Belief vs Credence — What’s the Difference? (Simple Explanation) PhiLIZophy 2026-09-23 | Belief vs Credence — What’s the Difference? (Simple Explanation)
Can Christians be Effective Altruists? PhiLIZophy 2025-06-06 | This video explains effective altruism, gives six reasons I'm a fan of the movement, and argues that Christianity and effective altruism are compatible. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED, FREE resources from Christians for Impact: - 10-minute career guide: bit.ly/4dXJ1Y7 - Impact Mentorship program: bit.ly/48n6yjV Christian EA resources: - EA for Christians: eaforchristians.org- Christians for Impact: christiansforimpact.org - Christians for Impact podcast: christiansforimpact.org/episodes General EA resources: - Effective Altruism website: effectivealtruism.org - GiveWell: givewell.org - Against Malaria Foundation: againstmalaria.com - 80,000 Hours Podcast: 80000hours.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Are Faith and Doubt Compatible? PhiLIZophy 2025-04-02 | Many think faith and belief are closely connected. On some views, belief is an essential part of faith. But what if someone's doubts keep them from belief? Is faith is possible without belief? What might that kind of faith look like? This video explores these questions and ultimate defends a credence-based faith. Handout available here: drive.google.com/file/d/1N0AYZlSF3gX-F5hluW2qh_328uHCzz-3/view?usp=drive_link My latest publication on faith: philpapers.org/rec/JACFIW---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Does God Exist? A Philosopher Weighs In PhiLIZophy 2024-09-17 | In this short video, I give a brief overview of the arguments for and against God's existence, and a taxonomy of responses to the question of whether God exists. Then I consider whether agnosticism should be a "default" response to God's existence and suggest that maybe the answer is no. ---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Choosing and Controlling Beliefs: What Do Philosophers Say? PhiLIZophy 2024-04-09 | This video is about doxastic voluntarism, the view that belief is under our voluntary control. First, I explain exactly what doxastic voluntarism is and why it matters. Then, I discuss why many philosophers are involuntarists, and focus on Alston's influential argument for involuntarism. Finally, I raise some worries about Alston's case and briefly discuss why I think many philosophers are wrong about whether we can choose our beliefs. A shoutout to my coauthor Mark Boespflug for much of this material. His website is here: sites.google.com/view/markboespflug/homeFor more info on our grant: https://cas.stthomas.edu/departments/areas-of-study/philosophy/academic-cross-training-grant/
Atheism and Faith: Friends or Foes? PhiLIZophy 2024-03-01 | Can atheists, who believe that God does not exist, have faith? Of course, atheists have certain kinds of faith: faith in their friends, faith in certain ideals, and faith in themselves. However, the question we’ll examine is whether atheists can have theistic faith: faith that God exists. Philosophers tend to fall on one of two extremes on this question: some, like Dan Howard-Snyder (2019), say unequivocally no; others, like Sam Lebens (forthcoming), say unequivocally yes. Spoiler: I take a middle position: I argue that atheists can have action-focused faith (faith in how they act) but not attitude-focused faith (faith in what attitudes they have).Link to handout: drive.google.com/file/d/1JbjUlsbap8HZkd-59d-RUCMVuN9s5HJY/view?usp=drive_linkPrevious video on atheism and religious practice: youtube.com/watch?v=BA3Ps39Qm-AMy IEP entry on faith: https://iep.utm.edu/faith-contemporary-perspectives/Joe Schmid on lack theism: youtu.be/ElYTNV8QSmk?feature=sharedMy paper (about the "hopeful atheist"): philpapers.org/rec/JACBFAMy paper (about the "wagering atheist"): philpapers.org/rec/JACFTP-2---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Solving a Puzzle about Faith PhiLIZophy 2023-11-09 | These three all seem plausible, but are inconsistent: 1. Faith can be epistemically rational. 2. Faith goes beyond the evidence. 3. No epistemically rational attitude goes beyond the evidence. In this video I suggest a solution to the puzzle. At the end, I also briefly sketch how faith can be rational on my picture. Handout here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Houston-Handout.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
A sneak peek at the NEW BOOK Im working on! PhiLIZophy 2023-09-14 | This video summarizes some of the arguments in the first half of a book I just started working on! Handout available here: liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Handout-Leeds.pdf---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Why A Religious Atheist Isnt As Silly As You Might Think PhiLIZophy 2022-11-08 | Can an atheist rationally practice a religion? In this video, I argue yes. For more on the nature of belief: youtube.com/watch?v=yGECoBlGHs8My paper (about the "hopeful atheist"): philpapers.org/rec/JACBFAMy paper (about the "wagering atheist"): philpapers.org/rec/JACFTP-2---------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Why PERMISSIVISM is key for figuring out what to believe PhiLIZophy 2022-09-28 | Is evidentialism true? Evidentialism is the view that evidence alone determines rational belief. Recently, several rivals to evidentialism have been defended, including pragmatic and moral encroachment, epistemic partiality, and practical and moral reasons for belief. Call these rivals “impurist” views. While impurist views have both compelling cases and interesting arguments in their favor, they also face a number of serious challenges. In this paper, I explain three of the most important challenges to impurism. Then I argue that, by embracing epistemic permissivism, impurists can hold onto what’s central to their views while dealing with all three of these challenges. Finally, I suggest that the evidentialist should also embrace permissivism, as it helps them better respond to the most compelling considerations in favor of impurism. Download my handout here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Handout.pdfFor an introductory video to evidentialism, see here: youtu.be/ZgJ3hDk0-V0-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
A Crash Course in Faith (part 2) PhiLIZophy 2022-07-13 | How can faith be rational but be resilient in light of counterevidence? This video gives three possible answers to that question. See here for part 1: youtu.be/UEmSunbIczQSee here for the paper this 2-part series is based on: philpapers.org/rec/JACFARHere is a playlist with a bunch of videos on faith: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAVhJKYeHG-WTU3-ab4N1La9T3ZUFiOD_-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
BIG Personal Update + A Crash Course in Faith (part 1) PhiLIZophy 2022-06-15 | I've missed you, YouTube! In this video, I explain why I've been offline for a couple months. Then, I share my 4-part definition of faith. See here for the paper this 2-part series is based on: philpapers.org/rec/JACFARHere is a playlist with a bunch of videos on faith: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAVhJKYeHG-WTU3-ab4N1La9T3ZUFiOD_Stay tuned for part 2!-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
A New Version of Pascals Wager PhiLIZophy 2022-03-18 | Imagine you had an unlimited amount of time to ask an omniscient being anything you wanted. The potential epistemic benefits would be enormous, if not infinite: endless pieces of significant knowledge/true belief/justified belief. I argue that considerations like these point to an epistemic version of Pascal’s wager. More specifically, I show how, on an epistemic consequentialist framework, there is epistemic reason to believe in God. I compare and contrast the epistemic wager with the traditional wager, and argue that the epistemic version has several notable advantages.This talk was given at Ryerson University in December 2019. -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Believing with Low Confidence Supports Dualism PhiLIZophy 2022-03-04 | We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief-credence dualism. Belief-credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief-firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence-firsters (who say belief reduces to credence) can best explain features of akratic cases, including the observation that akratic beliefs seem to be held despite possessing a defeater for those beliefs, and that, in akratic cases, one can simultaneously believe and have low confidence in the very same proposition.This talk was given with Peter Tan at the Pacific APA in April 2019, with comments by Andrew Moon.This paper, coauthored with Peter Tan (sites.google.com/site/petertanphilosophy) is forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACEAA-50:00 Talk24:55 Comments41:50 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
How to Argue for Belief-Credence Dualism PhiLIZophy 2022-02-15 | Ever wondered what it's like to write a philosophy dissertation? Or wondered what MY dissertation was about? This video summarizes the main arguments in my dissertation. I completed my PhD in Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame in 2019. Download my handout here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/APA-Handout.pdfYou can download my dissertation IN FULL here (brace yourselves, though; it's 205 pages): philpapers.org/archive/JACBAC-2.pdfTLDR? Here's a shorter summary of some of the main things discussed in this video: youtu.be/3eOSlPVYxI8-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Want to get into philosophy? Read this! PhiLIZophy 2022-02-04 | What are my top philosophy book recommendations for beginners? In this video, I recommend books for getting started in epistemology, philosophy of religion, religious epistemology, Pascal's wager, faith (in Christianity), philosophy, logic, and formal epistemology. Have you read any of these? Any recommendations to add? Let me know in the comments!@TheAnalyticChristian on Rota on the resurrection argument: youtu.be/UhPK-MSH2yoSee also this playlist from TAC: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLlVH-ThCazKlqtTVa-3hvKfBXy5LajVswMy video on logic: youtu.be/i__sLWRiCGkTAC's video with Justin Mooney and myself on philosophical research: youtu.be/OMNCkTziGlU-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Epistemic Permissivism and Pascals Wager PhiLIZophy 2022-01-28 | Pascal's wager is a pragmatic argument for belief in God. The basic idea is that believing in God has significant benefits, and these benefits aren’t available for the unbeliever. Thus, one should believe in God. This raises several questions. Can we take Pascal's wager? Do we have the right kind of control over our beliefs? And even if we can take it, should we? Shouldn't our beliefs be based on evidence, not on the potential benefits of believing? In this talk, I argue that if a view in epistemology called epistemic permissivism is true, then taking Pascal's wager is both possible and rational. Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that the evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. First, I argue that if permissivism is true, then permissivism is true about theistic belief. Then, I show how epistemic permissivism about theistic belief dispels two objections to Pascal’s wager: the objection that wagering is impossible, and the objection that wagering is epistemically impermissible.This talk was given at the Evangelical Philosophical Society in November 2018. This paper is now forthcoming in Erkenntnis. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACAPD-90:00 Talk24:41 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
What Makes a Commitment Rational? PhiLIZophy 2022-01-21 | Completing grad school, picking up a new instrument, getting in shape, marriage, and religious commitment all require the ability to keep a commitment over time. What makes these kinds of commitments rational? When should we give them up? In this talk, I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes can play the same role in rational commitment. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, p. I conclude by showing how my picture can explain how action-oriented commitments can be rational over time, both in the face of counterevidence and in the face of waning affections.This paper was presented at the World Congress of Philosophy in August 2018.This paper was published in Mind. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACBFA0:00 Talk30:45 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
This catchphrase used by Christians needs to stop... PhiLIZophy 2022-01-13 | This video is about one of my least favorite book titles. Surprisingly, it is a book written by two Christians! I reveal the book, read a few quotes from it, and give three reasons why I dislike the title. The paper on faith I mention in the video: philpapers.org/rec/JACTNA-2My interview with Finding Truth on why faith isn't irrational: youtu.be/gJgGng9iEYsCheck out this playlist with a bunch of my videos on faith: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAVhJKYeHG-WTU3-ab4N1La9T3ZUFiOD_Another paper of mine on faith people might enjoy: philpapers.org/rec/JACFAR-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Why Credences Arent Beliefs PhiLIZophy 2022-01-07 | What are credences? On the belief-first view, credences are probability-beliefs. Andrew Moon and I wrote a paper responding to some objections to the belief-first view. (See here: youtu.be/q_DJCfkGjfU). However, I don't ultimately hold the view, and this talk explains one reason why.Here, I argue that the belief-first view cannot account for agents who have credences in propositions they barely comprehend. I conclude that, however credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition.This talk was given at the Australian Catholic University in November 2019.This paper is forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACWCA-20:00 Talk30:50 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
What is Epistemic Paternalism? Is it Justified? PhiLIZophy 2021-12-31 | Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.This talk was given at Australian National University in September 2019. The paper is now published in a book titled _Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications_. You can download the paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACEPE-20:00 Talk49:26 Q&A---------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Believing with Low Confidence: Is it Possible? Rational? PhiLIZophy 2021-12-22 | We believe, withhold belief, and disbelief things. We also have various levels of credence (or confidence) in things. How do these attitudes related to each other? How tightly connected are they? Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational agent, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think.This talk was given at the Australian National University in October 2019. This paper is now forthcoming in Philosophical Issues. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACOTI-20:00 Cases where belief and credence come apart33:26 Upshots -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Faith: Answering the Most Common Questions PhiLIZophy 2021-12-13 | Can faith be rational but nonetheless go beyond the evidence? This video is about the puzzle of faith and reason. This video answers questions such as:Is all faith rational? Is all faith irrational? When should evidence change our beliefs? When should we give up a commitment?What's the difference between faith and belief? Faith and knowledge? Faith and hope?This video presupposes material from this video: youtu.be/tfah_rycCfQ (TLDR: Epistemologists have observed that evidence can change our confidence without changing our beliefs. This picture enables faith to remain steadfast, even as we get evidence that moves our confidence up and down.)A video on faith that God exists and desiring that God exist: youtu.be/5XuqLXzZsOQMy academic paper on belief, faith, and hope: philpapers.org/rec/JACBFAFor a popular-level blog post on faith, see here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-Can-Faith-Go-Beyond-the-Evidence-and-Still-Be-Rational.pdfAnd here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/An-Objection-to-Religious-Faith.pdfThis paper is based on a paper of mine published in Religious Studies, available here: philpapers.org/rec/JACBCA-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Pascals Wager: Answering the Most Common Questions PhiLIZophy 2021-12-06 | Pascal's wager is an argument that you should bet, or wager, on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose. Here, I answer some of the most common questions about Pascal's wager, such as:What is involved in the epistemic approach to God's existence?Does Pascal's wager conflict with evidentialism? What if I don't believe in hell?Does taking Pascal's wager involve bad motives? Can rational action and rational belief come apart? This video presupposes the material from this video: youtu.be/C_PI1ApAXtwA video on Pascal's wager and hell: youtu.be/-OQNRFNogEcFor a playlist of videos about Pascal's wager, see: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAVhJKYeHG-W3dZPU9nBnKuLPB1cjaxSRFor a longer introduction to Pascal's wager, decision theory, and epistemic permissivism, see this video: youtu.be/QNq3adeLLHwFor a video responding to the objection that taking Pascal's wager involves bad motives, see this video: youtu.be/-ShXWc0KcsYFor a video on evidentialism, see here: youtu.be/ZgJ3hDk0-V0For an written, popular-level explanation of the wager, see this article: 1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-godFor my (academic) paper on Pascal's wager and infinities, see here: philpapers.org/rec/JACSPW-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Are Credences Just Beliefs about Probability? PhiLIZophy 2021-12-01 | Credences are subjective probabilities that measure one's confidence level in some proposition. For example, I have a 0.9 credence it will rain tomorrow, a 0.5 credence this coin will land heads, and a credence of 0 that 1+1=3. But what are credences? On the belief-first view, they are beliefs about probabilities.This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.This talk was given at the Degrees of Belief Conference at the University of Leeds with Andrew Moon (andrewymoon.wordpress.com/). This paper, coauthored with Andrew Moon, is now published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/MOOCAB-30:00 Talk40:44 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
How do other people affect our knowledge? PhiLIZophy 2021-11-22 | This Q&A covers testimony, echo chambers and epistemic bubbles, and evidentialism. -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
A Permissivist Response to Religious Disagreement PhiLIZophy 2021-11-19 | What is permissivism? Can you be a permissivist and an evidentialist? What does permissivism say about religious disagreement? Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can be understood as an underdetermination thesis, and show how this moves the debate forward in fruitful ways: in distinguishing between different types of permissivism, in dispelling classic objections to permissivism, and in shedding light on the relationship between permissivism and evidentialism.This paper was presented at the Openmindedness Conference in April 2018 with Margaret Turnbull (margaretturnbull.weebly.com) This paper, co-authored with with Margaret Turnbull, is forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACPUA0:00 Talk23:55 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Can Belief-Credence Dualism Save Evidentialism? PhiLIZophy 2021-11-12 | Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical stakes can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases, which vindicates evidentialism. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.This talk was given at the Central APA in February 2019, with comments by Rima Basu.This paper is now published in The Philosophical Quarterly. You can download this paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACHBD0:00 Talk25:32 Comments37:32 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Does Faith Require Desire? PhiLIZophy 2021-11-08 | When it comes to theistic faith, philosophers of religion have mostly focused on the role of counterevidence: To what extent can faith co-exist with counterevidence? When does counterevidence render faith irrational? However, counterevidence isn’t the only threat to the rationality of faith. This paper focuses on a second component of faith, that faith involves desire. This has important connections to the axiology of theism—the question of whether God’s existence would be a good thing. Pro-theists say yes, and anti-theists say no. Bringing the rationality of faith and the axiology of theism into contact raises a host of interesting issues that merit further exploration, including whether faith entails desire, faith’s conative resilience, whether having faith requires one to take a stand on the axiology of theism, and ways that anti-theism may threaten the rationality of faith.Handout available here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Handout.pdf0:00 Introduction2:55 The Axiology of Theism 8:25 The Nature of Faith21:29 The Rationality of Faith27:46 Upshots and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism PhiLIZophy 2021-11-05 | Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism: that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.This talk was given at the Central APA in February 2018, with comments by Max Hayward.This paper is now published in Episteme. You can download the paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACADO-80:00 Talk22:55 Comments37:53 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Descartes, the Simulation Hypothesis, and Moore PhiLIZophy 2021-11-01 | This Q&A covers Cartesian skepticism, why skepticism matters, why skepticism is appealing, Moore's response to skepticism, the pragmatic response to skepticism, and the simulation argument. 0:00 Questions about Descartes2:55 Why skepticism matters / why skepticism is appealing6:46 Moore's response to skepticism9:02 Skepticism vs. solipsism 10:33 Can the pragmatic response give us knowledge?12:04 The Simulation Hypothesis -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Is Taking Pascals Wager Possible? Rational? (with Nikk Effingham) PhiLIZophy 2021-10-25 | In this video, Nikk Effingham (University of Birmingham) and I discuss my paper, "A Permissivist Defense of Pascal's Wager." You can download that paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACAPD-90:00 Introduction4:00 Brief summary of paper7:22 Defining and defending permissivism 11:43 Answering the impossibility objection15:08 How widely does this apply?16:37 Answering the irrationality objection-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
If You Believe It, They Will Come: Faith as Self-Justifying PhiLIZophy 2021-10-18 | Can Faith Justify Itself? I argue that epistemically rational faith is sometimes self-justifying. I do so by appealing to propositions that, when believed, create evidence for themselves. Handout: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Princeton-Handout.pdf0:00 Introduction (section 1)6:16 Self-Justifying Beliefs (section 2)16:32 Faith as Self-Justifying (section 3)29:00 Frequently Asked Questions (section 4)-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Does taking Pascals wager require believing in HELL? PhiLIZophy 2021-10-11 | If I don't believe in hell, should I still take Pascal's wager? This video addresses an objection to Pascal's wager regarding the afterlife. I explain what the wager is, and the three main views of the afterlife. Then, I explain the objection to the wager. I briefly explain some of the defenses of hell some philosophers have given, and then explain three reasons why you don't have to believe in hell in order to rationally take Pascal's wager. My paper, Salvaging Pascal's wager: philpapers.org/rec/JACSPWVideo on skepticism: youtu.be/urI7dMMhOuAVideo on Pascal's wager: youtu.be/C_PI1ApAXtwLonger video on Pascal's wager with more decision theory background: youtu.be/QNq3adeLLHwCrisp's defense of hell: link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02782398Murray's defense of hell is the chapter called "Heaven and Hell" in this book: google.com/books/edition/Philosophy_of_Religion/SVaIlb6eJaMC?hl=en&gbpv=0Lewis' defense of hell: amazon.com/Great-Divorce-C-S-Lewis/dp/00606529500:00 Intro / What is Pascal's wager?3:24 The Nature of the Afterlife: 3 Views5:25 The Hell Objection to Pascal's wager7:04 Two Philosophical Defenses of Hell9:24 Taking Pascal's Wager without Believing in Hell15:44 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Epistemology Q&A: Knowledge, Gettier, and Knowlege-First PhiLIZophy 2021-10-04 | This Q&A covers the JTB theory of knowledge, Gettier cases, and knowlege-first epistemology. For more about the nature of truth: youtu.be/goXSgSZNmvsZagzebski's paper on Gettier cases: drive.google.com/file/d/1tTnXQm3u1aVs18PVL8vcdzO0qwUreUFf/view?usp=sharing0:00 Introduction and overview 3:45 The basics and JTB 7:15 Is truth relative? 11:27 Gettier 19:24 Knowledge-First Epistemology-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
What is a Defeater? Epistemology 101 PhiLIZophy 2021-09-28 | This video is about defeaters in epistemology. I explain what a defeater is, three different types of defeaters (undercutting, rebutting, and no-reason defeaters), rationally responding to defeaters, and how defeaters can be defeated. Video on whether theism can be rational without argument: youtu.be/tZRGaZDXz6kVideo on defining knowledge and JTB: youtu.be/HI_q7RUjQ6IFor more on defeaters: https://iep.utm.edu/ep-defea/See also this: philarchive.org/archive/PIAED0:00 Intro2:35 Undercutting and Rebutting Defeaters8:25 No-Reason Defeaters10:45 What should I do if I have a defeater?13:26 Defeater Defeaters15:24 Summary -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
2019 Fantasy Football Draft Order PhiLIZophy 2021-09-06 | This video is two years old, but I thought I'd upload it for memory sake! Good times picking our draft order with our kangaroo friends.
2021 Fantasy Football Draft Order PhiLIZophy 2021-09-05 | 2021 Fantasy Football Draft Order1 - Conrad2 - Doug3 - Matt4 - Wes5 - Liz6 - Christine7 - Lidal8 - Gerard9 - Chad10 - Alex
Knowledge and Justified Belief: An Introduction PhiLIZophy 2021-08-31 | This video is an introduction to epistemology. We discuss three kinds of knowledge: knowledge-how, knowledge-who, and knowledge-that, and four branches of epistemology: traditional, social, religious, and formal. We then move to the three components of knowledge: belief, truth, and justification. Finally, I explain why studying knowledge and justified belief is important. -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Pascals Wager Discussion (with Dr. Graham Oppy) PhiLIZophy 2021-07-30 | In this video, Dr. Graham Oppy and I discuss Pascal's wager. My opening statement is based on the chapter on Pascal's wager in Dr. Oppy's book, Arguing about Gods: amazon.com/Arguing-about-Gods-Graham-Oppy/dp/0521122643My paper, Salvaging Pascal's wager: philpapers.org/rec/JACSPWMy paper, Faithfully Taking Pascal's wager: philpapers.org/rec/JACFTP-2Thanks to James with Modern Day Debate for moderating! (This debate was original held on MDD.) Check out James' channel here: youtube.com/channel/UC_cd4oF2phaIBD3WsU3f7Xg0:00 Liz Opening Statement18:33 What does it mean to wager?29:31 Many gods objection32:33 Who should wager?35:50 The Atheist wager42:43 Finite wagers46:43 Epistemic permissivism 1:03:37 Many gods and mixed strategies1:08:37 Arguments and theories1:19:22 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
SNEAK PEEK at my first book! PhiLIZophy 2021-07-23 | UPDATE 2: Amazon link here: amazon.com/dp/1647920116/ref=cm_sw_r_tw_dp_JD3HE7RQQ39P3DNE2WA1 UPDATE: you can now pre-order the book here: hackettpublishing.com/new-forthcoming/forthcoming-2021-titles/applied-ethics-an-impartial-introductionMy first book is coming out at the end of 2021! Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction, by Elizabeth Jackson, Tyron Goldschmidt, Dustin Crummett, Rebecca Chan (Hackett)philpapers.org/rec/GOLAE-2This book is an impartial introduction to applied ethics. We focus on six popular and controversial topics: abortion, the environment, animals, poverty, punishment, and disability. We cover three chapters per topic, and each chapter is devoted to a famous or influential argument on the topic. After we present an influential argument in premise-conclusion form, we then consider objections to the argument, and replies to the objections. The book is impartial, and set up in order to equip the reader to make up her own mind about the controversial topics covered. Basically, we are trying to present the best arguments for each position, but not convince you of any particular view. -----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Pascals Wager: A Very Basic Introduction PhiLIZophy 2021-07-12 | Pascal's wager is an argument that you should bet, or wager, on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose. This article provides a simple introduction Pascal’s wager and considers three objections: the many gods objection, the impossibility objection, and the irrationality objection. For a playlist of videos about Pascal's wager, see: youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAVhJKYeHG-W3dZPU9nBnKuLPB1cjaxSRFor an written version of this video, see this article: 1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-godFor a longer introduction to Pascal's wager, decision theory, and epistemic permissivism, see this video: youtu.be/QNq3adeLLHwFor my (academic) paper on Pascal's wager and infinities, see here: philpapers.org/rec/JACSPWFor a video responding to the objection that taking Pascal's wager involves bad motives, see this video: youtu.be/-ShXWc0KcsYFor a video on evidentialism, see here: youtu.be/ZgJ3hDk0-V00:00 What is Pascal's wager? 5:48 Many Gods Objection14:57 The Impossibility Objection18:42 The Irrationality Objection 22:14 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
What is Philosophy? PhiLIZophy 2021-06-30 | What is Philosophy? This video is about the methodology and subject matter of philosophy, and how it compares with other disciplines like math and physics. Philpapers: philpapers.orgPhilosophy Bites Podcast asks professional philosophers to define philosophy: philosophybites.com/2010/11/what-is-philosophy.htmlMy video on logic: youtu.be/i__sLWRiCGkMy interview with Finding Truth on Philosophy of Religion: youtu.be/3DwvvU51SQg0:00 Intro1:53 The Methodology of Philosophy6:06 The Subject Matter of Philosophy7:45 Metaphysics and Epistemology12:09 Value Theory 14:49 Philosophy of Science, Logic, Math17:29 History of Philosophy and XPhi20:06 Analytic vs. Continental Philosophy23:23 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Should we want God to exist? PhiLIZophy 2021-06-15 | Should we want God to exist? This is the central question in the axiology of theism. Pro-theists say that God’s existence would be a good thing, because if God exists, there is ultimate cosmic justice, human lives are meaningful, and no evil is gratuitous. Anti-theists say that God existence would be a bad thing, because if God’s exists, this invades our privacy, renders morality incoherent, and makes some lives meaningless and absurd. However, little work has been done on the epistemic axiology of theism. This paper seeks to fill that gap and answer the question: would God’s existence be an epistemically good thing? After a brief overview of the main theories of epistemic value, I explore considerations both in favor of epistemic pro-theism and epistemic anti-theism, and ultimately conclude in favor of epistemic pro-theism.I presented this paper at the Princeton Philosophy of Religion Incubator Conference (May 2021). Handout available here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Handout.pdf0:00 Talk24:01 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Logic: Simplified (bonus video) PhiLIZophy 2021-05-10 | This video covers propositional, quantifier, and modal logic. We discuss valid and invalid argument forms in proposition and quantifier logic, and the basic principles / axioms of modal logic. NOTE: the two invalid quantifier argument forms are mislabeled (in the column "similar to..."). The first is similar to denying the antecedent, and the second is similar to affirming the consequent. Video on validity: youtu.be/cGWhb722si8Video on truth and propositions: youtu.be/goXSgSZNmvs0:00 Introductory concepts (logic, argument, validity) 3:46 Propositional logic argument forms 9:50 Conditionals14:28 Biconditional16:44 Quantifier logic21:23 Modal logic28:14 Book recommendations and summaryThanks to Johnny Waldrop for helpful comments on my slides.-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/research/For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111/
Can Taking Pascals Wager Demonstrate Faith? PhiLIZophy 2021-04-22 | Is taking Pascal's wager selfish? In this video, I argue that the answer is no—one can take Pascal's wager with good motives. Further, I argue that taking Pascal's wager can demonstrate either faith or hope. The person of faith and the wagerer have several things in common, including a commitment to God and positive cognitive and conative attitudes toward God’s existence. I also argue that if one’s credences in theism are too low to have faith, the wagerer can still hope that God exists, another commitment-justifying theological virtue. I consider two upshots of my argument, including how my picture provides responses to common objections to Pascal’s wager.I presented this paper in the Society of Christian Philosophers (SCP) session at the 2021 Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Thanks to Anne Jeffrey for her great comments! (Learn more about Anne here: https://www.annejeffrey.com).Handout available here: http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/APA-handout.pdfA draft of the paper is available here: philpapers.org/rec/JACFTP-20:00 Talk38:53 Comments by Anne Jeffrey 51:13 Response to Comments 58:43 Q&A-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/research/For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...Follow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111/
Practical Ways to Disagree Well (with Sawyer Bullock) PhiLIZophy 2021-04-15 | In this video, Sawyer Bullock interviews me about having discussions about controversial issues. I share three tips for disagreeing more productively. 0:00 Intro4:54 Tip 1: Realize there are good arguments for positions you disagree with, and bad arguments for positions you agree with. 8:20 Tip 2: Acknowledge that, even if you both can’t be right, you can both be rational.13:05 Tip 3: Remember the goal of such discussions is finding the truth, not winning a debate.-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
The Dos and Donts of Objecting to Arguments (bonus video) PhiLIZophy 2021-04-09 | This video provides seven tips for analyzing arguments. 0:00 Introduction3:14 Tip 1: Don’t Criticize an Argument by Denying its Conclusion 6:05 Tip 2: Don’t Accept an Argument Simply Because You Believe the Conclusion 8:34 Tip 3: Direct Criticisms at Individual Premises 10:45 Tip 4: Make Your Criticisms of Premises Substantial14:15 Tip 5: Don't Distinguish Between Facts and Opinions 17:35 Tip 6: Don’t Accept Competing Arguments 20:05 Tip 7: Don’t Object to Intermediate Conclusions of Compound Arguments 22:45 Summary and Conclusion Much of the content for this video was taken from Feldman's Reason and Argument, ch. 7.-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Responding to Three Objections to Pascals Wager PhiLIZophy 2021-04-01 | Pascal's wager is an argument that you should believe in God, because you have a lot to gain by believing and a lot to lose by not believing. In this video, I defend Pascal's wager against three objections: (1) The many-gods objection; (2) the impossibility objection, and (3) the irrationality objection. This talk is based on two papers of mine: Salvaging Pascal's wager: philpapers.org/rec/JACSPWEpistemic Permissivism and Pascal's wager: (currently under review; email me for a draft) This talk was presented to the Talbot philosophy department on March 12, 2021. Thanks to Anthony Rowden for inviting me, and for designing the awesome thumbnail!0:00 Intro (to the wager and to decision theory)13:32 Salvaging Pascal’s Wager (many gods objection)26:17 Epistemic Permissivism and Pascal’s wager (impossibility and irrationality objections) 45:19 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
How to Tell WHAT Argument Someone is Making PhiLIZophy 2021-03-24 | This video is about argument reconstruction. Once you've identified that someone is making an argument, how do you know what argument the author is making?We discuss why we reconstruct arguments in standard form. Then we discuss the three steps of argument reconstruction: identifying the conclusion, identifying the premises, and applying the principles of charity and faithfulness. Finally, we talk about cheap validity: the idea that it's always possible to make any invalid argument valid by adding a linking premise. Much of the material from this video is taken from Feldman's Reason and Argument, chapter 5.0:00 Introduction 2:25 Step 1: Identifying the Conclusion 9:17 Step 2: Identifying the Premises 20:25 Step 3: The Principles of Charity and Faithfulness22:45 Cheap Validity 26:05 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
How To Tell if Someone is Making an Argument PhiLIZophy 2021-03-19 | This video is about argument identification. We discuss the goal of argument analysis, the principle of charity, the two steps of argument identification, and how argumentative writing contrasts with descriptive and rhetorical writing. Much of this content is taken from Feldman's Reason and Argument, chapter 5.0:00 Introduction1:15 The Goal of Argument Analysis3:24 The Principle of Charity 7:15 2 Steps of Argument Identification 8:19 3 Types of Writing: Descriptive, Rhetorical, Argumentative 15:05 Summary and Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------Check out my website: http://liz-jackson.comFor more on my research: http://liz-jackson.com/researchFor popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philosophyFollow me on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111Instagram: @lizjackson111Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
