Uploaded February 2022 | Updated September 2026, 2 hours ago
Audio Source:
youtube.com/watch?v=efrZxCOU0dM
avherald.com/h?article=467dddb7&opt=0
ChilloutJrs - CVR & ATC Audio Archive
|
CVR - Orenair 9558 - [Runway Overrun] 3 September 2013
🔇 TAP TO UNMUTE
![CVR - Orenair 9558 - [Runway Overrun] 3 September 2013](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/AqNvSEa6YvY/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - Orenair 9558 - [Runway Overrun] 3 September 2013
Audio Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efrZxCOU0dM
https://avherald.com/h?article=467dddb7&opt=0")
![ATC - Aero Lloyd 1135 - [Contributing factor for the Überlingen mid-air collision] 1 July 2002](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/BFpsVfx3Kdk/mqdefault.jpg "ATC - Aero Lloyd 1135 - [Contributing factor for the Überlingen mid-air collision] 1 July 2002
119.920 ATC Frequency")
![ATC - Eastern Airlines 401 - [CFIT 1)] 29 December 1972](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/BaNhSJqi6y4/mqdefault.jpg "ATC - Eastern Airlines 401 - [CFIT 1)] 29 December 1972
1) Pilot Error
Audio Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VoAh0yciNDM")
![CVR - Delta Airlines 1141 - [Stall during Take-off 1)] 31 August 1988 (Longer Version)](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/Bkmu904JUAY/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - Delta Airlines 1141 - [Stall during Take-off 1)] 31 August 1988 (Longer Version)
1) Pilot Error")
![CVR - Northwest 255 - [Stall after Take-Off 1) 2) 3)] 16 August 1987 (Longer Version)](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/C6HuTmWQeyE/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - Northwest 255 - [Stall after Take-Off 1) 2) 3)] 16 August 1987 (Longer Version)
1) Improper Take-off Configuration, 2) Pilot Error, 3) Mis-management of aircraft
Audio Source: RTI Consulting (https://vimeo.com/605031735) Enhanced
Special thanks to https://www.youtube.com/@jeraldheiss9050 and https://www.youtube.com/@alexhoe02")
![CVR - Birgenair 301 - [Autopilot and Crew error] 6 February 1996 (Longer Version)](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/DrLfpFUx9SU/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - Birgenair 301 - [Autopilot and Crew error] 6 February 1996 (Longer Version)
Audio Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1PcDbu1-O0
Found by German Aviation (Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCG2Wid4n8LhQWSK9P1FAwHA )")
![CVR - 1998 USAF C-5 Diego Garcia incident - [Stall during Go-Around] Summer 1998](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/DrupRo0UAws/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - 1998 USAF C-5 Diego Garcia incident - [Stall during Go-Around] Summer 1998
CVR - 1998 USAF C-5 Diego Garcia incident - [Stall during Go-Around] Summer 1998")
![CVR - 2009 MIA of Russia IL-76 RA-76827 crash - [Ground Collision] 15 January 2009](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/E35cZpcmpac/mqdefault.jpg "CVR - 2009 MIA of Russia IL-76 RA-76827 crash - [Ground Collision] 15 January 2009
2009 Makhachkala Il-76 collision
Audio Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SexmJiRMYUg&list=PLqwTQqRpBo9nXnI7x9JCpi0FnSHde4PrU&index=6
A group of four Ilyushin Il-76MD transport aircraft were engaged in delivering troops, military equipment and cargo from Chkalovsky to Makhachkala, Russia. One of these aircraft, RA-76827, was piloted by a captain who needed currency on the IL-76 and an instructor pilot.
During the descent towards Makhachkala, visibility deteriorated quickly from 2000 m to 300-350 m due to the formation of advection-radiation fog.
At 20:43, the controller reported a visibility of 800 m, and 1200 m at the runway to the flight crew.
However, by that time the visibility had already decreased further. Also, the instructor pilot was not allowed to land in these conditions.
At 20:45 the aircraft was 5,59 km from the runway the controller reported that the visibility was 500 m and 1100 m at the runway. At a distance of 1100 m from runway 14, the instructor pilot saw the approach lights and decided to continue to land
By that time, another Il-76 (RA-76825) had taxied to the runway for departure and was waiting on taxiway 2. The hold short line on this taxiway was placed at a distance of 91,30 m from the center line of the runway instead of 120 m.
At an altitude of 40 m, the navigator of RA-76827 stated the headlights still needed to be switched on. No action was taken.
Just prior commencing the flare, the aircraft entered an area of limited visibility due to advective radiation fog. The aircraft deviated to the left of the centreline and touched down 1 metre inside the runway edge. During the rollout the left-hand wing struck the flight deck of the stationary airplane (RA-76825) on taxiway 2, ripping away a large part of the forward fuselage. A fire erupted. Four of the seven crew members died. RA-76827 suffered damage to the wing but none of the 31 occupants were hurt.
Makhachkala has a single runway (14/32), measuring 8688 × 230 ft (2648 × 70 m).")
![ATC - 1985 Eden Prairie Bonanza 35 N687B crash - [LOC-I during landing] 25 July 1985](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/EamxjIj4uoU/mqdefault.jpg "ATC - 1985 Eden Prairie Bonanza 35 N687B crash - [LOC-I during landing] 25 July 1985
Audio Source: CONUS Archive (SMALL PLANE CRASH KILLS FOUR (1985) )")
![911 Audio - ValuJet 592 - [LOC-I after In-flight fire] 11 May 1996](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/EtWBv3Smerg/mqdefault.jpg "911 Audio - ValuJet 592 - [LOC-I after In-flight fire] 11 May 1996
Audio Source: Conus Archive (VALUJET 592 CRASH 911 CALLS)
ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). The inbound flight had been delayed and arrived at Miami at 13:10. Flight 592 had been scheduled to depart at 13:00. The cruising altitude was to be flight level 350 with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 32 minutes. The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)). The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as Oxy Cannisters -‘Empty.’ This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment.
Flight 592 was pushed back from the gate shortly before 13:40. The DC-9 then taxied to runway 09L. At 14:03:24, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff and the flightcrew acknowledged the clearance. At 14:04:24, the flightcrew was instructed by ATC to contact the north departure controller. At 1404:32, the first officer made initial radio contact with the departure controller, advising that the airplane was climbing to 5,000 feet. Four seconds later, the departure controller advised flight 592 to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:07:22, the departure controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading three zero zero join the WINCO transition climb and maintain one six thousand, which was acknowledged. At 14:10:03, the flight crew heard a sound, after which the captain remarked, What was that? At that moment, the airplane was at 10,634 feet msl, 260 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and both engine pressure ratios (EPRs) were 1.84. At 14:10:15, the captain stated, We got some electrical problem, followed 5 seconds later with, We’re losing everything. At 14:10:21, the departure controller advised flight 592 to contact Miami on frequency 132.45 mHz. At 14:10:22, the captain stated, We need, we need to go back to Miami, followed 3 seconds later by shouts in the background of fire, fire, fire, fire. At 14:10:27, the CVR recorded a male voice saying, We’re on fire, we’re on fire. At 14:10:28, the controller again instructed flight 592 to contact Miami Center. At 14:10:31, the first officer radioed that the flight needed an immediate return to Miami. The controller replied, Critter five ninety two uh roger turn left heading two seven zero descend and maintain seven thousand. The first officer acknowledged the heading and altitude. The peak altitude reached was 10,879 feet msl at 14:10:31, and about 10 seconds a wings-level descent started. Shouting in the cabin subsided. The controller then queried flight 592 about the nature of the problem. The captain stated fire and the first officer replied, uh smoke in the cockp... smoke in the cabin. The controller responded, roger and instructed flight 592, when able, to turn left to a heading of two five zero and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. At 14:11:12, a flight attendant was heard shouting, completely on fire. The DC-9 began to change heading to a southerly direction and at 14:11:26, the north departure controller advised the controller at Miami Center that flight 592 was returning to Miami with an emergency. At 14:11:37, the first officer transmitted that they needed the closest available airport. At 1411:41, the controller replied, Critter five ninety two they’re gonna be standing (unintelligible) standing by for you, you can plan runway one two when able direct to Dolphin [a navaid] now. At 14:11:46, the first officer responded that the flight needed radar vectors. At 14:11:49, the controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading one four zero. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:12:45, the controller transmitted, Critter five ninety two keep the turn around heading uh one two zero. There was no response from the flightcrew. The last recorded FDR data showed the airplane at 7,200 feet msl, at a speed of 260 KIAS, and on a heading of 218 degrees. At 14:12:48, the FDR stopped recording data. The airplane’s radar transponder continued to function; thus, airplane position and altitude data were recorded by ATC after the FDR stopped. At 14:13:18, the departure controller instructed, Critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at Miami. Again there was no response. At 14:13:27, the controller instructed flight 592 to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. At 1413:37, an unintelligible transmission was intermingled with a transmission from another airplane. No further radio transmissions were received from flight 592. At 14:13:43, the departure controller advised flight 592, Opa Locka airport’s about 12 o’clock at 15 miles. The accident occurred at 14:13:42. Ground scars and wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane crashed into the Everglades in a right wing down, nose down attitude.")
![CVR - Orenair 9558 - [Runway Overrun] 3 September 2013 @chilloutJr](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/AqNvSEa6YvY/maxresdefault.jpg)
