Uploaded March 2022 | Updated September 2026, 6 days ago
0:00 Introduction
01:14 What got you interested in the evolutionary argument against naturalism?
02:47 What is the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN)?
05:03 What are the specific premises and conclusion of EAAN?
11:40 Definition of terms in order to understand the Defense of Premise 1 [P(R|N&E) is low]: Materialism, Mental Properties, Content Properties, NP, Reductive Materialism, Non-reductive materialism
13:57 How does Plantinga defend premise 1 [P(R|N&E) is low]?
15:06 Defense of Premise 1: what follows from non-reductive materialism?
19:30 Defense of Premise 1: what happens if reductive materialism is true?
27:59 Objection to Premise 1: But doesn’t it still seem like having faculties that produce true beliefs are more likely to make a creature survive?
32:53 Defense of Premise 2: Anyone who accepts (believes) N&E and see that [P(R|N&E) is low has a defeater for R.
37:04 Objection 1 to EAAN: EAAN depends on externalism
43:17 Objection 2 to EAAN: EAAN is self-defeating
47:50 Question #1: if the naturalist holds a concept of truth other than the correspondentist one (like Putnam’s internal realism), does the EAAN still work against him? Greetings from Brazil!
49:50 Question #1 follow-up: Does the argument presuppose correspondence theory of truth?
50:20 Question #2: Dr. Moon, do you think that if the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable is inscrutable, the argument would still work?
52:44 Question #3: What is the conditional objection aka objection 3?
57:43 Question #4: What do you say about Richard Swinburne’s objections to Plantinga’s argument?
58:31 Question #5: Are there any books or resources to learn about the discussion of mind/soul, neuroscience and materialism that you’d recommend to mortals like me?
59:47 Question #6: Could a bias towards simplicity solve the problem? A possible world where belief contents are randomly associated with neurological states (i.e. if you change a single, or a single atom in a neuron or environment, you don’t automatically generate a random belief).
01:04:34 Question #7: Does this argument work the same if someone holds to dualism, idealism or Thomism?
01:07:04 Question #8: Why do the content propositions need to be selected for because of their true in order for the cognitive faculties to be reliable? Isn’t it enough that they supervene on things which are selected for?
01:08:38 Question #9: Do you think evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism that presupposes naturalism has a self-defeating argument?
01:10:24 Question #10: Does Plantinga think that we are left with a certain choice to make in rejecting either naturalism, evolution or both?
01:11:52 Question #11: What do you think of the following argument? 1. Our cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. 2. (1) is more expected given Naturalism rather than Theism. 3. So, (1) is evidence for N.
In this interview, Dr. Andrew Moon will summarize Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), then respond to some objections. For a short animated summary of the argument, check out the video linked below.
youtube.com/watch?v=qap_FyQxILM
To go more in depth, check out Dr. Moon's recent paper, "Global Debunking Arguments" linked below.
philpapers.org/rec/MOOGDA
Please consider becoming a patron. Go to patreon.com/theanalyticchristian
For merch and more, go to theanalyticchristian.com
0:00 Introduction
01:14 What got you interested in the evolutionary argument against naturalism?
02:47 What is the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN)?
05:03 What are the specific premises and conclusion of EAAN?
11:40 Definition of terms in order to understand the Defense of Premise 1 [P(R|N&E) is low]: Materialism, Mental Properties, Content Properties, NP, Reductive Materialism, Non-reductive materialism
13:57 How does Plantinga defend premise 1 [P(R|N&E) is low]?
15:06 Defense of Premise 1: what follows from non-reductive materialism?
19:30 Defense of Premise 1: what happens if reductive materialism is true?
27:59 Objection to Premise 1: But doesn’t it still seem like having faculties that produce true beliefs are more likely to make a creature survive?
32:53 Defense of Premise 2: Anyone who accepts (believes) N&E and see that [P(R|N&E) is low has a defeater for R.
37:04 Objection 1 to EAAN: EAAN depends on externalism
43:17 Objection 2 to EAAN: EAAN is self-defeating
47:50 Question #1: if the naturalist holds a concept of truth other than the correspondentist one (like Putnam’s internal realism), does the EAAN still work against him? Greetings from Brazil!
49:50 Question #1 follow-up: Does the argument presuppose correspondence theory of truth?
50:20 Question #2: Dr. Moon, do you think that if the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable is inscrutable, the argument would still work?
52:44 Question #3: What is the conditional objection aka objection 3?
57:43 Question #4: What do you say about Richard Swinburne’s objections to Plantinga’s argument?
58:31 Question #5: Are there any books or resources to learn about the discussion of mind/soul, neuroscience and materialism that you’d recommend to mortals like me?
59:47 Question #6: Could a bias towards simplicity solve the problem? A possible world where belief contents are randomly associated with neurological states (i.e. if you change a single, or a single atom in a neuron or environment, you don’t automatically generate a random belief).
01:04:34 Question #7: Does this argument work the same if someone holds to dualism, idealism or Thomism?
01:07:04 Question #8: Why do the content propositions need to be selected for because of their true in order for the cognitive faculties to be reliable? Isn’t it enough that they supervene on things which are selected for?
01:08:38 Question #9: Do you think evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism that presupposes naturalism has a self-defeating argument?
01:10:24 Question #10: Does Plantinga think that we are left with a certain choice to make in rejecting either naturalism, evolution or both?
01:11:52 Question #11: What do you think of the following argument? 1. Our cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. 2. (1) is more expected given Naturalism rather than Theism. 3. So, (1) is evidence for N.
In this interview, Dr. Andrew Moon will summarize Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), then respond to some objections. For a short animated summary of the argument, check out the video linked below.
youtube.com/watch?v=qap_FyQxILM
To go more in depth, check out Dr. Moon's recent paper, "Global Debunking Arguments" linked below.
philpapers.org/rec/MOOGDA
Please consider becoming a patron. Go to patreon.com/theanalyticchristian
For merch and more, go to theanalyticchristian.com
