Dartmoor National Park Authority v Darwall and another [2025] UKSC 20 UKSupremeCourt 2026-09-20 | Dartmoor National Park Authority v Darwall and another [2025] UKSC 20
R (on the application of AM (Belarus)) (Respondent) v SSHD (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2024-04-24 | [2024] UKSC 13On appeal from [2022] EWCA Civ 780AM is a Belarusian national. He arrived in the UK in 1998 and claimed asylum. His asylum claim was refused on 12 December 2000 and he was deported to Belarus on 29 June 2001. As AM told the Belarussian authorities that he was not a Belarussian citizen, he was refused entry and returned to the UK. Attempts by the Secretary of State to obtain necessary travel authorisations for AM from Belarussian authorities failed and he remains in the UK. Between 1999 and 2018, AM was also convicted of a number of offences and sentenced to several terms of imprisonment.On 15 September 2010, AM filed an application for judicial review of the Secretary of State's failure to provide him with leave to remain or permission to work in the UK. The High Court of England and Wales granted permission for this judicial review on 7 May 2011. In September 2011, the Secretary of State subsequently agreed to reconsider AM's asylum claim and the High Court stayed the judicial review claim.The Secretary of State again refused AM's asylum claim. AM appealed this refusal. On 30 March 2012, the First Tier Tribunal dismissed this appeal, finding that Belarus' refusal to admit him was because he had failed to provide accurate information, not his political opposition. AM appealed this judgment to the Upper Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal on 23 April 2013.Following the failure of further attempts by AM and the Secretary of State to obtain necessary travel authorisations for AM to travel to Belarus, AM applied to the Secretary of State for leave to remain in the UK as a stateless person on 9 February 2017. This too was refused.On 13 July 2018, AM applied to reinstate the judicial review proceedings which had previously been stayed. He also applied to add a second ground challenging the refusal to grant him leave to remain as a stateless person. On 31 July 2018, both applications were transferred to the Upper Tribunal, which granted permission to reinstate the judicial review proceedings and amend the grounds of challenge on 21 July 2020.Throughout this process, AM has suffered from ill-health. In early 2018, he was diagnosed with psychotic symptoms. The Upper Tribunal was also presented with evidence that he had attempted suicide whilst in detention and that his mental health had been adversely affected by delays in resolving his case and lack of status.The Upper Tribunal's judgment was handed down on 11 February 2021. It held that, as the likelihood of removing AM to Belarus was remote, continuing to refuse to grant AM leave to remain would be a violation of his right under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, as the refusal of the Belarussian authorities to allow AM to enter Belarus was because of AM's persistent failure to tell the truth as to his identity, he was not stateless.The Secretary of State appealed the Upper Tribunal's finding regarding article 8 to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, which dismissed its appeal. The Secretary of State now appeals that judgment to the UK Supreme Court.The issue is:When will a refusal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to grant leave to remain to an individual, who cannot be removed to their country of nationality, violate that individual's right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal.More information is available on our website: UKSC 2022/0113
Decision In The Matter Of UniCredit Bank GmbH (Respondent) v RusChemAlliance LLC (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2024-04-23 | Decision given on 23 April 2024 - UKSC 2024/0015 - UniCredit Bank GmbH (Respondent) v RusChemAlliance LLC (Appellant)
Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Respondent) v Mercer (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2024-04-17 | (UKSC 2022/0080) - [2024] UKSC 12 The appellant, Ms Mercer, was employed as a support worker in the care sector by a care services provider, Alternative Futures Group Ltd ("AFG"). As a workplace representative of UNISON, she was involved in planning and took part in lawful strike action. She was subsequently suspended by AFG. While suspended, Ms Mercer received normal pay but was unable to earn pay for the overtime she would otherwise have worked. Ms Mercer brought a claim against AFG under section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("TULRCA") that she had suffered detrimental treatment done for the sole or main purpose of preventing or deterring her from taking part in the activities of an independent trade union "at an appropriate time" or penalising her for having done so. By agreement between the parties, the Employment Tribunal determined as a preliminary issue whether, in light of articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"), section 146 of TULRCA protected workers from detriment short of dismissal for participation in lawful industrial action as a member of an independent trade union. The Employment Tribunal held that it did not. However, the Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed Ms Mercer's appeal and held that it could be interpreted as doing so. The Court of Appeal allowed a further appeal by the intervener, the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, holding that section 146 could not be interpreted compatibly with article 10 of the Convention but refused to make a declaration of incompatibility. Ms Mercer now appeals to the Supreme Court. The issue is: Can a worker who is subject to detriment for the purpose of preventing or deterring her participation in a union-organised industrial action can potentially bring a claim under s. 146(2)(b) of the Trade Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("TULRCA")? In particular: (i) does Article 11 ECHR protect workers in such circumstances, and can the absence of sufficient protection under s. 146 TULRCA as conventionally interpreted be justified under Article 11(2)?; and (ii) is it possible to interpret s. 146 TULRCA so as to be compatible with Article 11 pursuant to the duty in s. 3 HRA 1998, or should the court make a declaration of incompatibility pursuant to s. 4 HRA 1998? More information is available on our website: UKSC 2022/0080
Hassam and another (Appellants) v Rabot and another (Respondents) UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-26 | On appeal from [2023] EWCA Civ 19 This appeal arises from two claims in the County Court in Birkenhead. Both claimants were involved in road traffic accidents caused by the negligent driving of other drivers (the defendants). Both claimants suffered PSLA caused concurrently by both WLIs and NWLIs. The 2018 Act set the level of compensation payable for WLIs (including PSLA caused by WLIs) through the tariff award. Compensation for NWLIs (including PSLA caused by NWLIs) is determined by applying common law principles. The dispute centres on the approach a court should take to compensation for PSLA caused by both WLIs and NWLIs. The County Court held that the proper approach was to: (a) determine the nature of each injury; (b) assess the compensation for each injury in accordance with the appropriate regime (the tariff award for a WLI and the common law for a NWLI); (c) add these values together and then step back to assess whether the total amount would over- or under-compensate the claimant for the total PSLA that they suffered; and (d) if appropriate, make an adjustment to the total to avoid any such over- or under-compensation. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal and the claimants' cross-appeal. The defendants now appeal, and the claimants cross-appeal, to the Supreme Court. The issue is: How should a court assess damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity ("PSLA") in the tort of negligence, where the claimant suffered PSLA caused by both: (a) a whiplash injury ("WLI") which comes within the scope of the Civil Liability Act 2018 (the "2018 Act") and therefore attracts a fixed "tariff award"; and (b) a non-whiplash injury ("NWLI") which does not attract a tariff award? The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeals and the cross-appeals. More information is available on our website
Shawn Campbell Adidja Palmer Kahira Jones and Andre St John (App) v The King (Resp) No 2 (Jamaica) UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-14 | On appeal from the Court of Appeal of JamaicaAfter a trial lasting 64 days before the trial judge and a jury in the Home Circuit Court in Kingston, Jamaica, the appellants were convicted of Mr Williams' murder. The prosecution's case was that the appellants murdered Mr Williams on 16 August 2011 after he failed to return two unlicensed firearms which the second appellant, Mr Palmer, had given him for safekeeping. Mr Williams was not seen or heard from after that date, and his body has never been found.The police took the appellants into custody on 30 September 2011, and seized their cellular telephones. The prosecution relied heavily on evidence derived from these phones, which was taken from a copy of a CD rom provided by Digicel (a telecommunications provider in Jamaica) in response to a police request. At the trial, the appellants challenged the admissibility of this telecommunications evidence. They argued that the police request to Digicel and Digicel's provision of data to the police were carried out in breach of the Interception of Communications Act. Further, the evidence had been obtained in breach of the fundamental right to the protection of privacy of communication guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms contained in the Jamaican Constitution. However, the trial judge ruled that the telecommunications evidence was admissible.During the trial, the judge became aware of an allegation that a juror had attempted to bride others by offering $500,000 JMD for a particular outcome. After investigating the allegation and considering it with counsel for both the prosecution and the defence, the judge decided that the trial should proceed. He did not discharge the jury, or the particular juror said to have offered the bribes. The judge finished his summing up at 3.42pm on 13 March 2014. The jury returned at 5.35pm, when the forewoman told the court that the jury had not reached a unanimous verdict. The judge sent the jury out again. At 6.08pm, the jury returned and, by a majority of 10 to 1, convicted the appellants of the murder of Mr Williams.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal against conviction. The appellants now appeal to His Majesty in Council.The issue is:On 13 March 2014, the appellants were convicted of the murder of Clive "Lizard" Williams. The issue in this appeal is whether their convictions are safe in light of the following grounds of challenge:1. Should the trial judge have excluded the telecommunications evidence relied on by the prosecution?2. How should the judge have handled the allegations that there were attempts to bribe members of the jury during the trial? Should the jury have been discharged?3. Was the judge wrong to invite the jury to reach a verdict late in the day, given the special circumstances of the case?The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has concluded that the appeals should be allowed and the appellants’ convictions should be quashed on the ground of juror misconduct, and that the case should be remitted to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica to decide whether to order a retrial of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. Lord Lloyd-Jones gives the unanimous judgment of the Board.More information is available on our website:
Merticariu (Appellant) v Judecatoria Arad, Romania (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-06 | Ionut-Bogdan Merticariu is subject to a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW") issued by the Romanian Judicial Authority on 7 May 2019. Acting with others, Mr Merticariu entered commercial premises using a key which the group had as employees of the business concerned. Goods valued at around EUR 1,500 were taken but some of these were later returned. Mr Merticariu was convicted and sentenced for the burglary of commercial premises in his absence. Mr Merticariu was arrested under the EAW on 25 September 2019. Following a hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court, Mr Merticariu's extradition was ordered. The High Court dismissed Mr Merticariu's appeal. Mr Merticariu now seeks permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court. Mr Merticariu contests his extradition. One of the conditions for a court to make an extradition order under s.20(5) of The Extradition Act 2003 requires the court to be satisfied that the requested person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial. Mr Merticariu argues that this requirement has not been satisfied and that he should be discharged. The issue is: (1) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial? (2) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where it is not possible for a judge to say that a finding of deliberate absence by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, is "theoretical" or "so remote that it can be discounted"? More information is available on our website
Bertino (Appellant) v Public Prosecutors Office, Italy (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-06 | The Appellant is subject to a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW") issued by the Italian Public Prosecutor's Office. The warrant is a conviction warrant that was made after the Appellant was convicted of an offence described as child grooming. The Appellant committed the offence in 2015 and was released pending criminal investigations. In 2015 the Appellant signed a document in which he, amongst other matters, elected an address in Italy as the address for correspondence on the matter. The Appellant subsequently moved to the UK. He informed the Italian police that he was moving to the UK but did not provide a UK address. In June 2017, the decision was taken to prosecute the Appellant. The Appellant did not receive the summons to attend the trial and the trial occurred in his absence, with a court-appointed lawyer representing him. The Appellant, in his absence, was convicted and sentenced to serve 1 year in prison, suspended on condition of payment of compensation within 6 months. The Appellant did not pay the compensation required, with the consequence that the custodial sentence was activated and a EAW seeking to enforce the custodial sentence was issued. The Appellant contests his extradition. The issue at the first instance extradition hearing was whether the Appellant was deliberately absent from the trial in Italy, within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The first instance judge held that he was. The High Court upheld the judge's findings. The Appellant now seeks permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court. The issue is: (1) For a requested person to have deliberately absented himself from trial for the purposes of section 20(3) Extradition Act 2002, must the requesting authority prove that he has actual knowledge that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia? (2) Where the requesting authority asserts that it can be demonstrated by inference that a requested person could reasonably foresee that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia, must the inference be the only reasonable inference? More information is available on our website
Lifestyle Equities CV and another (Respondents) v Amazon UK Services Ltd and others (Appellants) UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-06 | (UKSC 2022/0108) - [2024] UKSC 8 The Lifestyle entities are the owner and exclusive licencee of a number of UK and EU trade marks relating to the "BEVERLY HILLS POLO CLUB". The equivalent trade marks in the US are owned by another commercially unrelated entity, which produces goods identical to those for which Lifestyle's trade marks are registered in the UK/EU. Lifestyle claim that the Amazon entities have infringed their trade marks by advertising, offering for sale and ultimately selling the US manufactured goods to UK/EU customers on www.amazon.co.uk, www.amazon.de and www.amazon.com (as viewable in the UK/EU). Amazon admitted that the listings on www.amazon.co.uk and www.amazon.de were an infringement of Lifestyle's trade marks. However, they denied that the listing on www.amazon.com was an infringement as it was not targeted at UK/EU consumers and so not to be treated as use of the trade marks in the UK/EU. Amazon also denied that sale (through any of the websites) was an infringement of Lifestyle's trade marks in the UK/EU as the sales took place in the USA. The High Court dismissed Lifestyle's claims (except to the extent they were admitted by Amazon). The Court of Appeal overturned this decision and granted an injunction against Amazon. It did so on the basis that the High Court judge (i) was wrong in concluding that the listings on www.amazon.com were not targeted at UK/EU consumers; and (ii) misinterpreted EU case law which meant that the sales to customers in the UK/EU were themselves use of the trade marks in the UK/EU. Therefore, both the listing and the sales infringed Lifestyle's UK/EU trade marks. Amazon now seeks permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court, on the basis that the Court of Appeal: (i) should not have overturned the High Court's analysis of whether the listings were targeted at UK/EU consumers; and (ii) misinterpreted the EU case law regarding whether sales on foreign websites could constitute infringement of the trade marks in the UK/EU. The issue is: When does the sale or advertising of trade-marked goods on a foreign website infringe the relevant trade marks in the UK or EU? More information is available on our website:
Judicial Assistants 2024/25 Online Information Event UKSupremeCourt 2024-03-06 | This event will provide prospective applicants with an insight into the Judicial Assistant role and an opportunity to ask questions about the application process.Supreme Court Justices Lord Sales and Lady Rose will speak about the role from the perspective of the Justices, while current and former JAs will talk about their experiences and how their time at the Court has shaped their careers and the Court's Head of HR will give an insight into the application process.
20 Questions with our Judicial Assistants UKSupremeCourt 2024-02-28 | Learn more about the role of Judicial Assistants.Applications for the 2024/25 Legal Year are open until midnight on 31 March. Find out more and apply at supremecourt.uk/about/ja-recruitment.html
In the matter of an application by RM (two linked appeals)(UKSC 2022/0144; UKSC 2022/0145) - [2024] UKSupremeCourt 2024-02-21 | RM suffers from a severe mental impairment. On 2 March 2018, RM was charged for a series of violent and sexual offences. RM was found unfit to plead to the charges but was held to have committed the alleged acts.The Crown Court imposed a Hospital Order and a Restriction Order on RM. RM was detained in a psychiatric ward in hospital.On 16 January 2019, RM made an application for discharge to the Tribunal. The expert medical evidence before the Tribunal indicated that RM would shortly begin receiving treatment outside of hospital in a community-based setting as part of a period of testing.Under Article 78 of the Order, a patient may only continue to be detained if they are suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants their detention in hospital for medical treatment.The Tribunal acknowledged that RM's care plan would involve him moving to live in a community-based setting but considered that he would nonetheless remain a patient receiving treatment in hospital.RM brought an application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal arguing that his continued detention was unlawful in light of the treatment plan advanced in medical evidence which did not envisage further treatment in hospital.The High Court dismissed the appeal upholding the decision of the Tribunal. However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decisions of the Tribunal and High Court holding that they had erred in law. The Tribunal and Department of Justice now jointly appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether the Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) was entitled to conclude that RM's mental disorder continues to be of a nature or degree warranting his continued detention in hospital for medical treatment (i.e. whether the test for discharge from a Restriction Order under Article 78 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (the Order) is met).More information is available on our website
Jersey Choice Ltd (Appellant) v His Majestys Treasury (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2024-02-14 | Section 199(3) of the Finance Act 2012 removed VAT relief known as Low Value Consignment Relief ("LVCR") from low value goods sold to UK customers by mail order from the Channel Islands, with effect from 1 April 2012.The appellant, Jersey Choice Limited ("JCL"), is a Jersey-registered company that grows horticultural products in Jersey and sells them to customers in the UK by mail order. It claims that the removal of the LVCR has caused it loss in excess of £15 million. JCL therefore issued proceedings against the respondent, His Majesty's Treasury, which is responsible for UK taxation policy. JCL seeks damages on the ground that section 199(3) was enacted in breach of EU law. It claims that section 199(3) unjustifiably treated Jersey and Guernsey differently from the other third territories within the common customs area, contrary to the free movement of goods provisions in articles 28, 30 and 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.The High Court struck out JCL's claim on the basis that it had no prospect of success and was also an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal agreed that JCL's claim should be struck out on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable grounds (though it was not an abuse of process). JCL now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Was the Court of Appeal wrong to uphold the order striking out Jersey Choice Limited's claim on the basis the pleadings disclosed no reasonable grounds?More information is available on our website:
Armstead (Appellant) v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company Ltd (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2024-02-14 | Lorna Armstead ('LA') hired a motor car from Helphire Ltd ('Helphire'). She signed a hire agreement confirming (a) she would pay Helphire for any loss or damage to the vehicle and (b) she would pay Helphire a daily rate for loss of use of the vehicle should the vehicle be unavailable to Helphire if returned damaged.On 23 November 2015, LA was involved in a road accident caused by the negligent driving of a third party. The third party was insured by Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company Ltd ('RSA'). The hired vehicle required repairs costing £1,990.65. Two years' later, on 14 May 2018, LA received a demand from Helphire requesting payment of a lump sum for loss of use of the vehicle while it was being repaired. LA brought a claim against RSA for both sums.The issue is:Can the terms of a contract signed between the hirer of a motor car and the hire car company be relied upon to calculate the damages claimed by the hirer against the insurance company of a negligent driver who collided with the hire car?More information is available on our website:
In the matter of an application by Stephen Hilland for Judicial Review (Appellant) Northern Ireland. UKSupremeCourt 2024-02-07 | The Appellant was convicted of two offences and sentenced in May 2015 to a sentence of imprisonment referred to as a "determinate custodial sentence", by which the custodial and license periods of a prisoner's sentence are set at the outset. The Appellant was sentenced to two years, with a year to be spent in custody and a year on licence. Prisoners spend their licence periods in the community, subject to conditions, and are subject to recall.In February 2016, the Appellant, having served the custodial element of the two offences, was released on licence. In September 2016, he was arrested on suspicion of involvement in offences, in breach of his licence conditions. He was ultimately recalled to prison by a decision of the Department of Justice on 21 October 2016. The Appellant's case was subsequently referred to the Parole Commissioner, which declined to release him, with the result that he remained in prison until 3 February 2017 when he was released.The Appellant argues that the Department of Justice's decision to recall him to prison was made in breach of Article 5 (right to liberty and security) read with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) ECHR, as incorporated by the HRA. It is argued that he has by virtue of the provisions of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 been discriminated against in comparison with the treatment afforded by that order to other allegedly comparable groups of prisoners, namely Indeterminate Custodial Sentence prisoners and Extended Custodial Sentence prisoners. The High Court in Northern Ireland dismissed his application for judicial review and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed his appeal. He now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Is applying a lower threshold test for the recall of prisoners on licence who are subject to a "determinate custodial sentence", such as the Appellant, than is applied for the recall of prisoners subject to other allegedly comparable types of sentence discriminatory and a breach of the Appellant's rights under Article 5 (right to liberty and security) read with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)?More information is available on our website.
Potanina (Respondent) v Potanin (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2024-01-31 | On appeal from: [2021] EWCA Civ 702The parties married in Russia in 1983 and lived there throughout their marriage. They have three adult children. In the 1990s, the husband amassed a large fortune, estimated to amount to $20 billion. The majority of his assets comprised shares in companies or other business entities. These were not registered in the husband's name, though the husband was their beneficial owner. The parties divorced in 2014, which prompted extensive litigation in Russia, as well as claims in the USA and Cyprus. The wife sought to obtain half of the assets beneficially owned by the husband, but her attempts were unsuccessful.In 2019, the wife sought permission to apply for financial relief pursuant to Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The High Court Judge initially granted the permission at a "without notice" hearing, where the husband was not represented. However, the Judge subsequently allowed the husband's application to set the permission aside on the basis that the Judge had been misled. The Court of Appeal allowed the wife's appeal. The husband now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Should the court have granted the wife permission to apply for financial relief pursuant to Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984?By a majority of three to two, the Supreme Court allows the appeal. Lord Leggatt gives the leading judgment, with which Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lady Rose agree. Lord Briggs gives a dissenting judgment, with which Lord Stephens agrees.More information is available on our website: UKSC 2021/0130
R (on the application of Worcestershire County Council) (Appellant) v SSHSC (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2024-01-17 | Lord Hamblen reads an oral summary regarding a case promulgated on the 10th August 2023
Herculito Maritime Ltd and others (Respondents) v Gunvor International BV and others (Appellants) UKSupremeCourt 2024-01-17 | [2024] UKSC 2On appeal from: [2021] EWCA Civ 1828The First Respondent is the registered owner of a vessel (the "Vessel") which it chartered, by a fixture recap dated 20 September 2010 (the "Charter"), for a voyage from St Petersburg to Singapore. The First Appellant is the lawful holder of all six of the bills of landing issued by the Vessel's master (the "Bills of Landing") and are the owners and eventual receivers of the Vessel's cargo in Singapore. The First Respondent took out insurance for 14 days from 25 October 2010, including for the Vessel's transit through the Gulf of Aden.On 30 October 2010, the Vessel was seized by pirates while she was transiting through the Gulf of Aden. She was released 10 months later following the payment of a ransom of US$7,700,000 by or on behalf of the First Respondent and/or the relevant underwriters. Most of the cargo was intact and was eventually carried to its destination in Singapore.Before discharge of the cargo at Singapore a General Average Guarantee was provided by the cargo underwriters and a General Average Bond was provided by the First Appellant. Both the Guarantee and the Bond provided that any disputes should be referred to arbitration in London. A General Average adjustment was issued, which concluded that the sum of US$4,829,393.22 was due to the First Respondent from the respective cargo interests. The Appellants denied that any contribution was due to the Respondents.The Arbitration Tribunal determined two preliminary issues: (1) that the terms of the Charter were incorporated into the Bills of Landing, and (2) that the First Respondent under the Bills of Landing agreed to look solely to their insurance cover and not to their counterparties under the Bills of Lading in the event they suffered a loss covered by that insurance cover. The Respondents appealed the Tribunal's findings to the High Court. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal on the first issue and formed a different view on one aspect of the second issue. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellants' appeal. The Appellants now appeal to the UK Supreme Court.The issue is:What is the proper interpretation of a charter agreement and bills of landing for a vessel, in respect of losses arising out the seizure of the vessel by pirates.The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal.More information is available on our website:
Paul and another (Appellants) v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust (Respondent) And Other Cases UKSupremeCourt 2024-01-11 | On appeal from: [2022] EWCA Civ 12These are three conjoined appeals. Each appeal relates to a claim by an Appellant for psychiatric illness caused by viewing a traumatic event which was caused by a Respondent's negligence. In each case, the Appellant witnessed or attended shortly after a death caused by the Respondent's negligence.Following existing law, the Paul and Purchase claims were dismissed by the High Court and County Court respectively, with permission given to appeal. Following Paul, an application to dismiss the claim in Polmear was rejected and permission given to appeal.The cases were conjoined and heard together before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found for the Appellants in Paul and Polmear, and for the Respondent in Purchase.All three cases come before the Supreme Court as a conjoined appeal.The issue is:Can an individual make a claim for psychiatric injury caused by witnessing the death or other horrifying event of a close relative as a result of earlier clinical negligence?By a majority of six to one, the Supreme Court dismisses the appeals.More information is available on our website
Zubaydah (Respondent) v Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others (Appellants) UKSupremeCourt 2023-12-20 | Zubaydah (Respondent) v Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others (Appellants)(UKSC 2022/0083) - [2023] UKSC 50The Respondent brought a claim alleging that the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service ("the Services") acted tortiously, causing personal injury to the Respondent, by allegedly sending questions to the CIA inviting them to use those questions in interrogations of the Respondent for the purpose of attempting to elicit information of interest to the Services. The personal injury is alleged to be the result of the Respondent being arbitrarily detained by the CIA without trial at secret CIA "black site" facilities and being subjected to extreme mistreatment and torture during interrogations conducted by the CIA in: Thailand; Poland; Morocco; Lithuania; Afghanistan; and Guantanamo Bay ("the Six Countries"). The torts alleged are misfeasance, conspiracy, trespass, false imprisonment and negligence.A preliminary issue arose as to whether the law applicable to the Respondent's claim is the law of England and Wales or the law of the Six Countries. The High Court found that the applicable law is the law of the Six Countries. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the applicable law is the law of England and Wales.The issue is:Is the law applicable to the Respondent's claim the law of England and Wales or the law of the six countries in which he alleges he was unlawfully detained and tortured by the United States' authorities?More information is available on our website:
Byers and others (Appellants) v Saudi National Bank (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2023-12-20 | Byers and others (Appellants) v Saudi National Bank (Respondent)(UKSC 2022/0048) - [2023] UKSC 51The appellants, SICL and its joint liquidators, issued proceedings alleging knowing receipt of trust property against SNB, the respondent, contending that a transfer of shares to Samba, a Saudi Arabian bank whose assets and liabilities were subsequently transferred to SNB, had been made in breach of trust and that Samba had known at the time of the transfer of the appellants' interest in the disputed securities and had incurred liability as a knowing recipient.The judge found, inter alia, that the liability of a knowing recipient rested on his knowledge that the property he received was trust property and where a recipient was, from the outset, entitled to treat the property as his own, no liability arose. A claim in knowing receipt would, therefore, fail if, on receipt, the beneficiary's equitable interest was extinguished under the law applicable to the transfer and that since, as a matter of Saudi Arabian law, SICL had no continuing equitable interest in the shares after the transfer, the claim in knowing receipt failed.The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal, contending that they were not required to demonstrate a continuing equitable interest in the shares to succeed in their claim, was dismissed. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether a claim in knowing receipt requires a claimant to prove a continuing equitable interest in the property transferred to the defendant in breach of trust, in addition to knowledge on the part of the defendant so as to render his receipt unconscionable.More information is available on our website:
Thaler (Appellant) v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2023-12-20 | Thaler (Appellant) v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks (Respondent)(UKSC 2021/0201) - [2023] UKPC 49This case concerns two British patent applications (the "Applications") for two inventions that the appellant, Dr Thaler, stated (in the Applications) were created by an AI machine known as DABUS in the absence of a traditional human inventor. Dr Thaler is the sole owner, creator and user of DABUS. It is not in issue whether DABUS created the inventions autonomously.On 4 December 2019, the respondent handed down a decision refusing to accept the designations of DABUS as the inventor in the Applications pursuant to section 13(2) of the 1977 Act on the ground that DABUS is not a person, as envisaged by sections 7 and 13 of the 1977 Act. Dr Thaler’s appeal of the respondent’s decision was dismissed in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. He now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:(a) Does section 13(2)(a) of the Patents Act 1977 (the "1977 Act") require a person to be named as the inventor in all cases, including where the applicant believes the invention was created by an AI machine in the absence of a traditional human inventor?(b) Does the 1977 Act provide for the grant of a patent without a named human inventor?(c) In the case of an invention made by an AI machine, is the owner, creator and user of that AI machine entitled to the grant of a patent for that invention?More information is available on our website:
HXA (Resp) v Surrey County Council (Appel); YXA (Resp) v Wolverhampton City Council (Appel) UKSupremeCourt 2023-12-20 | (UKSC 2022/0149) ; (UKSC 2022/0148) - [2023] UKSC 52This case joins two separate appeals by the local authority Respondents. In each case, the Respondent alleged that the Appellant owed them a duty of care to prevent harm that was done to them by their parents, on the basis that the Respondent had assumed responsibility to prevent that harm. In each case, the first instance judge struck out the claim, but the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and allowed each claim to proceed to trial. The facts as pleaded by the Appellants are summarised below. The parties accept that these facts must be assumed to be provable for the purposes of the strike-out applications.HXA was born in March 1988. The Appellant ("SCC") was involved with HXA's family from September 1993. A child protection conference ("CPC") was held in July 1994, at which HXA and her three sisters were placed on the child protection register under the category "neglect". In November 1994: (i) a referral was made to SCC alleging that HXA had been assaulted by her mother; (ii) a SCC social worker decided to seek legal advice with a view to initiating care proceedings; and (iii) SCC resolved to undertake a full assessment but did not do so. The children were de-registered in January 1995.Around July 1996, HXA's mother formed a relationship with a male ("LA"), who moved into the house. All the children except HXA were re-registered in November 1996. In Spring 1999, HXA reported to a school dinner lady that LA came into the bathroom while she was in the bath. The report was passed to the headteacher, but no further action was taken. In January 2000, SCC received a referral from HXA's school: a friend of HXA had alleged that LA had touched HXA intimately. At a January 2000 CPC: (i) SCC decided not to investigate the report further due to concern about LA's reaction and an incorrect belief there were no previous concerns; and (ii) SCC resolved to conduct "keeping safe" work with HXA and her sisters, but that work was not carried out. In January 2009, LA was convicted of raping HXA, and HXA's mother was convicted of indecently assaulting her.YXA was born in November 2001 and lived in the Appellant ("WCC")'s area from August 2007. YXA has epilepsy, learning disabilities and autism. Assessments were conducted by WCC in November and December 2007. YXA's needs and concerns about his parents' ability to meet them were identified. A paediatrician was concerned that YXA was being incorrectly medicated by his parents and recommended that he should be taken into care. From April 2008, WCC accommodated YXA for one night every fortnight and one weekend every two months, with the parents' agreement. Concerns remained about the parents' ability to meet YXA's needs. In December 2009, YXA was received into care with his parents' agreement. Care proceedings were later commenced, culminating in a final care order in March 2011.The issue is:In each of the appeals, is it arguable that the local authority Appellant owed the Respondent (a minor at the relevant times) a common law duty of care to protect them from harm on the basis that the Respondent had assumed responsibility to protect them from such harm?More information is available on our website:
Accessibility at the Court UKSupremeCourt 2023-12-04 | Accessibility at the court – The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council0:00 Accessibility at the Court0:41 Transport to the Court2:11 Entrance to the Court3:47 Reception Desk5:07 Wider Facilities at the Court6:10 Accessing Hearings at the Court7:00 Accessing Tours at the Court7:43 Visitors with Autism8:31 Contact us
TUI Ltd (Respondent) v Griffiths (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-29 | On appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 1442The appellant, Mr Griffiths, purchased an all-inclusive holiday from the respondent. During that holiday, he suffered gastric illness as a result (he alleges) of contaminated food and drink consumed in the hotel.Mr Griffiths subsequently brought a claim against the respondent for breach of contract and pursuant to the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992. At trial, Mr Griffiths relied on the expert evidence of a microbiologist in relation to causation, who opined that his illness had been caused by the food and drink consumed at the hotel. The respondent did not rely on its own expert evidence. The Judge in the County Court held that she was not satisfied that the medical evidence showed that it was more likely than not that the appellant's illness had been caused by eating food and drink at the hotel, dismissing the claim.On appeal in the High Court, this decision was overturned. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the High Court decision was overturned. The appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue in is: Whether, and (if so), in what circumstances, can the court evaluate and reject what is described as an "uncontroverted" expert’s report?The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses allows Mr Griffith's appeal.More information is available on our website:
Wolverhampton City Council & others(Respondents) v London Gypsies & Travellers & others (Appellants) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-29 | On appeal from [2022] EWCA Civ 13Between 2015 and 2020, a number of local authorities obtained injunctions designed to prevent Gypsies and Travellers from camping on local authority land without permission. The injunctions were addressed to "persons unknown" because the Gypsies and Travellers who might wish to camp on a particular site could not generally be identified in advance. At the time the injunctions were granted, these unknown persons, or newcomers, had not yet camped, or threatened to camp, on the local authority land without permission, or to commit any other relevant unlawful activity. The local authorities obtained the injunctions without notifying any other party, at hearings where the interests of Gypsies and Travellers were not represented.From around mid-2020, the local authorities made applications to extend or vary injunctions which were coming to an end. After a hearing in one of these cases, the High Court judge decided that there was a need to review all newcomer injunctions affecting Gypsies and Travellers. He gave the appellants, who represent the interests of Gypsies and Travellers, permission to intervene so that the interests of Gypsies and Travellers could be represented. Following the review hearing, the judge concluded that the court did not have the power to grant newcomer injunctions, except on a short-term, interim basis. He therefore made a series of orders discharging the newcomer injunctions obtained by the local authorities.The Court of Appeal held that the court had the power to grant newcomer injunctions, and allowed the local authorities' appeal. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Does the court have the power to grant "newcomer injunctions", i.e. injunctions against persons who are unknown and unidentified as at the date of the order, and who have not yet performed, or threatened to perform, the acts which the injunction prohibits? If so, on what basis and subject to what safeguards?The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appellants’ appeal. It holds that the court has power to grant newcomer injunctions. However, it should only exercise this power in circumstances where there is a compelling need to protect civil rights or to enforce public law that is not adequately met by any other available remedies. In addition, newcomer injunctions should only be made subject to procedural safeguards designed to protect newcomers’ rights.More information is available on our website
R (on the app of Afzal) (Appellant) v SSHD (Respt); R (on the app of Iyieke) (Appt) v SSHD (Respt) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-28 | R (on the application of Afzal) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent)R (on the application of Iyieke) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent)[2023] UKSC 46On appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 1909; and [2022] EWCA Civ 1147The facts in 2022/0021 are:Mr Afzal was originally granted limited leave to remain until 14 April 2013 on 4 February 2010. He was subsequently granted further leave to remain until 14 July 2017 as a Tier 1 entrepreneur.On 6 July 2017, before his leave had expired, Mr Afzal applied for an extension of leave, but the application was rejected as invalid by a notice dated 22 January 2018, due to Mr Afzal having failed to pay one of the required fees. Mr Afzal made no attempt to challenge that decision.Mr Afzal then made a fresh application on 2 February 2018 for further leave to remain, accompanied by the appropriate fees. On 5 September 2019 Mr Afzal was given leave to remain until 4 March 2022. In the period between 14 July 2017 and 5 September 2019, therefore, Mr Afzal did not have formal leave to remain.Mr Afzal made an application for indefinite leave to remain on 28 February 2020, for which one must have ten years' continuous residence pursuant to paragraph 276B of the Immigration Rules. On 11 March 2020 the Secretary of State refused that application on the basis that there was a period when Mr Afzal was not lawfully resident with the consequence that the period of continuous lawful residence had been broken.Leave to bring judicial review proceedings of the Secretary of State's decision was refused by two Upper Tribunal Judges, the first on the papers and the second after an oral hearing. The Court of Appeal granted leave to bring judicial review but dismissed Mr Afzal's claim. Mr Afzal now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue in 2022/0021 is: (1) Does section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 apply where an application for leave to remain is said to be invalid by reason of the failure to pay the relevant fee at the proper time, so that leave is extended by that provision until the application is decided or withdrawn?(2) What is the meaning of the word "disregarded" in the second sentence of para 276B of the Immigration Rules with regards to overstaying book-ended by periods of leave to remain?The facts in 2022/0168 are: The appellant is a Nigerian national who entered the UK on 13 February 2011 on a student visa and remained in the UK after that visa expired, thus becoming an overstayer on 10 August 2014. He applied for leave to remain on compassionate grounds in 2014 and on grounds of private and family life in 2015. On 11 August 2017, he was granted leave to remain on human rights grounds until 11 February 2020, later extended to 30 July 2022.On 17 February 2021, the appellant, having completed 10 years of residence in the UK, applied for Indefinite Leave to Remain under para 276B of the Immigration Rules – the long residence rule.The respondent refused the application and the appellant judicially reviewed that decision.The Upper Tribunal refused permission to bring the judicial review.The Court of Appeal granted permission to bring the claim but dismissed the substantive judicial review. The appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue in 2022/0168 is:Whether periods of time the appellant spent in the UK after overstaying a visa should be considered as time in the UK for the purpose of establishing 10 years' continuous lawful residence for an application for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. During the ten year period, the appellant had periods with leave and without leave to remain.The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses each of the appeals.More information is available on our website
R (on the application of Imam) (Respondent) v London Borough of Croydon (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-28 | [1] R (on the application of Imam) (Respondent) v London Borough of Croydon (Appellant)[2023] UKSC 45On appeal from [2022] EWCA Civ 601The respondent is disabled within the meaning of s6 of the Equality Act 2010. The appellant, a local housing authority, has provided the respondent housing since 2014. The appellant accepts that (a) the property provided is not suitable accommodation, within the meaning of the 1996 Act; and (b) it is in breach of s193(2) of the 1996 Act by not offering suitable alternative accommodation.The respondent judicially reviewed the appellant's failure to provide suitable alternative accommodation. In the High Court, the Deputy Judge declined to exercise his discretion to award a mandatory injunction to require the appellant to provide suitable alternative accommodation. In the Court of Appeal, this decision was overturned on the basis that the Deputy Judge had wrongly taken into account budgetary constraints imposed on the local housing authority in the exercise of his discretion and in the analysis of the steps taken by the authority to fulfil its statutory duty. The appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:When should a court make a mandatory order against a local housing authority to enforce a duty owed to a homeless individual under s193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 (the "1996 Act")? In particular, should the court take account of either: (a) budgetary constraints imposed on the housing authority; or (b) the availability of housing under a non-secured tenancy under Part VII of the 1996 Act (as opposed to a secured tenancy under Part VI of the 1996 Act).The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. More information is available on our website:
Lord Reed pays tribute to Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-21 | Following the sad news of the death of former Supreme Court Justice Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe on 17th November 2023, Lord Reed paid tribute to him before the UK Supreme Court hearing today (21st November 2023).
Commissioners for HMRC (Respd) v Fisher & another (Appt) Comm for HMRC (Appt) v Fisher (Respd) No 2 UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-21 | On appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 1438The Fisher family established the Stan James betting business. This appeal concerns the transfer of part of the Stan James betting business from a UK resident company, Stan James (Abingdon) Limited to a Gibraltar resident company, Stan James Gibraltar Limited ("SJG") in 2000, and the assessments to tax made on Stephen, Peter and Anne Fisher on the basis that they had "power to enjoy" income of SJG. Assessments to tax were issued by HMRC to each of Stephen and Anne Fisher in respect of the years of assessment 2000/2001 to 2007/2008 and Peter Fisher in respect of the years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. Pursuant to section 739 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1996, HMRC treated the income of SJG as the deemed income of the Fishers in proportion to their respective shareholdings in the company.The Court of Appeal upheld the tax charges on Stephen and Peter but not Anne. Stephen and Peter now appeal to the Supreme Court. HMRC are cross-appealing in relation to Anne's assessment to tax.The issue is: What is the correct construction of the anti-avoidance provisions in section 739 and following of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (and its successor in Chapter 2 of Part 13 of the Income Tax Act 2007)? In particular:i) Does the transfer of assets have to be a transfer by the individual who has the power to enjoy the income that becomes payable to the overseas person?ii) If the individual has to be the transferor of the assets in order for section 739 to apply, in what circumstances (if any) can an individual be treated as a transferor of the assets where the transfer is in fact made by a company in which the individual is a shareholder?The Supreme Court unanimously concludes that the Fishers' appeal must be allowed and HMRC's appeal must be dismissed. More information is available on our website:
Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (Appl) v Central Arbitration Committee and another (Resp) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-21 | On appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 952This appeal concerns collective bargaining rights in respect of Deliveroo riders. The appellant, the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain ("the Union") is an independent trade union whose members include Deliveroo riders. The second respondent, Roofoods Ltd ("Deliveroo") operates the Deliveroo food and drinks delivery service.On 28 November 2016, the Union submitted an application to the first respondent, the Central Arbitration Committee ("the CAC"), that the Union should be recognised by Deliveroo for collective bargaining in respect of a group of Deliveroo riders in the Camden zone. Applications are considered by the CAC in accordance with Schedule A1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("the 1992 Act"). The CAC refused to accept the Union's application on the basis that the riders were not "workers" within the meaning of the 1992 Act. This was because Deliveroo did not require them to provide delivery services personally, but permitted the use of substitutes.Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the Union's claim for judicial review of the CAC's decision. The Union now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Did the CAC's refusal to accept the Union's application to be recognised by Deliveroo for collective bargaining interfere with the rights of Deliveroo riders to form and join a trade union under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights? If so, was this interference justified? Should the courts below have construed section 296(1)(b) of the 1992 Act so as to give effect to Article 11?The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. More information is available on our website:
Canada Square Operations Ltd (Appellant) v Potter (Respondent) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-15 | On appeal from: [2021] EWCA Civ 339In July 2006, Mrs Potter took out a loan with Canada Square. At Canada Square's suggestion, Mrs Potter also took out insurance under a payment protection insurance policy (“the PPI Policy”). Mrs Potter was not told that over 95% of the premium for the PPI Policy was paid to Canada Square as its commission on the sale of the Policy (“the Commission”).In December 2018, Mrs Potter issued a claim against Canada Square, to recover the sums that she had paid under the PPI Policy, plus interest. Canada Square argued that it was too late for Mrs Potter to bring this kind of claim, as section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 imposed a six-year limitation period, which had long expired. Relying on section 32 of that Act, Mrs Potter argued that the six-year period did not begin to run until she found out about the Commission in 2018.The County Court decided that section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied and ordered Canada Square to pay Mrs Potter £7,953. Canada Square appealed, unsuccessfully, to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal. Canada Square now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:The Limitation Act 1980 sets out the time limits (or limitation periods) for bringing different kinds of legal claims. Section 32(1)(b) postpones the commencement of the ordinary limitation period where any fact relevant to the claimant's right of action has been "deliberately concealed" from them by the defendant. Section 32(2) provides that, for the purposes of section 32(1), "deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty."In this appeal, the Supreme Court is asked to clarify the meaning of the phrases "deliberately concealed" in section 32(1)(b) and "deliberate commission of a breach of duty" in section 32(2), so as to determine whether Mrs Potter's claim against Canada Square Operations Ltd ("Canada Square"), was issued too late and is therefore time barred.The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses Canada Square’s appeal. It holds that Mrs Potter’s claim is not time barred. This is because section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act postponed the commencement of the six-year limitation period until November 2018, when Mrs Potter was advised that the premium was likely to have included substantial commission. However, Canada Square’s failure to disclose the commission was not a deliberate breach of duty for the purposes of section 32(2), so the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that Canada Square was also deprived of a limitation defence by the operation of that section. Lord Reed gives the judgment, with which the other members of the Court agree.More information is available on our website
R (on the application AAA (Syria) and others) (Respondents/Cross Appellants) v SSHD (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-15 | On appeal from: [2023] EWCA Civ 745These appeals arise out of claims brought by individual asylum seekers ("the claimants") who travelled to the UK in small boats (or, in one case, by lorry). The Home Secretary declared the claimants' claims for asylum to be inadmissible, intending that they should be removed to Rwanda where their asylum claims would be decided by the Rwandan authorities. Her decisions were made in accordance with the Migration and Economic Development Partnership ("MEDP") between the UK and Rwanda, recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and a series of diplomatic "Notes Verbales".Under paragraphs 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules, if the Home Secretary decides that an asylum claim is inadmissible, she is permitted to remove the person who has made the claim to any safe third country that agrees to accept the asylum claimant. On the basis of the arrangements made in the MEDP, the Home Secretary decided that Rwanda was a safe third country for these purposes. This is "the Rwanda policy".The claimants (and other affected asylum seekers) challenged both the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally, and the Home Secretary's decisions to remove each claimant to Rwanda. The Divisional Court held that the Rwanda policy was, in principle, lawful. However, the way in which the Home Secretary had implemented the policy in the claimants' individual cases was procedurally flawed. Accordingly, her decisions in those cases would be quashed and remitted to her for reconsideration.The appeal to the Court of Appeal concerned only the challenges to the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally. By a majority, the Court allowed the claimants' appeal on the ground that the deficiencies in the asylum system in Rwanda were such that there were substantial reasons for believing that there is a real risk of refoulement. That is, a real risk that persons sent to Rwanda would be returned to their home countries where they face persecution or other inhumane treatment, when, in fact, they have a good claim for asylum. In that sense Rwanda was not a safe third country. Accordingly, unless and until the deficiencies in its asylum processes are corrected, removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda will be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is because it would breach article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the claimants' other grounds of appeal.The Home Secretary now appeals to the Supreme Court on issues (1) to (3) below. AAA (Syria) and others and HTN (Vietnam) cross appeal on issues (4) and (5). AS (Iran) also cross appeals on issue (4). ASM (Iraq) appeals on issue (6).The issue is:The Supreme Court is asked to decide the following legal questions:Did the Divisional Court apply the wrong test when determining whether removal to Rwanda would breach article 3?If the Divisional Court applied the right test, was the Court of Appeal entitled to interfere with its conclusion that Rwanda was a safe third country?If the Divisional Court applied the wrong test or there was another basis for interfering with its conclusion, was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that Rwanda was not a safe third country because asylum seekers would face a real risk of refoulement?Did the Home Secretary fail to discharge her procedural obligation under article 3 to undertake a thorough examination of Rwanda's asylum procedures to determine whether they adequately protect asylum seekers against the risk of refoulement?Were there substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda will face a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in Rwanda itself, in addition to the risk of refoulement?Does the Asylum Procedures Directive continue to have effect as retained EU law? This is relevant because the Directive only permits asylum seekers to be removed to a safe third country if they have some connection to it. None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda.The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the Home Secretary’s appeal, and upholds the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the Rwanda policy is unlawful. This is because there are substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement to their country of origin if they were removed to Rwanda. Lord Reed and Lord Lloyd-Jones give a joint judgment with which the other members of the Court agree.More information is available on our website:
Primeo Fund (in Official Liquidation) (Appellant) v Bank of Bermuda Ltd and another (Respondents) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-15 | On appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Cayman IslandsPrimeo operated as an open-ended investment fund incorporated in the Cayman Islands. It invested funds with Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), initially a small proportion of its overall investments, growing over time. From 2003, Primeo also placed a small proportion of investments with BLMIS indirectly through Alpha Prime, a Bermudan-domiciled investment fund. From 2004, Primeo also began investing indirectly via another Cayman-domiciled fund, Herald Fund SPC. On 1 May 2007, Primeo switched its remaining direct investments in BLMIS to an indirect investment through Herald Fund SPC. The respondents acted respectively as Primeo’s administrator and custodian at all relevant times.On 11 December 2008, Bernard Madoff was charged with fraudulently operating a multi-billion-dollar Ponzi scheme. Primeo was subsequently placed into voluntary liquidation. On 20 February 2013, Primeo brought claims against the respondents for breach of their contractual duties. At first instance, the judge dismissed Primeo’s claims, principally on the basis that strict liability loss and causation had not been established and that the claims were barred by the reflective loss principle in any event. The Court of Appeal agreed that that Primeo's claims were barred by the reflective loss principle, and so dismissed Primeo's appeal on that basis. Primeo now appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.The issue is:This appeal concerns claims brought by the appellant, Primeo Fund (In Official Liquidation) (Primeo), against the respondents for breach of their contractual duties. The claims arise in the context of the fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council allowed Primeo's appeal in relation to the application of the reflective loss rule to the extent explained in its judgment dated 9 August 2021. The Board is now asked to decide the remaining issues on Primeo's appeal and also decide the respondents' cross-appeal/additional grounds for upholding the decision belowThe Judicial Committee’s judgment is unanimous. It allows Primeo’s appeal in part and also allows the Respondents’ cross-appeal in part.More information is available on our website:
Swearing In of Lady Simler UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-14 | On Tuesday the 14th of November 2023 a special ceremony was held for the swearing in of Lady Simler as a new Justice of the UK Supreme Court.
Black Talent in the Legal Profession: Tackling Barriers and Creating Pathways UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-10 | The event will be opened by the President of the Court, Lord Reed, followed by a panel discussion on advancing black talent in the legal profession.The event aims to provide practical advice for Black lawyers and senior leaders within the legal community to assist Black lawyers to progress their careers and reach senior positions within the law.Chaired by the Black Talent Charter’s Chief Executive, Laura Durrant, speakers will:Offer first hand insights into their own career journey and provide practical advice on overcoming barriers and obstacles to progression.Offer views on how senior leaders and allies can assist in removing barriers to enable Black lawyers to progress in a sustainable and rewarding careerDiscussions will be followed by a Q&A Session.Speakers:Harry Matovu KC , Barrister and Chair of Black Talent CharterLord Leggatt, Justice of the Supreme CourtDr I Stephanie Boyce, Honorary Professor of Law, Immediate Past President of the Law Society of England and WalesElaine Banton, Barrister and Co-Chair of the Bar Council Equality, Diversity and Social Mobility Committee
Pathways to a Judicial Career: Q&A and practical advice for aspiring solicitor judges UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-08 | Watch the UK Supreme Court's webinar for aspiring solicitor judges, held in partnership with the Law Society of England and Wales.
Secretary of State for Transport (Appellant) v Curzon Park Ltd and others (Respondents) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-08 | When land is compulsorily purchased, the landowner is entitled to compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1961 (the "Act"). The basic measure of compensation is the open market value of land if sold by a willing seller. The landowner is also entitled to compensation for enhancement of the value of the land resulting from actual or prospective planning permission for its development. Under section 14 of the Act, in assessing the value of the land, account may be taken of: planning permission which is in force in respect of it at the relevant valuation date; the prospect at the valuation date of planning permission being granted in respect of it on or after that date; and 'appropriate alternative development' of the land. Development is 'appropriate alternative development' if, on stated assumptions, at the relevant valuation date planning permission for the development could reasonably have been expected to be granted on an application decided either on that date or at a time after that date. Under section 17 of the Act, the landowner may apply to the local planning authority for a certificate of appropriate alternative development ("CAAD") stating that there is development which is appropriate alternative development for the purposes of section 14.The issue which arises on this appeal is whether, in determining an application for a CAAD for a particular parcel of land, the decision maker may take into account CAAD applications or decisions which relate to the development of other land.The factual context in which the issue arises is the valuation of four neighbouring sites which were compulsorily acquired in 2018 by the Secretary of State for Transport in order to construct a railway terminus in Birmingham for Phase 1 of HS2 (the London to West Midlands high-speed railway). The four respondents were the owners of the sites and each of them applied for and was granted a CAAD in relation to their respective sites.In determining the respondents' CAAD applications, Birmingham City Council considered each application in isolation, rejecting the Secretary of State's contention that the cumulative impacts of all the applications for CAADs should be considered. The Secretary of State appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which held that, subject to certain boundaries, it was for the decision maker to give other CAAD applications or decisions relating to other land such evidential weight as they thought appropriate. The Upper Tribunal rejected the Secretary of State's arguments that CAAD applications in respect of other sites should be treated as notional applications for planning permission and that each of the respondents was liable to be over-compensated unless the cumulative effect of development which had or was likely to come forward on neighbouring sites was taken into account.The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal. Before the Court of Appeal, the respondents argued that section 14 of the Act requires the decision maker to assume that the scheme of development has been cancelled on the launch date (the "cancellation assumption"), and from the cancellation assumption it follows that no CAAD applications could have been made pursuant to section 17 of the Act in the counterfactual scenario posited by the statute (the "counterfactual cancelled scheme world"). As such, the respondents contended, the inevitable consequence of the cancellation assumption is that the decision maker must disregard any applications or decisions in respect of other sites which may in fact have been made. The Court of Appeal accepted this argument and held that the decision maker was not entitled to take into account other CAAD applications or decisions relating to the development of other land. The Secretary of State now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Popoviciu (Respondent) v Curtea De Apel Bucharest (Romania) (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-08 | On appeal from: [2021] EWHC 1584Gabriel Popoviciu ("Popoviciu") was convicted in Romania of two offences - accessory to aggravated abuse of power, and bribery – and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.On 3 August 2017, a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW") was issued by the Bucharest Court of Appeal (the "Bucharest Court") seeking the return of Popoviciu. He was arrested on 14 August 2017 and on 12 July 2019 the Westminster Magistrates' Court ordered his extradition.Popoviciu appealed to the Administrative Court on the basis that the judge that convicted him in Romania, Judge Tudoran, had an undisclosed and inappropriate long-standing relationship with the prosecution's primary witness. Popoviciu provided new evidence from a Romanian lawyer who is investigating Judge Tudoran for various corruption-related offences which shed light on his relationship with the prosecution's primary witness. The Administrative Court admitted this new evidence and, having taken it into account, overturned the Westminster Magistrates' Court's order. It held that there was a real risk that Popoviciu’s trial in Romania had been flagrantly unfair, and therefore returning Popoviciu to Romania would breach his Article 5 rights as he faced being imprisoned for a substantial period there because of his conviction. The judge's undisclosed relationship with the primary witness meant that Popoviciu suffered a complete denial of his Article 6 rights. The Bucharest Court now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:In a conviction extradition case, is it sufficient for the requested person to show substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that his trial was so flagrantly unfair as to deprive him of the essence of his Article 6 rights, and therefore a real risk that his imprisonment in the requesting state will violate his Article 5 rights?On 26 May 2023, soon after the Supreme Court heard the appeal, the Bucharest Court of Appeal suspended the execution of Mr Popoviciu’s conviction and sentence. On 13 July 2023, the Supreme Court was informed by the designated authority that the European Arrest Warrant had been withdrawn. The Supreme Court made an order dismissing the Romanian authorities’ appeal pursuant to section 43(4) of the Extradition Act 2003.The Court nevertheless decided to deliver its judgment, to answer the question that had been certified by the High Court, and to address other issues which had been raised in the appeal.More information is available on our website
Skatteforvaltningen (Respondent) v Solo Capital Partners LLP and others (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-08 | Skatteforvaltningen (the Danish Customs and Tax Administration) (Respondent) v Solo Capital Partners LLP (in special administration) and others (Appellant) - [2023] UKSC 40On appeal from: [2022] EWCA Civ 234SKAT had paid refunds of Danish tax totalling £1.44 billion. The basis of its claims was the recovery of sums which had been wrongfully extracted from it by fraudulent misrepresentations orchestrated principally through entities based in England. The defendants were individuals and corporate entities who had procured the refund applications and received the bulk of the sums; they had never paid, or been liable to pay, the tax themselves. Many were domiciled in Brussels-Lugano Member States when the proceedings were served. Dicey Rule 3 provides that English courts had no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign state. The Commercial Court determined as a preliminary issue that SKAT's claims fell within the scope of that rule and were therefore inadmissible. The judge concluded that seeking to recoup tax refunds erroneously paid was a claim directly or indirectly to enforce a foreign tax law and that although SKAT had framed its claims as private law causes of action, they were, in substance, claims to enforce Denmark's sovereign right to the tax in question. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a claim by the Danish tax authority to recover tax refunds said to have been induced by the fraudulent misrepresentations of entities based in England was a claim directly or indirectly to enforce a foreign tax law. The Danish tax authority, as a victim of fraud, sought only the restitution of monies of which it had been defrauded; its claims were therefore not inadmissible by virtue of the Dicey rule. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether the Danish Customs and Tax Administration's ("SKAT") claims for the recovery of tax refunds made to the appellants are not admissible before the English courts by reason of Rule 3(1) of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, which says that "English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action… for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign State".The Supreme Court unanimously rejects the appellants’ appeal. It holds that the revenue rule does not apply to SKAT’s claims. This means that SKAT’s claims against the appellants can proceed to a trial in the Commercial Court. Lord Lloyd-Jones gives a judgment with which the other members of the Court agree.More information is available on our website:
Brake and another (Respondents) v Chedington Court Estate Ltd (Appellant) UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-01 | This appeal concerns the standing of a bankrupt to challenge the acts, omissions or decisions of the trustee of the bankrupt's estate under section 303(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the "IA 1986").Section 303(1) of the IA 1986 provides:"If a bankrupt or any of his creditors or any other person is dissatisfied by any act, omission or decision of a trustee of the bankrupt's estate, he may apply to the court; and on such an application the court may confirm, reverse or modify any act or decision of the trustee, may give him directions or may make such other order as it thinks fit."Section 168(5) of the IA 1986 is the equivalent provision applicable in the liquidation of a company, enabling "any person aggrieved" (which has been interpreted to include creditors and contributories of the company) to make applications as regards the acts or decisions of liquidators. By parity of reasoning, the approach adopted under section 303(1) applies equally to section 168(5).Factual backgroundBetween February 2010 and June 2013, Mr and Mrs Brake (the "Brakes") and Patley Wood Farm LLP ("PWF"), an investment vehicle for Mrs Brehme, were in partnership (the "Partnership") carrying on an accommodation and events business at West Axnoller House (the "House"). Disputes arose between the partners, which were referred to arbitration. The arbitration concluded with a final award in favour of PWF, a costs order against the Brakes and the dissolution of the Partnership.The Partnership's property included a cottage, adjacent to the House, registered in the names of the Brakes and Mrs Brehme (the "Cottage"). The Brakes lived in the House but would use the Cottage when the house was temporarily let.In 2015, the Brakes were made bankrupt on the petition of PWF in respect of the unpaid costs of the arbitration. A trustee was appointed on 30 July 2015 (the "Trustee").In July 2015, receivers of the Partnership's property, who had been appointed by its bank, sold the farm to a company called Axnoller Events Ltd ("AEL"). The Partnership went into administration in July 2016 and into liquidation in May 2017.In February 2017, AEL was acquired by the appellant in the present appeal, The Chedington Court Estate Ltd ("Chedington"), a company owned by Dr Guy and his wife. On 8 November 2018, the Brakes were given notice to quit the House by Chedington and AEL. Both Dr Guy and the Brakes expressed an interest in purchasing the Cottage. Accordingly, on 18 December 2018, the liquidators invited bids for the Cottage from the Brakes and Dr Guy.On 20 and 21 December 2018, both Dr Guy (on behalf of Chedington) and the Brakes (in their capacities as trustees of the Brake Family settlement (the "Brake Trust") submitted bids for the Cottage. The liquidators accepted Chedington's higher bid, subject to contract. The liquidators were not willing to apply to the court for an order removing the Brakes as registered proprietors of the Cottage. Instead, Dr Guy and Chedington agreed an arrangement with the Trustee under which the Trustee would purchase the Cottage from the liquidator with funds lent by Chedington and would then sell the Cottage to Chedington, making the necessary application to the court to obtain clean legal title to the Cottage (the "Facilitation Agreement"). Pursuant to a notice provided by the Trustee to Dr Guy, agents of Chedington entered the Cottage and changed the locks on 18 January 2019.The proceedingsThe Brakes issued an application under section 303(1) of the IA 1986, both in their personal capacities as bankrupts and in their capacities as trustees of the Brake Trust, alleging that the Trustee wrongfully enabled Chedington to interfere with their right of possession of the Cottage.Chedington applied to strike out the relevant parts of the application on the ground that the Brakes lacked standing under section 303(1) of the IA 1986. The High Court struck out the application.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal brought by the Brakes in their capacities as trustees of the Brake Trust, because in that capacity they were third parties whose only interest was as disappointed under-bidders for the Cottage. By contrast, the Court of Appeal held that, in their personal capacities, the Brakes had standing because their interests were substantially affected by the impugned conduct of the Trustee and because, as bankrupts, they had a direct interest in the relief they sought. Chedington now appeals to the Supreme Court.
R (on the application of Palmer) (Appellant) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another UKSupremeCourt 2023-11-01 | On appeal from: [2021] EWHC 3013 (Admin)Mr Forsey was the sole director of West Coast Capital (USC) Ltd ("USC"). On 23 December 2014, Mr Forsey resolved to take steps to place USC into administration. Three joint administrators were subsequently appointed, one of whom was Mr Palmer. USC went into administration of 13 January 2015. The following day, the employees who worked at USC's warehouse in Dundonald in Scotland were given a letter by Mr Palmer informing them that they were at risk of redundancy and of USC's intention to consult with them at a staff meeting that day. Shortly afterwards, the employees were handed a further letter signed by Mr Palmer which informed them that they were dismissed with immediate effect.The Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act 1992 ("TULRCA") s193(1) and (2) provides that where an employer proposes to dismiss at least 20 employees as redundant within 90 days it is required to give notice to the Secretary of State at least 30 days before any dismissals take effect. TULRCA s194(1) and (3) provide that any "director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate" is guilty of an offence if the company fails to notify the Secretary of State with their consent, connivance or, as a result of their neglect. Mr Palmer and Mr Forsey were each charged with an offence contrary to that provision. Both pleaded not guilty.Mr Palmer argued (inter alia) that he had not committed an offence because an administrator appointed under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA") is not an "officer" within the meaning of TULRCA s194(3). The Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court (the "NDMC") rejected this argument. Mr Palmer sought to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. On 12 November 2021, the Divisional Court rejected Mr Palmer's judicial review application. The Divisional Court also rejected Mr Palmer's application for permission to appeal (although it certified the issue in the instant application as a point of law of general public importance). Mr Palmer now seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether an administrator appointed under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 is an "officer" of the company within the meaning of the phrase "director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate" so as to fall within s194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal.More information is available on our website: UKSC 2021/0233
Republic of Mozambique (Appellant) v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and others (Respondents) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-25 | Between 2013 and 2014, three corporate vehicles (the "SPVs") wholly owned by the Republic of Mozambique ("Mozambique") entered into supply contracts (the "Contracts") with three of the respondents (the "Privinvest companies") for the development of Mozambique's exclusive economic zone. The Contracts are governed by Swiss law. Two of the Contracts provide for dispute resolution by arbitration of "all disputes arising in connection with" the relevant project governed by the Contract. The third Contract provides for dispute resolution by arbitration of "any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, or in relation to" the relevant Contract (the "arbitration agreements").The SPVs borrowed the purchase funds from various banks, for which borrowing Mozambique granted sovereign guarantees (the "Guarantees"). The Guarantees are governed by English law and provide for dispute resolution in the courts of England and Wales.Mozambique accuses the Privinvest companies and others of paying significant bribes to Mozambique's officials, and exposing it to a potential liability of approximately US$2bn under the Guarantees. Accordingly, in 2019 Mozambique brought claims in England and Wales seeking damages resulting from its entering into the Guarantees.The respondents ("Privinvest") say that the Contracts have essentially been performed. Mozambique does not accept that what Privinvest has provided conforms to contract or is of material benefit to it. Privinvest asserts that it provided valuable goods and services and that the Republic has squandered them and sabotaged the project for reasons of internal politics.While Mozambique is not a signatory to the Contracts, Privinvest contends that, as a matter of Swiss law, Mozambique is bound by the arbitration agreements within them. On that basis, Privinvest sought a stay of all Mozambique's claims pursuant to section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the "1996 Act"). Section 9 provides that a party to an arbitration agreement (such as those in the Contracts) against whom legal proceedings are brought in respect of a "matter", which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration, may apply to the court to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter. On such an application the court must grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.As a preliminary question, the issue arose as to whether Mozambique's claims in the legal proceedings were "matters" which fell within the scope of the arbitration agreements under section 9 of the 1996 Act. At first instance, the High Court held the claims were not. The Court of Appeal disagreed on appeal. Mozambique now appeals to the Supreme Court.
FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd (Respondent) v Ting Chuan Holding Corp (Appellant) (Cayman Islands) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-25 | China CVS (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp (the "Company") operates a convenience store business in the People's Republic of China under the "FamilyMart" brand. The appellant ("Ting Chuan") owns 59.65% of the shares in the Company and the respondent ("FMCH") owns the remaining 40.35%. The relationship between Ting Chuan and FMCH so far as is relevant is governed by a shareholders' agreement (the "SHA"). The SHA is governed by the laws of the Cayman Islands but contains an agreement that any disputes in connection with or arising out of the SHA shall be submitted to arbitration under ICCA Rules in Beijing (the "arbitration agreement").On 12 October 2018 FMCH presented a petition in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to wind up the Company under the Companies Act, on the ground that it was just and equitable to do so. This was based on alleged misconduct by Ting Chuan in connection with the management of the Company. While FMCH does not intend to wind up the business, establishing that it is just and equitable to do so is a necessary step in enabling FMCH to obtain a court order for the buy-out of Ting Chuan's shareholding.Ting Chuan applied to strike out or stay the petition under section 4 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act (the "FAAEA"), or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, on the basis that the underlying disputes between the shareholders should be resolved by arbitration. The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands struck out certain elements of FMCH's petition and granted a stay of the remainder under section 4 of the FAAEA until the underlying matters had been arbitrated. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision on the basis that no part of the winding up petition was susceptible to arbitration. Ting Chuan now appeals to the Board.
Commissioners for HMRC (Appellant) v Vermilion Holdings Ltd (Respondent) (Scotland) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-25 | (UKSC 2022/0007) - [2023] UKSC 37In 2007, Vermilion Holdings Limited (“VHL”) granted Quest Advantage Limited (“Quest”), a corporate advisory and accounting company owned by Mr Noble (of which he was a director), an option to acquire 1.5% of VHL’s ordinary share capital (the “2007 Option”). Mr Noble was also appointed as a director of VHL from 16 March 2007, with a £4,167 monthly fee. The 2007 Option was novated to Mr Noble on 9 June 2016. Following a sale of VHL in November 2016, Mr Noble realised £636,238 from the exercise of the 2007 Option.A dispute arose as to whether the gain was subject to income or capital gains tax. HMRC considered the 2007 Option an employment-related securities option under section 471 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (“ITEPA”), making Mr Noble liable for £285,148.76 (income tax) and £100,709.98 (National Insurance), by decisions dated 17 August 2017.VHL appealed against these decisions to the First-Tier Tribunal, which allowed VHL’s appeal. By decision dated 27 May 2020, the Upper Tribunal allowed HMRC’s appeal. The Inner House allowed VHL’s appeal by decision dated 20 August 2021. HMRC now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Was the right or opportunity for Mr Noble to acquire the 2007 Option (a) available by reason of his directorship of VHL (section 471(1) ITEPA); or (b) made available by Mr Noble’s employer (section 471(3) ITEPA), thereby subjecting it to income tax under Chapter 5, Part 7 of ITEPA?More information is available on our website: UKSC 2022/0007
In the matter of an application by Rosaleen Dalton for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-18 | [2023] UKSC 36On appeal from: [2020] NICA 26Sean Eugene Dalton was killed in a bomb explosion at 38 Kildrum Gardens on 31 August 1988 after he went to check on his neighbour who lived at that address. The IRA subsequently took responsibility for the bomb.A police investigation was opened into the event. It did not result in any individual being charged or convicted of an offence connected to the deaths. An inquest was held into Dalton’s death on 7 December 1989. The coroner found that Dalton died from injuries. There was little further investigation from the police after this.In February 2005, one of Dalton’s sons lodged a complaint with the office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland regarding the police’s behaviour in the context of events leading to his father’s death and the subsequent investigation. The Ombudsman investigated and produced a report on its findings on 10 July 2013. It concluded that a number of the complaints were substantiated and made certain criticisms of the way in which the police’s investigation had been carried out.Following the completion of the report, a request was sent to the Attorney General on 25 July 2013 asking her to exercise her discretion pursuant to section 14 of the Act to direct a fresh inquest into Dalton’s death in view of the Ombudsman’s conclusions. The Attorney General refused the request on 2 October 2014.Dalton’s daughter challenged the decision by way of judicial review. The application was refused on 28 March 2017. However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the first instance determination on 4 May 2020. The Attorney General now appeals to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether the procedural obligation to investigate pursuant to Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to the State in respect of Mr Dalton’s death.The Supreme Court unanimously allows the AGNI’s appeal. It holds that Rosaleen Dalton cannot challenge the AGNI’s refusal to open a new inquest into her father’s death because it occurred outside the temporal scope (i.e., too long before the coming into force) of the HRA.More information is available on our website: UKSC 2020/0212
Surendra Dayal (Appellant) v Pravind Kumar Jugnauth and 7 others (Respondents) (Mauritius) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-16 | Surendra Dayal (Appellant) v Pravind Kumar Jugnauth and 5 others (Respondents) - [2023] UKPC 37On appeal from the Supreme Court of MauritiusThis appeal arises in the context of a general election to the Mauritius National Assembly held on 7 November 2019. The Appellant and the First to Third Respondents were all candidates in the same constituency. The Sixth Respondent was the returning officer for that constituency. The Fourth and Fifth Respondent had responsibility for supervision of the election. The First to Third Respondents were successfully elected and the alliance to which they belonged formed the Government of Mauritius with The First Respondent, Mr Jugnauth, as Prime Minister. The Appellant was not elected.The Appellant issued an election petition under sections 45, 64 and 65 of the Representation of the People Act. The Appellant claims that the election of the First to Third Respondents should be declared invalid and void for having been obtained by reason of bribery, treating, and undue influence. In particular he alleges that promises made by the First Respondent during the election campaign to increase the basic retirement pension, to accelerate forms of public sector pay and terms, and to pay one-off performance bonuses to police officers, firemen and prison officers constituted bribery. The Appellant also alleges that person acting on behalf of the First to Third Respondents entered into an agreement whereby the First to Third Respondents would, if elected, pay Rs 3 billion to victims of an alleged Ponzi scheme. This is also alleged to constitute bribery. The Appellant further alleges that the provision of food, drink and entertainment at an event organised by the Ministry of Social Security at which the First Respondent spoke constituted treating. In addition the Appellant alleges that the First to Third Respondents engaged in undue influence of voters by fraudulent contrivance through misuse of the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (the Seventh Respondent).In 2021 the Supreme Court of Mauritius dismissed the election petition on all grounds. The Appellant now appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with leave of the Supreme Court of Mauritius.The issue is:The Appellant challenges the First to Third Respondents' election to the National Assembly of Mauritius on the grounds of bribery, treating, and undue influence.The Board unanimously dismisses the appeal on all grounds. On the basis of its findings of fact, the Supreme Court of Mauritius was right to conclude that the First to Third Respondents (Mr Jugnauth, Mr Luchoomun and Mr Sawmynaden), were not guilty of bribery or treating. No criticism is made of the Fourth to Sixth Respondents, who appeared before the Board to assist on general matters relating to the background, scope and interpretation of the relevant legislation. Dame Sue Carr gives the judgment of the Board.More information is available on our website: JCPC 2023/0006
Target Group Ltd (Appellant) v Commissioners for His Majestys Revenue and Customs (Respondents) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-11 | On appeal from: [2021] EWCA Civ 1043Target provides outsourced loan administration services to customers. In May 2015, Target sought a Non-Statutory Clearance from HMRC concerning its VAT liability in respect of these services, contending that they are exempt from VAT. HMRC responded with a letter setting out its position that Target's services were vatable. Target requested a review of that decision, which HMRC upheld upon review. Target appealed to the First Tier Tribunal, which was unsuccessful. The Upper Tribunal also held that these services were vatable. Target appealed to the Court of Appeal, which confirmed the decision of the Upper Tribunal. Target now seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:Whether outsourced loan administration services supplied by Target are standard rated supplies for VAT purposes, or if they fall under the "financial services exemption" under article 135(1)(d) of the Principal VAT Directive, implemented in the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA)?The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal, unanimously holding that the financial services exemption did not apply to Target's load administration services.More information is available on our website: UKSC 2021/0189
Smith and another (Appellants) v Royal Bank of Scotland (Respondent) (UKSC 2022/0004) UKSupremeCourt 2023-10-04 | [2023] UKSC 34The appeal arises from two separate claims for compensation under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, each brought on the ground that an unfair relationship arose between the claimant debtor and the defendant creditor. The allegation in each case is that an unfair relationship arose by reason of RBS’s non-disclosure of commission received from the insurer in respect of payment protection insurance (“PPI”) policies taken out at the same time as agreements for credit cards from RBS. The claimant in each case succeeded at first instance before a District Judge, and on first appeal to a Circuit Judge. The Court of Appeal heard appeals in both cases together. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and dismissed the claims. The claimants now appeal to the Supreme Court.The issue is:This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The key issue is whether, in assessing the fairness of a relationship between a debtor and a creditor, the court can compartmentalise the relationship and, accordingly, consider whether the relationship is unfair at a given point, rather than at the end of the relationship.More information is available on our website:
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