#CheriABI: Hardware enforced memory safety for #FreeBSD by Brooks Davis @BsdcanOrg
#CheriABI: Hardware enforced memory safety for #FreeBSD by Brooks Davis  @BsdcanOrg
Uploaded June 2019 | Updated September 2026, 1 hour ago
Memory safety bugs such as buffer overflows are an ongoing source of security vulnerabilities. CheriABI is a new process model for FreeBSD on the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) hardware platform which eliminates the vast majority of buffer overflows and significantly increases the difficulty of control-flow attacks such as return-oriented programming.

Our protections cover programs, the C run-time environment including the dynamic linker, and kernel access to user memory. We have ported virtually all of the FreeBSD user space this platform demonstrating that memory safety can be fitted to existing C software.

More info:
bsdcan.org/2019/schedule/events/1053.en.html
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#CheriABI: Hardware enforced memory safety for #FreeBSD by Brooks Davis

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