPVs? Larger platforms?
Are there software supply chain and hardware risks inside of these products?
Do drones pose a risk to OT and sensitive facilities? Or is the “risk” really a story of “it depends”
This session provides a vendor-agnostic look at the tear down results for a few well known RPVs, outline discoveries, provide some recommendations, and how we, as a community, can move the bar forward on supply chain due diligence and product assurance.
Subscribe to Dale’s ICS Security: Friday News & Notes email here:
friday.dale-peterson.com/signup
Check out S4x27. Feb 8 - 11 in Tampa:
s4xevents.com
In 2024, researching and scraping over 50TB of industrial software from 40+ vendors and discovered several “genetic” links in the DNA of Operational Technology (OT). In many instances, the evidence of shared heritage was extremely strong, especially in portfolios where M&A activities and global growth were common. And in other instances, strong links were discovered between how an LTE driver was added to an industrial gateway device (which was on the GSA), and the foreign developer who added it. In other words, there is a history in software, and many products despite a different OEM – they have relationships to one another which could be utilized by a malicious actor directly and indirectly.
In 2025, and with the prevalence of drones, not only for warfare, but in consumer markets and industrial scenarios, Ron wondered if by analyzing a few common Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and performing complete teardowns, could he answer the following questions:
Do our assumptions when comparing OT systems hold true in Drones? What about FPVs? Larger platforms?
Are there software supply chain and hardware risks inside of these products?
Do drones pose a risk to OT and sensitive facilities? Or is the “risk” really a story of “it depends”
This session provides a vendor-agnostic look at the tear down results for a few well known RPVs, outline discoveries, provide some recommendations, and how we, as a community, can move the bar forward on supply chain due diligence and product assurance.
Subscribe to Dale’s ICS Security: Friday News & Notes email here:
friday.dale-peterson.com/signup
Check out S4x27. Feb 8 - 11 in Tampa:
s4xevents.com










