Captured Russian Equipment in Ukraine - (Featuring @TheChieftainsHatch ) Perun 2022-09-24 | Sponsored by Ground News:Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perunSPECIAL THANKS:PLEASE CHECK OUT THE CHIEFTAIN: youtube.com/c/TheChieftainsHatchIntro:Captured equipment has been a feature of human conflict going back to the point where one human stole another human's bashing rock. But normally there are limits on how much it can be used. Supplying, repairing, or training on captured hardware is usually a difficult thing - unless the enemy is using basically the same kit you are. The Russian invasion of Ukraine involves a contest between two sides using compatible (largely) Soviet or Post-Soviet kit, coupled with a Russian force that seems predisposed towards abandoning equipment to the enemy. The result is that Ukraine (supplied by its farmers in some cases) has made extensive use of captured kit (as have the Russian aligned proxies). This video looks at some of the data behind that captured kit, discusses some of the challenges involved in recovery and repair (thanks to a guest contribution by everyone's favourite US Officer, Nicholas Moran) and the strategic significance of all this stuff that's been recovered and reused. Enjoy - and join me next week for a look at Russia's mobilisation announcement...Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:Many caveats are gone over in the video but the regular ones around fog of war and data uncertainty apply. Specifically, I want to point out that while I have a good body of evidence on the 93rd Mechanised and their use of captured equipment, such things a liable to change as equipment is knocked out or rotated and I obviously can't go down and check myself. Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:02:51 — What We're Covering00:04:08 — Sponsor: GROUND NEWS00:05:42 — Kyiv Thrust00:06:59 — Abandoned On Withdrawal00:08:30 — Kharkiv Reprise00:10:06 — Putting It In Numbers00:11:08 — Understanding "Captures", & Challenges With Sources00:14:54 — Categorisation00:17:01 — BDAR With An Expert00:19:00 — BDAR With An Expert: Self Recovery00:20:57 — BDAR With An Expert: Like-Vehicle Recovery00:24:06 — BDAR With An Expert: Dedicated Recovery00:30:42 — BDAR With An Expert: How Russia Categorises Its Repairs00:34:16 — BDAR With An Expert: Replacement Components00:38:54 — Like-vehicle Recovery & Self Recovery00:40:13 — Tractor Brigade00:42:43 — Specialised Recovery Assets00:44:18 — Informal Procedures00:46:52 — Frontline & Informal Repair00:48:02 — Rear Area Capital Repair - A Significant Challenge00:49:50 — Primary Contributors00:50:44 — Calling Out Bulgaria00:53:10 — Quantities & Significance00:55:06 — Captured, Abandoned, & Foreign Supplied Equipment (ORYX)00:56:32 — Evidence Of Deployment00:59:04 — Ammunition & Smaller Items01:00:40 — Let's Talk AA01:02:26 — The Sensitive & Secret01:04:40 — You All Wanted To Hear About It01:06:40 — Conclusions01:08:08 — Channel UpdateExtra Reading: Oryx - Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraineoryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.htmlJakub Janovsky - critical to supporting the Oryx worktwitter.com/Rebel44CZCounteroffensive: Russian losses - @ragnarbjartur on Twitterdatastudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/dfbcec47-7b01-400e-ab21-de8eb98c8f3a/page/p_gqerfsjkyc?s=tWeosgYXPTUA Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks and Artillery - NYTnytimes.com/2022/08/30/world/europe/ukrainian-soldiers-weapons-front-line.htmlPoland multinational repair hub discussionhttps://mil.in.ua/en/news/in-eastern-poland-the-creation-of-a-center-for-the-repair-of-equipment-of-ukraine-is-being-considered/Czech companies to repair Ukrainian tanksreuters.com/world/europe/czech-companies-repair-damaged-ukrainian-tanks-2022-04-19Fantastic OSINT complication of interesting vehicle captures/sightingstwitter.com/UAWeaponsThank you to those sources who contributed to the preparation of this video.
Attrition, Casualties & the Winter War in Ukraine - losses, force quality and force generation Perun 2023-03-27 | Territory may be the most commonly used barometer for assessing the success or failure of the winter campaign, but just as important is the impact of the fighting on the forces. Attrition is intrinsically linked to war, as men and equipment are ground down by the effort and by enemy action. In this episode we look at loss estimates, discuss the challenges of attrition, and update on the efforts of both sides to make up losses and generate new offensive potential. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats/Corrections:At one point I make a reference to 'combat deaths' when i mean military deaths (hard to have non-combat-combat casualties) I also refer to pilots flying hundreds of hours per year, I meant per month in that example.I also incorrectly conflate Desert Storm and Shield - There are a number of other small errors of that typeRebuttal of statements/estimates advanced by others are general in nature and should be taken as merely my personal opinion on the matterI would also take my usual warning about data quality and limitations and multiply it as far as it will go on this one - attrition is hard to externally assess and, as noted, the data is tightly controlled and highly politically chargedSources/Reading:Credits to Oryx and Wartranslated as alwaysIndian Standing Committee on Defence - March 2023https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/lsscommittee/Defence/17_Defence_36.pdfUA repair figuresukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3686694-ukroboronprom-has-repaired-more-than-3000-armored-vehicles-in-combat-areas.htmlRUSI - the air war in Ukrainestatic.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdfGAO/NSIAD-91-304 (Costs of Desert Storm/Shield)gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-304.pdfTestimony in response to Desert Storm/Shield cost projectionshttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1176252.pdfRU 400,000 contractorsbusinessinsider.com/russia-recruiting-contract-soldiers-april-reports-2023-3tass.com/defense/10481383:1 Rulehttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA302819.pdfLoss estimatescsis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attritionhttps://zona.media/casualtieshttps://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-23/russia-180000-dead-wounded-soldiers-ukraine-conflict-norway/101883272washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/13/ukraine-casualties-pessimism-ammunition-shortageukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3626014-presidents-office-says-ukrainian-army-lost-up-to-13000-soldiers-since-war-started.htmlhttps://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/21/russian-defence-minister-shoigu-5937-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-newsUA Offensive Guardkyivpost.com/post/12095UA troops train on Leo2 euronews.com/2023/02/14/ukrainian-troops-train-on-leopard-2-tanks-in-poland#:~:text=Ahead%20of%20a%20highly%20anticipated,to%20be%20sent%20to%20Ukraine.GAO/NSIAD-92-20 Operation Desert Stormgao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-20.pdfNSIAD-92-94 Abrams performance in Desert stormgao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdfWagners's odd recruitment choicesrt.com/russia/573045-wagner-pornhub-recruitment-adRussia HIMARs claims in media:aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/22/russia-says-it-shot-down-4-himars-launchers-in-ukraineTASS on t-54/55tass.com/pressreview/1593845Ukrainians repairing Russian vehiclesrferl.org/a/ukrainian-mechanics-refurbish-captured-russian-tanks/32280903.htmlEU training efforts:https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-eu-wants-to-train-30-000-ukrainian-soldiers-mass-media/WW1 casualties per Library of Congressloc.gov/collections/world-war-i-rotogravures/articles-and-essays/events-and-statistics/mobilized-strength-and-casualty-lossesCIT on T-54/55notes.citeam.org/t-54?s=1Selected loss graphs from leedrake5github.com/leedrake5/Russia-UkraineTimestamps: 00:00:00 -- Attrition & the winter war in Ukraine 00:01:05 -- WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT? 00:02:09 -- CASUALTIES & ATTRITION 00:04:22 -- the real drivers of losses 00:06:59 -- historical deviation or return to mean? 00:08:10 -- ESTIMATING CASUALTIES 00:11:40 -- mixed methods 00:15:01 -- illustrating the point: Russian estimates 00:19:54 -- THE COST OF THE WINTER FIGHTING 00:23:17 -- UKRAINIAN ACTIONS & RESPONSES 00:27:23 -- RUSSIAN ACTIONS & RESPONSE 00:33:13 -- OBSERVATIONS & ENDURANCE 00:37:57 -- EQUIPMENT LOSSES 00:38:05 -- combat loss claims 00:42:14 -- visually confirmed loss data 00:43:34 -- what it shows? 00:45:29 -- DEPRECIATION & CONSUMPTION 00:45:39 -- attrition is more than just combat losses 00:48:50 -- scale drives consumption 00:54:04 -- the capacity & readiness problem 00:57:33 -- Indian evidence? 00:58:40 -- DEALING WITH THE EQUIPMENT CHALLENGE 00:58:47 -- the Russian approach & the T-54 thing 01:03:19 -- Ukraine's foreign lifelines and trophy systems 01:07:47 -- estimating endurance 01:08:39 -- CONCLUSIONS 01:09:58 -- CHANNEL UPDATE
Russias Winter Offensive in Ukraine - From Bakhmut to Vuhledar, outcomes, lessons, and costs Perun 2023-03-19 | Sponsored by Ground News: Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Try Ground News today and get 30% off your subscription by visiting https://ground.news/perunThe Russian invasion of 2022 began with a multi-pronged winter invasion of Ukrainian territory. After a series of reverses in late 2022, the Russian effort to reclaim the initiative in Ukraine seems to have begun...with another multi-pronged winter offensive. In this episode, I look at the way that offensive has played out, what observations and lessons might come out of the last three months, and what that may mean for the war to come. Also we're going to talk about the shovels story, because we have to do better than that.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Corrections: As a video covering military matters - be aware that the fog of war is much thicker on this issue that it is with things like economics and finance. As such - I'd advise attaching a responsible level of certainty to any of the ideas put forward here. For example, the use of artillery deployed mines at Vuhledar is widely reported - but has not been confirmed by any on-the-ground figures. I also want to point out that when I talk about the Ukrainian military being opened to lessons learned - that's a relative statement (with the point of comparison being Russia). It's also true that all militaries need to put in place systems of discipline and due process, so it's important to take published commentary, complaints and theorising into context - understand that it's not all that's being said, it's just the sample that makes it into the public sphere.Sources & Reading:Vuhledar Satelite Imagery:twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1621815960075116544Strelkov on the offensive:twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1633410034951438339wartranslated.com/i-girking-frontline-update-on-19-februaryKhodakovsky on ammo and Vuhledar:twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1628354732053131265Muradov Promotiontwitter.com/RALee85/status/1627545013386084352?lang=enKyiv independent on Bakhmut:kyivindependent.com/national/ukrainian-soldiers-in-bakhmut-our-troops-are-not-being-protectedkyivindependent.com/national/bakhmut-bound-infantry-assault-troops-we-are-holding-on-ready-for-any-scenarioComentary on RU Assault unit tactics:twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1630089568195313669twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502(Tatrigami's channel is generally worth looking at twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA)Commentary on potential lessons learned in the UA Army:By Lieutenant Colonel Glen Granttwitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1636589579183575040Visually confirmed loss data and graphics:Oryx:oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.htmlWar Mapper:twitter.com/War_Mapper?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorWarspotting:ukr.warspotting.netJomini of the Westtwitter.com/JominiWMapping per deepstatemap:https://deepstatemap.live/en#13/47.7566/37.2158Credit as always to Dimitri at Wartranslatedtwitter.com/wartranslated/status/1637130923027095556How the ebattle for the Donbas shaped Ukraine's success fpri.org/article/2022/12/how-the-battle-for-the-donbas-shaped-ukraines-successCasualties of 14th Spetznaz Colonel Sergey Polyakovtwitter.com/RALee85/status/1622340987350564866Kofman on the winter offensive:twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1627309427907854336Shoigu visit to Muradov:twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1632063279664181249Russian official commenting on Bakhmutreuters.com/world/europe/no-signs-ukraine-is-withdrawing-troops-bakhmut-russian-installed-official-2023-03-16Timestamps:00:00:00 — INTRO00:00:57 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:01:59 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS00:03:02 — BEFORE THE WINTER00:04:12 — The Surovikin Strategy?00:05:52 — Pressure Applied & Received00:07:28 — The New(old) Boss00:08:20 — Ukraine Secedes The Initiative00:08:55 — WINTER OFFENSIVE00:11:08 — OVERVIEW OF THE OFFENSIVE00:12:39 — A Sense Of Perspective00:15:36 — WINTER BATTLEFIELDS00:16:02 — Kherson00:17:25 — Luhansk00:18:12 — Svatove-Kreminna00:19:21 — Kupyansk00:19:43 — Donetsk00:20:54 — Avdiivka00:22:56 — Marinka00:25:00 — Bakhmut00:31:06 — Vuhledar00:37:05 — Culture Can Kill00:38:36 — OBSERVATIONS00:39:52 — Shovels And Sticks00:44:49 — Attacking Fortified Positions Is Difficult00:46:12 — Entrenchments & Defensive Tactics00:47:17 — Certain Systems Have Been Noteworthy00:49:06 — Changing Force Quality00:50:53 — EVOLVING TACTICS & FORCES00:53:45 — Ukraine's Lessons00:57:15 — EVALUATION & WHAT NEXT00:59:24 — The Russian Costs And Gains01:02:35 — Implications For Ukraine01:05:37 — Was There An Alternative?01:06:38 — Losses & Force (re)generation01:07:21 — CONCLUSIONS01:08:44 — CHANNEL UPDATE
The Economic War in Ukraine a Year On - The energy war, politics & production Perun 2023-03-12 | Over the last year, the Ukraine war has played out both on the battlefields of Ukraine, and on global markets where energy warfare, sanctions, and industrial mobilisation efforts went head to head. Russia wanted to freeze Europe, while the Western allies sought to strangle the Russian economy with sanctions.A year on - I want to look at how successful these competing economic campaigns have been. Setting the stage to look at battlefield developments, attrition, and force regeneration in the near future. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats/Corrections:As always - unless very explicitly otherwise stated everything said should be considered to have a 'reportedly' or 'seemingly' tag attached. I also note that my comments on survey, financial, and other data are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.Sources/Reading:LNG around the world:dw.com/en/lng-european-thirst-for-natural-gas-puts-bangladesh-and-pakistan-in-the-dark/a-63401354IPSOS polling:ipsos.com/en/war-in-ukraine-january-2023Europe gas prices hit low:edition.cnn.com/2023/02/17/energy/europe-gas-price-18-month-low/index.htmlEU Gas storage:https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/gas-storage-capacity/LNG Terminal 3 in Germanydw.com/en/third-floating-lng-terminal-arrives-in-northern-germany/a-64462246Seymour Hersh's article on Nord Streamseymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-streamHersh on Russia Today:rt.com/russia/571690-hersh-ukraine-nato-corruptionRussia switching oil tax calculations:reuters.com/business/energy/russia-may-switch-brent-based-oil-taxes-kommersant-2023-02-03Russia planning one-off contributions:reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-eyeing-one-off-budget-contribution-around-3-bln-business-three-sources-2023-02-08Russia plan for foreign owned assetsreuters.com/business/russia-outlines-plan-unfriendly-investors-sell-up-half-price-2022-12-30Sonnenfeld on Russian economy estimates:fortune.com/2023/03/06/imf-naively-parroted-putin-fake-statisticsand-botched-economic-forecast-russia-ukraineRussia produced economic figures :https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43430/forecast_221028.pdfhttps://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/ea2fd3ce38f2e28d51c312acf2be0917/prognoz_socialno_ekonom_razvitiya_rf_2023-2025.pdfhttps://www.cbr.ru/statistics/ddkp/mo_br/Carnegie Endowment on Deficit:carnegieendowment.org/politika/89009Jamestown Foundation on RU DIBjamestown.org/program/russias-defense-industry-growing-increasingly-turbulentBorisov on labour shortages:https://vpk.name/news/613140_borisov_deficit_kadrov_na_predpriyatiyah_opk_v_rf_budet_sostavlyat_okolo_400_tys_chelovek.htmlShadow fleet:edition.cnn.com/2023/03/01/business/russia-oil-shadow-fleet/index.htmlOil Sanctions:cnbc.com/2023/02/16/sanctions-on-russian-oil-are-having-the-intended-effect-iea-says.htmlthemoscowtimes.com/2023/01/02/russian-gas-exports-outside-ex-soviet-states-fell-455-in-2022-a79863barrons.com/articles/vietnam-markets-economy-e5c19acfDefence Production:euronews.com/my-europe/2023/03/08/eu-defence-ministers-discuss-joint-procurement-for-ammunition-to-replenish-depleted-stocksbusinessinsider.com/german-arms-giant-build-a-tank-factory-in-ukraine-rheinmetall-2023-3euromaidanpress.com/2023/01/10/ukraine-finally-launches-domestic-ammunition-production-how-will-this-impact-the-warthedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-is-using-guided-rockets-with-more-range-than-himars-launched-onesdtek.com/en/media-center/news/52-transformatori-dlya-ukraini---gumanitarna-dopomoga-vid-grupi-dtek-ta-hitachi-enerTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:02:18 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT? 00:02:49 — FREEZING EUROPE00:03:48 — The Euro Response00:05:59 — Climate & Culmination00:07:20 — Cost To The Eurozone00:09:46 — EU: Are Citizens’ Lives Heading The Right Direction? (graph)00:11:21 — The External Costs00:13:17 — Evaluation00:14:02 — Side Note On Nord Stream Claims00:17:45 — BREAKING UP UA's SUPPORT00:20:37 — Support levels00:21:43 — US Public Opinion00:24:10 — More Global Opinion? 00:27:23 — Evaluation00:27:51 — THE ECONOMIC WAR (ON RUSSIA)00:29:02 — Energy Markets & Exports00:34:10 — Follow On Sanctions And Induced Competition00:35:43 — The Dispute Over Stats00:37:23 — The Picture From Russia00:39:01 — The Russian Budget00:43:26 — Evaluation00:44:26 — THE STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN00:46:57 — Economic Impacts00:48:46 — The GBAD Problem00:50:57 — THE PRODUCTION RACE - UKRAINE00:53:25 — Strategic Imperative00:56:28 — THRE PRODUCTION RACE - THE WEST01:03:23 — THE PRODUCTION RACE - RUSSIA01:06:25 — Defence Spending Is Surprisingly Low01:08:17 — The Impact Of Sanctions & Inflation01:14:52 — CONCLUSIONS01:15:43 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Wagner Group, Russian PMCs & Ukraine - History, motives & privatised warfare Perun 2023-03-05 | For centuries, leaders often depended on bands of mercenary warriors to make up their military strength in times of war, but as national militaries evolved, these formations shank from prominence, with modern PMCs generally being focused on support roles like base or VIP security or logistics (even if their contracts grew massively post 2001). Wagner doesn't follow that example. A force tens of thousands strong, Wagner has helped spearhead the Russian offensives around Bakhmut, and taken on international prominence. In this episode, I look at the evolution of PMCs, Russia's modern employment of them, and the implications of Wagner's role in Ukraine and its public spats with the Russian MoD.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats and comments:The usual caveats here apply, but with an extra layer of severity - Russian PMCs do not keep good, reliable public records of their activity. All information presented should generally be considered qualified even where an appropriate words (e.g. 'reportedly') are not included.Sources & Reading:As a policy I do not directly link to Russian Government or Wagner materials, but this episode utilises material from telegram channels owned by or linked to bothCSIS - Russian PMCsrussianpmcs.csis.orgRussian PMCs - CRSsgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11650.pdfWar on the Rocks - Russia in Libyawarontherocks.com/2021/01/the-pendulum-how-russia-sways-its-way-to-more-influence-in-libyaRussian State Media - Putin on the value of PMCshttps://ria.ru/20120411/623227984.htmlCSIS - Wagner and the Russian Statecsis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-stateAnna Borshchevskaya - Russian PMCsfpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/rfp4-borshchevskaya-final.pdfThe Conversation - On Russian PMCstheconversation.com/russias-reliance-on-mercenaries-in-ukraine-points-to-the-weakness-of-its-military-and-putins-strategy-of-deflecting-blame-190612Testimony on Russian PMCscsis.org/analysis/putins-proxies-examining-russias-use-private-military-companiesSerbian Police close down Racoon basebalkaninsight.com/2018/08/17/serbia-police-closes-controversial-military-style-children-s-camp-08-17-2018Wagner prisoner recruitment ceasesreuters.com/world/europe/russias-wagner-mercenaries-halt-prisoner-recruitment-campaign-founder-prigozhin-2023-02-09Prigozhin on ammorferl.org/a/prigozhin-wagner-mercenaries-ammunition-supplies-army/32284809.htmlMangushev shot dead:bbc.com/news/world-europe-64566582"Implausible Deniability" - Carnegie Endowmentcarnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954Decree on Gazprom - PSChttp://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302060031Jamestown foundation - Vega Strategic Servicesjamestown.org/program/vega-strategic-services-russian-pmcs-as-part-of-information-warfareJamestown Foundation - Russian PMCsjamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflictsA deeper look at Vegacy by the Atlantic Council DFRL: medium.com/dfrlab/a-deeper-look-into-vegacy-strategic-services-ltd-8985ba3eac52Wagner in Mozambiquethemoscowtimes.com/2019/10/31/7-kremlin-linked-mercenaries-killed-in-mozambique-in-october-sources-a67996Wagner declared a transnational criminal organisationhome.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220Ukrainian claims RE Patriot PMCtwitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1608131037099425793Reporting on Wagner deployment in March 2022usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-28/russia-deploys-wagner-group-to-eastern-ukraine-in-risky-attempt-to-break-stalemateWagner - sledgehammer executionrferl.org/a/telegram-vagner-sledgehammer-killing-ukraine-defector/32128961.htmlTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening00:03:21 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:04:34 — MERCENARIES, PMC & VOLUNTEERS00:06:58 — HISTORY00:12:42 — European Golden Age: Condottieri00:16:25 — DECLINE OF THE MERCS00:22:35 — EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN PMCs00:26:04 — State Sponsorship00:28:22 — Roles & Duties00:36:17 — GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS PRE-202200:36:34 — Syria 2015+00:41:01 — Libya 2015+00:42:45 — Central African Republic00:45:04 — A Global Footprint00:46:11 — WAGNER IN UKRAINE00:51:25 — Understanding The Why00:53:04 — WAGNER VS THE MINISTRY00:53:40 — The Politics Of Wagner Success00:58:24 — Ammunition & Recruitment01:02:56 — Wagner Humbled?01:04:28 — TO EVERY LORD, AN ARMY01:04:36 — The Proliferation Of Russian PMCs01:05:25 — Patriot & Vuhledar01:06:16 — WHY DOES THIS MATTER?01:08:19 — War, Motives, Stability01:10:02 — CONCLUSIONS01:10:52 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Defence strategy for small nations - force design, friends, and deterrence on a budget Perun 2023-02-26 | Much of the the defence content online focuses on what might be called major power competition and the cutting edge platforms that go with it. We often focus on the race by major military powers to field the latest and greatest expensive jets, ships, or submarines in quantity - and it's often those systems that capture the imaginationBut all those things have something in common - they cost immense amounts of money, and for most nations, keeping up with the USAF or the shipbuilding efforts of the PRC just isn't on the cards. So following a vote by my patrons I decided to look at the question of how smaller (both in terms of population and/or economic power) nations can try to defend themselves in a world dominated by larger powers.It's a bit of a light-hearted return to some defence 101 concepts, and I hope you enjoy. We'll be back next week with a deeper look at Wagner, Blackwater, and the historical and modern role of PMCs.For my recent interview on "The Red Line" see either:theredlinepodcast.com/listen/episode/3fbb957d/89-european-rearmament-are-we-preparing-for-the-wrong-war (podcast format)oryoutube.com/watch?v=5gncQ3x9_lo (youtube format)Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Comments:This video is intended as a bit of a walk back into the world of defence concepts 101, as a result, it may be a bit on the basic side for those in the industry. I also fully admit to blurring the lines of the stages between the development of a strategic concept and fielding and sustainment for the sake of brevity and simplicity.I have also deliberately over-simplified the concepts and force designs in each of the examples for illustrative purposes. Also - several typos made it into the slides, apologiesSources & reading:Defence in a Competitive Age (Defence contribution to the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy)gov.uk/government/publications/defence-in-a-competitive-ageUK Defence and Security Industry Strategy 2021:assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/971983/Defence_and_Security_Industrial_Strategy_-_FINAL.pdfUK Defence Industrial Strategy 2006:assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272203/6697.pdfFinnish army headcounts:https://maavoimat.fi/en/about-usNetherlands Defence Vision 2035:https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/publications/2020/10/15/defence-vision-2035Netherlands Defence White Paper 2022:https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/publications/2022/07/19/defence-white-paper-2022What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? - RAND 2017rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1820.htmlDefence Capability Manual (2021)https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/defence-capability-manualTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:52 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:02:44 — DEFENCE 10100:02:55 — Military Spending Should Serve A Purpose00:03:49 — Defining A Defensive Concept Or Strategy00:05:18 — Force Design00:06:38 — Procurement & Industry Strategy Follow00:07:43 — A Few Themes Of Small Nation Defence00:08:41 — MEET KIWILAND00:09:29 — Starting From Scratch00:10:03 — Understanding The Enemy00:11:00 — MACRO STRATEGY TOTAL DEFENCE00:11:53 — The Threat00:12:44 — The Concept00:14:22 — Designing A Force00:18:00 — Specialised Equipment00:20:14 — Preparing Society00:21:59 — Fortress Kiwiland00:26:17 — MACRO STRATEGY DOMAIN DOMINANCE00:26:30 — Kiwiland At Sea00:26:44 — The Threat & Concept00:27:50 — Making The Ocean Dangerous00:30:37 — Kiwiland Rules The Waves00:33:30 — (Sea) Fortress Kiwiland00:35:24 — MACROSTRATEGY WMD DETERRENCE00:35:46 — When War Changed00:37:33 — Cost & Consequences00:39:57 — Threatening Armageddon00:41:23 — The North Korean Nuclear Program00:43:19 — Kiwiland Goes Nuclear? 00:48:14 — MACROSTRATEGY ALLIED INTEGRATION00:48:35 — You Do Not Exist In A Vacuum00:50:05 — Being A Better Ally00:51:03 — Becoming Part Of An Alliance Architecture00:53:28 — Designing A Force00:54:08 — Greater Than The Sum Of Parts00:54:55 — Kiwiland Partners Up00:56:09 — DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL SPECIALISATION00:56:33 — Self-reliance And Strategic Autonomy00:58:13 — Kiwi-industrial Policy00:58:50 — HARD & SOFT POWER00:59:05 — Defence Without Deterrence01:00:26 — Would You Invade This Guy’s Home?01:01:35 — CONCLUSIONS 01:02:16 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Russias Grand Strategy and Ukraine - Is Putins war already a strategic failure? Perun 2023-02-19 | After a year of hard fighting there are a rush of observers trying to make sense of the current balance of power in Ukraine. The focus in often on (often small) movements in the frontlines, casualties, or the performance of particular platforms and systems. Those things matter, but wars are not generally fought to take individual trenches or solely to inflict casualties. They are fought for strategic objectives.In this episode I dig into Russia's history of Empire, its modern strategic objectives, and try to assess whether or not the war in Ukraine represents a success or failure by Russia's own chosen metrics (as far as they can be determined). My suggestion is that in repeating a number of the mistakes previously made by leaders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, it can be argued that Putin has already condemned the Russian federation to a strategic reverse. What remains to be seen, is whether Ukraine can win a victory from Russia's defeat, or if it will be left to lose as well.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCorrections/Caveats: This content represents an attempt to divine Russian Strategic intent in Ukraine on the basis of public statements, official media and published Western research - but it is impossible to definitively prove what Putin's goals were in invading Ukraine. Many of the presented opinions have a relatively low confidence level.At one point I refer to this invasion as an event which has done more to galvanize Ukrainian nationalism than any of the past 100 years - that was unjustified hyperbole - the statement should instead be "of the post Soviet era" or words to that effect for reasons that I hope are obvious. Sources & Reading:Russian State Media highlighting the role of the Primakov Doctrine:tass.com/russia/756973Russian State Media on the annexation of Kherson and other regions:tass.com/politics/1517899 Carnegie Endowment on the Doctrine:carnegieendowment.org/files/Rumer_PrimakovDoctrine_final1.pdfWilliam C. Wohlforth - The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balancejstor.org/stable/2010224UN Statistics on Donbas civilian casualties: https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/conflict-related-civilian-casualties-ukraine-december-2021-enruukDNR figures on losses as a result of military activity (civilian and military)https://eng.ombudsman-dnr.ru/the-overview-of-the-current-social-and-humanitarian-situation-in-the-territory-of-the-donetsk-peoples-republic-as-a-result-of-hostilities-in-the-period-17-and-23-december-2022/?__cf_chl_tk=D.CE95NCUbzAikL1zEk8.Mj8MKlv3wsbLFN1_N3Eux8-1676799261-0-gaNycGzNC_sReferences to visually confirmed losses are references to Oryx DataPew Research on opinions of Russia among selected European political party voters:pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/23/among-european-right-wing-populists-favorable-views-of-russia-and-putin-are-down-sharplyPew Research on opinions on Russia by selected national populationspewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/ratings-for-russia-drop-to-record-lowsNew Czech president on NATO expansion: bbc.com/news/world-europe-64455121EGF Poling on opinions on the US as leading global power:axios.com/2022/06/16/countries-prefer-us-china-superpower-pollTimestamps: 00:00:00 — Russian Grand Strategy00:01:56 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:03:03 — A NATURAL SUPERPOWER00:04:04 — A Strong Hand00:06:10 — The Same Old Errors00:06:46 — LOSING THE EMPIRE00:07:26 — A Power On The Rise00:10:41 — BROKEN SICKLE00:11:48 — History Rhymes00:13:57 — What Held It Together? 00:15:09 — THE LOST 90s00:15:16 — Russia's Potential00:15:50 — Oligarchisation & Decay00:17:04 — RUSSIAN GRAND STRAT & EURASIANISM00:18:16 — From Dugin To Primakov00:20:39 — The Primakov Doctrine00:25:41 — THE ROAD TO CRIMEA00:26:18 — It Was A Different Time00:28:33 — The Cost Of Crimea00:29:56 — THE LAST CHANCE00:30:08 — The State Of Play 202200:32:10 — Throwing The Dice00:32:29 — UKRAINE & STRATEGIC DISASTER00:36:25 — Defining The Goals00:37:36 — RUSSIAN VICTORY AS DEFEAT00:39:05 — Halting NATO Expansion & Weakening The Alliance00:41:04 — A Statement Of Intent00:45:11 — How's That Influence In The Post Soviet Space00:45:50 — "protecting The Donbas"00:48:21 — Demilitarising Ukraine & Repressing "nationalism"00:50:49 — A "neutral" Ukraine? 00:51:53 — Value Of The Annexed Regions00:53:11 — Russia's Economic Future00:54:50 — Russia's Military Potential00:58:02 — THE RISK OF CATASTROPHE00:58:25 — All Of That Assumed Russia Won01:00:06 — Destabilisation & Exhaustion01:00:29 — Russia Diminished01:01:11 — THE FINAL ROLL OF THE DICE? 01:01:16 — Russia Has Always Bounced Back?01:03:30 — THE WAR CONTINUES?01:04:39 — Russia Losing Does Not Mean Ukraine Has Won01:06:02 — The Fight For The Future Isn't Settled01:06:52 — CONCLUSIONS01:07:59 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Small Drones & Loitering Munitions in Ukraine - The terrifying rise of cheap precision Perun 2023-02-12 | Sponsored by Blinkist: Get 25% off Blinkist premium and enjoy 2 memberships for the price of 1! Start your 7-day free trial by clicking here: blinkist.com/perunDescription:While the news often focuses on the role of large, expensive systems in the Ukraine war (think of the attention given to tanks, aircraft, or MLRS and SAM systems in recent weeks and months) some of the most omnipresent and disruptive systems have actually been terrifyingly cheap and accessible. Off-the-shelf commercial drones converted for military use have been deployed by the truckload, while some of Russia's more successful weapons have been comparatively cheap loitering munitions and kamikaze drones like the Iranian Shahed and Russian Lancet. Videos of equipment destroyed by drones that might cost a thousandth of the price have become image of the war across social media.In this video, I examine the use of these (often civilian) systems in the war in Ukraine, look at international developments, and ask what lessons we can take from the terrifying rise of cheap sensor and cheaper precision on the battlefield. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats and corrections:I mispronounce "Shahed" on several occasionsI refer to the Mavic 2 and 3 together - they are not comparable, with the 3 being far more common as a drone supplied to lower level units in UkraineI call the Norwegian Black Hornet Drone Danish (big oof)I refer to to the saturation of drones across the front - I should clarify that the reporting on that point is anecdotal and may only relate to specific sections of the front where drone activity is that its most dense. I also wish to be clear that I do not at all endorse the modification or use of drones for purposes other than those legally allowable in your jurisdiction.Sources & Further reading: RUSI - Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-202JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE (JAPCC) - A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systemsjapcc.org/books/a-comprehensive-approach-to-countering-unmanned-aircraft-systemsjapcc.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Comprehensive-Approach-to-Countering-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems.pdfJAPCC - Denial of Spectrum Denialjapcc.org/essays/denial-of-spectrum-denialDepartment of Defense Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstrationdefense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstrationUK on drone developmentsdefensenews.com/global/europe/2022/07/14/royal-air-force-chief-says-drone-swarms-ready-to-crack-enemy-defensesMy thanks to those in Ukraine and elsewhere who consulted in relation to this episode.Timestamps: 00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS00:01:23 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:04:09 — MEET THE UAS00:04:17 — Classifying Drones00:07:59 — Another Take On The Divide00:08:32 — SYRIA AND THE DONBAS00:09:53 — The War In The Donbas00:11:54 — WEAPONS OF THE UKRAINE WAR00:12:15 — "Mavics"00:13:47 — Thermal & Heavier Drones00:15:25 — Loitering Munitions00:16:23 — "FPVs"00:18:03 — CAUTION AND CAVEATS00:18:13 — A Very Public Side Of War? 00:19:03 — Publication Biases00:20:06 — Security & Secrecy00:21:13 — A Personal Warning00:22:13 — DRONE USAGE00:22:18 — Employment At All Levels00:23:17 — Reconnaissance00:24:55 — Artillery Correction00:27:30 — Coordination00:28:41 — Strike Role00:34:18 — Whet It Goes Wrong - RU & UA Drops00:36:11 — Fear & Isolation00:38:07 — THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE00:40:33 — LOITERING MUNITIONS00:40:43 — The Lancet Threat00:41:35 — The Shahed Campaign00:42:22 — Ukrainian Loitering Munitions00:43:09 — LOGISTICS & SUPPLY00:43:18 — The Role Of Volunteers00:44:35 — Artisanal Work At Industrial Scale00:46:15 — COUNTERS & EFFECTIVENESS00:47:23 — Electronic Warfare00:48:51 — New Problems, Old Solutions00:49:54 — The Very Old (and Odd)00:51:34 — Counter-operator Operations00:52:39 — GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS00:52:55 — Tactical Tools00:53:54 — Swarm Technology00:55:27 — Deployability00:56:02 — Networking And Going Solo00:57:15 — A THREAT PROFILED00:57:22 — Extreme Accessibility00:58:18 — The Shot Exchange Problem00:59:16 — Nowhere To Hide01:00:07 — LESSONS & NEXT STEPS01:00:17 — The Battle For Awareness & Precision01:01:24 — Availability & Attritability01:03:25 — The Drones Will Get Better01:04:12 — Need For Efficient Countermeasures01:05:08 — Training & Doctrine01:06:19 — Evolving Threats01:06:57 — CONCLUSIONS01:07:41 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Resupplying Ukraine: Arms, Aid & Escalation - What, Who, & What might be next? Perun 2023-02-05 | Last week I talked about the enduring strengths of the Russian armed forces and their ability to launch offensives and apply pressure in Ukraine. Faced with that pressure, Ukraine's ability to carry on the fight will be driven not just by its own determination, but by the flow of weapons and assistance from its allies abroad. Aid to Ukraine has evolved dramatically since February 2022, and there are few topics that have attracted more constant press coverage away from the battlefield itself. So today I try and set out how aid has evolved, who the major contributors are, and the impact aid has had - and may have in 2023.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Corrections:In this episode I refer to the White House announcing periodic age packages for Ukraine - I meant to refer to the DoDI also refer to percentages of Russian artillery in storage being towed/122mm - this is a reference to 'reserve' Russian artillery systems per MB2021 as stated on the slide.I also wish to emphasise again that I deliberately included extreme examples of Western escalation options to illustrate a point, not as advocacy.Sources & Further Reading:German military support for Ukrainehttps://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992CSIS - US Security Assistance to Ukrainecrsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040Ukraine supplemental FY2023appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Ukraine%20Supplemental%20Summary%20FY23.pdfKiel Institute for World Economy figures on Ukraine support:https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/Oryx: Answering the call - heavy weapons to Ukraineoryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.htmlEU Training Mission Targetseuractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-ramps-up-military-support-doubles-training-mission-targets-for-ukraineUkraine FOREX reservesreuters.com/markets/ukraines-foreign-reserves-hit-2795-bln-topping-pre-invasion-level-2022-12-06US plans combined arms trainingdefense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3248075/us-plans-combined-arms-training-for-ukrainian-soldiersPoland repairing Ukraine equipmenthttps://mil.in.ua/en/news/poland-launched-large-scale-repairs-of-the-equipment-of-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine/#:~:text=Poland%20launched%20a%20large%2Dscale,AHS%20Krab%20self%2Dpropelled%20guns.Estonia handing over all its 155mm howitzerskyivindependent.com/news-feed/estonia-to-give-ukraine-all-its-155-mm-howitzers-in-largest-aid-package-so-farhttps://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/879537.htmlReznikov: Ukraine needs 300 tanks, 600-700 IFVs, 500 howitzers for specific operationTASS on Escalation Risktass.com/politics/1570233CSIS on Ukraine Aid:cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-chartsOlaf Scholz steers clear of commitment to supply of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukrainetheguardian.com/world/2023/jan/18/olaf-scholz-steers-clear-of-pledging-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraineU.S. funds not misused in Ukraine, U.S. Treasury says amid corruption crackdown reuters.com/world/us/us-treasury-says-no-indication-that-us-funds-were-misused-ukraine-2023-01-31UK Tanks to Ukrainebbc.com/news/uk-64274755M113s to Iraqhttps://www.army.mil/article/106646/excess_armored_personnel_carriers_benefit_u_s_foreign_partnersPaper system counts for elements like Russian and US reserve artillery are per Military Balance 2021Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:43 — What Am I Talking About?00:03:21 — From Korea to Afghanistan00:04:47 — AID PRE-202200:05:00 — The Ukrainian Military of 201400:08:27 — Made in Ukraine (with some help)00:09:41 — THE AID ESCALATION00:10:05 — Phase 1: Stop the Tanks00:11:08 — Phase 2: Light & Heavy00:12:10 — Phase 3: Keeping the Lights On00:12:45 — Phase 4: Enabling Manoeuvre00:14:31 — Phase 5: Reach00:15:18 — HOW MUCH AID HAS GONE?00:20:25 — What is a Thing Worth?00:21:54 — Personal View - Focus on Type & Qty.00:22:55 — NATIONAL AID PROGRAMS00:23:07 — The VANGUARDS00:23:12 — Leading the Charge00:23:35 — Leading on Heavy Weapons00:25:02 — Accepting Risk00:26:42 — Pushing the Boundaries00:27:58 — THE CAUTIOUS GIANT: US AID00:32:11 — The Source of Deterrence00:33:13 — LET'S TALK ABOUT GERMANY00:36:04 — German Military Aid00:37:08 — Messaging & Authorisation00:39:58 — IMPACT & SCALE00:40:06 — Finances00:41:06 — Humanitarian & Refugee Costs00:42:02 — Military Aid by the Numbers00:46:36 — OTHER AID TYPES00:50:40 — CAN IT BE ENOUGH?00:57:07 — The Numbers are the Numbers01:00:28 — The Trend So Far01:01:29 — WHAT IS NEEDED?01:01:44 — The Ukrainian Requests01:02:49 — Solution 1: New maneuver01:04:18 — Solution 2: Fight Like Ukrainians01:08:35 — THE WEST IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT01:10:25 — CONCLUSIONS01:11:40 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Russian Strengths & Capabilities in Ukraine - Why Russia is still a threat in 2023 Perun 2023-01-29 | Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed significant issues with Russian planning, force structure and military culture. On this channel I've spent the better part of a year exploring some of those issues and helping to explain why, as suggested back in March 2022, this was (and is) a much closer war many analysts expected. But it is equally important not to underestimate Russian strengths and capabilities. From information warfare to ammunition production and mobilisation potential, Russia has a suite of resources and capabilities that it can leverage. Following a popular vote, in this episode I look at Russian military performance and capabilities in Ukraine, and why I believe it remains a major threat for Ukraine in 2023.As you might expect, there won't be quite as many punchlines in this one.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:Many, many, many caveats - some of which I capture in this video. My big ask is that this presentation not be taken out of context. A sober assessment of Russian capabilities is not the same as an assessment that Russia is likely win. Instead it represents a set of challenges that Ukraine will have to overcome - something I will look at further next week. Sources:RUSI - Preliminary Lessons in conventional warfighting...rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022RUSI - The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defencerusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence"I live, I fight, I win" - a guide by the Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan and Special Military Operations (machine translation)docdroid.net/5avzOQK/i-live-i-fight-i-win-the-rules-of-living-in-war-pdfWork of Covert Cabal counting Russian tanks in depots:youtube.com/watch?v=ZNNoaRp5lz0&tyoutube.com/watch?v=eHhgVrKJJoAFMSO - The Russian way of Warhttps://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdfPaper figures for RU military equipment are per MB2021 as always for consistency (though the omission of T-62 from paper reserve list is yet another point that causes me to raise a questionmark with that source)TC 7-100.2 OPFOR tacticshttps://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdfVariety of public statements and interviews given by officers and troops involved in the fighting in Ukraine. Examples include: Interview with Ukrainian artillery officer at Bakhmutyoutube.com/watch?v=-5hmhU5LvC8Interview with Ukrainian pilot by thedrivethedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-mig-29-pilots-inside-account-of-the-changing-air-war-over-ukraineI would also like to extend a personal thanks to those who consulted directly on the preparation of this presentation, including those Ukrainians who agreed to provide input on the challenges they still face. I hope to receive permission to credit at least some of these in the future.Credit to social media and OSINT based sources as normal, in particular Julia Davis of Russia Media Monitor for her work monitoring and translating Russian media, and, of course, loss aggregators and geolocators.Timestamps00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:57 — What Am I Talking About?00:02:47 — A Note on Sources00:03:39 — RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE00:03:53 — Contradictions00:06:52 — What Does This Achieve?00:08:58 — Leveraging Legacy?00:10:14 — BELARUS00:11:23 — COMBAT PERFORMANCE00:11:53 — The Poor Mobik Trope00:13:53 — Russia's Hard Edge00:18:26 — Let's Not Get Ahead of Ourselves00:19:29 — FIRE SUPERIORITY00:19:44 — Russian Artillery Retains the Advantage00:26:24 — STRATEGIC LOGISTICS00:26:35 — Wait What? Russia & Logistics?00:27:27 — Logistics at the Strategic Level00:34:23 — Adaptation00:35:35 — Enabling Strategic Manoeuvre & Sustainment00:36:40 — TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE00:36:48 — The Product of Modernisation00:38:10 — Ukraine Is Not All Bling00:39:02 — THE EDGE IN THE AIR00:39:24 — An Asymmetric Fight00:42:08 — BVR00:43:57 — A Realised Advantage00:45:01 — NAVAL EDGE00:45:09 — The Black Sea Situation00:46:09 — A Strategic Handicap00:46:45 — AN ASYMMETRY OF REACH00:46:50 — Russia's Long Reach00:48:22 — From Lancet to Iskander00:50:10 — A One-Way Tax00:50:56 — RUSSIA CAN LEARN00:51:12 — Evidence of Adaptation00:53:29 — ENDURANCE00:53:40 — Regeneration & Reconstitution00:53:58 — Casualty Tolerance00:55:43 — The Manpower Pool00:57:21 — Equipment Reserves01:00:53 — Industrial Mobilisation01:01:58 — Adaptation01:02:53 — Regression and Output01:04:50 — CONCLUSIONS: The Threats to Ukraine01:05:55 — CONCLUSIONS: Russia is Not a Broken Force01:06:31 — CONCLUSIONS: Overcoming Russian Advantages 01:08:03 — CONCLUSIONS: An Enduring Threat01:08:17 — Channel Update
How Politics Destroys Armies: Politics, Factionalism & Russias war in Ukraine Perun 2023-01-22 | Sponsored by Private Internet Access: piavpn.com/PerunDescription:Militaries, like any organisation, share a basic vulnerability - they're made up of people. And wherever there are people, there is an organisational culture.Culture can shape the way a military performs just as much as the capabilities of its weapons or the count of its personnel. Having all the tanks in the world only means so much if the system maintaining them is weakened by corruption and false reporting - factors we've explored before.But there's a third part of this story, the component that helps explain why systems adopt inefficient structures, struggle to coordinate or become filled with mutual distrust and self sabotage. Politics. Where the political interests of individuals deviate from the interests of the collective, bad things happen, and where leaders begin to put more focus on loyalty than on competence, then a system will never live up to its full potential. This episode serves as the third episode in the trilogy that began with "How corruption destroys armies" so I would advise watching those first if you have not alreadyPatreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Comments:Under normal circumstances, Kremlin power games would not normally be played out in public - contests like those now being seen between Wagner and Shoigu for example that play out in public are relatively new phenomena. As a result, there is a recency bias in the examples used. Also note that as much of this topic is evidenced by competing, self-interested claims by various parties - examples should be considered illustrative or with low confidence levels.Further Reading:Information drawn from the Telegram channels of relevant figures - as a rule I do not directly link to content by these sources but relevant extracts are contained in this presentation.Drach's video on the IJA's Navy (recommended)youtube.com/watch?v=mZ9AFbnY4To&tRussia’s defence reform Assessing the real ‘Serdyukov heritagehttps://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/fiia/0027951/f_0027951_22760.pdfRussia’s New PMC Patriot:jamestown.org/program/russias-new-pmc-patriot-the-kremlins-bid-for-a-greater-role-in-africaRussia’s (not so) Private Military Companieshttps://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206653Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian Statecsis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-stateThe Russian Way of wararmyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdfThe Best or Worst of Both Worlds?csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/best-or-worst-both-worldsShoigu survives reshufflejamestown.org/program/russias-defense-minister-sergei-shoigu-survives-government-reshuffleShoigu sells Russias military success storyhttps://icds.ee/en/defence-minister-shoigu-sells-russias-military-success-story/theconversation.com/chechens-fighting-in-ukraine-putins-psychological-weapon-could-backfire-179447Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:42 — What Am I Talking About00:02:47 — SPONSOR: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS00:04:21 — POWER & INCENTIVES00:04:33 — The Problem of Incentives00:06:15 — System Self-Select & Perpetuate00:08:34 — The Personalist Structure00:09:04 — The Autocrat's Incentives00:12:09 — The Boyar's Incentives00:13:34 — COMPETENCE, REFORM & THE RUSSIAN ARMY00:13:48 — The Post-Soviet Decline00:14:18 — Yeltsin's Praetorians00:15:23 — Grachev00:16:55 — The Serdyukov Reforms00:19:29 — Rebellion & Replacement00:20:14 — Remember Sergei?00:21:14 — The Shoigu Years00:22:19 — Sergei's Failures00:23:25 — Sergei's Successes00:24:54 — DUPLICATION & EMPIRE BUILDING00:25:05 — Efficiency is Sleek00:25:54 — Empire Building & Divided Rule00:26:37 — Building an Ideal Military00:27:44 — German Military Feudalism00:28:56 — Waffen SS or HEER00:29:14 — An Organisational Melee00:31:11 — FRAGMENTATION IN RUSSIA (DRAMATIS PERSONAE)00:31:17 — The Regular Army00:31:49 — Rosgvardia00:32:59 — The DNR & LNR00:34:59 — Russian Law00:35:49 — Kadyrov00:37:25 — Kadyrovtsy00:37:55 — Loyal to Whom?00:38:38 — Yevgeniy Prigozhin00:40:29 — "Volunteer" Units00:41:22 — Other Players?00:42:16 — The Costs of Fragmentation00:43:53 — COORDINATION & COHESION00:44:05 — There is no "Team"00:45:12 — IJA: The Rivalry00:46:07 — IJA: Organisation00:46:44 — IJA: Coordination00:47:51 — The MoD v Wagner00:49:51 — Duelling Narratives00:50:54 — The Narrative?00:53:03 — Meanwhile, in Wagner World00:55:10 — DIRECT "COMPETITION"00:55:17 — Unit "Friction"00:56:12 — Rogozin00:58:59 — POLITICAL OBJECTIVES00:59:25 — When Politics Trumps Military Logic01:00:52 — THE AGGREGATED IMPACT01:00:59 — An Ending (To This Act)01:02:00 — CAN IT BE FIXED?01:02:08 — This is Not Unique01:02:55 — Antidotes and Controls01:04:13 — The Russian Issue01:05:35 — Cultural Factors01:07:57 — Conclusions
Infantry Fighting Vehicles in Ukraine - losses, lessons & will Western IFVs matter? Perun 2023-01-15 | Sponsored by Ground News: Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Try Ground News today and get 15% off by visiting https://ground.news/perunWhile tanks and fighters tend to win public attention, the fighting in Ukraine has done a lot to remind us of the critical role played by the infantry. And to survive and thrive on the battlefield, the infantry in Ukraine rely on their armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to enable to enable movement and provide fire support. Those vehicles, so critical to both sides have, however, been lost in extreme numbers - with no vehicle on the Russian side having suffered more visually confirmed losses than the BMP-2.Now, it seems, the floodgates are opening on the supply of Western IFVs to Ukraine. In this video I look at these vehicles, their employment in Ukraine, and suggest that despite being lost in large numbers - that they will remain critical in the fighting to come.Special thanks to those consulted for this video.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Comments:I mispeak and call RUSI the "uniform services institute" - It is correctly (and has for the better part of two centuries) been the "united services institute."As always, keep in mind that while visually confirmed loss data is among the best data we have for setting loss baselines, it is limited and should be interpreted with care.To enable some of the analysis in this video, some data treatment was done - for example, entries for destroyed BMPs where the variant could not be determined were divided, pro-rataRegarding the narrative - while the BMP-1 had a major impact, I should note that other IFV type vehicles preceded it - with perhaps the most significant being the German HS.30.In this video, I call the Stryker an American vehicle due to its service. The vehicle has Canadian DNA and is built thereNotes/further reading:pre-war equipment levels are as per Military Balance 2021 for consistency.Loss and resupply data as per Oryx as noted:oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.htmlWar for Ukraine - First Conclusions from 2022 and New Challenges 2023youtube.com/watch?v=54daqNraMxEPreliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdfTASS - on the Bradley tass.com/defense/1561793TASS - on BMP-2 Productionhttps://tass.ru/interviews/15445983?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.comOn the pledge of Marders and BMPs to Ukrainedefensenews.com/pentagon/2023/01/05/us-and-germany-pledge-infantry-fighting-vehicles-for-ukraineRussian MoD claim of destroyed Bradleys is as per their official TG channel - September 4 2022GAO assessment of Bradley and Abrams in Desert Stormgao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdfTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:57 — What Am I Talking About?00:02:36 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS00:03:43 — IFVs: History & Doctrine00:03:52 — The Combined Arms Problem00:05:17 — VARIETY OF RESPONSES00:06:36 — Halftracks & APCs00:08:05 — The BMP-100:10:14 — IFVs & Modern Mechanised Infantry00:11:06 — Related Vehicles00:12:08 — PRE WAR FORCES00:12:13 — The Russian Arsenal00:14:02 — The "Cutting Edge"00:15:57 — Fossils00:17:08 — Shortage Conditions00:17:51 — The Primary Force00:19:14 — The Ukrainian Armoury00:20:07 — The Soviet Inheritance00:20:28 — New Gen. Vehicles00:21:28 — Western Systems00:22:19 — LOSSES: AND WHY THEY AREN'T EVERYTHING00:23:02 — Assessing Losses00:23:59 — Overall Trends00:25:54 — Visually Confirmed Losses00:27:20 — ORYX IFV & APC Visually Confirmed Losses 00:29:07 — Russian Losses00:31:24 — Analysing Ukrainian Losses00:33:15 — Highlighting Outliers00:36:08 — Three Common Potential Misconceptions00:36:53 — ORYX Implied Net IFV Loss00:38:18 — Colonel Reisner00:39:27 — EMPLOYMENT & EXPERIENCE00:40:11 — Infantry Support and Early Losses00:41:50 — Vulnerability00:43:15 — Relationship with Survivability00:45:20 — Dispersion & Concentration00:46:09 — A Critical Tool00:48:07 — Static Warfare00:49:03 — Through the Fog of War00:49:49 — Potential Lessons00:50:19 — RESUPPLY & REPLACEMENTS00:50:28 — The Need to Replenish00:51:40 — Russian Efforts (and Debates)00:53:28 — Western Resupply00:55:17 — The Shift To Heavier Materiel00:55:59 — A Note on Quantities00:57:19 — MEET THE CANDIDATES00:57:24 — Marder00:58:18 — M2/M3 Bradley00:59:24 — Moving the Needle?01:01:06 — STRYKER (+MGS)01:01:44 — THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE01:02:07 — 1: Gross Escalation01:02:37 — 2: The System is Terrible01:03:09 — 3: They Were Destroyed01:03:51 — WHAT NEXT?01:03:55 — The Resupply Effort & Losses01:04:47 — Force Evolution: Russia01:05:55 — Force Evolution: Ukraine01:06:39 — Conclusions01:07:35 — Channel Update
Why War Economies dont collapse (until they do) - why Russia and Ukraine wont collapse tomorrow Perun 2023-01-08 | By popular vote, welcome to a bit of war economics 101.There are few things people have been keener to predict throughout history than 'quick' wars. Pro Russian commentators after February 24th 2022 expected a rapid victory - while Western media was quick to suggest that Russia's economy was collapsing soon after sanctions were implemented. Instead, both Ukraine and Russia show signs of increasing their wartime production and scaling up their armed forces. That should not come as a surprise. Historically, the process of converting from a civilian to a wartime economy has yielded more than enough results to overcome even significant trauma inflicted on the industrial base (for example, strategic bombing attacks). Russia's economy is suffering, it's long term economic prospects have been badly wounded by a collapse in international trust, market denial, and a barrage of sanctions. Ukraine's economy is likewise under immense pressure - primarily from physical attacks by the Russian armed forces. But it would be naïve to think that either is likely to collapse in the coming weeks and months. As long as the will to go on (and foreign support) remains in play, there is every reason to think that both nations will find a way to keep their economies going. In this episode, we look at the basics of war-economics, industry conversion, and try to understand why 'short wars' are so hard to win between peer opponents, once the economic struggle begins in earnest.This video is obviously not financial advice - and a discussion of certain economic ideas or techniques should not be taken as an endorsement of them. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats/Comments:A few major ones on this video:Economic data coming out of Ukraine and Russia is obviously suspect (I have covered the issues with official RU statistics before) and external statistics are highly uncertain - all figures should be taken as just indicative as a result. Describing techniques does not equal endorsement of them - Just because I can explain why you might be able to spend 40% of GDP on defence, doesn't mean I think that is a good idea.All jokes at the expense of particular careers or product categories are just that, jokes, and very much not meant. Finally - this is an exploration of historical experiences and the economic status of Russia and Ukraine - it is is focussed on the economic element of endurance while at war and makes no findings as to the point where political or social endurance might fail. Further reading/sources:To be included post publication (apologies, source list held locally on a different computer, it'll follow shortly).Timestamps:00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS00:03:28 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?00:04:07 — War Economics 10100:04:21 — Prior Planning00:06:08 — The Demand for Materiel00:06:55 — Productive Resources00:08:12 — Illustrating the Point00:09:02 — Mobilisation & Conversion00:09:17 — Ploughs to Swords00:11:04 — Conversion Models00:12:26 — Productivity & Coordination00:13:56 — Resource Prioritisation00:14:55 — Informal Conversion00:16:22 — The WW2 Exp00:18:23 — ENDURANCE00:18:50 – Gains Under Pressure00:19:50 — Pushed to the Extreme00:20:58 — What is a Collapse00:21:34 — Endurance: Non-essentials00:24:16 — Expanded Resources00:25:33 — Expended Resources00:26:44 — Will to endure00:29:18 — "You Will Grow Tired of It"00:32:05 — Temporary Measures00:33:01 — Hard Choices00:33:07 — Even Harder Choices00:34:20 — Funding a war: Business as Usual00:35:58 — Funding War: Mortgaging tomorrow00:39:33 — Funding War: Money Printer go BRRRRR00:41:44 — Papering Over the Cracks00:42:34 — Currency Tanking00:45:25 — Critical Resources shortages?00:46:57 — Out of Cash?00:48:07 — Inflation Out of Control?00:50:23 — Ever Heard of the Office of Price Administration (OPA)?00:51:22 — So Why Do They Fail?00:51:31 — Failure Mode 1: Overrun00:51:57 — Mode 2: Functional Collapse00:52:43 — (Mode 3): Capitulation or revolution00:53:53 — RUSSIA00:54:06 — The Russian Economy 202100:55:03 — Escalating Spending00:55:48 — Russian Assumptions00:56:29 — Economic Hardening00:57:34 — Options & Endurance01:00:50 — A Brief Word on Ukraine01:02:18 — CONCLUSIONS01:03:58 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Ammunition shortages in Ukraine - production, supply, & are Russia or the West running dry? Perun 2022-12-30 | In Ukraine, perhaps no weapon has caused more losses, or decided more engagements than the artillery. With contested airspace both side have turned to the big guns to support their operations - and both have consumed ammunition at a prodigious rate (albeit Russia many times faster than Ukraine). In this episode - I look at the question of production and supply and ask the question - are Russia or Ukraine going to run out of shells in 2023Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUReading/Sources:Russian Ammunition Consumption:https://news.err.ee/1608800317/edf-intelligence-chief-russia-has-used-up-two-thirds-of-its-ammunitiondefensenews.com/smr/reagan-defense-forum/2022/12/04/russia-burning-through-ammunition-in-ukraine-at-extraordinary-rateTranslation of Murz article - original linked (use wayback machine?)wartranslated.com/russian-volunteer-murz-on-why-russia-is-not-ready-to-defend-ukrainian-winter-offensiveProduction Levels:thedefensepost.com/2022/11/17/uk-bae-artillery-shell-productiondefensenews.com/pentagon/2022/12/05/army-plans-dramatic-ammo-production-boost-as-ukraine-drains-stocksreuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-ammunition-csg-idINL8N32R4T9https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/call-for-munitions-investment-to-turbocharge-our-defence-preparedness/news-story/634788501d744eb5f9aaed960af76af2rheinmetall.com/en/rheinmetall_ag/press/news/latest_news/index_35904.phpthedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukraine-first-operator-precision-bombhttps://ubn.news/germany-is-building-its-own-munitions-factory-which-ukraine-needs/bdnews24.com/world/europe/fdo6merjychttps://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/11/29/ukraine-has-an-insatiable-need-for-ammunition-but-the-us-doesnt-have-an-endless-supply/US Stocks & Cluster:GAO Report - '95govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89.htmUS Army Ammo Procurement justification bookshttps://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2020/Base%20Budget/Procurement/04%20Procurement%20of%20Ammunition%20Army.pdfhttps://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/Base%20Budget/Procurement/AMMO_FY_2021_PB_Procurement_of_Ammunition_Army.pdfUS Army Demil programmedia.defense.gov/2017/Dec/21/2001860132/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-052.PDFCRS - Clustersgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdfedition.cnn.com/2022/12/07/politics/ukraine-cluster-munitions-us-war-russia/index.htmlhttp://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/united-states/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx#ftn52Others:https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA416944.pdfCaveats/correction:The nature of reporting on an ongoing war limits the confidence/accuracy of the information presented. Please regard the content of this video accordingly.At one point I state that the US will hit 20,000 rounds of 155mm produced per month in summer, it's in fact by Spring.This video is no financial advice, and should not be relied upon/may contain errors in all respects. Please don't go making financial decisions because of what you see in a YT video.Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:02:03 — What Am I Talking About00:02:39 — HISTORY00:02:44 — The Scandal of 191500:04:12 — The Korean Crisis00:04:44 — Cold War Ruggedisation00:05:37 — Post Cold War Atrophy00:06:56 — Russia's Close Calls00:07:35 — Storage & Production00:08:37 — FEEDING THE GUNS00:08:45 — Everyone is Running Out00:09:05 — Everyone has Plenty of Ammo00:09:30 — RUSSIA00:09:33 — The Artillery Army00:10:44 — Dueling Narratives00:11:36 — Systems & Consumption00:12:57 — Shell Hunger?00:14:27 — FIRMS Returns00:16:29 — Why?00:18:02 — Production00:19:43 — Stretching Production00:21:26 — Options?00:23:01 — Conclusion00:25:08 — UKRAINE00:25:21 — Doom and Gloom?00:26:02 — Crashing Out the Rainy-Day Fund 00:26:31 — No NATO Shells?00:27:22 — Why Did This Happen?00:29:02 — Overly Focusing the View00:30:48 — CONSUMPTION00:31:21 — Putting a Number on the Need00:32:18 — Filling the Requirement00:33:12 — PRODUCTION00:33:23 — Atrophied Industry00:33:52 — Describing Production00:35:07 — The Production Picture00:36:22 — Surge Capacity?00:37:12 — The Production Picture: US00:38:53 — The Production Picture: EUROPE00:40:44 — Production Slack (EU)00:42:40 — The Production Picture: Asia-Pacific (APAC)00:44:06 — The Korean Option00:46:32 — The Production Picture: The Extras00:48:10 — LEGACY AMMO00:48:19 — Legacy Ammo Production00:49:09 — MAKING IT WORK00:50:06 — Politics & Patience00:52:20 — Wide Sourcing00:52:41 — The Great Ammunition Purchase Tour00:53:58 — Substitution...00:55:29 — ... & Precision00:57:39 — Emergency Options00:58:16 — Cluster Munition01:00:09 — The Cluster Option01:03:41 — What Are We Seeing?01:05:24 — CONCLUSIONS01:07:05 — CHANNEL UPDATE
The Race for 6th Generation Fighters - Drones, Lasers & Future Air Dominance Perun 2022-12-23 | Sponsored by Private Internet Access: privateinternetaccess.com/PerunTaking a quick break from the horrors of trench war and artillery combat in Ukraine for a week, we instead try to gaze forward towards the 2030s and the future of air combat.Fighter jets are among the most expensive, complex platforms that any nation builds and maintains (losing out to submarines and warships mostly because of the scale of the latter). For years, the US was the undisputed leader in the fighter domain, having introduced the 5th Generation F-22 Raptor in 2005, while challengers like the SU-57 would have to wait until the 2020s (and rise to fame a little thanks to the new Topgun film). But technology moves on; drones, engine technology, sensors, stealth...it all improves, and eventually countries are left with the choice to either build something new or fall behind. Many have chosen to compete, and in this video I introduce some of the projects pushing for next generation fighters, including the British-Japanese-Italian GCAP, Franco-German-Spanish FCAS, and two American programs.Whether I look at those in any detail in the future (or at the Russian, Chinese, and other programs) will likely depend on how this video goes.Recent interview with Jake Broe:youtube.com/watch?v=nWAkUWqdfBY&tPatreonpatreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:While sources are listed, information on 6th Generation fighters in the public domain is generally a mixture of extreme speculation, carefully calibrated marketing speak, and rumour. Please regard this video as what it is, a fun, speculative look at what is involved in producing the next generation of fighter aircraft (and their associated systems).Relevant Reading:Congressional Research Service Report on USAF NGAD:crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11659Reporting on existence of an NGAD demonstrator:defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/09/15/the-us-air-force-has-built-and-flown-a-mysterious-full-scale-prototype-of-its-future-fighter-jetBAE Tempest site:baesystems.com/en/product/military-capabilityUSAF wargame reporting:defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-off-or-win-against-china-in-2030XA-100:geaerospace.com/propulsion/military/xa100Dassault Airbus deal:https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/32827-dassault-airbus-fcas-agreementQuestions with Spain's FCAS lead:defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/05/5-questions-with-airbus-spains-fcas-leadUSN future plans reporting:thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40007/navys-aviation-boss-lays-out-big-vision-for-drone-packed-carrier-air-wings-of-the-futureGCAP:news.usni.org/2022/12/09/japan-italy-u-k-enter-collaboration-to-develop-next-generation-fighterThere is No Spoon: _The New Digital Acquisition Reality (formatting was not what I would have gone with)https://software.af.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/There-Is-No-Spoon-Digital-Acquisition-7-Oct-2020-digital-version.pdfF-35 Information fusion presentation (credit Lockheed Martin)https://swiss-f35.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PIRA-F-35-Sensor-Fusion-Brief-for-Switzerland.pdfTimestamps:00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS00:02:28 — SPONSOR: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS00:03:45 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?00:05:18 — FIGHTER GENERATIONS00:05:22 — The Naming Game00:06:18 — 1st Gen.00:07:05 — 2nd & 3rd Gen.00:07:48 — 4th Gen.00:08:33 — 4th Gen. Plus00:10:02 — 5th Gen.00:11:16 — Networking & Sensor Fusion00:13:12 — A Three Horse Race?00:14:19 — WHAT MAKES 6TH GEN?00:14:30 — The Next Steps?00:15:21 — Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)00:16:28 — Adaptive Cycle/Variable Cycle Engine (ACE/VCE)00:17:33 — Directed Energy00:18:14 — Why Build Them?00:20:58 — The Challenge00:21:01 — A Development Starshot00:22:02 — The Combination Problem00:22:34 — Directed Energy Weapon Testing00:23:05 — Single Features are Easy00:23:28 — Enabling the Requirements00:26:18 — Counting the Costs00:29:01 — Solution 1: A New Way to Design Aircraft00:31:08 — Solution 2: Fleet Size00:32:08 — Solution 3: Mega Projects00:34:06 — GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAM (GCAP)00:34:38 — The Tempest (UK and Italy)00:37:25 — The F-X (of Japan)00:40:42 — GCAP Merger00:42:21 — Program Goals00:44:29 — What to Expect?00:45:28 — F/A-XX (of the US Navy)00:45:36 — A New Generation Carrier Group00:46:40 — Tipping The Balance00:48:06 — What to Expect?00:49:12 — FCAS (of Germany, France, Spain)00:49:21 — A new European Fighter00:49:57 — The Requirements00:50:37 — The Concerns00:53:28 — Carrier Capability00:55:32 — NGAD (of the US Air Force)00:55:53 — A Different Beast00:57:26 — Growing Challenges00:59:11 — Refusing Parity00:59:55 — Rumoured Requirements01:01:02 — A Tall Order01:02:53 — Next Gen. Dominance01:05:46 — Questions01:07:47 — Conclusions01:08:45 — Channel Update
Bakhmut & The Ukraine Trench War - fortifications, attrition, and lessons Perun 2022-12-18 | As always, please check the pinned comment for any notes or corrections.For months now, a city with a pre-war population of 70,000 has been the focus of relentless artillery and infantry attacks by the Russian military and the "Wagner PMC."For many commentators, the attacks seem nonsensical. At a time when Russia is pivoting to defence just about everywhere else along the line, why keep pouring men and materiel into a city that simply doesn't have value relative to the effort expended trying to take it. In this video I zoom in on the battle for Bakhmut, and explore its history, implications, and some of what we have heard about the tactics there. At the same time, we also look at Russia's campaign of fortification building across much of the rest of Ukraine (and Russia). As the world focuses on Russia's Bakhmut attacks, Russia is throwing up belts of defences that...for now at least...seem to have some of the hallmarks of typical Russian defence procurement.Many thanks to the people who provided input into this episode, with a special thanks to Sgt. Kates - USMC, for giving the kind of input only a combat engineer can (I do not have any idea how to clear a minefield)As always, this video represents merely person views based on imperfect information gathered during an active war.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:While I have attempted to discuss the factors I consider when evaluating casualty claims - the reality is that the error bars around any estimates are still extremely wide. Estimates of 1:10 ratios in some sectors at certain times are paired with claims consistent with very different situations elsewhere. Even that Ukrainian Govt estimate on Russian losses may be low - simply because of when the estimate was made and the limited territory it may have covered. This is the problem of uncertainty when viewing a war from afar.While I am confident in the analysis of matters at the overarching strategic level - be aware that the smaller you get in this war, the less certain things often become.Notes and further reading:Thanks as always to various OSINT aggregation channels whose work is critical to analysis like this. A non exhaustive list includes:twitter.com/oryxspioenkoptwitter.com/UAWeaponstwitter.com/JuliaDavisNews?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthortwitter.com/DefMon3/status/1602059972103348225I do not generally link directly to Russian Telegram channels - but they provide an important source of information on how views of the war are evolving on that side."Arty Green" - Ukrainian artillery officer:youtube.com/watch?v=-5hmhU5LvC8Examples of constant media coverage:theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/ukraine-russia-war-cold-donetsk-frontlinetheguardian.com/world/2022/dec/10/russia-ukraine-war-bakhmut-meat-grinder-deadlockyoutube.com/watch?v=7kwy5BVTdo4nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world/europe/ukraine-war-bakhmut.htmlyoutube.com/watch?v=g51oovaB_SsTimestamps: 00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:40 — What Am I Talking About00:02:37 — DIGGING TO VICTORY00:02:43 — Fortification and Entrenchment00:03:59 — Search for Movement00:04:47 — Always a Risk of Reversion00:05:17 — THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE00:05:22 — The War in The Donbass00:06:12 — War of Movement00:07:07 — Transfer of the Initiative00:08:16 — Russia Digs In00:08:38 — Even in Russia...00:09:52 — There's Bakhmut00:10:49 — TIMELINE00:10:58 — Core Objective00:11:36 — "Protecting the Donbass"00:12:42 — The Donbass Offensive00:14:06 — It Isn't Just Bakhmut00:15:16 — Wagner's Verdun00:17:05 — A Brutal Back and Forth00:17:14 — Encirclement Plan & Ukrainian Rotation00:18:57 — FEATURES AND EVOLUTION00:19:08 — Entrenchment00:20:03 — Traditional Model00:21:04 — Wagner Waves00:21:42 — Wagner Tactics00:24:47 — War by the Meter00:25:42 — The Gas Station00:26:13 — The Garbage Dump00:26:55 — War Made Small00:27:46 — Infiltration Assaults00:28:47 — Myths00:31:18 — WHY BAKHMUT?00:31:31 — Road to Sloviansk00:32:47 — "Smashing Their Foreheads"00:33:22 — So Why?00:34:34 — IS IT WORTH IT?00:34:38 — We're Talking About It00:35:19 — A1: Offensive Potential00:36:05 — A2: Attrition00:37:10 — A3: Politics00:37:52 — Opportunity Cost00:38:39 — Other Options?00:39:04 — Real Cost of Bakhmut00:40:46 — What if Bakhmut is Taken?00:42:04 — ASSESSING THE COST00:42:23 — Illustrating the Point: Causality Scale00:44:35 — Medium-high Confidence Inputs00:45:33 — Consistency and Assumptions00:46:18 — The Picture00:49:45 — FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONS00:50:05 — Wat Defaulting to Attrition00:51:12 — Drone & Artillery Warfare00:52:45 — "Mines are the Worst"00:54:53 — Challenges of Breaching00:55:53 — Sidenotes on Options...00:56:33 — "Wagner Line"00:57:25 — The Ugly00:58:36 — The Significant00:59:25 — CONCLUSIONS01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Russias attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure - does strategic bombing ever work? Perun 2022-12-11 | Sign up to Morning Brew for free today morningbrewdaily.com/perun Sponsored by Morning BrewDescription:In the opening months of the war, Russia's formidable arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles was directed against a wide array of targets, from ground based air defences to military bases and infrastructure. For more information on that stage of the campaign, please refer to my previous video on the subject. But since October, Russia has turned both these systems and its newly arrived Iranian drones on Ukraine's critical infrastructure instead, particularly its power grid, sending millions into rolling (or total) blackouts. These attacks have all the hallmarks of strategic bombing, an attempt to destroy the ability and will of a nation to resist by striking targets behind the lines. It seems reasonable to assume that Russia's focus has thus turned from using its best weapons to destroy military units, to coercing the population and Government of Ukraine to surrender. That is not a new idea, and in this episode I examine the nature of the new Russian campaign, discuss historical strategic bombing campaigns and their outcomes, and try to build a better understanding of these attacks and what they might achieve.Caveats:Any attempt to discern exactly what Russia's intention is with these strikes is obviously limited by the fact that information on decision making in the Russian Government is extremely limited. This video is based on attempting to divine their motivation based on their actions. I also want to stress that announcements by all parties regarding these acts should be scrutinised closely - including all discussion of damage or interception rates. estimates on production rates and stockpiles is subject to wide error margins.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUSources:United States Strategic Bombing Survey - summary reportshttps://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0020_SPANGRUD_STRATEGIC_BOMBING_SURVEYS.pdfRUSI - Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022Russia declaring various attacks illegal/terrorismtass.com/politics/1520069tass.com/politics/1544997tass.com/russia/1529537euronews.com/2022/12/06/fire-at-russian-airport-labelled-as-terrorist-attack-by-moscowCoverage of civilians facing hardship (for illustrative purposes)washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/09/mykolaiv-water-infrastructure-ukarine-warforeignpolicy.com/2022/12/07/ukraine-is-on-the-edge-of-a-complete-blackoutEnergy support to Ukraine (for illustrative purposes)kyivindependent.com/news-feed/eu-will-give-ukraine-200-transformers-40-heavy-generators-to-support-energy-sectorhttps://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410869/finland-supports-energy-sector-in-ukraineCredit to Russia Media Monitor for their monitoring of Russian state TV (so I don't have to)twitter.com/JuliaDavisNewsTimestamps:00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS00:01:46 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?00:02:33 — SPONSOR: MORNING BREW00:03:38 — SOURCING00:04:45 — STRATEGIC BOMBING 10100:04:51 — What Is Strategic Bombing?00:05:35 — Initial Experiments00:06:02 — WWII00:07:17 — From Pyongyang to Linebacker00:08:07 — "Precission" Stretegic Bombing?00:08:43 — Russian Strategic Bombers00:09:39 — RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN SO FAR00:09:43 — The Early Missile Campaign00:12:21 — Targeting Switch00:13:39 — For What Purpose?00:15:54 — Why Energy?00:19:06 — November-December00:20:42 — The Russian Defence00:22:18 — The Russian Standard (Crimean Bridge)00:23:01 — The Russian Standard I (Attacks on Ships in Sevastopol)00:23:49 — The Russian Standard (Drone Attack)00:24:53 — Way Forward00:25:40 — DOES IT DESTROY INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL00:26:01 — Paralysing Production00:27:23 — The Oil Story00:28:48 — The Leuna Saga00:29:49 — Persistence and Precision00:30:51 — The Ukraine Problem00:31:37 — DOES IT DESTROY MILITARY POTENTIAL?00:31:51 — Mobility & Communications00:34:15 — The Cost of Defence00:35:26 — Total Impact00:36:38 — DOES IT BREAK MORALE?00:37:08 — Meet Giulio Douhet00:38:29 — USSBS Findings00:40:26 — Korea & Vietnam00:42:04 — Ukrainian Morale00:44:19 — SUSTAINABILITY00:44:33 — "Russia is Running out of Missiles"00:48:31 — Sustaining the Offensive00:50:48 — Sustaining Air Defence00:51:45 — The Supply Challenge00:53:28 — Critical Infrastructure00:55:12 — ADAPTATION00:55:26 — The Straight Line Trap00:56:31 — Target Adaptation00:57:47 — System Adaptation00:59:00 — Social Adaptation01:01:57 — WHAT NEXT?01:02:04 — A Supply Race01:02:47 — Adaptation01:03:54 — Counterstrike Potential01:05:17 — BUT IN THE END...01:07:39 — Suffering, not victory01:09:46 — CONCLUSIONS01:11:52 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Winter & the War in Ukraine - Who is better prepared for winter conditions? Perun 2022-12-04 | Description:The 2022 phase of the war in Ukraine began in the closing weeks of winter, with a February offensive rapidly coming to face the onset of mud and thawing conditions.Now, in December, Ukraine prepares for a full winter of full-scale, conventional conflict. Winter conditions are extremely demanding, both on manpower and materiel, and in this episode we look a little closer at what is involved in operating in cold weather conditions, how cold Ukraine gets, and how prepared both sides seem to be for the onset of their winter war. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:Getting a holistic picture on the quality of supply and training for Ukrainian and Russian units is difficult. Social media and visual evidence are useful sources, but will only ever represent a small sample of overall units. Analysis is based on, and limited by, the available information.On second listening, this video includes some wording that could have been tightened up. For example, I think I say efficiency regarding battery performance in cold word when 'capacity' would have been more accurate.When I suggest that both sides are likely to launch offensives, I do not mean that both will likely launch operations at the same scale, simply that both will identify local opportunities to exploit conditions.Comments on recent publicity around certain sponsors on YT towards the end of this video simply represent me restating what I have heard, and do not constitute an accusation of any wrongdoing by any actor. Sources/Extra Reading:ATP 3-90.97 Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operationsirp.fas.org/doddir/army/atp3-90-97.pdfATP 3-21.50 Infantry Small-Unit Mountain and Cold Weather Operations https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30234-ATP_3-21.50-000-WEB-1.pdf Supply of winter equipment:reuters.com/world/europe/nato-calls-allies-supply-winter-uniforms-ukrainian-army-2022-09-09telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/22/dead-winter-beckons-poorly-equipped-russian-forces-ukrainehttps://mil.in.ua/en/news/latvian-companies-begin-producing-winter-uniforms-for-armed-forces-of-ukraine/reuters.com/world/canada-announces-new-military-package-ukraine-after-russian-missile-attacks-2022-10-12UD 6-81-7 EINSTRUCTION IN WINTER SERVICEUSE AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENThttps://www.forsvaret.no/en/organisation/centre-of-excellence-cold-weather-operations/handbook-and-lectures/english-handbooksUkraine has enough gas for winter, prime minister saysreuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-has-enough-gas-winter-prime-minister-says-2022-11-04Credit to relevant Twitter aggregators referenced in this video, e.g.twitter.com/RALee85/status/1596509527293235213/photo/1twitter.com/RALee85/status/1555002181509586944twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1595515700810027008Order of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation dated November 4, 2022 No. 547 "On approval of the List of information in the field of military, military-technical activities of the Russian Federation, which, if received by foreign sources, can be used against the security of the Russian Federationhttp://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211170017?index=0&rangeSize=1Timestamps:00:00:00 — *OPENING WORDS*00:02:54 — *WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?*00:04:14 — _*HOW COLD IS COLD*_00:04:34 — Categorising Cold00:05:17 — Wet Cold00:06:33 — Dry Cold00:07:18 — Intense Cold00:08:05 — Extreme Cold00:08:54 — Hazardous Cold00:09:54 — How Cold Does Ukraine Get?00:11:12 — _*TACTICAL LEVEL*_00:11:24 — Concealment and Movement00:13:57 — Protecting the Person00:16:30 — Equipment Issues00:17:46 — Mounting Requirements00:19:35 — Training and Discipline Premium00:23:14 — What Does it Mean?00:25:23 — _*OPERATIONAL LEVEL*_00:25:42 — Not a Time to Stop00:27:25 — Historical Engagements00:28:42 — Enabling Movement00:29:48 — Pushing Logistics00:31:12 — The Aerial Dimension00:32:55 — _*HOW WELL PREPARED ARE THEY*_00:33:17 — Not Their First Winter War00:34:56 — The MOBIK Problem00:36:39 — Gearing Up for Winter00:38:09 — The Russian Situation00:39:34 — The Full Spectrum00:40:58 — Real Solutions00:41:20 — The Role of Volunteers00:42:39 — Are They Ready?00:45:25 — Leadership at All Levels00:47:18 — Operational Concerns00:48:40 — The Fuel of War00:49:38 — So, On Balance?00:51:10 — _*WHAT TO EXPECT?*_00:51:24 — Objectives00:53:23 — Operational Tempo00:54:13 — Realities at the Front00:55:31 — _*STRATEGY LEVEL*_00:55:43 — Winter Economics00:56:22 — Russian Comfort00:57:02 — Threats00:58:45 — The Will Go On01:00:23 — *CONCLUSIONS*01:01:55 — *CHANNEL UPDATE*
Polish military modernisation & why are they buying Korean tanks? - Featuring @TheChieftainsHatch Perun 2022-11-27 | Sponsored by World Of Tanks - If you're interested, use the following link to sign up: http://bit.ly/3UuHS1hIn the video I'm pretty sure I say you get the Matilda Black Prince - it's actually the Excelsior, which is a decent tank capable of moving faster than walking speed (unlike my TOG II). You also get a bunch of in game currency, seven days of premium, and rental access to three solid vehicles - Tiger, Cromwell, and T-34/85. Only for new players though!Importantly though - I want to stress the Chieftain is appearing in a personal capacity for his video segment, not as a rep of Wargaming or WoT.Description:Military modernisation is a complex task for any state. Individual system selection is usually based on competitive trials and an extensive review and evaluation process. Usually. Poland's plans are a little different - ordering what is basically an entire new army's worth of equipment (with more tanks than many other major European states combined) from the Republic of Korea without any sort of extended trials process. In this episode, I ask the question of why a country in Europe would suddenly buy 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery pieces from a country half way around the world without so much as a trials program for the tank. To comment on why Poland may have selected the K2 - I've invited back the Chieftain to give a tanker's expert view on the question. Thank you as always for engaging with this study of defence economics in action, and we'll return to topics examining the Ukraine war next week. Caveats:There are two big caveats over this one. The first is that announcements (as used as a key source here) doesn't always mean a program will deliver on time or as announced. 1,000 tanks ordered could become 500, delivery times might change etc. In fact, I'd go so far as to say they PROBABLY WILL change in many respects. This is a massive block of procurement that will challenge the heck out of any procurement office, let alone one that has not had to deal with this volume in recent years. The second is that some statements are based on what you might call industry rumour, scuttlebutt, 'common knowledge' or what have you. I have tried to flag these where they come up. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUSources & Further Reading:2021 platform figures are MB2021 as usual for the sake of consistency between episodes. NATO expenditure figures are per NATO as normal:https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htmFor PPP calculations - see detailed sourcing in my video on European DefencePolish announcement on domestic production:https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/himars-and-k239-chunmoo-launchers-will-be-partially-produced-in-polandRE: Technical modernisation plansdefence24.com/armed-forces/poland-to-spend-133-billion-on-modernization-of-the-armed-forces-new-f-16-to-be-orderedPolish MoD publications:https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/defenceconcept-publicationPolish Abrams Procurement announcement example:defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/05/poland-signs-475-billion-abrams-tank-deal-as-russias-war-speeds-procurements"USAF plan to Divest to Invest is too risky" - Gen. John Michael Loh (ret.) (presented without either endorsement or critique)defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/11/16/us-air-forces-divest-to-invest-plan-is-too-riskyK9 production for Poland:https://www.edrmagazine.eu/hanwha-rolls-out-24-k9pl-howitzers-for-polandTimestamps:00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS00:02:06 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT00:03:04 — SPONSOR: WORLD OF TANKS00:04:32 — *THE POLISH MILITARY*00:04:44 — A Cold War Force00:06:23 — Between East and West00:07:42 — The Military of 202100:08:20 — Designed with Purpose00:10:32 — Poland's Competing Requirements00:12:03 — The Polish DIB00:13:13 — Borsuk & Krab00:14:12 — *THE BUYING SPREE*00:15:34 — K200:16:10 — K900:16:56 — K23900:19:34 — FA-5000:19:57 — A "Diverse" Fleet00:20:54 — *HOW ARE THEY AFFORDING IT*00:20:58 — Divest to Invest00:22:34 — Budgets and Margins00:24:03 — But it is Expensive00:25:15 — *WHY KOREAN*00:25:25 — An Extensive Order Book00:26:12 — *ASSESSING K2*00:26:22 — Guest: The Chieftain00:36:55 — *THE INDUSTRIAL DIMENSION*00:37:27 — More Than Just Speculations00:38:32 — *KOREAN EXPORT STRATEGY*00:38:49 — A Growing Player00:39:29 — RoK Arms Exports (SIPRI TIV 2001-21)00:39:53 — Competitive Advantages00:41:21 — Playing to Their Strengths00:42:20 — The Strategy00:43:31 — *TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & MARKET PENETRATION*00:43:42 — S1: Imported Hardware00:45:52 — S2: Domestic Production00:48:05 — S3: Joint Development & Marketing00:49:36 — *TARGET EUROPE*00:49:54 — The European Market00:50:57 — Entrenched Actors00:51:43 — Evolving Tank Fleets00:53:09 — A Third Competitor00:55:20 — The Korean Offer00:56:48 — CONCLUSIONS00:57:50 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Ukraines Kherson Campaign - Lessons & Implications of the Southern counterattack Perun 2022-11-20 | Sponsored by Ground News:Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perunDescription:While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion centre on the battle for Kyiv and the reverses Russia suffered there, in the South, the Russian invasion was altogether more successful in its opening moves. Advancing from Crimea, the Russians rapidly secured a number of critical positions in the South of the country, including a regional capital on the right bank of the Dnipro, the city of Kherson. The fighting to take back Kherson would be some of the hardest for Ukrainian forces. They would face a number of high quality Russian units who were heavily dug in, and they would do it over unfavourable ground. The fighting would take months and claim many lines before the final Russian withdrawal in November. This is the story of that campaign - from the city's fall to its liberation, along with some of the lessons and observations that we can (with admittedly low confidence levels) make using the data available so far.Caveats:Data quality and certainty will always vary video to video. In the case of this video, the topic in question is battlefield movements and the conduct of operations. As such, there is a considerably lower level of confidence than there are over major economic patterns for example. I expect that at least some of this analysis will be refuted or augmented by later discoveries or data releases - at which point I will prepare an update. But given the implications of this campaign, I thought it best to try and tell the story now, with the best information we currently have available. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUFurther Reading/Sources:Several maps used credit of the Institute for the Study of War, eg.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2022Visually confirmed loss statistics as per Oryx:oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html (and Ukr equivalent)RE: Russian media statements - special credit to the work of people like Julia Davis & Wartranslatedtwitter.com/JuliaDavisNews?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthortwitter.com/wartranslated?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorTelegram extracts from both the Russian MoD and Russia's Kherson administration are used - as always I do not link directly to these but they are credited hereRegarding the Antonovski campaign - the best thread documenting strikes and inadvertent BDA is maintained by the Twitter User Special Kherson Catmobile.twitter.com/bayraktar_1lovetwitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1558720653347487745?lang=enGraphics from the videos of Kings and Generals Included:youtu.be/yBZPE9o2gHUAnd as always thanks to other OSINT channels and aggregators, including Ukraine Weapons Tracker twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor....and to all those interviewed or questioned directly in preparation for this video.Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:02:36 — What Am I Talking About?00:03:18 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS00:04:29 — The Fall of Kherson00:07:20 — Victory at Mykolaiv00:09:34 — Steady Transition00:10:19 — The Shaping Campaign00:12:06 — Telegraphing the Offensive00:14:25 — The Himars Campaign00:16:51 — The Crimean Dimension00:17:51 — Concentrating Capability00:20:00 — The Campaign Begins00:21:44 — The Attack Goes In00:22:42 — Russia Claim Victory00:24:52 — Announcing Victory00:26:04 — Continuing Pressure00:27:21 — Supply, Attrition, Corrosion00:28:05 — The Story of a Bridge00:29:33 — Back and Forth00:31:45 — Final Days00:32:55 — The End00:33:04 — The First Cracks00:34:42 — The Withdrawal00:39:03 — Reclamation00:40:09 — Losses and Military Observations00:44:39 — New Capabilities...00:46:06 — ... And Old Ones00:47:10 — The Cost of Victory...00:47:52 — ... And of Defeat00:49:10 — Interrogating Losses00:50:48 — Some Very Old Stuff...00:53:33 — Reactions & Significance00:53:52 — Ukrainian Elation?00:55:35 — Russia - Confusion and Anger00:57:39 — International Community00:58:55 — Discrediting "Annexation"01:01:00 — What Next?01:01:12 — Reading the Terrain01:03:55 — Redeployment Opportunities01:05:23 — Towards a Winter Campaign01:07:24 — Conclusions01:10:19 — Channel Update
How lies destroy armies - Lies, coverups, and Russian failures in Ukraine Perun 2022-11-13 | Sign up to Morning Brew for free today: morningbrewdaily.com/perunSponsored by Morning BrewA note on враньё "Vranyo" : In this video I use the term "Vranyo" to describe a particular pattern or type of lying. Consulting with many Russian speakers in preparation for this segment, i got many conflicting definitions of враньё with some suggesting it was derogatory, others that there was no difference between it and ложь, while others said it was the perfect term for the phenomenon described. In the end I have used it because it is a neat term to describe a complex practice/phenomenon, but understand that it is being used as a label, not as an unambiguous code word for these practices of collective, knowing deception.Description:The performance of a military system is about more than the sum of its equipment, manpower, and training. Culture and practices are critical.The Russian army appears to suffer from serious cultural issues. Corruption is a key one, while the practice of making up obvious lies to cover up the real state of affairs (which everyone then goes along with) and telling the boss what they want to hear at all costs - those practices enable corruption to thrive, and seriously undermine battlefield decision making. In this episode, we look at the culture of deception in the Russian army, explore some of the common complaints, and discuss some ways it may (I am not a Kremlinologist) potentially impact or have impacted Russian decision making in Ukraine. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats: As noted below in sourcing, the existence of "Vranyo" is a cultural phenomenon that is hard to measure. While we can find evidence of it at a macro level, attestations for its prevalence are based on interviews, anecdotes, and complaints from former conscripts, serving personnel, and ordinary Russians. As such this video should be taken as describing a phenomenon and some of the damage it can cause - but I do not make any assertion over exactly how widespread it is.I also stress that this sort of lying appears in many organisations where people are encouraged 'to 'tell the boss what they want to hear' I am also not a Kremlin whisperer - so my discussion of how Vranyo at that level is obviously purely hypothetical. Sources and extra reading:The Russian Way of War - Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernisation of the Russian Ground Forces (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth)https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdfOpposing force tactics, TC 7-100.2https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdfComposite credits to the work of translators of Russian commentary like Dmitri of Wartranslatedtwitter.com/wartranslated?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorTASS on Fake News Lawstass.com/politics/1416591Translation of alleged letter by the 155th regarding the incompetence and deception of Rustam Muradovtwitter.com/i/web/status/1589298282085646337Russian Denial of the abovereuters.com/world/europe/russia-issues-rare-denial-pointless-losses-by-brigade-ukraine-2022-11-07Discussion of the alleged purge of the FSB 5th Service:youtube.com/watch?v=6SA5d2JgazMKadyrov threatens to brief Putintheguardian.com/world/2022/sep/11/putin-loyalist-kadyrov-criticises-russian-armys-performance-over-ukraine-retreatTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:31 — What Am I Talking About?00:02:12 — SPONSOR: MORNING BREW00:03:21 — "Vranyo" - A Culture of Lies00:03:33 — What's in a Word00:05:02 — Rejecting Reality & Substituting Your Own00:06:33 — History & Collective Participation00:08:46 — Stocks vs Soldiers00:09:07 — Motivation00:10:16 — Involuntary Participation00:12:55 — Compounding Falsehood00:14:42 — Militaries as Networked Systems00:15:03 — War is not an RTS00:16:37 — Information Flow Enables Decision Making00:17:46 — Why is the Russian Army so Vulnerable00:18:02 — The RUssian Way of War00:18:38 — War as an Equation00:20:38 — Forces and Means00:23:33 — Echelonment (aka Leming Attacks)00:26:06 — Rigidity and Commander Centric Decision Making00:28:46 – Objective: Fortressgrad00:30:25 — The Assault on Fortressgrad00:31:46 — Start at the Bottom00:33:35 — The Officers Get Involved00:35:14 — A Fine Airforce Showing00:36:08 — Garbage In...00:38:17 — ...Garbage Out00:40:52 — Smile For the Cameras00:41:31 — A Doomed Venture00:42:23 — Pervasive Complaints00:45:23 — Vranyo All the Way to the Top00:46:46 — Understanding Ukraine00:50:07 — Understanding The Russian Army00:52:12 — Understanding the Russian Economy & the West00:53:55 — Understanding Progress00:54:55 — Tragic Results00:58:02 — Can You Fix It?00:58:34 — Failure-Safe Systems01:00:07 — Trust But Verify01:01:04 — Entrenched Culture01:02:16 — Conclusions01:03:51 — Channel Update
Russias Allies - How will Iran, Syria & North Korea impact the war in Ukraine? Perun 2022-11-06 | Over the last several months I've spent a great deal of time (and will spend more time) looking at the role that Ukraine's friends and allies have played in supporting its war-effort. This has included the provision of funds, weapons, humanitarian aid and the taking in of millions of Ukrainian refugees. Against the backdrop of that assistance, it's easy to paint Russia as entirely isolated, a pariah state without friends to turn to. While it may not have the allies that Ukraine does, that is obviously not entirely true. From Iranian drones to North Korean shells, there are signs that Russia is turning to friendly or allied powers for the tools it needs to carry on its war - and in this episode we look at those nations and what impact they've had so far...and may have in the future. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUFurther Reading:Relating to the DPRK:Example of the 100,000 claim - https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/100000-north-korean-soldiers-could-be-sent-to-bolster-putins-forces-fighting-ukraine/news-story/1126782c8c5e6fe08a8ad2d9fa38dff0US claims on ammunition salespolitico.com/news/2022/11/02/north-korea-is-secretly-supplying-russia-with-ammunition-kirby-says-00064611DPRK denials:theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/north-korea-denies-supplying-weapons-or-ammunition-to-russiaArticles relating to Syria:The Guardian "20,000 mercenaries" claim - theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/19/russia-deployed-20000-mercenaries-ukraine-donbas-regionPutin approving the use of Middle Eastern fighters -reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-volunteers-welcome-help-fight-against-ukrainian-forces-2022-03-11Tracking Syrian losses in the Civil Warbellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/03/27/saa-vehicle-losses-2011-2017Carnegie on the Syrian mercenaries claim - carnegieendowment.org/sada/87382RE: CENTCOM statemental-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/russia-not-sending-syrians-ukraine-just-yet-top-us-general-saysRecruitment effortsaljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/in-syria-moscow-leads-effort-to-recruit-fighters-for-ukraineenglish.aawsat.com/home/article/3784656/no-syrian-%E2%80%98mercenaries%E2%80%99-russia%E2%80%99s-war-ukraine-%E2%80%98so-far%E2%80%99Iran: Stoltenberg statement on the potential supply of ballistic missiles:reuters.com/world/iran-could-supply-russia-with-ballistic-missiles-nato-chief-says-2022-11-03Western claims on Iranian missile supply:theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/18/iran-agrees-to-supply-missiles-as-well-as-drones-to-russiaIran acknowledging drone shipments:abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-acknowledges-sending-drones-russia-time-92701301CSTO:TASS on Armenian requests for aid:tass.com/world/1506567Caveats:The supply of weapons or troops by Russia's allies is obviously a matter of great secrecy - as a result, conclusions drawn here are based on available open source information and may not reflect any secret movements or aidRegarding statements on Iranian or DPRK missile systems - these statements are general and based on assumed or projected paper capabilities. Accurate CEP data on all Iranian missiles compared to Iskander for example is not available.Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:03:12 — What Am I Covering?00:03:49 — Not For Today: The PRC & Russia00:05:01 — Russia's NATO: The CSTO00:05:56 — The Commonwealth of Independent States00:06:46 — Russia's NATO cont.00:08:23 — Capabilities and Recent History00:09:44 — Erosion00:12:16 — DPRK (North Korea)00:15:35 — Songun's Result00:17:22 — A Deadly Museum00:19:27 — Kim's Hundred Thousands00:21:44 — Ammunition Transfers00:22:41 — What Could Go?00:25:25 — Impact & What Next?00:27:50 — Assad's Syria00:28:53 — An Ugly War00:30:19 — Russian Intervention in Syria00:32:29 — The Syrian Arab Army00:33:36 — Syria & Ukraine00:35:09 — The Phantom Mercenaries?00:37:44 — Impact and What Next?00:41:36 — Their Own War?00:42:17 — Iran - Russian and the Islamic Republic00:44:44 — The Web of Iranian Military Structures00:47:39 — Iran & Ukraine00:50:37 — War on the Cheap00:52:50 — Impact & What Next00:54:55 — Conclusions00:57:33 — Channel Update
European Defence & The Russian Challenge - Third Superpower or paper tiger? Perun 2022-10-30 | Sponsored by Ground News:Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perunIntro: Throughout 2022, implied or explicit Russian military threats to Europe by Russian politicians or media figures have become so common as to be almost ubiquitous. In many ways, this is a continuation of long historical pattern dating back to the cold war, when much of Western Europe lived in fear that, at any moment, the Soviet army may come storming West with a phalanx of metal and manpower. For many European leaders, the assumption long was that only the USA could serve as a meaningful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Even with the end of the cold war, NATO wargames and academic papers alike have often modeled scenarios where Russian forces maul NATO opponents, occupying the Baltic States or Poland in short order, demanding an American response. But 2022 has also proven the Russian military is not what it claimed to be, and so it is likewise worth taking stock of what Europe has to offer. For while individually, most European militaries have glaring shortcomings, especially compared to the USA (particularly in the area of munitions storages and readiness rates) taken together they represent and impressive military force.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUSources:System and manpower figures are as per Military Balance 2021. NATO budget figures for 2021 (est) are as per NATO release:https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htmNATO Strategic Concept (2022)https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/INIOCHOS '22 exercise (illustrative of joint exercise/training)https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/allied-fighters-increase-combat-readiness-during-exercise-iniochos-22 UK MOD aircraft flight hour figuresassets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/827297/Military_flying_hours_by_fleet_FY2018-19.pdfInternational Comparisons of Real Military Purchasing Power: A Global Database - Peter Robertsonhttps://api.research-repository.uwa.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/96622664/DP19.13_Robertson.pdfRussian politicians suggesting Poland is in line for invasion:https://archive.ph/pG5djPolish Official stating Europe cannot defend itself without the USAapnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-poland-united-states-crimea-07647005997157def8aa16b8cf833b53Polling on NATO and common defence obligationshttps://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196561.htmRAND - Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern FlankWargaming the Defense of the Balticsrand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.htmlCaveats & Corrections:The use of PPP figures is always fraught with different methods often yielding quite different results. They're useful, and almost certainly necessary if you want an accurate picture, but keep in mind the limitations of the figures used here. Similarly, while I use MB2021 for consistency between videos for all system/manpower figures, they are not perfect, and in particular the definitions used for active/stored equipment or whether a given unit should count as active/reserve/paramilitary or be ignored entirely is occasionally, in my view, up for debate. There are also, I believe, three locations where I misspeak in this episode while the backing slides are correct. For example, when the stats on screen refer to PSCs, (big ships) I say coastal combatants or words to that effect. If it sounds odd - check the slide. Timestamps00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:55 — What Am I Covering?00:02:46 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS00:03:57 — Evolution Of European Security00:04:04 — A Militarised Continent00:05:15 — Nato & The Warsaw Pact00:06:23 — The Peace Dividend & NATO Expansion00:08:46 — Ukraine and Beyond00:10:18 — European Forces Today00:10:29 — What Are We Counting?00:11:44 — Let's Talk Money00:12:23 — GRAPH: Estimated Defence Expenditure (NATO fig.)00:12:52 — The PPP Factor00:15:25 — GRAPH: Estimated Expenditure (with PPP Premiums)00:15:52 — The PPP Picture00:16:46 — Manpower00:18:14 — GRAPH: Active Reserve Manpower00:19:36 — Equipment00:20:41 — The Full Spectrum00:21:23 — European Strengths (on Paper)00:21:38 — European Strengths: Land00:23:30 — European Strengths: Sea00:25:42 — European Strengths: Air00:28:02 — European Strengths: Independent Atomic Deterrence00:30:47 — Fit For Purpose?00:32:11 — There is No "European" Military00:33:41 — Challenges of Division00:36:20 — Can, Would & Deterrence00:37:45 — Modernisation00:38:48 — Depth & Resilience00:39:56 — Readiness and Mobility00:41:40 — Comparisons & Capabilities?00:42:33 — Russia as the Yardstick00:46:16 — Demonstrated Capabilities00:48:12 — The Aerial Dimension?00:49:34 — Cognitive Dissonance?00:50:44 — The US Comparison00:51:29 — THe Gap - Power Projection & Nuclear Capabilities00:54:48 — Opportunities to Grow?00:57:47 — Conclusions01:00:07 — Channel Update
The Naval War in Ukraine - The Moskva, Missiles & Lessons Perun 2022-10-23 | The Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the Ukrainian war as the unchallenged master of that body of water. Ukraine's own fleet was small and less modern, and the opening weeks of the war were dominated by news of the Russian fleet launching missile attacks and threatening naval landings that pinned down Ukrainian forces in Odessa. But when the Moskva sank, the pattern of naval activity changed dramatically. Now, the Russian fleet stays mostly away from the Ukrainian cost, nervous of missile, drone, and air threats posed by an opponent whose own navy is mostly neutralised. In this episode I look at the evolving war in the Black Sea, the evolution and role of the Russian navy there, the sinking of the Moskva - and what if any lessons foreign observers might be taking from the war at sea so far.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:The sinking of the Moskva, for all that we have learned, ultimately remains a mystery. I have not interviewed any of her crew, and I am not an expert in the field. I have tried to explain why I adopt conclusions on some matters and decline to make any on others - but even the conclusions made are only at a moderate confidence level. There could have been more missiles, there could just have been some horrible freak accident involved. The comments therein are thus ultimately the best I can make using the evidence available - but as with so many other things in this war, I expect future evidence will reveal twists we do not now anticipate. I'd also note there are a few typos that snuck through on the slides - forgive these please.I'd also like to flag that the use of ground based systems at sea is not an unknow - though it is usually intended as an expedient. In some cases the ships involved may also merely have been transporting the systems, though that does not seem to have been the case in all instances. Russian naval operations are obviously secret and knowledge presented therein is based on open source information - it is, for example, possible that Russia launches secret incursions against the Ukrainian coast, but the situation described is based on the best available information I have access to. Finally - yes i know it's a stretch giving the Canadians credit for the Brits torching the White House , but the joke was thereSources/notable articles:Russian fleet strengths - composite but primarily Military balance 2021US accelerating deployment of laser weapons for navy shipsnews.usni.org/2022/07/26/cno-missile-attack-on-russian-warship-moskva-moved-navy-to-speed-up-laser-defense-for-shipsWeapon supply data drawn from open source aggregators - including Oryx and official sources, E.G for Germanyhttps://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992Russian navy and PLAN recognition Guideshttps://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia_Ship_Silhouettes_2021.png?ver=hrKOr75XjW5QYQzVwlVkhw%3d%3dThe Sinking of the Moskva by Christopher Carlsonhttp://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/pdf/His2022_Sinking_of_Moskva.pdfRussian claims on Moskva's sinking:tass.com/russia/1438045Turkey closing the straits:aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkeyaljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkeyTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:15 — What Am I Covering?00:02:07 — Evolution of the Russian Navy00:03:00 — Land and Sea Powers00:04:14 — The Rises and Falls of Russian Naval Power00:06:07 — Gorshkov's Navy00:07:16 — The "Soviet Style” of Ship00:10:00 — The Cost of Firepower00:11:22 — The 90's00:12:53 — Putin, Modernisation, Syria & "Kalibrisation"00:14:45 — Pre-War Strength00:15:46 — Russian Federation Navy Recognition and Identification Guide00:16:13 — The Early Stages of the War00:16:22 — Russian Fleet Strength00:18:31 — The Opening Salvos00:20:27 — End of the Ukrainian Navy00:22:22 — From Snake Island to Odessa00:24:32 — The Moskva Moment: A Moment That Captured Global Attention00:26:53 — The Soviet Rustbuckets00:28:36 — How Did It Happen?00:30:33 — Moskva Under The Microscope00:32:51 — State of the Ship00:35:01 — Incompetence or Arrogance?00:37:16 — What Did It Mean?00:38:07 — What Happened?00:40:19 — Emerging Threats00:40:39 — The Missile Threat00:43:27 — Drones and Air Threats00:44:54 — Networked Intelligence00:46:24 — What Next?00:47:10 — Unmanned Systems Introduced00:49:21 — The Crimean Dimension00:50:15 — Force Regeneration00:52:13 — Lessons & Observations00:53:56 — Paper vs Actual Capabilities00:55:36 — Soft Factors01:01:19 — Nowhere to Hide01:02:27 — Conclusions01:04:01 — Channel Update
Deadly Skies Air Defence In Ukraine - Drones, SAMs, and Attrition Perun 2022-10-16 | The Russian Air Force began the war in Ukraine with a formidable inventory of combat aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) supported by an array of stand-off munitions and EWAR capabilities. In the opening hours, it seemed that those capabilities may be paying off, with paratroopers inserting at Hostomel without interception by Ukraine's integrated air defence system (IADS). At the same time, Russian columns were (seemingly incomprehensibly) being picked apart by slow moving TB-2 Drones.But things changed quickly, and since the stabilisation of the situation, the airspace over Ukraine has been contested. Aircraft fly low to avoid interception, while new threats periodically emerge to challenge the equilibrium. Recently, those include HARM missiles, Iranian and Russian loitering munitions, and cruise missile attacks on civilian infrastructure. In this video I look at the impact of air-defence systems on the Ukraine war, and what lessons observers may be taking based on the available data. Patreon: patreon.com/PerunAUGaming Chanel:youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQCaveats:The two big unknowns sitting behind this one should be obvious - accurate loss data and the burn rate on munitions is hard to come by. Visually confirmed losses diverge heavily from claimed losses in every category, but for aircraft in particular. While an important topic - it is important to remember that the data here is ...flawed to say the least. Sources:Figures for arms exports are SIPRI TIVs for 2001-2021Figures on pre-war weapon inventories are Military Balance 2021Individual engagement examples like shootdowns are credited to a range of OSINT aggregators including: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.htmltwitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorUsage of Gepards and Osa together in Ukraine:armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_conflict_war_2022/ukrainian_army_uses_together_german_gepard_air_defense_gun_system_and_russian_sa-8_missile_system.htmlOn Russian EWAR efforts - Colonel (Retired) Jeffrey Fischerthedefensepost.com/2022/04/13/russia-electronic-warfare-failure-ukraine"The Russian Victory Everyone Missed" - Military History not Visualised (note that I don't agree with all of the conclusions therein)youtube.com/watch?v=SooynsCBOr0&t=229sSlovakian S-300 supplyaljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/slovakia-says-it-has-given-s-300-air-defence-system-to-ukraineMovement of Russian missiles from Saint Petersburg:https://yle.fi/news/3-12626182#:~:text=Satellite%20images%20obtained%20by%20Yle%20indicate%20that%20Russia%20has%20been,areas%20for%20Russian%20air%20defence.Russian sources are as previously statedTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:02:19 — What Am I Covering?00:03:34 — Soviet Sam Development00:05:55 — An Integrated Offering00:06:32 — Long Range Systems00:09:06 — Mid-Short Range Defence00:10:14 — SHORAD, Lots of SHORAD00:12:25 — The Dominant Actor00:13:55 — Usage In Ukraine00:14:10 — The Opening Days00:16:48 — The Line's Steady00:19:07 — Contested Airspace00:19:41 — Disruptive Systems00:21:18 — The Missile Campaigns00:22:47 — "Traditional Targets"00:25:53 — A Failure of SEAD/DEAD00:27:25 — "Unconventional Targets"00:28:23 — The TB-2 Experience00:29:40 — The Himars Problem00:32:40 — The Orlan Problem00:35:47 — Losses and Statistics00:37:04 — Confirmed Russian Losses00:37:50 — Ukrainian Losses00:39:00 — Resupply and Sustainment00:40:49 — Western Systems and Their Deployment00:42:35 — What Has Been Pledged?00:44:50 — Inventory Problem00:45:56 — NASAMS and its Significance00:48:14 — Themes and Observations00:48:59 — SEAD/DEAD Are Hard00:50:44 — Drones - The Vulnerable00:51:28 — Drones - The Problematic00:53:42 — New Threats, New Defences00:55:08 — Old Tools, and New Ones00:56:22 — EWAR & Software00:57:17 — A Renewed Market01:00:06 — Conclusions01:01:26 — Channel Update
Ukrainian mobilisation & force generation - Featuring General Ben Hodges (Ret.) Perun 2022-10-08 | Last week we talked about Russian mobilisation and what it might mean for Russian force generation this year and next - and in particular, I noted the fact that it was possible that the problems were resolved and new combat power was generated. In order to assess what impact that may have on the course of the war though Winter and into 2023, it's important to consider the Ukrainian side of the equation. The Ukrainians have been clear on their ambitions for next year, and set out what they believe their force requirements to be. So the question becomes - what are those requirements and can they meet them. In this episode, I explore that question, augmented by excerpts from an interview with the former commander of the US Army in Europe - LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & Corrections:As stated in the video - I cannot thank Ben Hodges enough for agreeing to participate in this video. He has not reviewed the content of the episode and all views expressed by me remain mine and mine alone.At one point during this video I say that the US conducted a market survey of firms that could produce 16,000 shells per month - the correct figure is 12,000. I also refer to the supply of aircraft by Bulgaria. that supply was reportedly of aircraft parts. bulgaria has denied supplying full aircraft from inventory and given it continues to fly its aircraft I have good reason to believe that statement Sources:Article by Valery Zaluzhnyi & Mykhailo Zabrodskyihttps://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.htmlUS market survey of potential artillery producers:sam.gov/opp/90113cce8c9a452a93fc5c7db958dac2/viewCredit to the regular OSINT channels who collect video and visual evidence of weapon systems, ammunition, and losses in Ukraine:Oryx - twitter.com/oryxspioenkopUkraine Weapons Tracker- twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor1995 artillery shell inventory - intended to illustrate the fact that the USSR was not the only power to stock up on shellsgovinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89.htmCSIS piece on US weapons supply bottlenecks to Ukrainecsis.org/analysis/united-states-running-out-weapons-send-ukraineTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:40 — What Am I Covering?00:03:14 — LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)00:04:16 — Ukraine Pre-February00:05:29 — Wartime Evolution00:07:28 — Force '23 - Ukraine's Military Objectives00:08:37 — The Force Requirement00:09:37 — Manpower vs Metal00:10:46 — Interview pt.I: Ukrn Force Generation00:11:34 — Interview pt.I: Answer00:13:23 — Can It Be Done?00:14:02 — Heavy Weapons00:14:10 — Warsaw Standard00:15:47 — Interview pt.II: Equipment00:16:16 — Interview pt.II: Answer00:18:51 — Nato Armour?00:20:56 — Interview pt.III - Nato Armour?00:21:20 — Interview pt.III - Answer00:22:33 — Maintenance and Sustainment00:23:33 — Russia's Own Advantages00:24:28 — Interview pt.IV: Overcoming Maintenance and Sustainment Challenges00:24:59 — Interview pt.IV: Answer00:29:36 — Long Range Capabilities00:32:12 — Munition & Shell Crisis00:33:11 — Sustaining the Soviet(+) Systems00:35:12 — Unconventional Sources00:35:54 — Iran's Contribution?00:37:20 — Nato Standard in Quantity00:38:51 — Feeding The Guns00:39:32 — Interview pt.V: Feeding The Guns00:40:16 — Interview pt.V: Answer00:44:02 — Case Study: US Industry Response00:45:54 — Case Study: US Ammo Production00:47:40 — Is Production up to the Task?00:49:48 — Interview pt.VI: Is the West capable of sustaining Ukraine?00:50:22 — Interview pt.VI: Answer00:51:36 — The Force Generation Race00:52:03 — What About the Russian Effort?00:52:46 — Interview pt.VII: Russian and Ukrainian Mobilisation Assessment00:53:10 — Interview pt.VII: Answer00:54:17 — What About The Russian Effort? - Cont.00:55:02 — Interview pt.VIII: Likely Failure Point for the Russian Military?00:55:33 — Interview pt.VIII: Answer00:59:57 — Who wins the Force Generation Race?01:00:54 — Interview pt.IX: Final Reflections and Predictions01:01:21 — Interview pt.IX: Answer01:04:28 — Conclusions01:06:42 — Channel Update
Russian Mobilisation - what does it mean for the war in Ukraine? Perun 2022-10-01 | Sponsored by Blinkist: Use the link to start your free 7-day Blinkist and get 25% off a Premium membership: blinkist.com/perunFor nearly seven months, the war in Ukraine was not really regarded as a genuine war by the Russian government. The fighting would be done not by a fully mobilised Russian force, but by regular units, mercenaries, and Donbass conscripts - Russia's own conscripts would stay at home. But after seven months the result of that complacency was a crushing shortage of manpower to feed Russian frontline units. Ukrainian mobilisation had made good manpower losses and allowed the formation of entirely new units - while the Russian regular army, still undoubtedly a powerful force, found itself overstretched and forced to trust sections of the front to proxies or Rosgvardia. The results of that policy were obvious during the Kharkiv offensive. Now, Russia has decided to double down and recommit to war. Announcing mobilisation, enacting stop-loss, and 'annexing' parts of Ukraine. In this video, I explore why, how it's going, and what the implication may be.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:All my videos suffer from fog-of-war effects, but this one is especially difficult because it relies on things that are hard to quantify. The morale of Russian conscripts for example, is critical to the impact this mobilisation has, but is difficult to assess from open sources. As such, take my observations in this video as an attempt to surface relevant considerations, rather than any kind of confident or definitive assessment. I also want to stress that while I focus on some of the difficulties Russia is facing during the mobilisation I want to bring one point home yet again. Russia may be able to find its feet and generate new units if given time and an absence of battlefield pressure. It would be wrong to write off Russian mobilisation potential - and thus It is reasonable to assess that the importance of Ukraine accumulating additional resources in order to compensate is more vital than it has been in months (in my humble opinion). Notes on Sourcing: CSIS piece on Russian force design and manpower issuescsis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/best-or-worst-both-worldsAljazeera (just as an illustration of media coverage) on Russian recruitment strategies prior to mobilisation:aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/18/russia-turns-to-trucks-and-big-wages-to-woo-volunteer-soldiersFull text of the mobilisation order:https://www.politico.eu/article/text-vladimir-putin-mobilization-decree-war-ukraine-russia/Many of the DLPR/Russian sources used in this video should be familiar to those on this channel. Given the nature of many of these individuals, I do not directly link their content (and obviously do not endorse their views). But these are easy to find if verification is desired. Often quoted for example is Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of a 'regular' unit of the (now defunct) so called 'DPR.'en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_KhodakovskyAgain, credit to Rob Lee and others for their work collecting and reporting on Russian obituaries and unit casualty identification. twitter.com/RALee85Timestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:01:40 — What Am I Covering?00:02:41 — Sponsor: BLINKIST00:04:20 — The Problem00:04:48 — Strategic Inputs00:06:24 — Russia's 'Unused Strength'00:08:22 — 1GTA: Instructors and Missileers00:09:26 — Driving Issues00:09:37 — I1: Casualties and Attrition00:11:03 — I2: Contract Lapses00:13:36 — I3: Recruitment Deficit00:15:46 — I4: Deployment Restrictions00:16:58 — Bleeding or Just Fading Away?00:18:12 — Preparation & Denial00:19:47 — The Announcement00:21:07 — The Document00:22:45 — Reality Might be a Bit Different...00:23:04 — Stop-Loss & Referenda00:23:15 — Stop-Loss, Russian Style00:25:07 — Redefining Russia00:27:36 — Mobilisation00:27:51 — Russian Reserves/Resources00:28:12 — What Are the Russian "Reserves"00:28:50 — Russian Reserve Readiness00:29:30 — Who is Being Called Up00:30:52 — Making Quota00:32:57 — Training Standards00:35:42 — Training Failures at the Personal Level00:37:40 — Equipment Standards00:39:17 — BYO Kit00:42:14 — Acknowledging Missteps00:44:26 — Public Responses00:45:52 — Motivations for Evasion00:46:45 — Evaluating the Public Response00:48:11 — Impacts & Questions00:48:52 — Q1: Training Pipeline00:52:27 — Q2: Morale00:54:26 — Q3: Utilisation00:56:14 — Stabilising the Situation00:57:51 — Learning from Ukraine01:00:44 — A Workable Proxy?01:03:34 — Inflection Potential?01:05:23 — Towards General Mobilisation...01:07:18 — More Painful War01:09:00 — Conclusions01:11:43 — Channel Update
Ukraines counter-offensives - Seven months from Kyiv to Kharkiv Perun 2022-09-17 | A few weeks ago the Ukraine war was one of attrition and grinding advances, with Russian attacks in the Donbass an Ukrainian actions in Kherson both running into heavy defensive operations. Then suddenly the Ukrainians launched their operation in Kharkiv Oblast, and within less than a fortnight, the Ukrainians would reclaim more territory than Russian forces had gained in months of bombardment and attrition-driven advances.The war in Ukraine began with desperate defensive operations by the Ukrainian armed forces and population. Russian forces ended the first days pushing on the Ukrainian capital as the Ukrainians called for anyone capable of holding a rifle to stand up to defend the capital. Now, it sees Ukrainian mobile units launching exploitation operations and forcing storied units like 1st Guards Tank Army to give up its positions at Izium rather than risk encirclement. It's a heck of a story, one for the history books - and while it's still an evolving situation and data is thin, I thought it was worth asking three questions. What the heck just happened, how did it happen, and what does that mean for the war to come?Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats & corrections:On certainty:As noted in the video, developing situations like this one are covered in just about the thickest layer fog that one can get. I have done my best using the sources available, but be prepared for some of the details to be contradicted in coming days and months.On losses: The loss data used in this presentation is incorrectly labelled ' in 7 days.' The figures were updated prior to recording to cover more of the offensive period, but the 7 day marker war not.On the use of Russian language in Ukraine:At one point I talk about people in the liberated areas greeting Ukrainian troops in Russian. As this is a contentious point I wanted to make clear that I meant that in a majority of the videos I saw, Russian was used. Overall, the Oblast has a diverse linguistic environment, with the distribution between those who use Ukrainian and Russian as a first language varying between cities, towns etc. When I describe Kharkiv as an Oblast that was meant to have Russian sympathies, I mean that from the point of view of the Russian pre-war narrative, not as an objective appraisal.Timestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening Words00:01:20 -- What Am I Covering?00:01:52 -- Caveats00:03:28 -- War By The Numbers00:04:34 -- Inputs To Warfighting Capability00:05:15 -- PHASE 1: To Kyiv And Back00:05:25 -- Ukraine Before The Storm00:07:00 -- Putin's Greatest Gamble00:07:15 -- Critical Points: The Morale Factor00:08:06 -- Critical Points: Rallying, Not Running00:08:45 -- Critical Points: Resupply00:09:26 -- Inputs & Trends00:11:09 -- PHASE 2: The Grind00:11:30 -- Advance In The Donbass00:12:35 -- The Mobilisation Race00:14:17 -- Ukrainian Fire Capabilities00:15:15 -- Bakhmut & Pisky00:17:53 -- The Kherson Telegraph00:20:02 -- Clues On Unit Preparation00:22:24 -- Southern Grind00:27:28 -- Counter Offensive In The Donbas00:30:06 -- Numbers & Scale00:32:18 -- There Is No Panic00:35:48 -- Confusion & Liberation00:37:04 -- Rout Or Repositioning?00:40:05 -- Assessed Control Of Terrain In Ukraine00:41:30 -- Exploitation, Insult & Injury00:43:21 -- The Materiel Losses00:46:12 -- A Story of 1GTA 00:51:02 -- Black Mark On The Russian Air Force00:52:51 -- The Moral00:57:18 -- Cracks In Russia?01:00:26 -- The Manpower Problem01:04:18 -- It's Not Over Yet01:06:02 -- Pressure To Slow Down01:07:02 -- Full Range Of Outcomes01:08:12 -- Trends, Inputs & Outputs01:10:19 -- The Winter Race01:10:39 -- Russian Challenges01:12:39 -- What Ukraine Requires?01:16:25 -- Steel Over Blood01:17:30 -- Final Perspective01:18:45 -- The Political & Personal01:21:46 -- Political Mobilisation01:23:37 -- Conclusions01:25:06 -- Channel UpdateFurther Reading/Listening: Discussed article on Ukraine's prospects and needs in 2023https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.htmlCredit to Jomini of the West for the Kharkiv battle mapstwitter.com/JominiW?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor"All in!" The Ukrainian Offensives in Cherson and Charkiv - COL. Reisneryoutube.com/watch?v=Q9-NER8aFJ4&tVisual loss confirmation compilations:oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.htmltwitter.com/ralee85/status/1504982786524041221twitter.com/oryxspioenkopNo panic in Balakleyatwitter.com/200_zoka/status/1567137106006245377Russian TV discussing Ukrainian nationality and culturetwitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1570073307533156353
Naval Arms Exports - How Europe & Asia overtook the US & Russia Perun 2022-09-11 | With the next update on the Ukraine war delayed on account of the the Kharkiv counter-offensive, I thought it would be good to return to some defence economics with a study of global military ship and submarine exports. When we think of major naval powers, we usually think of the big players. The USA, the USSR/Russia & the PRC - but surprisingly enough, in recent times all of them have sold relatively few of their ships and submarines abroad. How can it be that major naval powers, with significant military shipbuilding capacity, find themselves in this position? Well thanks to the results of the recent topic votes here and on my Patreon, you get to spend the next 56 minutes finding out. Maximum possible credit to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for making their data freely and publicly available in easy to manipulate formats - it makes covering topics like these much, much easier by providing good, open-source data.Next week we'll return to Ukraine, but for now, enjoy another dive into defence economics and the arms market. Caveats:As always - this video includes only my own personal opinions and does not represent financial advice. SIPRI data is used as the basis for identifying trends in arms exports, and specific trade register data is also used. As discussed, tracking arms sales, and valuing them all in terms of Trend Indicator Value (TIV) to allow more like-for-like comparisons is difficult. SIPRI data may not be complete (not capturing all transactions) and valuations and national attributions may be made more complicated or difficult based on the structure of a particular deal. As such, it should be treated as informative, but not unambiguously authoritative.Sources:Primary data analysis based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Export TIV Registers:sipri.org/databases/armstransfersUS fleet figures sourced from Navy History and Heritage Command:https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.htmlCommentary on US shipyard capacitydefensenews.com/naval/2021/03/19/the-us-navys-shaky-plan-to-save-its-shipyards-is-getting-overhauleddefensenews.com/naval/2020/02/07/the-us-navys-vaunted-deployment-plan-is-showing-cracks-everywhereforeignpolicy.com/2021/10/10/us-navy-shipbuilding-sea-power-failure-decline-competition-chinaPatreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00 -- Opening Words02:28 -- What Am I Covering?04:09 -- Congratulations Mr. President!05:24 -- Military Ship/Submarine Exports06:15 -- What is a Competitive Advantage?08:10 -- The Competitors08:16 -- The Soviet Union10:45 -- Meet Sergey11:33 -- Ship & Submarine Arms Exports - USSR & USA 1970-8912:10 -- Collapse of the USSR13:27 -- Renaissance14:33 -- The Golden Years15:24 -- Re-collapse & Modern Offering16:37 -- What do the Russians offer?18:16 -- What about the Americans?20:15 -- Market Decline?20:38 -- Product Problem23:30 -- The Shipbuilding Challenge26:31 -- Détente, Not Decay28:21 -- Second-Hand Dealer30:53 -- What do the Americans offer?31:58 -- Made in Europe?33:24 -- The EU 534:54 -- Germany36:30 -- France39:36 -- Spain40:14 -- Italy41:55 -- The Netherlands43:25 -- Integrated Offerings45:09 -- What do the Europeans offer?46:47 -- Let's Travel to Asia46:55 -- Korea's Rise48:01 -- Naval Tradition in Korea49:26 -- Meet the Big 350:54 -- Growing Export Provider52:54 -- Conclusions54:42 -- Channel Update
6 Months of War in Ukraine - Economics, Endurance & the Energy War Perun 2022-09-04 | Sponsored by Ground News:Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perunNOTHING IN THIS VIDEO IS FINANCIAL ADVICEYou asked for a six month update, here it is.If one thing is clear after six months of fighting in Ukraine, it's that there is little chance of an imminent, overwhelming battlefield victory to end the war.Instead, the struggle has become (as expected) one of attrition and economics. A question of Russian economic resilience, matched against the will of Ukraine and its allies to carry on the fighting, and Europe's ability to endure rapid and deep cuts in the supply of Russian energy resources. In this 6 month update on the war, I focus not on the battlefield so much as the politics and economics of the war, and ask the question of how much pain is being inflicted, and if we should expect them to carry on in a way that winning a long war requires.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:In top commentSources:Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey and Tian, Steven and Sokolowski, Franek and Wyrebkowski, Michal and Kasprowicz, Mateusz, Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=4167193 Putin hikes Russian pensions, plays down Ukraine impact on economy -reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-announces-10-hike-pensions-minimum-wage-2022-05-25Timeline of European Sanctionshttps://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/Financing Putin’s war: Fossil fuel imports from Russia in the first 100 days of the invasionenergyandcleanair.org/publication/russian-fossil-exports-first-100-daysEP Spring 2022 Survey: Rallying around the European flag https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2792European views on the war in Ukraine:https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukrainePew Research Centre - views on NATO 2007-2022pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/international-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-nato-and-russia-in-a-time-of-crisis/pg_2022-07-22_u-s-image_2-02Poling of Ukraine by NORC at the University of Chicagohttps://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJ_NORC_Ukraine_Poll_June_2022.pdfExample of US survey data on Ukrainestatic1.squarespace.com/static/5c9542c8840b163998cf4804/t/62f11ac3010ae8217bd58593/1659968203055/MOTN-APMResearchLab-Ukraine%28Aug2022%29.pdfEU Plans energy market interventionafr.com/companies/energy/eu-plans-emergency-intervention-in-energy-markets-20220830-p5be0cUkraine FOREX reservestradingeconomics.com/ukraine/foreign-exchange-reservesAdditional WB aid to Ukraineworldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/08/08/world-bank-mobilizes-4-5-billion-in-additional-financing-for-vital-support-to-ukraineUkraine war credit holiday:reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraines-creditors-agree-two-year-payment-freeze-almost-20-billion-international-2022-08-10German exports:https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/08/PE22_325_51.htmlFrance restarting reactors france24.com/en/france/20220902-france-to-restart-all-nuclear-reactors-by-winter-amid-energy-crunchTimestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening Words00:01:55 -- What Am I Covering?00:02:53 -- GROUND NEWS00:04:27 -- The War and Way Forward00:04:44 -- A War of Position00:06:13 -- Look at the Map!00:07:40 -- How Do You Win?00:08:23 -- Sanctions & the Economy00:08:50 -- The Opening Punch00:10:37 -- Adaptation & The Energy Dividend00:12:31 -- Where Are We Now? (Officially)00:13:39 -- Where Are We Now? (Actually)00:15:43 -- Statistics & Economics Intelligence 10100:18:57 -- A Moment for Perspective00:21:21 -- Import Substitution & Demand00:24:26 -- Capital Flight00:26:24 -- Stimulus & Reserves00:29:12 -- What Next?00:30:34 -- Europe, Ukraine & The USA00:30:48 -- Ukraine: The War Economy00:33:14 -- USA: Uncomfortable But Dominant00:34:53 -- Europe: Holding in There00:36:32 -- The Energy War00:36:54 -- Exposed Continent00:38:22 -- Nervous Beginnings00:39:43 -- Sanctions: Shots Fired00:40:59 -- The Squeeze00:42:19 -- European Response00:45:27 -- Responses & Options00:50:19 -- Russian Oil in the Crosshairs00:54:17 -- The Limits of Coercion00:58:33 -- The Political Dimension01:00:33 -- Political Dimension: EU01:01:56 -- EU Approval Survey01:02:33 -- Importance of UE Membership Survey01:03:26 -- Citizens' Positive Image of the EU Survey01:04:03 -- European Support for Staying the Course01:05:56 -- Sharp Decline in Favourable Views of Russia01:08:08 -- American are Hawkish01:11:38 -- Ukraine & The Will to Resist01:13:47 -- Ukrainian Determination01:17:00 -- The Fight Will Go On01:18:24 -- Conclusions01:19:59 -- Channel Update
Russian Arms Exports - Will the Ukraine invasion tank their market share? Perun 2022-08-28 | Throughout the cold war, the Soviet Union dominated as a supplier of arms to the world, rivaling, and sometimes exceeding the United States as a source of global arms exports. With the fall of the Union, the former Soviet arms industry struggled, but the Russian Federation steadily rebuilt its share of the global market, resting on a reputation as a reliable seller of 'rugged, reliable and affordable' weapons to those in the world without the diplomatic alignment, cash, or desire to purchase Western made equipment. By 2014, Russian arms exports started to suffer reverses, damaged by sanctions and being cut off from industrial integration with Ukraine. But the industry survived.Then February 2022 came, and an avalanche of import restrictions, banking and financial sanctions were joined with very public images of missile failures, turret tossing tanks, and an under-performing air-force. With the worst marketing one could hope for, this video explores the potential future for the Russian arms export sector, and its vital role in supporting the sustainability of Russian research and production effortsPatreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats: At several points in this video I say "SU-35" when I mean "SU-75" - in these cases the slides referring to the SU-75 Checkmate are correct, I just misspeak. I also want to note that SIPRI TIV is obviously not a perfect or the only methodology for estimating arms shipments - but the quantity and quality of the available data makes it a good source for use in my opinion.Regarding "boomerang" faults in SAMs, I want to be clear that in all cases I have seen, including the Saudi one, the missile does not hit the launcher - I use the term because the missile hooks back In the general direction of the launcher but never hits it obviously.I also want to stress again the difference between reputational damage and performance damage. In this video I make the case that it appears some Russian systems have underperformed - but that evidence is still needed to fully understand the reasons for those apparent failures. The point from an export perspective is that the reputational damage is more clearly taking place. I am not, for example, saying that the T-72 was not a great tank for what the Soviets needed when it was designed and produced - only that in Ukraine, the vehicle has done its reputation no favours and that is likely to have impacts for the demand for Russian weapons going forward.Sources (full source list delayed for a few days): SIPRI arms registers, e.g. - sipri.org/databases/armstransfersarmstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.phpSIPRI methodology - sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1212.pdfIgnoring Ukraine setbacks, Putin touts 'superior' Russian weapons exportsreuters.com/world/europe/putin-boasts-russian-weapons-prowess-says-moscow-is-ready-share-it-with-allies-2022-08-15Animarchy's video which includes a discussion of Russian IADSyoutu.be/ctfkvpTY5DYTimestamps: 00:00:00 -- Opening Words00:00:52 -- Kyiv Arms Expo00:01:45 -- What Am I Covering00:02:37 -- History00:02:39 -- USSR - The Arsenal of Everyone Else00:04:03 -- No Need for Sticks and Stones00:04:32 -- Russian Industry Post '9100:05:36 -- Consolidation & Re-assertion00:07:33 -- Understanding the Arms Market00:09:02 -- Production Advantage: German Diesel00:10:48 -- Diplomatic Advantage: PRC & Pakistan00:11:55 -- What Does Russia Sell?00:13:02 -- Russia's Market Share00:14:13 -- Russian Air-Defence Advantage00:15:49 -- Russian Aviation00:17:17 -- The Buyers00:17:32 -- Politics & Relationships00:19:31 -- Russia's Main Markets00:20:41 -- African Influence00:22:11 -- Product-Purchaser Alignment00:23:34 -- Recent Trends & Decline00:25:06 -- Recent Trends & Decline: Line Go Down00:25:35 -- Recent Trends & Decline: Finances & Bottlenecks00:27:51 -- Impacts of the War-Product00:28:13 -- Performance00:29:41 -- Bad Equipment, Bad Plan, or Bad Army?00:31:08 -- Reputation00:32:07 -- WHAT AIR DEFENCE DOING00:33:47 -- Turret Tossing Tanks00:35:12 -- Easy Marketing00:36:52 -- Passive Airforce00:39:19 -- Does reputation matter?00:40:50 -- Impacts of the War - Risk Factors00:41:09 -- Production00:44:35 -- Availability & Integration00:45:05 -- Delivery & Sanction Risk00:46:31 -- Case Studies - India00:48:15 -- Case Studies - Vietnam00:50:03 -- But is the Industry Stuffed?00:52:38 -- Don't Count Russia Out00:57:02 -- Conclusions00:58:46 -- Channel Update
Chinas Military Modernisation Speedrun - Budgets, Industry, and Purchasing Power Parity Perun 2022-08-21 | I think it's fair to say that the days of Moscow being the hub of the world's second most powerful conventional military are at an end. Now, that power rests in Beijing. The PLA's budget is vastly larger than Russia's but a mere fraction of what the US spends. Despite that, China has gone through an incredibly rapid military modernisation over the last two decades, building new platforms and fielding new technologies so quickly that the gap between its capabilities and the USA has narrowed significantly. How? Today I look at the Chinese military budget, industry, and the wonders of purchasing power parity.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00 -- Opening Words00:07 -- Russia Stronk?00:41 -- What about the PRC?01:07 -- Where is all this coming from?01:39 -- Capability Revolution02:11 -- What Am I Covering?03:45 -- Caveats04:20 -- History04:23 -- A Revolutionary Army05:45 -- Contraction and Expansion07:06 -- Force In Transition08:21 -- Three Milestones10:05 -- What's in a Budget?10:12 -- Inclusions and Exclusions11:27 -- The Paramilitary Factors12:23 -- Meet the 中国人民武装警察部队12:59 -- Chinese Paramilitaries15:43 -- Inclusions and Exclusions16:55 -- Building a better budget - IISS method18:27 -- Getting Closer?19:12 -- What's a Dollar Worth22:04 -- Problems with PPP for Military Spending23:26 -- Creating A defence PPP Index25:13 -- The Global Picture27:44 -- Industry31:10 -- The SOE Problem33:39 -- Black Holes and Questions35:47 -- Progress & Momentum36:06 -- The Spending Balance37:44 -- Legacy Systems39:56 -- The Buildup Benefits41:18 -- Catching up is a curve42:40 -- Does the line go up forever?46:53 -- The Closing Picture47:59 -- Conclusions49:35 -- Channel Update50:34 -- Scam WarningCaveats:At one point I mention that China was the second nation to field a 5th generation fighter with its J-20. That's lazy wording on my part as the F-35 is a multinational project. I hope my intention in that statement was clear.As always - this video was produced on the basis of imperfect information, though the sources relied on or discussed are largely captured in the source list below.This video has been produced to help explain the pace of Chinese military modernisation and give some context to how it has managed to rapidly catch up with other powers. It is my hope that it is taken in the spirit in which it is intended.I accept that this video, out of necessity, simplifies a range of elements, ranging from the interaction between SOEs in the PRC to the specific budgetary arrangements that are in place in China. In this video I reference a range of methodologies to try and more accurately compare the value of the PRC defence budget with others (such as Russia or the USA). These examples should be considered approximate, and use methodologies set out in the sources below - I do not personally endorse any given method - they are used to illustrate the concepts involved. Sources:PRC 2019 defence white paper:https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.htmlAssessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies (IISS) - iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/assessing-chinese-defence-spendingChina’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - CRSsgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46808.pdfUnderstanding China’s 2021 Defense Budget - CSIScsis.org/analysis/understanding-chinas-2021-defense-budgetDebating defence budgets: Why military purchasing power parity matters - Peter Robertson - cepr.org/voxeu/columns/debating-defence-budgets-why-military-purchasing-power-parity-matters#:~:text=It%20can%20be%20seen%20that,the%20market%20exchange%20rate%20figure.A NEW ESTIMATE OF CHINA’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE - SIPRIsipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/2101_sipri_report_a_new_estimate_of_chinas_military_expenditure.pdfChina’s military might is much closer to the US than you probably think- theconversation.com/chinas-military-might-is-much-closer-to-the-us-than-you-probably-think-124487World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time - SIPRI - sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time#:~:text=China%2C%20the%20world's%20second%20largest,grown%20for%2027%20consecutive%20years.Measuring Hard Power: China’s Economic Growthand Military Capacity - Robertson & Sin - ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v28y2017i1p91-111.htmlChina Naval Modernization: Implications forU.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress - CRS - sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdfOECD PPP Data (retrieved week of 15/08) - data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htmThe known unknowns of China’s defence budget - Frederico Bartels - https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-known-unknowns-of-chinas-defence-budget/
All manpower, no metal - Ukrainian mobilisation, equipment shortages, and training Perun 2022-08-14 | Sign up to Morning Brew for free today morningbrewdaily.com/perun - Sponsored by Morning BrewPreviously, I've looked at the way in which Russian force design and political decision-making have left Russian forces with a surplus of heavy equipment, but an inadequate supply of quality infantry. Today, thanks to a Patron vote, I look at Ukraine's situation. There, the combination of volunteers, popular resistance, and compulsory mobilisation filled the ranks with hundreds of thousands of new troops - but where a shortage of equipment and training has prevented them from realising the true potential of a mobilised, committed nation at war.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:There are three overarching caveats that I want to put forward on this video - The quality of data on this topic is subject is low and findings generally carry wide error margins- I do not go into great depth about the distinction between the Ukrainian Army, TDF, NGU, and the many other units that are contributing to the fighting. Please keep in mind the impact these distinctions might have as I go through the presentation.- This video is not intended to be, in any way, a slight on the fighting power and spirit of Ukrainian troops. I think calling out the issue of equipment shortages as well as the limitations of the mobilisation system in fact attests to what the TDF, Army, and other forces have achieved given their resources.There are also some smaller ones on terminology that might be worth mentioning:I use the terms like volunteers and persons 'called up' in a soft fashion. Many of those I describe as 'called up' were called up as a result of voluntary enlistment and registration while largely volunteer formations may include infusions of conscripts."Mobilisation" is traditionally associated with the mass call ups of conscripts. The Ukrainian experience is much more of a hybrid, combining popular, spontaneous resistance, the mass enlistment of volunteers, and conscription.Timestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening Words00:01:34 -- What Am I Covering?00:02:29 -- Today's Sponsor: MORNING BREW00:03:36 -- Mobilisation - The Concept00:05:20 -- The Soviet System00:07:16 -- Ukraine's Reforms00:09:12 -- The Ukrainian Mobilisation Experience00:11:22 -- The Opening Callup00:14:54 -- Evolving Mobilisation00:17:55 -- Women in Service00:20:12 -- Demography and Mobilisation00:23:43 -- Where Are We Now?00:24:58 -- How Much Materiel Does Ukraine Have?00:26:25 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures00:28:16 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures: The Examples00:30:01 -- The Base-Loss-Replenish Method00:33:38 -- Observed Equipment Method00:34:20 -- The New00:35:13 -- The Old00:36:06 -- The Ugly00:37:21 -- Statements/Observations00:40:30 -- The Combined Picture00:42:41 -- A Diverse Army00:43:20 -- So What Needs To Happen?00:46:28 -- Training & The Training Issue00:49:43 -- Resolution Methods00:51:52 -- Earned Veterancy00:54:11 -- Scale and Sustainability00:56:06 -- What Does This Mean?00:58:18 -- Offensive Readiness01:00:28 -- Future Potential?01:01:48 -- Conclusions01:02:54 -- Channel UpdateSources/References:Ukrainian equipment pre-war:Military Balance 2021 (as always, for consistency)Ukrainian loss data: OSINT visual confirmed:oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.htmlDeclared:odessa-journal.com/it-became-known-what-losses-ukraine-has-suffered-in-military-equipment-since-the-beginning-of-the-war/#:~:text=Since%20the%20beginning%20of%20the%20full%2Dscale%20war%2C%20Ukrainian%20troops,the%20intensity%20of%20the%20war.Interview with Ruslan Pukhov:wartranslated.com/russian-defence-research-expert-on-afu-performance-the-effect-of-western-weapon-suppliesUkraine at War - Paving the Road from Survival to Victory - RUSI (I particularly concur with their contention on priority equipment classes)ik.imagekit.io/po8th4g4eqj/prod/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web.pdfUkrainian Resupply - Pledged or Delivered (estimated)oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.htmlStatements on enrolment of women in Ukraine (in Ukrainian)ips.ligazakon.net/document/RE37684?an=1https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou_orders/mou_2021/313_nm.pdfVisual confirmation on equipment use:Various, but particular credit to twitter.com/UAWeaponsOriginal Ukrainian general mobilisation:dw.com/en/ukraine-president-orders-general-mobilization/a-60908996NYT piece on some issues with the mobilisation process (I do not share the implied assessment on what realistic standards are during wartime).nytimes.com/2022/07/25/world/middleeast/ukraine-soldiers-recruitment-draft.html#commentsContainerUkrainian mobilisation progress:bbc.com/news/world-europe-62118953
Cruise & ballistic missiles in Ukraine - effectiveness, lessons (and are the Russians running out?) Perun 2022-08-07 | Russia (and the USSR before it) has always placed great emphasis on its missile and rocket forces. Whether the threat to be countered was NATO aircraft, shipping, or ground targets, the Russian military has always looked to relatively advanced missile systems as the answer. And so, when the February invasion opened, many observers expected Russia to commence its campaign with a barrage of modern cruise and ballistic missiles, the famous Kalibr and Iskander missiles, destroying Ukrainian command and communications infrastructure. Instead, what followed was a relatively limited campaign the achieved, at best, the temporary suppression of the Ukrainian air forces and air defences. As the war evolved however, Russia broadened its list of targets and started inflicting a greater toll on Ukrainian targets. For their part, the Ukrainians introduced their own new family of missiles - the GLMRS of HIMARS fame. In this video I look at that initial missile campaign, the way the campaign evolved subsequently, and what lessons other countries might take from the war to date. I also address the question of sustainability - is Russia running out of these precision munitions, and to what extent do their production facilities have the ability to compensate. One thing I do want to say as well, is that while I try and take a reasonably detached look at issues like this, I want to make clear that discussing the performance of these systems shouldn't take away from recalling the very real human impact of their use, particularly against civilian targets or in built up areas. Apologies for the late upload - wasn't well earlier this week and it pushed my recording window back. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening Words00:00:31 -- Russia's Most Feared Conventional Weapons00:01:57 -- What Am I Covering?00:02:45 -- Doctrine & History00:03:03 -- Historic Aerospace Talent00:04:25 -- Soviet Rocketry and Missile Programs00:05:42 -- Rocketry as a Response00:08:14 -- A Rocket and Missile Force00:09:14 -- Doctrine and Usage00:10:41 -- The Competing Forces00:10:58 -- The Cutting Edge00:13:31 -- The Kalibr Showpiece00:15:11 -- The Old00:16:34 -- The Improvised00:18:47 -- Ukraine - the Old, the New, and yet to come00:22:08 -- Missile Use In Ukraine00:22:16 -- The Opening Salvos00:24:22 -- Escalation00:25:42 -- Send in the Museum Pieces00:27:52 -- Note on Targeting00:30:15 -- The Rebuttal00:33:13 -- Performance Observations00:33:28 -- Reliability and Performance00:36:50 -- Targeting and Accuracy00:41:18 -- Ukrainian use of GMLRS00:43:59 -- Sustainability?00:44:08 -- "They're running out"00:45:39 -- Evaluating the Thesis00:49:35 -- Production Capacity00:52:53 -- So is this Sustainable?00:54:54 -- Lessons for the others00:55:03 -- ISR is Central00:57:14 -- Consumption Rates00:58:42 -- Capability Requirements01:01:45 -- Potential Importance01:03:13 -- Conclusion01:04:34 -- Channel UpdateSources (incomplete due to late upload, check back in 24-48hrs for more):Ukrainian and Russian missile strengths: Various (primarily MB 2021 as always)Russian doctrine on the use of SSMs:https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdfRussians claiming use of Onyx ASM against ground targets:tass.com/defense/1456649Missed Targets: the Struggles of Russia’s Missile Industry - Maxim Starchak (CEPA)cepa.org/missed-targets-the-struggles-of-russias-missile-industry/#:~:text=The%20company%20produces%20about%20100,missiles%20for%20the%20Iskander%20system.Russia and strategic non-nuclear deterrence -Capabilities, limitations and challenges (by Valeriy Akimenko - Chatham House)chathamhouse.org/2021/07/russia-and-strategic-non-nuclear-deterrence/russias-strategic-non-nuclear-deterrentPartial compilation of KH-22 strikes:19fortyfive.com/2022/06/why-russia-is-using-old-kh-22-aircraft-carrier-killer-missiles-to-hit-ukraineVideo of air launch of KH-22 against Ukrainethedrive.com/the-war-zone/we-may-have-our-first-sight-of-a-russian-bomber-launching-missiles-at-ukraineReference to US claims on Russian missile failure rates:businessinsider.com/us-intel-suggests-many-of-russias-missiles-fail-reports-2022-5Key Caveat:There is one golden caveat for this one - as coverage of the ongoing war, this video suffers from all the usual caveats around data and source quality. The only people who fully understand the decisions being made in the Ukrainian and Russian HQs are the people who are there. I am just doing the best I can with the information available to me. All claims here should be treated as speculative in nature, and may well be displaced as additional information comes to light.
Defence economics, and the US production advantage Perun 2022-07-31 | Sponsored by Ground News:Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perunVideo info:In some of my earliest coverage of the Ukraine war, I noted that just comparing defence spending between countries was extremely difficult and not all budgets are created equal. Today following a Patron vote, I'm going to try and unpack that a little more by diving into the world of defence economics and production 101. In doing so, we're going to try and answer some questions.Why does America dominate the global arms market?How can a 5th generation fighter be cheaper than those decades older than it? And why do so many nations chose to buy in arms rather than build their own despite the fact it leaves them highly reliant on other countries?Get ready for an "exhilarating" mix of economic theory, budget figures, and many, many stories of countries failing to build a good jet engine and just buying one from General Electric instead. This video is not financial advice, and I'm not an American, but if you're going to talk about scale in high-tech military production, you have to talk about the US of A.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUCaveats:Just because I throw up an image of a system when describing challenges - that does not mean I think whatever I've put on the slides is a bad system. The Avro Arrow was a masterpiece - but it's a good picture of risk because it ended up cancelled and a bunch of resources were wasted for example. Arjun is a good example for competitive advantage because, while India was willing to back it domestically, Arjun 1 had nothing like the export successes of the major players (Abrams, Leopard, and the Russian Ts) Figures from groups like the AIA are taken and presented as is - I obviously have not independently audited Lockheed Martin's annual report or the AIA facts and figuresAs mentioned in the video - I have focused on comparing defence spending to other sorts of defence spending. I am not seeking to do opportunity cost analysis against other forms of spending. I'm also not arguing for higher or lower military spending in this video, I'm just trying to explain why the impact of a procurement budget is highly contingent on where stuff is manufactured, and things like that. Sources: Lockheed Martin annual report 2021:lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/annual-reports/lockheed-martin-annual-report-2021.pdfStockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database:sipri.org/databases/armstransfersF-35 price declines:Lockheed Martin (graphic)AIA facts and figures:aia-aerospace.org/report/2021-facts-figures-u-s-aerospace-defense/2021-facts-and-figures-u-s-aerospace-and-defenseNews coverage:defensenews.com/air/2019/10/29/in-newly-inked-deal-f-35-prices-fall-to-78-million-a-copyIndia T-90S procurement:defensenews.com/land/2019/11/26/india-pays-russia-12-billion-in-technology-transfer-fees-for-t-90s-tanksImpact of Defence Spending on Economic Growth - RANDrand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-2.htmlTimestamps: 00:00 -- Opening words01:33 -- What am I covering?02:46 -- SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS04:20 -- What's in a defence budget05:56 -- People Costs07:03 -- System Costs09:04 -- System Sourcing09:36 -- Example 1: Bring it in12:29 -- Example 2: Domestic production14:58 -- The make or buy decision16:49 -- The hard decisions17:58 -- Foreign Import19:01 -- Kit Assembly20:28 -- Licensed/local production22:22 -- Domestic productions23:07 -- Why not indigenise23:28 -- Barriers to domestic production23:56 -- Complexity and cost of entry27:03 -- Indigenous fighter programs29:16 -- Manufacturing scale31:50 -- Development risks33:59 -- Competitive advantage36:55 -- Case Study: The US advantage37:21 -- Dominant consumer & producer39:59 -- Production costs41:13 -- Scale43:17 -- Learning curves45:03 -- Risk mitigation46:54 -- Accumulated advantage49:40 -- American arms ecosystem52:42 -- A tale of two aircrafts55:26 -- A question for another time…55:57 -- Conclusion57:13 -- Channel update
End of the Helicopter? (no) - MANPADS and helicopter losses in Ukraine Perun 2022-07-24 | Anyone who has watched a Hollywood film knows that helicopters on the big screen seem destined to do only one thing, crash. In Ukraine, that has proven to be the final fate for dozens of helicopters, including some of the world's most modern types.For these incredibly capable machines, the Ukraine War has been a challenging environment. After a flurry of aggressive use in the opening days (culminating in the assault on Hostomel Airport) the mass introduction of man portable air defence systems and a rush of early casualties seems to have forced both the Russian and Ukrainian attack helicopters into a much more conservative posture. This raises the question - if a $200,000 missile can shoot down a helicopter worth tens of millions of dollars, what does that mean for the future of the helicopter on the battlefield (and the procurement budget)In this video I take a look at the rotary aviation side of the Ukrainian war (with a particular look at the Russian KA-52), try to piece together how the tactics have changed, try and explain some of the weirder things we've been seeing, and examine what the losses and challenges mean for the future of these aircraft. Patreon: patreon.com/PerunAUSources: Visually confirmed loss database: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html (I then went through each of the helicopter listings)Russian tactics:https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdfReimbursable Rates for Airframes (FY2019)comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2019/2019_b_c.pdfTimestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening words00:01:20 -- Not a great war for attack helos00:02:19 -- How to get this topic wrong00:03:36 -- What am I covering?00:04:38 -- Caveats & Preface00:07:26 -- First days at Hostomel00:10:36 -- The MANPADS surge00:12:36 -- Deterioration: March & April00:15:28 -- Deterioration: May - present00:18:50 -- KA-52 Losses00:20:54 -- Strange tactics00:23:12 -- Pilots/command error?00:26:03 -- The rocket slinging00:29:09 -- Chornobaivka00:32:39 -- "Doctrine" doesn't mean "good"00:34:05 – Nothing new, helicopters get shot down a lot00:36:16 -- Novel weapons aren’t novel00:38:30 -- Evolving enemies00:42:42 -- A cost problem00:46:24 -- Survival: Efficiency MANPADS00:48:35 -- Survival Efficiency: Other threats00:50:24 -- Offensive efficiency00:54:05 -- Helicopters are vulnerable00:58:35 -- Stand-off and survive01:01:18 -- Tactics and training01:03:27 -- Consider the mission01:08:00 -- Conclusion01:10:50 -- Channel update
Putins closest ally - Could Belarus successfully invade Ukraine (probably not) Perun 2022-07-17 | Before February 24th, there probably weren't many Western commentators that would have bet on a post-soviet state of 9 million people taking on a significant strategic role in deciding the fate of Ukraine and European security. But these are strange times, and following a call in the comments of a previous video, I've decided to look at the current (and potential future) role of Belarus in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Since Russian troops advanced into Ukraine from Belarusian territory in February, speculation has been rife that Belarusian dictator Lukashenko would send his own troops into battle alongside his Russian allies. Practically ever week brings a new series of articles announcing new mobilisation efforts or exercises in Belarus, and a heighted threat to Ukraine's Northern border. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00 -- Opening Words00:47 -- What am I covering?01:37 -- How did we get here?01:52 -- History06:24 -- Belarus today08:27 -- Europe's "Last Dictator"09:53 -- Lukashenko's hold is not complete14:22 -- Belariusian involvement15:59 -- The Maybe Invasion18:26 -- Hunting for a Casus Belli20:47 -- The Belariusian Army21:01 -- The "Good": A lot of metal24:01 -- The "Oh...": Manpower28:36 -- Intervention scenario29:00 -- To Kyiv and victory29:56 -- Fool me twice...32:08 -- Serving the artery33:20 -- Cutting off the hand37:08 -- A grinding distraction38:19 -- The question is why?39:16 -- Why the Hesitation?39:40 -- Internal Stability46:36 -- The thing about stability47:18 -- The economy49:12 -- NATO response51:09 -- What is there to gain?53:38 -- The brief warning: "Crap" doesn't mean harmless55:43 -- Conclusions56:57 -- Channel UpdateSources:Example of media coverage around the possibility of Belarus entering the war:aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/22/will-belarus-join-the-wartheconversation.com/ukraine-war-fears-that-belarus-might-invade-on-russias-side-are-growing-185416The "Colonel thing" - one example of reporting on thishttps://www.sb.by/en/lukashenko-putin-promised-me-the-rank-of-colonel-but-had-not-done-yet.htmlChatham House Survey: drive.google.com/file/d/12uAiH_gLZAKhbtm_Gb6n2NsH1u7gYrtE/viewDisclaimers and Caveats: At one point I say "Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv" in reference to cities that are along the "Belarusian front." That's just force of habit from describing cities threatened during the early phase of the war. It would be more accurate to say that Kyiv and Chernihiv are on the Belarusian facing front, Sumy obviously isn't. I gloss over the importance of Belarus' military industry - Russia is in fact dependent on Belarus for some critical inputs into some of its most sensitive military hardware. I want to stress again that I have nothing against the people of Belarus - this video is merely an attempt to illustrate the weaknesses the Belarusian military would have to overcome to be genuinely effective in an offensive operationThe section on potential NATO responses should be taken as illustrative, and not a prediction that NATO would resort to any particular policy response or 'harassment' tactics in the event of a Belarusian offensive. It is instead intended to illustrate the vulnerability of the plan to potential escalatory (or debatably escalatory) responses.
Outgunned - Artillery & The War in Ukraine - Developments, lessons, & logistics Perun 2022-07-10 | Sponsored by Private Internet Access: privateinternetaccess.com/Perun**As always - check pinned comment for any additional caveats or comments**We've talked a lot about the weaknesses of the Russian army in the past, including the difficulties it has faced attempting a war of rapid maneuver in February and March and bringing sufficient infantry forward to support its armoured vehicles.But one very clear strength of the Russian military is is artillery corps. Russia has guns, lots of guns, and deep stocks of ammo leftover from the old Soviet Union. In this video we explore the pre-war Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces, look at the way the artillery war has evolved to date, how logistics may impact the sustainability of both forces going forward, and what lessons forces around the world might (tentatively) take from the war so far, based on the information in the public domain. Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 -- Opening words 00:00:56 -- Sponsor: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS 00:02:14 -- What Am I covering? 00:03:32 -- The competing forces 00:03:38 -- Russia - An Artillery Army 00:06:40 -- Russian Artillery: Cutting edge stuff 00:07:48 -- Russian Artillery: Most is good old soviet artillery 00:09:00 -- Russian Artillery: Most is good old soviet artillery 00:11:07 -- Guns of Ukraine 00:12:47 -- NATO support 00:14:37 -- Artillery in Ukraine 00:14:47 -- The road to Kyiv 00:17:39 -- Shift Towards Static Warfare 00:19:43 -- How the artillery battlespace was born? 00:23:45 -- Russian Artillery usage 00:25:23 -- Weight of fire 00:27:25 -- Ukrainian artillery usage 00:29:29 -- The Himars Effect 00:31:32 -- The Depot Blitz 00:33:28 -- Drone spotting 00:36:24 -- From the Front: The Donbass 00:37:44 -- From the Front: Kherson 00:38:33 -- From the Front: Izium 00:39:59 -- Ammunition and sustainment 00:41:00 -- Barrels and lifespan 00:46:19 -- Accuracy matters 00:52:17 -- Russian Ammo 00:55:33 -- Ukraine’s (old) ammo 00:58:29 -- Ukraine’s (new) ammo 01:01:42 -- Early lessons 01:02:24 -- Ammunition consumption 01:06:04 -- Sensor fusion & transparent battlespace 01:09:24 -- Is NATO outgunned 01:11:30 -- A plan for contested airspace 01:14:42 -- Range, Range, Range 01:15:59 -- Conclusions 01:19:13 -- Channel updateSources (non-exhaustive due to late upload, will pad these out over the coming days): Russian and Ukrainian pre-war artillery strength: iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2021FIRMS system:firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@0.0,0.0,3zDeepstate map (used to integrate FIRMS with frontline data)https://deepstatemap.live/en#6/49.438/32.053Examples of OSINT on suspected HIMARS strikes: twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1546014473416237056?cxt=HHwWgICzmZ7-xfQqAAAAtwitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1545937965028876290?cxt=HHwWhICxpe6Yo_QqAAAAtwitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1545587963098284033?cxt=HHwWgoC-2YiEhPMqAAAA
Germany, rearmament, and Ukraine - Why 100 billion Euro may not fix the German military Perun 2022-07-03 | **see pinned comment for any corrections**When Russia launched its February 24th invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of the nations that experienced a dramatic, near overnight political shift. Germany turned its eyes to rearmament after decades of reduced defence spending, while outside commenters criticised the limited number of heavy weapons the great Central European industrial power was able and willing to provide. The reality is that Germany's military is both one of the best funded in the world, and also one of the least prepared for action with much of its military reduced to scrounging from other units while equipment is out for maintenance. It is a military hampered by deep budgeting and procurement difficulties that have caused its readiness rates and equipment to run down to dire levels. German defence industry is among the world's best. It's capable of developing world beating products (especially when working with other European powers) but it operates at production levels, and in a procurement environment, that mean it has often been foreign militaries, not the Bundeswehr, that benefit most from German military-industrial potential. In this video, I go through some history of how the Bundeswehr came to be so run down. I go after the myth that the Bundeswehr has been poorly funded (there's both a yes and no answer there) and go through some of the reasons I think Germany's planned 100 billion Euro equipment spend could go horribly wrong if proper reforms and plans aren't put in place. To my German viewers, please take this as the friendly (if often critical) view of an ally across the sea.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAUSources or resources:Report on material readiness in the Bundeswehr 2021https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5325364/11a1d50cce70b7b1a8307adc16991f4d/download-bericht-zur-materiellen-einsatzbereitschaft-2-2021-data.pdfCommentary on 2018 figures:dw.com/en/limited-number-of-weapons-in-german-military-ready-for-action-report/a-42752070ukdefencejournal.org.uk/less-third-german-military-assets-operational-says-reportThe BAAINBw CPM guidelines (in English) (Only for the very dedicated)https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/1718386/d21a4f590da15adad3aecd560f3cc5cc/cpm-en-data.pdfMore relevant procurement rules and regs (again, for the dedicated)https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/equipment/contract-award/foundations-of-procurement2018 reporting on shortage of tents and basic equipmentdw.com/en/germanys-bundeswehr-lacks-basic-equipment-for-nato-mission/a-42638910Germany losing a lawsuit with H&K over the G36dw.com/en/germany-military-loses-legal-battle-with-heckler-koch/a-19522739DGAP - "Proposals for a new German armaments policy"dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/vorschlaege-fuer-eine-neue-deutsche-ruestungspolitikGerman Parliament blocking armed drones:dw.com/en/no-armed-drones-for-the-german-army-for-now/a-55936615German ambition to make the Bundeswehr the most effective army in Europe:https://www.rnd.de/politik/reaktion-auf-russischen-krieg-lindner-will-bundeswehr-zur-wirksamsten-armee-europas-machen-OR2OM2P5ILDKD7IZMKNQ77B44A.htmlBEWARE OF POTEMKIN: GERMANY’S DEFENSE RETHINK RISKS REINFORCING OLD HABITSwarontherocks.com/2022/04/beware-of-potemkin-germanys-defense-rethink-risks-reinforcing-old-habitsDW on the dangers of procurement issues in spending the 100 billion Eurodw.com/en/germanys-military-upgrade-hampered-by-bureaucracy/a-62046032RUSI on procurement issues in the Bundeswehr (2019)rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/germany-calling-bundeswehr-acquisition-and-broken-narrativeTimestamps:slightly better stamp, I've dropped them in the comments for now:00:00:00 -- 00:00:54 -- What Am I covering?00:02:20 -- Hey Germans00:02:59 -- History00:06:13 -- Cold War Germany - West00:07:37 -- Cold War Germany - East00:09:31 -- Armee der Einheit00:12:09 -- The broken Bundeswehr00:12:26 -- Germany and France comparison00:16:45 -- Scrounging and minor ambitions00:19:16 -- German Advantages00:19:42 -- German Advantages: German Industry00:21:55 -- German Advantages: The Sharp Edge00:23:35 -- What's going on?00:23:51 -- Where does the money go?00:26:39 -- The capitalisation issue00:29:42 -- Procurement00:30:16 -- Procurement disasters00:32:16 -- Focking it up00:36:42 -- The aggregate picture00:37:56 -- Financial horizons00:39:16 -- Defence investment is long term00:44:19 -- Capability00:45:31 -- Compliance & litigation00:49:01 -- Politics00:51:50 -- 100 billion euro00:52:21 -- Zeitwende00:54:50 -- The Dangers00:56:40 -- Stage 1: The gold rush00:59:02 -- Stage 2: The cracks01:00:32 -- Stage 3: Strangulation01:02:51 -- Stage 4: gold plate & decay01:04:52 -- How to make it work?01:09:32 -- How to make it work? The social and political change01:12:09 -- And what of Ukraine
Myths & Claims of the Russia-Ukraine War - Claims, Feints, and Bioweapons Perun 2022-06-26 | In the chaos of the Ukrainian information war, we've seen all sorts of outlandish (and some credible) claims surface regarding the war and its progress.For weeks, the most requested topic from my Patrons and coming in by email to look at some of those claims, ranging from the wacky to the reasonable, and to cast a critical eye on the way the war has been covered in its first four months. At their request, I'm going to have a look at some of the various claims that have come up, and put forward comments on some of the most pervasive ones (especially those that were nominated multiple times). Because I'm trying to cover a lot of ground, don't expect the same level of deep-dive detail as normal, but hopefully we can have some fun with it. Sources & Notes: Reporting on the age of Russian volunteers on short term contracts:bbc.global.ssl.fastly.net/russian/features-61848550Coverage by Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces including observations regarding stress and equipment of Ukrainian TDF in the Donbassyoutube.com/watch?v=RpC1kXhW2LwWHO confirmation on biolab Pathogen destruction orderreuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-who-says-it-advised-ukraine-destroy-pathogens-health-labs-prevent-2022-03-11Russian leadership changes and firings (these are just a sample):-twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1540475582173126656-https://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/152176-putin_sacks_generals/-thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-purges-150-fsb-agents-in-response-to-russias-botched-war-with-ukraine-lf9k6tn6g?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1649702327-1Sponsor: I'm incredibly lucky to have a returning sponsor, Ground News.Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at:https://www.ground.news/perunPatreon: patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 -- Mythbusting the Russia-Ukraine War 00:00:35 -- What Am I Covering 00:02:34 -- Sponsor Segment - GROUND NEWS 00:03:55 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies 00:04:06 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs 00:05:43 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs - The "evidence" 00:08:19 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs - The Genius plan 00:10:23 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: Nato Special Forces in Ukraine 00:12:09 -- Economics: German Aid 00:14:30 -- Economics: all of the Ukrainian economy is in the Donbass 00:18:10 -- Battlefield matters 00:18:16 -- Battlefield matters: "Cannon fodder" and casualties 00:21:40 -- Battlefield matters: Aces and super heroes 00:23:48 -- Battlefield matters: Media Coverage 00:23:58 -- Battlefield matters: "Game changers" 00:27:19 -- Battlefield matters: Every day is change? 00:28:52 -- All according to plan? 00:29:29 -- All according to plan - Russian war aims 00:30:32 -- All according to plan - Assessing the goal 00:31:54 -- All according to plan - Kyiv was a feint? 00:33:44 -- All according to plan - The Donbass is a feint? 00:34:35 -- All according to plan - The war is a feint? 00:39:33 -- All according to plan - A Bad Plan 00:42:05 -- All according to plan - Is the war going according to plan 00:47:13 -- All according to plan - Just look at the map 00:50:40 -- All according to plan - The Narrative 00:54:12 -- What Am I Saying? 00:56:55 -- Expectations 00:59:16 -- Conclusion 01:00:41 -- Channel updateCaveats and corrections:At one point I refer to German aid 'per capita' rather than 'as a share of GDP'I also refer to US WW2 dead figures without clarifying that the cited figure is 'combat' deaths.
Two Economies at war - Russia and Ukraine after 100 days of sanctions and shelling Perun 2022-06-19 | Sponsored by Blinkist: Use the link below to start your free 7-day Blinkist and get 25% off a Premium membership: blinkist.com/perun** Apologies for the iffy sound-quality and double-upload on this one, my regular editor is travelling so I've done the best I can**When Russia commenced its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, the West responded with a harsh regime of sanctions and measures that were intended to deeply wound the Russian economy. Now, more than 100 days on, it's hard to find consensus over exactly how well those measures are working. Some will tell you that Russia is on its knees, incapable of carrying on the war much longer, while others will insist that it's Ukraine and Europe that are about to break. In this video I look at the sanctions measures that have been imposed, what impact they've had, and try to assess how well the Russian and Ukrainian economies are holding up, and what may be next in store as the fighting (and economic pressure) continues. Notable Sources:Russian Statistics Service Poverty Statisticshttps://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/document/157001 - 2021https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/document/168756 -2022CRS report on Sino-Russian ties:crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12120ILO Brief on Ukrainian Job losses:ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/documents/briefingnote/wcms_844295.pdfBank of Russia release on interest rates:https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/keypr/EU Support for Egypt english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/06/15/EU-provides-104-million-to-Egypt-to-cope-with-rising-food-pricesPatreon: patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps00:00:00 — The Price of War II: Economics of the Russo-Ukraine War 00:00:39 — Sponsor Segment: BLINKIST 00:01:57 — What Am I covering? 00:02:59 — War is expensive: Opening Words 00:03:30 — War is expensive: Peloponnesian War 00:04:20 — War is expensive: WW1 00:04:48 — War is expensive: The War on Terror 00:05:09 — War is expensive: The Russo-Ukraine War & be careful with expenditure figures 00:07:27 — The Russian economy: Opening Words 00:07:39 — The Russian economy: Headline details 00:09:54 — The Russian economy: Sanctions 00:12:11 — The Russian economy: Restricting Russian exports 00:13:47 — The Russian economy: The Hydrocarbon Money Cannon 00:14:57 — The Russian economy: The issue with energy sanctions 00:17:33 — The Russian economy: The Long term challenge 00:19:32 — The Russian economy: Let's talk Roubles 00:23:26 — The Russian economy: Restricting imports 00:25:21 — The Russian economy: China, India & Sanctions 00:29:58 — The Russian economy: Industrial impacts 00:33:20 — The Russian economy: The private sector is vulnerable 00:35:27 — The Russian economy: Poverty Rising 00:37:19 — The Russian economy: “The Two Economies” 00:38:02 — The Russian economy: Where to from here for Russia? 00:40:40 — The Ukrainian economy: Health Check 00:42:17 — The Ukrainian economy: A Wartime economy 00:43:21 — The Ukrainian economy: Sustainability 00:46:06 — The resilience of Industrial states: Economic Collapse? 00:47:48 — The resilience of Industrial states: WW1 period France 00:51:04 — What about the world? Europe 00:54:00 — What about the world? The Wider World 00:55:49 — The Conclusion 00:57:17 — Rebuttal of the week 01:00:42 — Channel Update
All metal, no manpower - Russian infantry shortages and mobilisation in Ukraine Perun 2022-06-12 | When we think of Russia, we tend to think of the great "Russian Steamroller" of the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, with their enormous (by European standards of the time) populations and huge potential to throw large numbers of troops into battle. But, and I know I say this a lot:Russia is not the Soviet Union. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the kind of conflict the Russian army has prepared for. The army is being asked to fight at essentially peacetime strength, leaving behind its conscripts and not calling up the larger class of its reserves. That has left the Russian army short staffed and, critically, lacking infantry to support the number of tanks and armoured vehicles it has deployed. How that has influenced the fighting is uncertain, but it does seem to have contributed to the loss of unsupported armour, and a real difficulty in taking urban and fortified areas. In their place, Russia has inserted national guard troops, mercenaries, and huge numbers of proxy-forces from the DPR and LPR.In this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue. In doing so, we're also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia? We're going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and try to answer some of those questions. I will not be covering Ukrainian mobilisation this episode, if only because it has its own, almost diametrically opposite strengths and weaknesses and a totally different force design behind it.My thanks to the many sources covering this topic - particularly the venerable Michael Kofman whose work on Russian force structures was critical to this piece. Interesting reading:NOT BUILT FOR PURPOSE: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S ILL-FATED FORCE DESIGN - MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ROB LEEwarontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-designPatreon: patreon.com/PerunAUGaming channelyoutube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQTerra invicta E1youtu.be/QU4E2NtvRlMTIMESTAMPS00:00:00 -- The image of military power00:01:48 -- There are questions to be asked00:02:59 -- The contention: The Russian Army has too much metal and not enough grunts00:03:29 -- What am I covering?00:04:32 -- The jobs only infantry can do00:08:30 -- The jobs only infantry can do: Armies do know it, including the Russian Army00:10:51 -- Where are the Russian infantry?00:13:24 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 1: the Russian Army is too small00:16:03 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 2: Mobilisation00:17:11 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 3: Undermanning00:18:27 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 4: Over-Armouring00:20:02 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 5: Organisation (Private Conscriptovic returns)00:22:40 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 6: Early losses00:24:46 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Recap00:26:52 -- Russian Solutions: Shadow Mobilisation00:28:16 -- Russian Solutions: The TikTokers and the Wagner Group00:29:13 -- Russian Solutions: Training unit cannibalization00:31:28 -- Russian Solutions: The Donbass Proxy forces00:31:43 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: What are the DLPR (DPR/LPR)?00:33:26 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Disclaimer on DPR/LPR sources00:34:59 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Pre-war forces & subsequent mobilisation00:36:41 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Verification & Numbers00:37:52 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Training00:40:04 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Equipment00:43:11 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Are they the Cannon Fodder?00:46:03 -- What Russia needs vs what they have00:47:07 -- The discrepancy between the Russian narrative and and use of DLPR forces00:47:55 -- Why does this matter00:49:58 -- Sustainability00:51:33 -- Channel Update
Ukraines vital ally - Why Poland matters in the Russian-Ukrainian war Perun 2022-06-05 | It's easy to think of the invasion of Ukraine through the lens of cold-war American-Russian competition, with Washington having been one of the first to announce substantial weapon shipments and financial support for Ukraine from February onward. But support for Ukraine has been a pan-European affair, with some nations going to extraordinary lengths when contrasted with their limited resources. The Baltic and many Eastern European nations stand out in this regard for the willingness they've shown to dig deep into their military reserves in order to get hardware into Ukrainian hands. In terms of volumes for key heavy equipment like tanks and mobile rocket and artillery systems, Poland stands out as a critical source. Warsaw has emerged as one of Ukraine's staunchest advocates, shipping tanks by the hundred, and allowing its territory to be converted into a logistical hub while opening its doors to Ukrainians by the millions. In this video I try to give historical context to Poland's decision to throw its resources behind Ukraine and put focus on what this nation, with an economy nominally the size of New Jersey's (ppp-aside), has done to keep the Ukrainian army fighting while preserving the lives and wellbeing of millions of Ukrainian civilians. Patreon: patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 – For our freedom and yours: Poland and the Ukraine War00:00:57 – Ukraine's most important allies (by GDP figures)00:01:33 – America has limits00:02:48 – What am I covering?00:03:29 – History of Polish-Russian relations00:04:18 – History: Destruction of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth00:08:03 – History: Partition and occupation00:10:26 – History: “The Red Flag” - the Polish-Soviet war (1918)00:11:27 – History: “The Red Flag” - Soviets are back (1939)00:13:42 – Poland's strategic situation00:15:10 – The Stakes for Poland00:17:06 – Poland's Support: Civilians00:19:43 – Poland's Support: Arms00:21:02 – Poland's Support: Armoured Vehicles00:22:28 – Poland's Support: Small Arms00:24:44 – Poland's Support: Artillery & Ordnance00:27:03 – Poland's Support: Scale00:28:28 – Poland's Support: Logistics00:32:36 – Russian retribution00:34:07 – Why does all this matter00:37:12 – What could have been00:39:39 – Poland's Military transformation00:43:03 – Poland's post-war possibilities00:46:43 – Summary00:48:13 – Channel update
How Corruption Destroys Armies - Theft, Graft, and Russian failure in Ukraine Perun 2022-05-29 | On paper, Russian military modernisation should have produced a force that could overmatch the Ukrainian army. For more than a decade, funds for modernisation were allocated to State Defence Orders for everything from next generation aircraft and tanks, to new communications and battlefield control systems. Russian R&D did its part (mostly), turning out systems that won attention and praise at trade shows, while commentators steadily built the Russian army up as an example of a dangerous foe that proved you could achieve more with less in the military procurement space. Then they invaded Ukraine, and the image was shattered. I've previously explained this by looking at the Russian Defence budget and their priorities in the lead up to the invasion, but in doing that I refrained from focusing on one key issue.Corruption in Russia is endemic, corruption in the Russian defence sector (like many around the world) is a catastrophe. From the highest levels of procurement fraud, down to the level of the enlisted personal hawking diesel, copper, and even explosives for petty cash, corruption has been a constant thorn in the side of all efforts to modernise the Russian army and mould it into an effective fighting force. In this video, I try to take a somewhat light hearted look at how corruption in a military context can (and sometimes does) work, citing examples of actual cases and using hypotheticals to demonstrate the kinds of actions that can rot an institution from head to tail. For those of you in countries that face this problem, it should all seem a little familiar.Examples are taken from the sources listed below and I make no independent representations on the veracity of any claims. I don't know exactly how much is stolen from the Russian defence budget, I doubt anyone does. But what I can do, is help us understand how a nation capable of producing some of the most advanced defence equipment in the world would be running out of fuel on day 3, and be rolling out museum piece tanks less than three months into a major conflict. Sponsor: I am fortunate enough to have a sponsor for this video, Ground NewsCompare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at:https://www.ground.news/perunA majority of proceeds will be directed to the Australian Red Cross Ukraine appeal, which supports Ukrainians displaced by the war. https://www.redcross.org.au/ukraine/Key sources: Corruption in the Russian Defence Sector (Beliakova and Perlo-Freeman)https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2018/05/Russian-Defense-Corruption-Report-Beliakova-Perlo-Freeman-20180502-final.pdfRussian statements (albeit old) on defence budget theftreuters.com/article/us-russia-defence-idUSTRE74N1YX20110524Russian corruption rankingtransparency.org/en/countries/russiaPatreon: patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 -- The military Russia wanted us to see 00:01:10 -- Meet Sergei00:02:11 -- What Am I Covering 00:02:44 -- Sponsor Segment 00:04:11 -- Caveats 00:05:48 -- Corruption in the Russian military 00:07:31 -- What does corruption look like & understanding corruption 00:08:17 -- Corruption at Senior Political Leadership level 00:09:28 -- Corruption at Senior Political Leadership level – who you know 00:11:15 -- Corruption at Senior Military Leadership level 00:12:45 -- Corruption at Senior Military Leadership level – Story of Battlecruiser Pyotr Veliki (Peter the Great) 00:15:03 -- Corruption at lower commanders level 00:16:23 -- Corruption at supply officer level 00:17:57 -- Corruption at "Private Conscriptovic" level 00:18:53 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – a worked example 00:19:02 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 0: R&D 00:20:20 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – Phase 1: Procurement 00:21:49 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 2: production & ordering 00:23:17 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 3: supply phase 00:24:24 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 4: the unit level 00:26:19 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – Phase 5: the front 00:27:50 -- Why is it so damaging 00:28:03 -- The economics of corruption 00:28:43 -- Not all corruption is "theft" 00:30:07 -- It can destroy research & industry 00:31:42 -- Cultural corrosion 00:33:10 -- Asymmetric cost/benefit 00:35:57 -- The Critical Gear 00:38:54 -- Why are militaries so vulnerable to corruption 00:39:06 -- Public attitude 00:39:53 -- Hierarchy 00:41:34 -- Secrecy 00:43:39 -- Invisibility 00:47:48 -- How to deal with corruption – mechanics and processes 00:50:23 -- Culture 00:52:36 -- Summary 00:54:32 -- Channel updates
Russias greatest defeat? Finland and Sweden joining NATO and what it means for Europe Perun 2022-05-21 | When Russia invaded Ukraine, one of the reasons cited was the need to 'demilitarise' Ukraine and prevent the expansion of NATO. In doing so, it convinced the nations of Finland and Sweden to break with long traditions of non-alignment with military alliances (and strong public support for that stance) and apply to join NATO. In some ways, this must seem like a natural step. Both Finland and Sweden are members of the EU and NATO partners, which hardly made it unclear which side of the metaphorical iron curtain they favoured. There's also reason to suggest this might not change as much as some networks are suggesting, with both nations expressing their lack of desire for permanent NATO bases in their territory or any sort of nuclear weapons sharing. But in other ways, this move is a tremendous boost to NATO and a disastrous strategic reverse for Russia. In this episode, I look at the history of Swedish and Finnish neutrality (and shift to non-alignment in the post cold war era), examine what these two nations would bring to NATO, and what that means for Europe, Russia, the USA, and global peace and security. I want to stress that while I talk about the relevance of these new NATO members in the context of certain military scenarios that have appeared on Russian TV, I don't believe any of those are at all likely. They're used because they help illustrate the point, and because when something appears on Russian TV, you can't argue that there's zero chance of that being on the Kremlin's bucket list.Also, because I'm aware the word is used differently around the world, please note that when I'm using the term 'liberal' in reference to the post-war order, I'm referring to the system of institutions, rules, and norms the victorious powers put in place after WW2 rather than any contemporary politics.I'd also ask you to check the pinned comment regarding the question of how large the Swedish army is and what to include or not include in that figure.Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAURelevant news items:On Russian energy cuts to Finland:* aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/russia-to-cut-gas-flow-to-finland-saturday-gasum* bbc.com/news/business-61442432Russian TV discussing invasions (anti-Russian posters, but Russian content) I can't get the original Rossiya 1 clips:* twitter.com/i/status/1506283895771348994* youtube.com/watch?v=Q5IBevEpVoQ&t=69s
Is NATO running out of weapons to supply Ukraine? (no) Perun 2022-05-17 | This war has produced some truly interesting takes - so many that I'm already planning my next myth-busting video as we speak.But one recent one stood out as as both particularly strange, and also as a good opportunity to discuss a serious topic. Recently a number of media organisations ran stories suggesting that the shipment of American missiles to Ukraine were dangerously depleting American supplies to the point where urgent measures are necessary or American security would be threatened.So yes, I'm going to deal with the idea that sending Stingers to Ukraine is a danger to the USA, but I'm also going to talk about how deep American weapon stocks are, what it means to have your security threatened, and why America probably shouldn't rush to crash-manufacture Stingers just because they're finally using the ones that were in storage. Defence procurement decisions have lasting impacts, and while the decision to ramp up Javelin production is an obvious one, I think we should be wary of the idea that Stinger should be resurrected without other options being considered.This is a shorter video that serves in a stand-in while I edit and re-record the longer video that was originally scheduled for this time (if I'm going to talk about Poland, I want to do it justice). And because I wanted to hold off the video on Finland and Sweden joining NATO until they had formally applied for membership (so expect it soon). Thanks as always for watching and supporting me and the channel. Patreon: patreon.com/PerunAUPerun Gaming: youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQTimestamps:00:00 INTRODUCTION00:25 What is this???01:13 What am I covering?01:43 WHAT'S THE CLAIM?02:25 Is any of that true?03:34 Should the West panic?05:39 Should the West panic? - replacement06:31 US ARMS STOCKPILE07:30 That's a lot of metal07:48 And the real reality check08:55 There is more than one way to kill a tank09:37 Direct and indirect substitution10:50 There is more than one way to kill a tank (cont.)11:13 America is armed12:26 WHAT ABOUT EUROPE?14:54 Impact on Euro forces16:01 Expenditure is not one sided17:29 Expenditure is not one sided - UA isn't just throwing these things out19:01 SO WHAT NEXT?21:15 _CHANNEL UPDATE_
Lend Lease 2.0 - Will it be Ukraines Arsenal of Democracy? Perun 2022-05-11 | Please see the pinned comment for updates and correctionsLend-lease was one of the pivotal factors in the second world war. It was a mechanism by which the United States shipped tremendous quantities of everything from boots to bullets in order to keep Britain, the USSR, and the other allies in the fight. On May 9th, President Biden signed an Act bearing the lend-lease name into law, taking on the authority to loan defence articles (that's a fancy way of saying militarily useful stuff) to Ukraine. Journalists across the internet have been quick to herald the Act as a game changer, one which will fundamentally transforms the flow of assistance to Kyiv. I'm not so sure. In this video, I look at what the modern lend-lease Act actually does, assess its significance, and then focus on some of the lesser known, and altogether less dramatic mechanisms that are being used to authorise the ever growing flow of US money and weapons supporting Ukraine. I'm also rather proud I managed to get the video under 30 minutes. The side effect of that is that I do not have time to delve into each of the individual pieces of legislation discussed. My descriptions of how foreign military financing work for example are necessarily simplistic, but I've tried to make sure the basics of what you need to know are here.Thanks for your support as always. Submissions email:perunsubmissions@gmail.comPatreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps from the usual legend: 00:00 Introduction00:40 The buzz around Lend-Lease01:58 What am I covering02:35 Historical Lend-Lease was a game changer04:51 What doesn't it do?06:03 What does it actually do?06:52 Condition 1 FAA 196107:22 Condition 2 AECA08:29 So does Lend-Lease matter10:27 Existing rules12:56 The "$30B"15:09 The "$30B" — Analysis17:26 The debt trap myth19:45 So where to next?22:45 So where to next? — Personal view23:38 Does Lend-Lease have a role?26:10 Summary28:20 Close out
Calling Russias nuclear bluff - Russian nuclear doctrine & the Ukraine war Perun 2022-05-03 | I survived COVID, let's talk about nuclear war.Russia's nuclear threats, and warnings of potential nuclear war growing out of the Ukraine invasion, make for great headlines - but how much substance actually sits behind those threats?Nothing triggers fear quite like the prospect of a world ending nuclear exchange, but that doesn't make the hype true. While we can't relax entirely (the risk isn't zero), I think we can afford to stop hyping the risk of WWIII quite so much, at least for now. So if you'd like some reverse clickbait where I explain why you probably shouldn't be that afraid, let's get into it.In this video, I take a look at what Russia's been doing that has caused so much concern around the world, both in terms of demonstrating new weapons and issuing warnings and threats. Then I dive into Russian doctrine around nuclear weapons use, as well as the reality of the nuclear taboo, in order to determine how great the actual threat of Russian nuclear weapon use is. Finally, I talk a bit about what other nations can do if they're determined to avoid any breach of the nuclear taboo, and keep Russian warheads locked up in their storage bunkers where they belong. A caveat as always that I am not a nuclear strategist by trade, but there are a number of good talks and articles out there if you would like to know more. I come at this from the perspective of someone who has studied and written on cold war era.I rely on a number of documents in this piece, a few key ones are listed below: US 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviewmedia.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDFThe Russian Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence - a number of sites host English translationsI found "Nuclear Signalling Between NATO and Russia" by Rear Admiral John Gower, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear & Chemical, Biological) to be an easy read among the papers I looked at preparing for this presentation - though admittedly his work predates the 2020 basic principles. jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep22136.pdfThe Perun Gaming Channel (I will aim to start shifting and publishing new content there this weekend):youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQPatreon: patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00 Introduction01:02 Nukes and the media02:09 But hold up a moment02:28 What am I going to cover?03:33 TLDR04:40 Caveats05:28 WHAT IS RUSSIA DOING?05:34 Capability demonstration06:21 Rhetoric07:10 Capability development10:21 So who is the audience?11:50 DOES NUCLEAR COERCION WORK?12:02 Historically? No14:30 Nuclear taboo16:34 A simple example18:59 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE19:08 Doctrine and declaratory strategy20:03 Why should we care?21:34 Lavrov quote21:58 Putin the nuclear warmonger?25:32 Historical perspective28:17 The 2020 statement29:39 The four reasons32:11 "Escalate to de-escalate"33:48 SO WILL THEY USE NUKES?34:10 No doctrinal use case35:03 Russian media control to the rescue36:15 No military utility37:14 Likely response39:24 WHEN MIGHT NUKES BE USED?39:39 Nuclear use case?42:03 HOW DO YOU PREVENT USE?42:11 Signal and deter44:30 KEY TAKEAWAYS47:33 CHANNEL UPDATE
Ukraine vs Russia - Who wins a war of hardware attrition? Perun 2022-04-22 | Description: Continuing on from our look at the relative economic power of Russia as compared to Ukraine and its supporters in NATO, today I look a little more at the question of military equipment resupply specifically. I try to break down the scale of the Russian army's equipment reserve and contrast that with the way we have seen, and can expect to see, the resupply effort evolve on the Ukrainian side of this fight. I also look at the military industrial capability that sits behind these powers, and the role it might play in the event this conflict stretches to be a matter of months and years, rather than weeks. I want to stress that this video is not a prediction of a long war, I make no prediction on that point, it's just an attempt to continue looking at a question I have not seen covered in great depth - how might this war evolve if the conflict does go on. NATO Expenditure data and definitions can be found here:https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htmCorrections:Since recording this video, I've fallen sick and can't record addenda without holding the release process up, so I include one correction here. While I reference statements by the US DoD that Ukraine has been supplied with entirely new aircraft (not just parts), those statements have been subsequently retracted. The current line put out by the USA and Ukraine is that, as of the 20th of April, Ukraine has not been supplied with any new fighter aircraft or airframes of that kind.Contact Email for news and information submissions:perunsubmissions@gmail.comPatreon:patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps (Thanks to NIibblrrr as always!)00:00 Introduction00:40 Where are we now?01:46 A note on the coming offensive02:55 War is not just a question of materiel03:47 But materiel is important – particularly in conventional conflict04:57 How am I going to cover the materiel question?05:33 Phases of materiel use06:47 The Russian position09:34 Russian endurance hinges on reserved equipment11:23 Russian reserves are deeper than Ukraine's12:19 Ukraine is not alone13:24 And that's an issue if this goes long14:36 Resupply – the limiting factors16:15 Equipment is not "capability"17:49 POTENTIAL PHASES OF MATERIEL RESUPPLY18:55 Phase 1 – Going at it alone19:34 Phase 2 – Shouldering the burden21:08 Phase 3 – From Warsaw with Love24:42 Phase 4 – NATO standard27:58 Phase 5 – Take it to scale28:22 PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY — Assessing productive capacity is hard29:54 The Russian defence industry31:50 Challenges for Russian defence34:12 Challenges for Russian defence (pt.2)35:43 What about NATO?36:59 So what about our factors?37:13 Meeting demand39:57 SO, WHAT NEXT? — What next for the West?43:06 What does that look like?44:46 Time for some heresy46:08 KEY TAKEAWAYS49:50 ADDITION: What has this looked like?51:39 capability support52:36 foreign training54:00 outro54:10 CHANNEL UPDATE55:16 audio, captions56:02 propaganda best of56:36 Who are you?58:09 100k subscribers58:46 thank you
The Price of War - Can Russia afford a long conflict? Perun 2022-04-14 | DescriptionSo apparently hour long presentations on defence investment weren't dry enough, so I'm dusting off the Economics degree (strongly recommended when pairing with military or strategic studies) to ask the question of what the economic situation may be if this war drags on. Some are insisting sanctions are achieving nothing, and that Russia is well placed to outlast Ukraine. Others are convinced that Russia's war will grind to a halt under the weight of these sanctions. In this video, I look at some of the tactics Russia has been using to minimise the impact of sanctions, as well as the basic economic disparities between Russia and the Western powers backing Ukraine. Suffice to say, Russia is economically outmatched, but it has a variety of tools and strengths to leverage, including energy exports and a defence sector that has spent years moving towards self-reliance.Key Contact Points: Send me data or submissions relevant to the topics I cover: perunsubmissions@gmail.comFind me on Patreon:patreon.com/PerunAU (I will be overhauling rewards soon to better suit the new audience)A note on calculations used:Comments on the impact on German GDP of an Oil and Gas Embargo sourced from this interview:youtube.com/watch?v=lFl4aTIa5aY&t=468sMost quoted GDP figures are World Bank 2020Figures used for calculating NATO expenditure and potential expenditure generated using NATO declared 2021 defence expenditure and % GDP data which can lead to significant differences compared to, for example, simply applying spending ratios to the 2020WB figures. In particular, take that $1.4t figure as indicative, different methodologies can produce higher or lower results, varying by potentially hundreds of billions of dollars. None of that changes the core message.The reason for this potentially odd choice of statistics is to enable clear analysis on equipment spending - something we'll see next video when we unpack the Russian and NATO defence industries and resupply efforts.Timestamps (Credit not mine)0:00:00 Introduction0:00:59 Where we are now0:01:29 Potential Russian objectives?0:02:26 Minor problem: What if Ukraine says NO?0:03:12 Wars end by mutual assent0:04:41 What am I going to cover?0:05:29 What am I not covering0:05:56 TLDR0:06:47 THIS IS NOT A CLOSED-SYSTEM WAR0:08:12 The Russian economy since the war0:09:29 The recovery of the Ruble…0:10:08 Step by step guide to saving the Ruble0:14:47 Similar situation on the stock market0:16:11 In other words, a lot of people are getting screwed here…0:17:22 And how long can they keep it up?0:19:43 More reasons to think this isn't OK 0:21:09 Summary: Russian economy0:21:49 UKRAINE'S SUPPORTERS & THE ECONOMIC BALANCE0:22:00 The economic balance0:23:01 NATO economic capacity0:25:04 What would this look like at the extreme?0:27:40 So, a quick health check0:30:35 And it's not just the USA0:31:43 Financial mobilisation0:33:24 What about Ukraine?0:35:35 THE LONGER TERM0:35:55 Hydrocarbons and Europe0:40:50 And let's talk about those gas fields0:44:08 Import substitution0:46:11 Human capital decay0:47:59 Ukrainian logistics0:49:53 Russian sovereign risk0:52:24 SO, WHAT NEXT?0:52:43 What can Russia do?0:56:22 What can the West do?0:58:54 This doesn't work quickly1:01:26 And isolation does not need to mean an end for Putin1:03:02 Nor are the consequences limited to the 'sides' actively involved1:04:17 CLOSING THOUGHTS1:07:07 CHANNEL UPDATE
