Does timely reporting of insider trading actually increase insiders’ profits? @FuquaSchOfBusiness
Does timely reporting of insider trading actually increase insiders’ profits?  @FuquaSchOfBusiness
Uploaded June 2025 | Updated September 2026, 3 weeks ago
What if the rules meant to prevent insider trading actually made it easier — and more profitable — for insiders to trade? Professor Xu Jiang examines how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirement for quicker reporting of insider trades may have backfired. His research shows that faster disclosure enables insiders to see and mimic each other’s trades more easily, leading to better coordination and higher profits at the expense of everyday investors.

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Does timely reporting of insider trading actually increase insiders’ profits?

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