Uploaded September 2025 | Updated November 2026, 30 minutes ago
In this video, Professor Thorsby discusses Christopher Stone's essay, "Do Trees Have Standing?"
In this lesson, we turn away from theoretical questions about where value comes from, and instead ask - if nature has intrinsic value, and that we are required to recognize it, how can this actually be applied in a real world context? Towards this end, we now turn to an essay that extends the concept of value into a practical fashion - can trees have legal rights?
Legal Standing and Environmental Ethics
In law, standing refers to the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case. Traditionally, only humans (or their representatives, such as corporations) have legal standing. This means that if a forest, river, or mountain is damaged, someone must show how they, as a human, are directly injured by that harm.
Christopher Stone’s groundbreaking 1972 essay, Should Trees Have Standing?, challenged this assumption. He proposed that natural objects—trees, rivers, valleys, and ecosystems—should themselves be granted legal standing. This would allow them to be represented in court by guardians, much as infants or those unable to represent themselves are given legal guardians in legal proceedings.
Stone’s argument is not only legal but philosophical: it pushes against anthropocentrism by asking whether nature itself deserves recognition in our moral and legal community.
Christopher Stone begins by observing a historical pattern: entities once denied rights—slaves, women, children—were eventually granted them. At the time, the idea of extending rights to these groups seemed radical or even absurd, but once society recognized them, the earlier resistance looked backward and unjust. Stone uses this as a springboard to suggest that we may one day look back on our refusal to extend legal rights to natural objects—trees, rivers, and ecosystems—with the same sense of moral short-sightedness. His point is not merely rhetorical; it is that our conception of the legal and moral community has steadily expanded and could expand further.
He then turns to the concept of legal standing, which in U.S. law refers to the ability to bring a case in court. Under current arrangements, only humans and certain human-created entities (like corporations or trusts) can be recognized as parties in legal disputes. This means that if a forest is destroyed, a case can only be brought if a human being can demonstrate a personal injury—such as a financial or recreational loss. The harm to the forest itself does not count in court. Stone argues that this limitation artificially narrows the scope of justice: the environment itself may be gravely damaged, yet there is no way for its interests to be recognized directly.
To show that his proposal is not unprecedented, Stone points out that the law already recognizes many nonhuman entities as legal “persons.” Corporations, ships, municipalities, and estates can sue or be sued even though they are not natural persons. If the legal system can grant personhood to such entities for practical reasons, Stone suggests, there is no principled reason it cannot grant standing to natural objects as well. This analogy is meant to undermine the objection that forests or rivers cannot “speak” or act in court—neither can corporations, yet they have rights because representatives act on their behalf.
Stone proposes a guardianship model as the mechanism for giving nature standing. Just as children or the mentally incapacitated cannot represent themselves in legal proceedings, yet their interests are represented by guardians, so too could natural objects have representatives appointed to act on their behalf. These guardians would be empowered to sue for damages to the natural object, and the court could order remedies directly for the benefit of the environment, not only for the benefit of humans. This shift would allow environmental harms to be recognized as injuries in their own right, not merely when they impact human interests.
Finally, Stone highlights the moral and practical significance of this change. Morally, it would represent an enlargement of the community of beings whose interests are respected in law, aligning with a broader ethical move away from anthropocentrism. Practically, it would strengthen environmental protection by ensuring that ecosystems have direct defenders in court, preventing their interests from being subsumed under competing human claims. Stone acknowledges that the idea may seem strange at first, but insists that it is no stranger than the once-radical idea of rights for children, slaves, or corporations. By pushing us to imagine nature as a rights-bearing subject rather than a mere object of property, Stone aims to reshape both our legal institutions and our moral imagination.
In this video, Professor Thorsby discusses Christopher Stone's essay, "Do Trees Have Standing?"
In this lesson, we turn away from theoretical questions about where value comes from, and instead ask - if nature has intrinsic value, and that we are required to recognize it, how can this actually be applied in a real world context? Towards this end, we now turn to an essay that extends the concept of value into a practical fashion - can trees have legal rights?
Legal Standing and Environmental Ethics
In law, standing refers to the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case. Traditionally, only humans (or their representatives, such as corporations) have legal standing. This means that if a forest, river, or mountain is damaged, someone must show how they, as a human, are directly injured by that harm.
Christopher Stone’s groundbreaking 1972 essay, Should Trees Have Standing?, challenged this assumption. He proposed that natural objects—trees, rivers, valleys, and ecosystems—should themselves be granted legal standing. This would allow them to be represented in court by guardians, much as infants or those unable to represent themselves are given legal guardians in legal proceedings.
Stone’s argument is not only legal but philosophical: it pushes against anthropocentrism by asking whether nature itself deserves recognition in our moral and legal community.
Christopher Stone begins by observing a historical pattern: entities once denied rights—slaves, women, children—were eventually granted them. At the time, the idea of extending rights to these groups seemed radical or even absurd, but once society recognized them, the earlier resistance looked backward and unjust. Stone uses this as a springboard to suggest that we may one day look back on our refusal to extend legal rights to natural objects—trees, rivers, and ecosystems—with the same sense of moral short-sightedness. His point is not merely rhetorical; it is that our conception of the legal and moral community has steadily expanded and could expand further.
He then turns to the concept of legal standing, which in U.S. law refers to the ability to bring a case in court. Under current arrangements, only humans and certain human-created entities (like corporations or trusts) can be recognized as parties in legal disputes. This means that if a forest is destroyed, a case can only be brought if a human being can demonstrate a personal injury—such as a financial or recreational loss. The harm to the forest itself does not count in court. Stone argues that this limitation artificially narrows the scope of justice: the environment itself may be gravely damaged, yet there is no way for its interests to be recognized directly.
To show that his proposal is not unprecedented, Stone points out that the law already recognizes many nonhuman entities as legal “persons.” Corporations, ships, municipalities, and estates can sue or be sued even though they are not natural persons. If the legal system can grant personhood to such entities for practical reasons, Stone suggests, there is no principled reason it cannot grant standing to natural objects as well. This analogy is meant to undermine the objection that forests or rivers cannot “speak” or act in court—neither can corporations, yet they have rights because representatives act on their behalf.
Stone proposes a guardianship model as the mechanism for giving nature standing. Just as children or the mentally incapacitated cannot represent themselves in legal proceedings, yet their interests are represented by guardians, so too could natural objects have representatives appointed to act on their behalf. These guardians would be empowered to sue for damages to the natural object, and the court could order remedies directly for the benefit of the environment, not only for the benefit of humans. This shift would allow environmental harms to be recognized as injuries in their own right, not merely when they impact human interests.
Finally, Stone highlights the moral and practical significance of this change. Morally, it would represent an enlargement of the community of beings whose interests are respected in law, aligning with a broader ethical move away from anthropocentrism. Practically, it would strengthen environmental protection by ensuring that ecosystems have direct defenders in court, preventing their interests from being subsumed under competing human claims. Stone acknowledges that the idea may seem strange at first, but insists that it is no stranger than the once-radical idea of rights for children, slaves, or corporations. By pushing us to imagine nature as a rights-bearing subject rather than a mere object of property, Stone aims to reshape both our legal institutions and our moral imagination.










