Uploaded July 2026 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
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Molyneux's Question with Janet Levin and Brian Glenney
In 1688, an Irish scientist named William Molyneux sent John Locke a letter with a question in it. Suppose a man born blind has learned by touch to tell a cube from a sphere. Suppose he is given sight, and the two objects are set on a table in front of him. Could he tell, by looking alone, which is which?
Locke said no, and put the question into the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Berkeley said no more emphatically. Leibniz said yes — with a hint, and a little time. And three centuries later the question is still open, only now it's being asked in operating theatres in New Delhi, in habituation studies with ten-hour-old infants, and in the way a skateboarder looks at a handrail.
Janet Levin and Brian Glenney have been in conversation about this problem since Brian's dissertation defense in 2007, where Janet was on his committee. They still disagree — productively — about whether you need to move your body in order to see. This episode is that disagreement, twenty years on.
Janet Levin is recently retired from the philosophy department at the University of Southern California. She works on the mind-body problem, phenomenal concepts, and what she calls the philosophy of philosophy: whether thought experiments are worth anything, and whether they can absorb empirical information and still count as philosophy. Her 2008 paper introduced the distinction between temporal and epistemic immediacy that has shaped how the Molyneux question is tested ever since.
Brian Glenney teaches at Norwich University in Vermont. He wrote his dissertation on Molyneux's problem at USC in 2007 under James Van Cleve and Janet Levin, wrote the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the question, and has since argued for a pluralist answer — that the question has many correct answers depending on who is being asked about, and how. He also works on skateboarding, urban space, and the sensory expertise he calls the skater's eye.
Full show notes (lovephilosophy.substack.com/?utm_campaign=profile_chips)
• 00:00 — Why a navigational approach to mind keeps running into this question
• 02:20 — Introductions: phenomenal concepts, sensory expertise, and Bernie Sanders at the skate park
• 05:20 — Janet reads Locke's own statement of the question, and his answer
• 08:00 — Why this was supposed to be the crucial experiment for empiricism vs. rationalism
• 10:30 — The 1688 letter Locke never answered, and the 1693 one he did
• 12:00 — Molyneux, Dioptrica Nova, and the attempt to give empiricism experimental oomph
• 14:00 — Why Locke buried the question in a passage about perceptual learning
• 15:00 — Common sensibles: what touch and sight might share
• 17:00 — Locke's "at first sight" trick, and what it forecloses
• 19:30 — Passivity vs. activity: if you move your head, is it still perception?
• 20:40 — Leibniz's cheat code, and the birth of epistemic immediacy
• 22:20 — Janet's distinction: temporal immediacy vs. epistemic immediacy
• 24:15 — Held (2011) and the best evidence for a "no"
• 27:30 — Andrea's caricature: two languages, or one idea?
• 29:30 — Why restored vision isn't normal vision — and the paradox that follows
• 31:00 — Vision and touch as English and Russian; Leibniz as the bilingual child
• 33:30 — Janet on phenomenal concepts and why Molyneux caught her
• 35:40 — Did you know Adam Smith had a theory of perception? He wrote it at fifteen
• 37:50 — Brian finds his own ancestor in the archive: George Glennie, Aberdeen, 1796
• 40:15 — The moon illusion, and how Janet and Brian actually met
• 41:20 — The dissertation with six chapters, and the one revision that changed everything
• 42:30 — Maybe there isn't a single correct answer
• 47:15 — Project Prakash: five subjects, three days of play, and a fast yes
• 51:30 — Janet's counter-proposal: what if you only tweak vision?
• 55:20 — Bumpy pacifiers, baby chicks, and the ten-hour-old infants who disagree
• 58:50 — The six-month-old who recognizes its own hand
• 01:01:00 — Nobody frames it as empiricism vs. rationalism anymore
• 01:03:20 — The couch potato perceiver and the sentient statue
• 01:05:50 — Could virtual reality run the experiment we can't?
• 01:07:00 — Path dependency: every subject arrives with a history
• 01:11:20 — The blind Rubik's Cube puzzler, and whether expertise transfers
• 01:15:00 — "Give me something I care about": motivation as the missing variable
• 01:19:10 — Why does perception have to be passive at all?
• 01:22:20 — Andrea: what if it isn't yes or no?
• 01:26:50 — Ned Block and the border between seeing and thinking
• 01:29:20 — The skater's eye: knowledge in the heel rather than the head
• 01:33:00 — Enactivism, affordances, and t...
Send a love message (buzzsprout.com/2229994/fan_mail/new)
Molyneux's Question with Janet Levin and Brian Glenney
In 1688, an Irish scientist named William Molyneux sent John Locke a letter with a question in it. Suppose a man born blind has learned by touch to tell a cube from a sphere. Suppose he is given sight, and the two objects are set on a table in front of him. Could he tell, by looking alone, which is which?
Locke said no, and put the question into the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Berkeley said no more emphatically. Leibniz said yes — with a hint, and a little time. And three centuries later the question is still open, only now it's being asked in operating theatres in New Delhi, in habituation studies with ten-hour-old infants, and in the way a skateboarder looks at a handrail.
Janet Levin and Brian Glenney have been in conversation about this problem since Brian's dissertation defense in 2007, where Janet was on his committee. They still disagree — productively — about whether you need to move your body in order to see. This episode is that disagreement, twenty years on.
Janet Levin is recently retired from the philosophy department at the University of Southern California. She works on the mind-body problem, phenomenal concepts, and what she calls the philosophy of philosophy: whether thought experiments are worth anything, and whether they can absorb empirical information and still count as philosophy. Her 2008 paper introduced the distinction between temporal and epistemic immediacy that has shaped how the Molyneux question is tested ever since.
Brian Glenney teaches at Norwich University in Vermont. He wrote his dissertation on Molyneux's problem at USC in 2007 under James Van Cleve and Janet Levin, wrote the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the question, and has since argued for a pluralist answer — that the question has many correct answers depending on who is being asked about, and how. He also works on skateboarding, urban space, and the sensory expertise he calls the skater's eye.
Full show notes (lovephilosophy.substack.com/?utm_campaign=profile_chips)
• 00:00 — Why a navigational approach to mind keeps running into this question
• 02:20 — Introductions: phenomenal concepts, sensory expertise, and Bernie Sanders at the skate park
• 05:20 — Janet reads Locke's own statement of the question, and his answer
• 08:00 — Why this was supposed to be the crucial experiment for empiricism vs. rationalism
• 10:30 — The 1688 letter Locke never answered, and the 1693 one he did
• 12:00 — Molyneux, Dioptrica Nova, and the attempt to give empiricism experimental oomph
• 14:00 — Why Locke buried the question in a passage about perceptual learning
• 15:00 — Common sensibles: what touch and sight might share
• 17:00 — Locke's "at first sight" trick, and what it forecloses
• 19:30 — Passivity vs. activity: if you move your head, is it still perception?
• 20:40 — Leibniz's cheat code, and the birth of epistemic immediacy
• 22:20 — Janet's distinction: temporal immediacy vs. epistemic immediacy
• 24:15 — Held (2011) and the best evidence for a "no"
• 27:30 — Andrea's caricature: two languages, or one idea?
• 29:30 — Why restored vision isn't normal vision — and the paradox that follows
• 31:00 — Vision and touch as English and Russian; Leibniz as the bilingual child
• 33:30 — Janet on phenomenal concepts and why Molyneux caught her
• 35:40 — Did you know Adam Smith had a theory of perception? He wrote it at fifteen
• 37:50 — Brian finds his own ancestor in the archive: George Glennie, Aberdeen, 1796
• 40:15 — The moon illusion, and how Janet and Brian actually met
• 41:20 — The dissertation with six chapters, and the one revision that changed everything
• 42:30 — Maybe there isn't a single correct answer
• 47:15 — Project Prakash: five subjects, three days of play, and a fast yes
• 51:30 — Janet's counter-proposal: what if you only tweak vision?
• 55:20 — Bumpy pacifiers, baby chicks, and the ten-hour-old infants who disagree
• 58:50 — The six-month-old who recognizes its own hand
• 01:01:00 — Nobody frames it as empiricism vs. rationalism anymore
• 01:03:20 — The couch potato perceiver and the sentient statue
• 01:05:50 — Could virtual reality run the experiment we can't?
• 01:07:00 — Path dependency: every subject arrives with a history
• 01:11:20 — The blind Rubik's Cube puzzler, and whether expertise transfers
• 01:15:00 — "Give me something I care about": motivation as the missing variable
• 01:19:10 — Why does perception have to be passive at all?
• 01:22:20 — Andrea: what if it isn't yes or no?
• 01:26:50 — Ned Block and the border between seeing and thinking
• 01:29:20 — The skater's eye: knowledge in the heel rather than the head
• 01:33:00 — Enactivism, affordances, and t...
