Silicon Curtain | David Gioe, Huw Dylan & Elena Grossfeld: Putin’s (mis)Management of Russian Intelligence Assessments @SiliconCurtain | Uploaded September 2024 | Updated October 2024, 6 hours ago.
This is a conversation with the three esteemed authors of a paper entitled “The autocrat’s intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War. Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe and Elena Grossfeld
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This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is illustrative of this broader, though understudied, pattern of autocratic mismanagement of strategic intelligence. The invasion was both spurred and accompanied by a catastrophic intelligence failure, the responsibility for which rests with Vladimir Putin, the arbiter of a system with limited capacity to offer dispassionate strategic assessments. His failure is characteristic of autocratic regimes assessing foreign developments, including Putin’s Soviet predecessors.
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft, war, before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine but has since recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article explores Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings, they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
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CHAPTERS:
00:00:00 Paper: Mismanagement of Russian Strategic Assessment in the Ukraine War.
00:03:47 Putin's KGB past didn't help him with intelligence in Ukraine.
00:05:36 Putin's intelligence and security apparatus kept him in power in Russia.
00:08:38 In the 1990s you have KGB culture mixed in with the poison of corruption.
00:12:46 The murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya called him the strutting Chekist.
00:16:42 How do you get to a prime assignment in the KGB? Connections help.
00:20:13 One of the Putin was doing in East Germany was handling ‘illegal officers.’
00:25:26 The intelligence setup he has is really geared up to help Putin survive.
00:30:22 The GRU was saying they don’t want us in Ukraine. It won’t be a picnic.
00:37:12 It seems everybody is taking everything at face value in the system.
00:42:40 Putin thought this was going to be a short, sharp ‘special military operation.’
00:48:59 In Russia the economy and the system are set up in an almost medieval way.
00:54:32 Longer trends in Russian intelligence show they struggle with the big picture.
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LINKS:
washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/putins-kgb-past-didnt-help-him-with-intelligence-ukraine
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13691481241258108
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13691481221146113
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Professor David Gioe is Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies. He joins the department as a British Academy Global Professor. He is Associate Professor of History at the US Military Academy at West Point, where he also serves as History Fellow for the Army Cyber Institute. David is also Director of Studies for the Cambridge Security Initiative and co-convener of its International Security and Intelligence program.
Dr Huw Dylan is a Reader in Intelligence and International Security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is also an Associated Researcher at the Centre for Intelligence Studies in the Norwegian Intelligence School. His work is focused on intelligence in the Cold War and beyond, with a specific focus on deception operations, intelligence in diplomacy, and covert action.
Elena Grossfeld is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London (KCL), and a member of King's Intelligence and Security Group (KISG). Her research interests are strategic culture of Russian/Soviet intelligence, Cold War, and information warfare.
----------
SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:
buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain
patreon.com/siliconcurtain
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TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND:
Save Ukraine
saveukraineua.org
Superhumans - Hospital for war traumas
superhumans.com/en
UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukraine
https://unbroken.org.ua/
Come Back Alive
https://savelife.in.ua/en/
Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchen
wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraine
UNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyy
https://u24.gov.ua/
Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation
prytulafoundation.org
NGO “Herojam Slava”
heroiamslava.org
kharpp - Reconstruction project supporting communities in Kharkiv and Przemyśl
kharpp.com
NOR DOG Animal Rescue
nor-dog.org/home
----------
This is a conversation with the three esteemed authors of a paper entitled “The autocrat’s intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War. Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe and Elena Grossfeld
----------
This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is illustrative of this broader, though understudied, pattern of autocratic mismanagement of strategic intelligence. The invasion was both spurred and accompanied by a catastrophic intelligence failure, the responsibility for which rests with Vladimir Putin, the arbiter of a system with limited capacity to offer dispassionate strategic assessments. His failure is characteristic of autocratic regimes assessing foreign developments, including Putin’s Soviet predecessors.
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft, war, before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine but has since recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article explores Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings, they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
----------
CHAPTERS:
00:00:00 Paper: Mismanagement of Russian Strategic Assessment in the Ukraine War.
00:03:47 Putin's KGB past didn't help him with intelligence in Ukraine.
00:05:36 Putin's intelligence and security apparatus kept him in power in Russia.
00:08:38 In the 1990s you have KGB culture mixed in with the poison of corruption.
00:12:46 The murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya called him the strutting Chekist.
00:16:42 How do you get to a prime assignment in the KGB? Connections help.
00:20:13 One of the Putin was doing in East Germany was handling ‘illegal officers.’
00:25:26 The intelligence setup he has is really geared up to help Putin survive.
00:30:22 The GRU was saying they don’t want us in Ukraine. It won’t be a picnic.
00:37:12 It seems everybody is taking everything at face value in the system.
00:42:40 Putin thought this was going to be a short, sharp ‘special military operation.’
00:48:59 In Russia the economy and the system are set up in an almost medieval way.
00:54:32 Longer trends in Russian intelligence show they struggle with the big picture.
----------
LINKS:
washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/putins-kgb-past-didnt-help-him-with-intelligence-ukraine
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13691481241258108
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13691481221146113
----------
Professor David Gioe is Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies. He joins the department as a British Academy Global Professor. He is Associate Professor of History at the US Military Academy at West Point, where he also serves as History Fellow for the Army Cyber Institute. David is also Director of Studies for the Cambridge Security Initiative and co-convener of its International Security and Intelligence program.
Dr Huw Dylan is a Reader in Intelligence and International Security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is also an Associated Researcher at the Centre for Intelligence Studies in the Norwegian Intelligence School. His work is focused on intelligence in the Cold War and beyond, with a specific focus on deception operations, intelligence in diplomacy, and covert action.
Elena Grossfeld is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London (KCL), and a member of King's Intelligence and Security Group (KISG). Her research interests are strategic culture of Russian/Soviet intelligence, Cold War, and information warfare.
----------
SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:
buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain
patreon.com/siliconcurtain
----------
TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND:
Save Ukraine
saveukraineua.org
Superhumans - Hospital for war traumas
superhumans.com/en
UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukraine
https://unbroken.org.ua/
Come Back Alive
https://savelife.in.ua/en/
Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchen
wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraine
UNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyy
https://u24.gov.ua/
Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation
prytulafoundation.org
NGO “Herojam Slava”
heroiamslava.org
kharpp - Reconstruction project supporting communities in Kharkiv and Przemyśl
kharpp.com
NOR DOG Animal Rescue
nor-dog.org/home
----------
