What You Havent SeenIn July 2017 What You Haven't Seen launched by publishing the complete surveillance camera footage from the crash of Asiana 214 at San Francisco International Airport. In the time since, I am proud to have published hundreds of other significant exclusives, but despite all that, I never thought that I would find this.
CNN has a copy of their Challenger launch broadcast footage. It's available on CNN's own YouTube channel, and it understandably has millions of views. CNN's upload is a 360p video whose content is similar to what you see here — with three major differences: (1) this version is of substantially higher quality, (2) this version doesn't have any CNN branding, and (3) this version continues NASA's feed longer than CNN showed on air.
This is a direct copy of NASA's broadcast feed. It was saved by NASA, and at some point a copy was transferred to the United States Geological Survey on a VHS tape. This video is a digitization of that tape; as far as I know, this is the first time it is being shown publicly.
Shuttle Challenger Explosion [New Copy Found; Better Quality]What You Havent Seen2020-04-06 | In July 2017 What You Haven't Seen launched by publishing the complete surveillance camera footage from the crash of Asiana 214 at San Francisco International Airport. In the time since, I am proud to have published hundreds of other significant exclusives, but despite all that, I never thought that I would find this.
CNN has a copy of their Challenger launch broadcast footage. It's available on CNN's own YouTube channel, and it understandably has millions of views. CNN's upload is a 360p video whose content is similar to what you see here — with three major differences: (1) this version is of substantially higher quality, (2) this version doesn't have any CNN branding, and (3) this version continues NASA's feed longer than CNN showed on air.
This is a direct copy of NASA's broadcast feed. It was saved by NASA, and at some point a copy was transferred to the United States Geological Survey on a VHS tape. This video is a digitization of that tape; as far as I know, this is the first time it is being shown publicly.Nuclear Weapons Loading Procedures (1976)What You Havent Seen2024-03-20 | As longtime viewers of this channel know, on occasion we have departed from our transportation-safety focus... to cover nuclear weapons.
This 1976 instructional film, published by the United States Marine Corps, describes the structure of the Nuclear Weapon Loading Team, and the correct procedures for completing their tasks.B1 Bomber: Catastrophic Engine Failure at Dyess Air Force BaseWhat You Havent Seen2023-06-01 | I am committed to bringing you exclusive footage from significant incidents and accidents, and today is no exception. This video presents exclusive, never-before-seen footage and imagery associated with an April 20, 2022 accident in which a United States Air Force Rockwell B1-B Lancer supersonic bomber experienced a catastrophic engine failure, explosion, and fire during a ground run-up at Dyess Air Force Base, Taylor County, Texas. One person received minor injuries.
The Accident Investigation Board report summary follows:
On 20 April 2022, at approximately 2216 local time (L), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), a USAF B-1B, tail number 85-0089, assigned to Dyess Air Force Base, 7th Bomb Wing, 7th Maintenance Group, 7th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, experienced a catastrophic engine failure and fire on a the #1 engine while undergoing maintenance on the main ramp at Dyess AFB, Texas. The MA suffered catastrophic damage to the #1 engine, as well as extensive fire damage to the left nacelle and wing. Debris from the explosion struck one Airman who suffered minor injuries and was treated promptly at the local hospital. The estimated cost of damage sustained by the MA is $14,943,680.00.
Shortly before the accident, the Mishap Maintenance Crew (MMC), comprised of members from the 7th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron and the 489th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, performed routine corrective maintenance, in accordance with technical orders, in response to the MA's malfunctioning #1 engine variable area exhaust nozzle. During run-up to maximum augmenter to verify correct performance of the #1 engine variable area exhaust nozzle, the #1 engine catastrophically failed, ejecting its 2nd Stage Fan Disk from the intake section and severing fuel lines, which caused a fire to erupt in the engine. The 2nd Stage Fan Disk continued to fly away from the aircraft and landed over five hundred feet from the MA. The MMC executed emergency engine shutdown procedures and egressed away from the aircraft. Emergency crews quickly responded and extinguished the fire within ten minutes.
The Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence that high cycle fatigue on the #1 engine's 2nd Stage Fan Disk was the cause of the accident. Laboratory testing demonstrated that high cycle fatigue initiated a crack on the surface of the 2nd Stage Fan Disk at the corner of a blade slot and the forward face of the disk. The crack, once initiated by the stress induced from repeated acceleration and deceleration of the engine, was propagated by a mix of high cycle and low cycle fatigue. The crack and its initial growth increased the stress beyond the 2nd Stage Fan Disk's yield strength, leaving it susceptible to low cycle fatigue. The surface crack grew to a depth of approximately 0.7 inches before the 2nd Stage Fan Disk broke apart causing the #1 engine to fail catastrophically. The root cause of the high cycle fatigue that caused the initial crack in the 2nd Stage Fan Disk could not be determined. No factors substantially contributed to this mishap.
00:00 Engine run-up 00:39 Catastrophic engine failure 00:47 Close-up footage 01:07 Distant footage 01:53 First ARFF truck 02:12 Firefighting begins 02:50 PhotosExclusive: Crash of Navy Blue Angels F/A-18C HornetWhat You Havent Seen2023-04-25 | This video presents never-before-seen footage showing the 2016 crash of a United States Navy Blue Angels F/A-18C Hornet, as well as the associated emergency response. The post-accident footage and photographs were obtained from a source who insisted on anonymity.
According to the command investigation report, Captain Jeffrey Kuss was fully qualified to fly his aircraft and was universally recognized as one of the most meticulous and professional Blue Angel pilots by his teammates. In addition, he had accumulated 1,686.5 total flight hours and had no previous military mishaps or flight violations. The Blue Angels were in Smyrna, Tennessee for the Great Tennessee Air Show and Kuss occupied the #6 position within the Blue Angels' final demonstration.
On June 2, 2016, Kuss performed a Tactical Demonstration of an F/A-18C aircraft during a practice flight in Smyrna, Tennessee. During the execution of a "Split S" maneuver, Kuss deviated from approved procedures which, compounded by several tactical errors and loss of situational awareness created a rate of descent during that maneuver that could not be arrested and resulted in ground impact. Based on the investigation, weather conditions and fatigue were contributing causal factors, but ultimately, the mishap was due to pilot error.
Several indicators from Kuss' behavior on the morning of the mishap suggest he was fatigued: Kuss did not sign his A sheet (accepting his aircraft) prior to the mishap flight and did not turn on his transponder (mode 3 IFF squawk) prior to take off for the mishap flight (both omissions were out of character). Additionally, he failed to retard the throttle out of afterburner during the mishap maneuver despite verbalizing his intent to do so on the radio.
On the day of the mishap, potential weather impacts of a scattered to broken cloud layer were discussed by Kuss and the Lead Solo. Clouds at about 3,000 feet near the projected flight path did not impact the solos ability to fly, but that weather was likely a contributing factor to Kuss' decision to initiate the "Split S" maneuver below the normal altitude. Airspeed higher than normal for the maneuver and the lower starting altitude limited decision-making opportunities and removed margins of error for corrections to the flight trajectory.
Kuss ejected into the fireball of his aircraft's explosion. This instantly incinerated Kuss's parachute, and Kuss did not decelerate.
00:00 Intro 00:21 Accident video w/ radio traffic 01:20 Post-accident footage & photos 04:08 Accident reportFatal Crash of Beechcraft B60 Duke Near Northern Colorado Regional Airport (Loveland, CO)What You Havent Seen2023-04-23 | On May 15, 2019, at 1248 mountain daylight time, a Beech 60, N60RK, was destroyed when it collided with terrain during an emergency landing at Northern Colorado Regional Airport (FNL), Loveland, Colorado. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Majeste Air LLC, and was being operated as a Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed at the accident site at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated from Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport (BJC), Broomfield, Colorado, about 1230, and was destined for FNL.
The airplane had been at BJC since July 2017 for the installation of new avionics which included a primary flight display (PFD); multi-function display (MFD); a backup to the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS); two navigation, communication, and GPS units, a transponder, audio panel, and associated wiring.
According to individuals who performed work on the airplane, a Hobbs meter oil hose was installed, as well as a longer fuel line in order to use the same mounting locations for the fuel flow transducers. This was only required on the right engine because of the location of air conditioning compressor.
Three engine runs were conducted after the work was completed. The first test run revealed an oil leak in the left engine oil pressure transducer. The line was re-torqued and the two subsequent engine runs revealed no anomalies. In a telephone conversation about two weeks prior to the accident, the pilot stated that he was applying for an FAA ferry permit because the airplane's annual inspection had expired. The pilot arrived at the airport about 1130. He did not have a ferry permit and no ferry permit inspection was conducted.
At 1217, the pilot contacted BJC ground control and requested a "high-speed taxi" before takeoff. The request was granted, and the pilot made the high-speed taxi on runway 12L. He was subsequently cleared for takeoff at 1226.
At 1247, the pilot reported on the FNL common traffic advisory frequency that he was on the left downwind leg for runway 15 and that he had "an engine out [and] smoke in the cockpit." The pilot of another airplane advised that he could see the fire and that the runway was clear. The accident pilot replied, "I've got a fire. I'm gonna land it pretty darn quick. Please have the trucks come on out." There were several ground witnesses, one of which said that the airplane's right wing was on fire before the accident.
The 69-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single- and multiengine land and instrument ratings. He also held a third-class airman medical certificate, dated March 14, 2018, that contained the restriction, "Must wear corrective lenses for distant vision and have available glasses for near vision." At the time of his medical certification, he reported civil flight experience of 7,000 total hours with 50 hours in the previous 6 months.
According to maintenance records, the plane's last annual inspection was on 9/1/17, when the airframe had accrued 3,119.9 hours on the tachometer (the Hobbs meter read 1,754.0 hours). At that time, the left engine had accrued 3,337.5 total hours and 902.9 hours since major overhaul, and the right engine had accrued 3,467.3 total hours and 827.7 hours since major overhaul. Review of FAA records confirmed that the pilot had not obtained a ferry permit for the accident flight.
The right engine was located about 40 ft northeast of the main wreckage. The right wing was separated just outboard of the right nacelle. Fire had consumed the inboard right wing, left wing, rudder and right elevator, but the left elevator was intact. The fuselage and instrument panel were destroyed by fire. Control cable continuity was established to all flight controls from their attach points through tensile overload failures. The flap actuators were consumed by fire. The left main landing gear was found in the retracted position. The nose landing gear and right main landing gear were separated during the impact sequence. The actuating arm indicated that the landing gear was extended.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident to be a loss of control due to an inflight right engine fire due to the loose fuel hose between the engine-driven fuel pump and the flow transducer.
We previously published exclusive footage of this accident. Today, after a protracted tug-of-war over these records, we are ready to cover the emergency response. Apologies for the 720p video. It is what it is.
00:00 ATC audio 00:22 Crash 00:52 Bystander video 02:08 Crash truck 03:49 Fire supervisor dash cam (see note regarding audio in pinned comment) 11:46 Supervisor arrives on sceneAeromexico 737 Nearly Lands on Occupied Runway at San FranciscoWhat You Havent Seen2023-04-23 | On January 9, 2018, an Aeromexico Boeing 737 operating as flight 668, was ordered to go-around at San Francisco International Airport as it descended toward Runway 28L — which was occupied by a Virgin America Airbus A320 waiting to depart for Kona, Hawaii. The Aeromexico 737 had been cleared to land on Runway 28R, which runs parallel to 28L.
According to an FAA spokesperson, the Aeromexico jet was "cleared to land on Runway 28R, and correctly read back that clearance. When the plane was about a mile from the airport, air traffic controllers noticed the aircraft was lined up for Runway 28L and instructed the crew to execute a missed approach."
00:00 ATC audio begins 00:24 Aeromexico 668Delta Airlines Airbus A320 Slides Off TaxiwayWhat You Havent Seen2023-02-23 | According to the report of Officer C. Miller with the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Police Department, on January 3, 2023, at approximately 6:42 p.m. local time, Officer Miller responded emergent to an Alert 3 at the intersection of the Kilo-Whiskey taxiway for an Airbus 320, registration N378NW) that had slid off the taxiway.
From the report of Officer Miller, lightly edited for clarity: Upon arrival, I observed the aircraft was stuck in the snow next to the taxiway. I later photographed the aircraft and uploaded those photos to the case. Sergeant Gullickson was in communication with fire command and other operations involved in this incident.
Passengers were offloaded from the aircraft via MAC fire's air stairs. I assisted in escorting buses full of passengers to U.S. Customs FIS area at Gate G8.
I met with both pilots of the aircraft. I identified the Captain as Charles Tommaselly and his co-pilot Stephen Black. In short and not verbatim, Tommaselly and Black told me the following:
They were flying an Airbus A320 (Delta 1819) that had departed from Cabo San Lucas. Upon arrival at MSP, they landed on the 35 approach of runway 17-35. As they began turning at the end of the runway, the brakes locked up due to the ice on the runway. The aircraft was unable to stop before entering the snow on the side of the runway. There were 153 souls onboard, including the crew. There were no reported injuries.
This concluded my conversation with both pilots.
This video presents never-before-seen footage and audio associated with the incident and emergency response. The audio and video are not in sync for the overwhelming majority of the video. (Otherwise, you would have been watching three hours of mostly-silent footage.)
00:00 Airport surveillance footage 01:32 DL1819 cleared to land 03:04 Taxiway departure 11:23 "Aircraft has been extricated"; photosCirrus SR20 Landing Gear Collapse (Fort Worth, Texas)What You Havent Seen2023-01-28 | On November 5, 2020, at 2233 central standard time, a Cirrus SR20 airplane, N720TX, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Fort Worth, Texas. The flight instructor and student pilot were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.
The flight instructor and the student pilot were conducting touch-and-go takeoffs and landings to runway 16R. After the airplane touched down, the nose of the airplane came down and the nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest on the runway.
Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed substantial damage to the firewall and lower composite structure. The nose landing gear tire was flat, and the nose landing gear strut was separated at the top of the assembly.
A video provided by the flight instructor, which recorded the landing, showed that the accident landing was not a hard landing. The airplane touched down and as the nose of the airplane came down and contacted the runway, a sound consistent with a flat tire could be heard, followed by the subsequent nose landing gear collapse.
According to the FAA inspector, the airplane had experienced a hard landing about two months before the accident landing. The operator had completed the Cirrus Hard/Overweight Landing maintenance checklist and subsequently returned the airplane to service. The accident landing was the fourth landing following the return to service.
The nose landing gear strut assembly was not retained by the operator for metallurgical examination. Pictures of the fracture surface were inconclusive.Crash of North American T-28B | Puyallup, WAWhat You Havent Seen2023-01-14 | On August 12, 2021, about 1443 Pacific daylight time, a North American T-28B airplane, registration N392W, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Puyallup, Washington. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot reported that, after touchdown on runway 35 at Pierce County-Thun Field (PLU), the nose wheel started to shimmy, and he was not able to steer the airplane. The airplane veered to the left side of the runway as the pilot continued to try and steer away from the edge of the runway using the right brake. When the left main landing gear wheel went off the edge of the runway, he initiated the emergency procedures to retract the landing gear, shut down the engine and open the canopy. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire ignited the grass under the engine nacelle which was extinguished by emergency responders. The wings were substantially damaged.
Examination of the wreckage revealed that the nose wheel steering components and the hydraulic shimmy damper appeared to remain intact and attached to their respective mounts. The shimmy damper piston rod was actuated by hand and found to compress and extend normally. No hydraulic fluid leaks were observed on the damper. No evidence of a pre-accident mechanical failure or malfunction was revealed that would have precluded normal operation.
The investigation is ongoing.
00:00 Surveillance video 00:37 Interruption 00:54 Video continues 04:43 Investigative recordsDouble Fatal Crash of Cessna 180 Immediately After TakeoffWhat You Havent Seen2023-01-11 | On September 1, 2014, about 1050 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 180, N6510A, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and terrain during the initial climb after takeoff from Hampton Airfield (7B3), North Hampton, New Hampshire. The airline transport pilot and a passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the Part 91 personal flight, destined for a private airport in Kingston, New Hampshire. On the day of the accident, the airport was hosting its annual customer appreciation day.
According to witness statements and video images, the pilot contacted the airport advisory frequency from a position approximately 5 miles west of 7B3. The airplane then overflew the south end of the airport and the pilot advised that he would be joining the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for "Runway 22." The pilot then advised that he was joining the base leg of the traffic pattern, and then reported that he was "landing south" without indicating the runway number.
The airplane landed normally and shut down at the fuel pumps at 1023. The pilot then refueled the airplane with approximately 31 gallons of 100 LL aviation gasoline, finishing at approximately 1036.
After starting the airplane and taxiing away from the fuel pumps, a witness observed a seat belt hanging out of the passenger door. The witness gained the pilot's attention and advised him about the seatbelt. The pilot then taxied to runway 02. Witnesses did not observe the pilot perform a run-up prior to turning onto the runway, and also noted that the flaps were partially extended before the takeoff roll began.
The airplane appeared to take off normally with the tailwheel coming off the surface of the runway first, followed by the main landing gear wheels. The ground run was approximately 890 feet. After liftoff, the airplane's angle of attack (AOA) began to increase. One witness stated that as the AOA began to increase, the pilot's left hand reached for the glareshield, while another witness observed the pilot's left hand already on the glareshield as the AOA began to increase.
Approximately 320 feet later, the airplane's AOA was still increasing and the airplane's altitude was higher than a group of approximately 73' tall trees adjacent to the west side of the runway. Moments later, the airplane rolled and yawed to the left, its AOA decreased through a level flight attitude, to a steep nose down attitude, engine RPM decreased "as if it was being throttled back to idle" and the airplane went out of view behind trees. The sound of impact was then heard.
Post-accident examination of the airplane, including the flight controls, stall warning system and engine revealed no evidence of any pre-accident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot had reported to the FAA that he had hypertension, gastro-esophageal reflux disease (GERD), and high cholesterol. However it is unlikely that either of these conditions or associated medications contributed to the accident.
Post-accident toxicology testing of the pilot's specimens identified levels of diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, indicating it likely that the pilot's diphenhydramine level was near the middle of the therapeutic window at the time of the accident. Even at therapeutic levels, diphenhydramine is quite impairing. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1%. Thus, it is very likely that the pilot was impaired by diphenhydramine at the time of the accident.
Toxicology testing of the passenger's specimens detected a level of zolpidem, a short-acting sedative hypnotic used as a sleep aid, however it is not likely that the passenger was significantly impaired by zolpidem at the time of the accident.
Based on the pilot's reported hand position at takeoff, it is possible that he had decided to let his unrated passenger attempt the takeoff; however, this could not be definitively determined. In either case, with the passenger or the pilot flying, the pilot failed to ensure that the airplane maintained adequate airspeed, which led to the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack. It is likely that the pilot's impairment by diphenhydramine contributed to the accident and led to his poor decision-making or affected his ability to respond to the stall quickly.
The NTSB determined that probable cause of this accident was the pilot's failure to ensure the airplane maintained adequate airspeed during the initial climb and the subsequent exceedance of its critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's impairment due to a sedating antihistamine, which led to his decision to possibly allow the passenger to attempt the takeoff, and his delayed remedial action to lower the nose when the airplane began to pitch up too much.MQ-9 Reaper Drone Crashes in Syracuse: The AftermathWhat You Havent Seen2022-12-29 | On August 14, 2021, this channel published exclusive, never-before-seen footage showing the crash of a Reaper drone at Mathis Field Airport in San Antonio, Texas. Prior to that, the public had never seen footage of a Reaper drone crashing. That accident, however, wasn't the only crash of a Reaper drone.
On 25 June 2020, at about 13:24 Zulu time, an unmanned MQ-9A, tail number 15-4295, lost engine power shortly after takeoff and impacted the ground at Syracuse Hancock International Airport, Syracuse, New York, coming to rest approximately 600 feet from the departure end of runway 33. The mishap aircraft was assigned to the 174th Attack Wing and operated by the 108th Attack Squadron's Launch and Recovery Element located at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base. The mishap aircraft was significantly damaged on impact resulting in a loss of government property valued at $6,085,179. Damage to civilian property was minimal, and there were no injuries or fatalities reported.
Syracuse Hancock International Airport is not in possession of video of the mishap itself, and to the extent the Air Force is, they are not releasing it. Indeed, I was only able to obtain footage of the San Antonio crash because there was no way to stop its release under Texas law. However there is footage of the accident's aftermath, and it's surprisingly high-quality, having been captured in 4K. As you will see, I also requested records from the Syracuse Regional Airport Authority, under New York's Freedom of Information Law. In response, SRAA released... three photographs. Total. And they claim that's all they have.
At 13:23:41 Zulu, the mishap pilot applied takeoff power to the mishap aircraft and began the takeoff down runway 33 at Syracuse Hancock International Airport. At 13:24:14Z, the mishap aircraft lifted off the runway and began to climb out for departure. Approximately seven seconds after becoming airborne and about 150 feet above ground level, the mishap aircraft experienced a complete loss of engine power. Investigation determined that the loss of engine power was due to the mishap pilot misidentifying the aircraft's Flap Lever. Instead of pushing the Flap Lever forward to reduce the flaps, the mishap pilot retarded the Condition Lever, which cut off fuel supply to the engine, with obvious consequences. After realizing that the engine had lost power, in accordance with an emergency procedures checklist, the mishap crew, which consisted of the mishap pilot and mishap sensor operator, began running the Critical Action Procedures for an engine failure. The mishap pilot continued to misidentify the appropriate lever, and fully retarded the Flap Lever. The mishap aircraft impacted the ground twenty-one seconds after the initial loss of engine power. Upon impact, the mishap aircraft struck airport runway lights, spun 180-degrees, and came to rest approximately 600' off the departure end of runway 33.
The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the mishap pilot misidentifying the Flap Lever and pulling aft, or back, on the Condition Lever instead of pushing forward on the Flap Lever. This cut the fuel supply to the engine, causing the engine to stop and the mishap aircraft to impact the ground. Further, the AAIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence that the following factor substantially contributed to the mishap: the design of the pilot Ground Control Station Control Console Throttle Quadrant, including the proximity of the Condition Lever and the Flap Lever, lack of markings, color differentiation, or a safety guard.
As noted at the end of this video, YouTube has decided to demonetize videos of accidents that show "a strong moment of impact," regardless of context. I produce this channel because I believe that transportation safety is enhanced through transparent and accessible disclosures of the facts. If you find value in this channel's content, please consider supporting my work by clicking "Join" and becoming a channel member today.
There is no difference in perks between membership levels; join at a level that is comfortable for you. Rather than overcommitting, my promise to members is that I will continue to produce this channel's unparalleled content, just as I have for the better part of a decade. You don't have to do anything, and this channel is not going anywhere. I appreciate you all. You make this channel possible.Testing Tank Farm Fire Suppression SystemsWhat You Havent Seen2022-12-21 | ...Ground Collision: Bombardier Challenger 300 vs. Pilatus PC-12What You Havent Seen2022-12-19 | On June 7, 2022, a Bombardier BD-100-1A10 Challenger collided with a Pilatus PC-12 while taxiing at Jet Center Los Angeles, Hawthorne Municipal Airport, Hawthorne, California. There were no injuries, however the Pilatus rudder was substantially damaged and the Challenger sustained minor damage to its left wing.
The pilot of the Challenger reported that after landing, he was taxiing via taxiway S to the parking area near the fixed based operator located near taxiway A. As the airplane approached the ramp, the pilot looked to a marshaller to start his right turn. During the turn, the marshaller gave the stop signal when the Challenger's left wing collided with the rudder of a Pilatus PC-12 that was holding short of runway 25 at taxiway A.
Neither flight crew reported that pre-accident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident to be the Challenger pilot's failure to maintain clearance from another airplane during taxi.
00:00 Intro 00:11 Accident video 00:46 Photos 00:59 Investigative records 03:55 Interruption 04:11 Crash of Air Force T-38 Trainer (Extra content)Fatal Crash of PZL-104 Wilga 35A (Pearland, Texas)What You Havent Seen2022-12-11 | On May 29, 2021, at 1451 central daylight time, a PZL Warszawa-Okecie PZL-104 Wilga 35 airplane, N124MS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at the Pearland Regional Airport (LVJ), Pearland, Texas. The pilot was fatally injured; the passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Part 91 personal flight.
ADS-B data indicated that the flight departed the Texas Gulf Coast Regional Airport (LBX) at 1406. The pilot proceeded east and overflew a portion of Galveston Island before turning north to LVJ. He entered a left downwind for runway 14 and completed a continuous left turn from downwind to final approach. The final ADS-B data point was recorded at 1451:00 as the airplane was on short final about 51 ft from the runway arrival threshold. ADS-B data was not available for the accident sequence.
The pilot-rated passenger stated that it was a "good landing." The airplane touched down on the runway centerline and did not bounce. It was initially tracking straight down the runway until it veered to the right. The pilot applied left rudder, but the airplane did not respond. The airplane subsequently departed the runway pavement and encountered a ditch located between the runway and the parallel taxiway. She reported that there were no issues with the airplane during the accident flight.
A witness, located in a helicopter holding short of the runway at the time of the accident, reported that the airplane touched down near the 1,000-foot markers. He recalled that the main landing gear touched down briefly but the airplane became airborne again. About that time, the airplane veered to the right. It remained in a level attitude as it yawed to the right and exited the runway.
Airport surveillance video footage depicted the airplane during the downwind to final turn. The airplane appeared to be in a stabilized decent during that time. As the airplane reached short final, the camera field of view was obstructed a by a hangar on the airport. When the airplane re- a entered the field of view, the pilot initiated a landing flare. Shortly after the airplane appeared to settle onto the runway, it veered abruptly to the right, and it exited the runway pavement. The airplane subsequently encountered a ditch located between the runway and the parallel taxiway. The airplane dropped into the ditch momentarily, reappeared on the opposite side, and came to rest.
The pilot did not hold a current FAA medical certificate, and there was no record of him completing certification under the Basic Med program.
The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident to be the pilot's loss of directional control during landing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the presence of a drainage ditch between the runway and taxiway.
~~~
YouTube has decided to demonetize videos of accidents that show "a strong moment of impact," regardless of context. I produce this channel because I believe that transportation safety is enhanced through transparent and accessible disclosures of the facts. If you find value in this channel's content, please consider supporting my work by clicking "Join" and becoming a channel member today.
There is no difference in perks between membership levels; join at a level that is comfortable for you. Rather than overcommitting, my promise to members is that I will continue to produce this channel's unparalleled content, just as I have for the better part of a decade. You don't have to do anything, and this channel is not going anywhere. I appreciate you all. You make this channel possible.
~~~
00:00 Accident video 00:32 Zoomed in 00:51 Post-accident 01:33 Photos 02:06 Investigative records 03:50 Final accident report 06:11 Airframe maintenance records 08:00 Engine maintenance recordsCessna 414 Chancellor Crashes into Marsh, Seriously Injuring SevenWhat You Havent Seen2022-11-29 | On October 8, 2020, about 11:15 local time, a Cessna 414, N8132Q, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at North Palm Beach County General Aviation Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida. The two private pilots and five passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Part 91 personal flight.
According to the multiengine-rated private pilot seated in the right front seat (copilot), after engine start and taxi, the pilot performed a run-up and did not notice any irregularities. As the pilot taxied onto the runway for takeoff, the copilot checked the takeoff trim setting, which gave him a clear view of the pilot's control yoke. He did not notice the presence of the control lock. The pilot then applied the brakes and advanced the throttles to full power. At full RPM, the pilot released the brakes. Shortly into the takeoff roll, the copilot felt a brief "slight shudder," which appeared to come from the controls. As they continued down the runway, the copilot realized they should have rotated for liftoff; he observed that they were about 10 to 15 mph past the "blue line" (119 mph), but the airplane was on the runway, continuing to accelerate. The copilot looked at the pilot, who was looking down at the controls and trying to determine why he was unable to move the yoke. The copilot tried to pull back on the yoke, but it would not move. The copilot pulled the throttles to idle and applied max braking. He estimated they were doing between "120 and 130 knots" when the takeoff was aborted.
The airplane came to rest about 450' beyond the departure end of runway 14. The airplane spun around and came to rest nose-down in a marshy area, partially submerged in about 5 feet of water. The fuselage, wings, and empennage weere substantially damaged.
The pilot reported he performed the preflight, taxi, and runup according to the checklist and there was nothing unusual. The pilot further stated that he always removes the control lock per the checklist and that, when the flight controls appeared jammed during the accident takeoff roll, he looked down and observed that there was no control lock in place. He also stated that when he removes the control lock, he puts it in his flight bag but that a shoulder injury may have led to the control lock missing the flight bag, which is why the control lock was found behind the rudder pedals. Due to a head injury, the pilot remembered no additional details about the accident.
During a follow-up interview, the copilot stated he could not recall if the pilot left the control lock installed during preflight, or whether the pilot may have attempted to remove it during the takeoff roll.
During impact, the stabilizer/elevator assembly was torn from its attachments, but both sides remained attached to their respective locations, and the elevator control rigging was intact and operational. The control lock holes for both left and right sides yokes had no signs of elongation or damage. Examination of the elevator flight control rigging in addition to functional checks of the elevator confirmed continuity and functionality of the elevator. No pre-impact anomalies with the airframe or flight controls were noted.
The control lock was located on the left side of the cockpit under the far-left rudder/brake pedal and showed no signs of damage. The control lock was about 12" long and consisted of a metal rod in a "7" shape that slid into the control yoke on one end; on the opposing end there was a red and yellow streamer attached. The witness video shown here shows the airplane as it began to taxi on the ramp. Still images captured from the video show the elevator was in the trailing-edge-down position with the elevator horns above the horizontal stabilizer. An exemplar airplane with a control lock installed was used for reference and showed the elevator in a trailing-edge-down position with the elevator horns above the horizontal stabilizer surface. The accident airplane's exact elevator position, although similar to the exemplar airplane with control lock installed, could not be determined.
A video study determined that the airplane was accelerating through 100 knots with about 1,800' (of 4,300') of runway remaining. Airplane performance data indicated that the airplane should have taken off at 2,185' down the 4,300' runway. The weight and balance of the airplane were within limitations.
According to the manufacturer's preflight and before takeoff checklists, the flight control lock must be removed prior to engine start, and flight controls must be checked prior to takeoff.
00:00 Initial taxi 00:30 Takeoff 01:00 Surveillance video 01:27 Zoomed in 01:54 Photos 02:32 Control lock position 03:16 FAA inspector's report 04:30 Copilot's statement 05:38 NTSB copilot Q&A 07:03 Pilot statement, through copilot 07:38 Notes from NTSB call with pilot 08:14 Control lock photos 08:46 Pilot logs 09:02 Maintenance records 09:06 Report of accident 10:55 Maintenance recordsHUD Footage: F-16 Hydraulic Failure & EjectionWhat You Havent Seen2022-11-17 | On May 16, 2019, at 1539 local time, a block 40 F-16C, tail number 88-0477, assigned to the 114th Fighter Wing, Air National Guard, Joe Foss Field, South Dakota, with duties at the 144 Fighter Wing, Detachment 1, March Air Reserve Base, California, crashed on approach to March Air Reserve Base. There were no fatalities, but the mishap aircraft impacted a commercial warehouse, resulting in minor injuries to warehouse employees. The mishap pilot, assigned to the 144 Fighter Wing, Detachment 1, ejected before impact and sustained minor injuries. The mishap aircraft, valued at $24,991,645, was destroyed, and the environmental clean-up cost was $3,937,652.
The purpose of the mishap flight was to practice an Aerospace Control Alert scramble of two F-16 fighters and to conduct aircraft intercept training. The mishap flight consisted of a two-aircraft formation with the training activities occurring in a Military Operating Area approximately 120 miles east of March Air Reserve Base. The mishap pilot flew the number two aircraft in the formation (the "wingman") during take-off, transition to the Military Operating Area, return to base and landing. During the approach into March Air Reserve Base, the mishap aircraft experienced low pressure in system A of its dual hydraulic system, followed by low pressure in system B. The loss of hydraulic pressure in both the A and B systems significantly degraded the effectiveness of the mishap aircraft's hydraulically actuated fight controls. Unable to maintain control of the mishap aircraft, the mishap pilot ejected near the threshold of March Air Reserve Base's runway 14.
The Accident Investigation Board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the improper installation of two hydraulic check valves in the right Flaperon Integrated Servo Actuator (ISA), which resulted in a loss of sufficient hydraulic pressure to control the mishap aircraft. A preponderance of the evidence also indicated an inadequate ISA overhaul process that lacked an effective procedure to identify improper installation of ISA check valves was a substantially contributing factor.
This is never-before-seen heads-up display footage of the mishap flight.
/r/realworldpolice @RealWorldPolice
00:00 Highlights, Ejection Video 01:08 Photos 01:31 Full HUD video 18:04 GaugesJet Bridge Pierces American Airlines 737 (Charlotte, NC)What You Havent Seen2022-11-13 | On August 20, 2022, an American Airlines Boeing 737-823, registration N806NN, was involved in an incident at Charlotte Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, when a jetbridge pierced the fuselage of the aircraft during deplaning operations. There were no injuries.Double Fatal Crash of Cessna 310 (Las Vegas, NV)What You Havent Seen2022-11-05 | On October 29, 2020, about 0939 PDT, a Cessna 310, N101G, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Henderson, Nevada. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Part 91 personal flight.
ADS-B data indicate that the airplane departed from runway 12 at North Las Vegas Airport at 0929 and flew on a southeast heading for about one minute before turning southwest. The pilot's intended destination was Gillespie Field Airport, San Diego, California. At 0930, approximately 1 mile south of VGT at an altitude of 2,800 ft, the pilot contacted Las Vegas Terminal Radar Control and requested a change of destination to Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Henderson, Nevada.
At 0935, the pilot requested to proceed direct to HND and stated that he needed to shut down one engine. The controller approved the request and transferred communication to HND tower controllers. No further communication was received from the pilot. ADS-B data indicate that, about the time of the pilot's request to proceed to HND, the airplane turned to the east then southeast before data was lost at 0938. When the airplane began its turn to the east, its airspeed was approximately 86 knots. Airspeed briefly increased to 97 knots over the next minute, then gradually decreased to a final airspeed of 78 knots when contact was lost. (See video.)
The final portion of the accident flight was captured by a video taken on a cell phone by a witness, with additional video from security cameras. Security camera video shows the airplane rolling to its left before ground impact followed by a post-crash fire. Examination of the cell phone video at the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Lab found that the left propeller was not turning before ground impact, and that the right propeller was turning.
Another witness later reported observing the airplane fly south as it crossed a highway. According to the witness, it appeared as if the plane attempted to gain altitude (while losing airspeed) as it avoided hitting power lines that ran across the highway. The airplane appeared to nose down after crossing the power lines, then maintained its altitude for approximately 1,000'. Shortly thereafter, the airplane nosed down again, rolled "hard left," and impacted the ground. The witness stated that the left propeller was not spinning. Additionally, the airplane was flying about 15° to 20° right wing down before it rolled to the left and impacted the ground. Post-accident examination of the left engine revealed two holes in the crankcase above cylinders 3 and 4.
The crankcase was opened, and indications of fretting were present on main bearings 2 and 3. Additionally, no indication of lubrication was noted. The #2 main bearing was laterally displaced, indicating there was some bearing movement.
The left engine's three-blade propeller separated at the crankshaft propeller flange. Two of the blades remained straight with no bending or twisting deformation. One blade was slightly bent as a result of the impact. Examination of the right engine revealed signatures of power at the time of the accident.
Various components from the left engine were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination. The #4 main bearing inserts exhibited heavy rubbing damage, and metal had filled in much of the bearing groove, obstructing five of the six oil through-holes. All of the main bearing left inserts exhibited features consistent with melted and resolidified metal near the insert end face.
Maintenance records revealed an entry dated January 29, 2020, stating the left engine was "disassembled and inspected for low oil pressure." The entry stated: "alternator failure metal caused oil pressure problem." According to the entry, the connecting rod nuts and bolts were replaced, and the main bearings and rod bearings were replaced. Additionally, the alternator, oil cooler, and starter adapter were replaced with overhauled units.
The most recent annual examination was completed on April 18, 2020, at a Hobbs time of 1,197.2 hours. The entry in the logbook for the examination indicated cylinder compressions were: 1/62, 2/61, 3/64, 4/65, 5/62, and 6/64. The entry also stated the engine magneto to engine timing was checked and adjusted, and the spark plugs were serviced.
FAA Advisory Circular No. 43.13-1B, "Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair," states in part: "If cylinder has less than a 60/80 reading on the differential test gauges on a hot engine, and procedures in paragraphs 8-15b(5)(i) and (j) fail to raise the compression reading, the cylinder must be removed and inspected."
According to the AC, when performing a differential compression test, cylinders should be pressurized to 80 psi.
00:00 Intro 00:07 Witness cell phone video 00:14 Video #1 00:40 Video #2 00:54 Video #3 01:01 Video #4 01:19 Photos 01:27 Radar playback video 01:51 Accident investigation recordsBeech Baron destroyed after landing gear retracts during takeoff rollWhat You Havent Seen2022-11-02 | On November 9, 2019, at 1024 eastern daylight time, a Beech BE55, N686DR, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Griffin, Georgia. The commercial pilot and four passengers were not injured. The airplane was being operated Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that he was giving rides in his airplane as part of a "patient appreciation" day, and that the accident flight was his fifth flight of the morning. After the passengers boarded, the pilot taxied to runway 14 and completed the before-takeoff checklist, then applied full power for takeoff. He reported that everything appeared normal during the takeoff roll, but, as the airplane approached 70 knots, about one third of the way down the runway, the landing gear suddenly retracted, and the airplane skidded off the right side of the runway before coming to rest partially on the grass and runway pavement. Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage.
Following the accident, the pilot noticed that the landing gear handle was in the up position; he reported that it may have been accidentally bumped by one of the passengers as they got into the airplane. A subsequent follow-up examination of the airplane and its landing gear system revealed that the gear handle operated normally, and the landing gear functioned as designed. No anomalies were discovered with the system that would have precluded normal landing gear operation. Maintenance was performed on the landing gear handle on January 19, 2018, at an airframe total time of 3,896 hours, because the landing gear control handle was loose due to a selector handle spring retainer irregularity. The landing gear handle was repaired, and functionality was verified. There were no additional maintenance irregularities noted with the system during subsequent maintenance and the pilot reported no issues with the landing gear since the maintenance was performed 22 months before the accident.
The airplane's "initial" checklist includes a line item stating "gear lever -down." According to the airplane flight manual landing gear systems description, the airplane was equipped with a safety switch to prevent inadvertent retraction of the landing gear on the ground; a main strut safety switch opens the control circuit when the strut is compressed. A caution note stated, "Never rely on the safety switch to keep the gear down during taxi or on takeoff, landing roll, or in a static position. Always make certain that the landing gear switch is in the down position during these operations."
The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident to be the pilot's failure to ensure that the airplane was properly configured for takeoff, which resulted in the inadvertent retraction of the landing gear during the takeoff roll and the airplane's subsequent runway excursion.De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver Overturns During LandingWhat You Havent Seen2022-10-24 | On June 27, 2019, at about 0945 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped, de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, registration N94DC, sustained substantial damage following a loss of control during landing at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska. The airline transport pilot and four passengers aboard were not injured. The airplane was registered to V2 Aviation LLC, and operated by Pacific Airways as a Part 135 flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and company flight following procedures were in effect.
The flight departed the dock at Ketchikan International Airport (PAKT) at 0941 destined for 5KE. According to the pilot, after providing the passengers with a preflight safety briefing, he departed the PAKT airport dock for the short repositioning flight to the company's harbor side dock. After departure, he flew the standard west route, turned back over the airport dock, and then turned inside of Pennock Island for its final approach to the harbor. Upon touchdown, the airplane skipped, and its right float dug into the water. The airplane water-looped, nosed down, and began to submerge.
After all motion had ceased, the pilot secured the magnetos, assisted the passengers with their life vests and evacuation, and then evacuated the airplane himself. A good Samaritan fishing boat responded to the scene and assisted with the rescue of the airplane's occupants. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. This video, recorded by a cruise ship passenger, captured the accident sequence and revealed that the airplane was landing parallel to an ocean swell and touched down in a relatively flat pitch attitude. After touchdown and encountering the swell, the airplane veered to the left, water-looped, nosed down and began to submerge.
Water Flying Concepts, Second Edition, by Dr. Dale De Remer is an advanced text on wilderness water flying. It states, in part:
"The seaplane is very directionally stable as long as it is landed so that its center of gravity is forward of its center of rotation. The seaplane center of rotation in the air is its center of gravity, and on the water it is the center of the wetted side area of the float(s). This is difficult to visualize, as it changes with the speed and attitude of the aircraft on the water. It can be considered to be close to the center of buoyancy. The main thing to remember is to keep the center of rotation aft of the center of gravity. Keep the center of rotation aft, period, until the aircraft has slowed and settled off the step."
The airplane operator recommended the following three changes to their operations as a result of this accident:
1. More extensive training for new pilots on aborted and glassy water landings.
2. No longer allowing first year pilots to execute short approaches into the harbor.
3. Aircraft to refuel at the harbor, prior to passengers boarding at PAKT airport dock for their flights.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing, left lift strut, and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident to be a loss of directional control while landing, which resulted in a water loop.Piper Cherokee Crashes into Power LinesWhat You Havent Seen2022-10-19 | On December 18, 2020, at 1322 EST, a Piper PA-28-140 airplane, N6978W, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident during an instructional flight near Tampa, Florida. The flight instructor, student pilot, and passenger (the airplane owner) were seriously injured.
The airplane departed Tampa International Airport (TPA) about 0900 for Zephyrhills Municipal Airport (ZPH). Before departing ZPH to return to TPA, the airplane was fully fueled. The airplane departed ZPH about 1307 with the student pilot in the left seat at the controls. The flight instructor stated that the engine was running smoothly during the flight to TPA.
The passenger, who was seated in the back seat and videotaping the approach, noted that the student pilot adjusted his seat during final approach. Moments later, the flight instructor noticed the airplane's descent path starting to get low, and advised the student pilot to add power. The student pilot attempted to add power, but the engine did not respond. The flight instructor assumed control of the airplane, established best glide speed, and attempted to restore engine power. The flight instructor noted a momentary increase of 200 rpm when he cycled the throttle, but he was unable to restore engine power with the engine "basically at idle."
The flight instructor contacted air traffic control and declared an emergency, and attempted a forced landing on a small road, maneuvering the airplane to avoid buildings, trees, and power lines, however the airplane struck a utility pole and power lines in a parking lot about 0.6 nm from the runway threshold. The airplane caught fire upon impact with the power lines, spun counterclockwise, and fell to the ground, coming to rest upright next to the parking lot. The passenger (in the rear seat) noticed that the fuel pressure showed zero just before the airplane impacted the power lines. The fuel selector was located in the wreckage and was found fully in the OFF position. The flight instructor stated that he did not direct or teach the student pilot to move the fuel selector to the off position during the approach for a forced landing and did not observe him doing so. The student pilot stated that he had no recollection of moving the fuel selector and that he would have taken action if he had he noticed that the fuel selector had been inadvertently moved.
Examination of the student pilot's logbook revealed that he had accrued 2 hours of flight time in the accident airplane before the accident flight.
The accident airplane's fuel selector valve was the original model design, which had four selectable positions in an "X" pattern. The fuel selector valve was mounted on the airplane's left sidewall near where the pilot's left leg would be positioned. The lower two detents of the "X" pattern were both OFF positions, and the forward and aft upper detents selected the right and left tanks, respectively. The valve and bezel design on the accident airplane allowed the valve to be rotated without stops or safety measures to any of the available positions, including off.
The design of the fuel selector bezel and handle was subsequently modified twice by the manufacturer. The second-generation design was a three-position design with off, left, and right selections. Rotating the handle fully counterclockwise to the 9:00 position selected the "OFF" position, and rotation clockwise to the 3:00 position selected the right tank, and the intermediate 12:00 position selected the left tank. The third-generation fuel selector added a spring-loaded stop that prevented a pilot from inadvertently selecting the "OFF" position. To select that position, the pilot must simultaneously depress the spring-loaded stop and rotate the lever.
Examination of the accident airplane's logbook revealed that the fuel selector was replaced during the airplane's last annual inspection on 9/15/20. The entry read, "Removed and replaced fuel selector with new," but included no reference to Service Bulletin (SB) 840A, "Fuel Selector Valve Cover Replacement," dated 11/7/13. The airplane manufacturer considered compliance with this SB to be mandatory because the fuel selector valve cover assembly would reduce "the possibility of pilot mismanagement of the fuel system through inadvertent selection to the OFF position, resulting in power interruption or stoppage."
In 1971, the FAA issued an AD that required operators of airplanes equipped with second-generation fuel selector covers and handles to upgrade the cover assembly, but did not require upgrades in airplanes with first-generation equipment.
On July 10, 2014, the FAA issued an SAIB that recommended 'the installation of a fuel selector valve cover designed to prevent inadvertently selecting the off position and the maintenance of fuel selector valves to prevent their binding.' According to the FAA, SAIBs are for information only. They are not mandatory.
~~~
00:00 Accident video 00:57 Photos 01:09 Investigative recordsMedevac Helicopter Crashes With Patient OnboardWhat You Havent Seen2022-10-13 | On July 7, 2018, about 2123 CDT, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135 P1 helicopter, N312SA, impacted terrain during an autorotation near Chicago, Illinois. The pilot, paramedic, and nurse were seriously injured, and the patient was not injured. The helicopter was operated by Pentastar Aviation Charter as an air ambulance flight.
While en route, the pilot noticed a twist grip caution indication on the left engine (No. 1) cockpit display system (CDS) panel. The pilot also noticed a second indication but could not recall the specific caution. He stated that he then grabbed each engine throttle twist grip individually to gently verify if he could feel they were in or out of neutral detent, but did not notice any significant changes to the throttle position. The pilot decided to divert to a nearby airport, and, as he executed a turn toward the airport, he noticed the No. 2 engine indication no longer matched the No. 1, stating that "it was lower and oscillating."
Within ~1 minute, the pilot "heard the low rotor [rpm] horn," and lowered the collective to maintain rotor speed. The pilot located a "dark spot" on the ground, which he determined would give him the best opportunity to complete a full autorotation. As he started a turn toward his intended landing location, he felt the tail oscillate to the right and back and heard an oscillation in engine speed. When the helicopter was about 200' AGL, he thought he may land short of the intended location and adjusted the collective and cyclic to maintain rotor rpm and airspeed. The helicopter impacted terrain, rotated 180°, and came to rest upright. This video from a rail platform showed a fire near the right (No. 2) engine during the autorotation, and a flame burst after impact with terrain.
Examination of the aircraft revealed no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Analysis of data retrieved from the CDS and EEC units revealed that, about 4 minutes after takeoff, the No. engine was placed in manual mode and out of EEC control, which indicates that the pilot had likely inadvertently moved the No. 1 engine throttle out of its neutral detent. The No. 2 engine was in manual mode for about 7 minutes before the pilot noted the CDS twist grip caution indication. The data showed that as the pilot continued to manually control the No. engine, the No. 2 engine was also placed in manual mode and out of EEC control, which indicates that the pilot moved the No. 2 throttle out of its neutral detent. The pilot attempted to maintain rotor and engine rpms while controlling both engines manually; it is not likely that he fully understood the nature of the problem.
The pilot misinterpreted an aural alert (low rotor rpm as opposed to high rotor rpm) when high rotor rpm existed, then lowered the collective, which created a rotor overspeed condition. This configuration resulted in a high-workload scenario in which it would be particularly challenging for the pilot to control the helicopter while maneuvering in low altitude and night visual conditions.
The pilot had accumulated about 300 hours in EC135s, with about 11 hours in the accident make and model. The accident helicopter was the only EC135 P1 variant in the operator's fleet. Its engines, displays, and throttle controls differed from the EC135 P2+ in which the pilot was formally trained. The pilot had completed an online self-study differences training presentation, and some informal familiarization training with other company pilots. No formal training was part of the differences training curriculum.
Because the throttle (twist grip) differs between the P1 and P2+ variants, it is likely that the pilot moved it into manual mode without realizing; he likely did not recognize this issue because he did not have as much experience or formal training in the P1 variant. Because the displays also differed between the variants, it could have been more difficult for the pilot to recognize and understand the indications he was receiving. Given the differences among the two variants regarding the displays and throttle controls, additional familiarization training, such as a familiarization flight with a company check pilot, would have provided the pilot with a better understanding of the key differences.
The helicopter manufacturer issued a voluntary service bulletin 10 years before the accident regarding collective throttle controls with grips that had an increased mechanical protection against unintentional adjustment.
The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident to be the pilot's inadvertent disabling of the No. 1 and No. 2 engines' electronic engine control systems, which resulted in engine and rotor overspeed conditions, a subsequent autorotation, and a a hard landing. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's inexperience with the helicopter variant and the operator's lack of a more robust helicopter differences training program.Fatal Crash of Gyroplane Immediately After TakeoffWhat You Havent Seen2022-10-06 | On December 16, 2020, about 1417 MST, an experimental, amateur built, SilverLight AR-1 gyroplane, N261MD, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Heber Valley Airport (HCR), Heber, Utah. The pilot received fatal injuries. Multiple witnesses reported observing the gyroplane take off from runway 22. One witness stated that the flight looked “incredibly unstable” the entire time it was airborne. Another witness stated that he saw the gyroplane make an abrupt pull up and a right-hand turn out, with the mast parallel with the ground if not beyond. Multiple witnesses reported the gyroplane in a spin [about its vertical axis] before pitching nose down and descending to the ground. A video recording, taken by a witness at the airport, revealed the gyroplane began a takeoff roll on runway 22. During the roll, the left landing gear and nose wheel lifted off the runway and settled back onto the runway. Shortly after liftoff, the gyroplane pitched nose-up and down multiple times, followed by an abrupt nose-up attitude and an abrupt gain in altitude. About 3 seconds later, the gyroplane banked right, after which it began to descend, rotating about its vertical axis. The gyroplane then pitched nose down and impacted terrain.
ADS-B data recorded the gyroplane as it taxied onto runway 22 at HCR. The data showed the gyroplane initially track down the center of the runway. About 1,700 ft from the beginning of the runway, the gyroplane was off the left side of the runway. About 2,200 ft from the beginning of the runway, the gyroplane turned right about 45°, followed by a left turn of about 20°. The last ADS-B data point indicated the gyroplane was about 427’ northeast of the accident site. The gyroplane came to rest in a concrete reinforced ditch on the north side of a highway that bordered the airport.
According to the pilot’s son, his father owned a side-by-side gyroplane prior to his purchase of the tandem-seat AR-1. He flew the side-by-side for about 2 years then sold it. The son purchased his own side-by-side gyroplane, and his father flew with him for about a year before he purchased the AR-1. The pilot’s son stated that he never saw his father fly in a dramatic pitch up and hard right attitude. Medical records recorded the pilot’s weight at 143 pounds.
According to the manager of SilverLight Aviation LLC, the pilot approached him in June 2019 to inquire about building an AR-1 gyroplane. The manager stated that the owner chose to use a Rotax 915iS engine due to the high altitude at HCR and his desired better performance. After completion of the build, the manager flew the gyroplane for a total of 6 hours, and an employee, who was a pilot and a mechanic, flew it for about 2 hours, then shipped it to HCR. The manager stated that the employee travelled to Utah to assist the owner in reassembling the gyroplane and to show him how it operated with two people. The manager indicated that the pilot was not a certified flight instructor, just a very experienced pilot.
According to the employee, he visited the pilot in Utah for 2 days to help him with set up and familiarization. The first day, they practiced using the prerotator and charging forward with a goal of observing the engine and rotor increasing together, with no flight activities conducted. The second day began about noon, and involved multiple flights. The employee reported that the owner had flight performance issues, including repeated application of excessive throttle, over-controlling the gyroplane, pilot-induced oscillations, and abrupt or aggressive control inputs. The employee reported that on every takeoff he had to tell the owner to reduce power. At the end of the second day, the employee reported to his employer that while the owner showed improvement with his flying skills, he needed additional instruction and transition time; the employee offered the owner additional training time, but the owner declined.
The AR-1 Pilot’s Operating Handbook stated, in part: “The manual is not a substitute for competent theoretical and practical training on the operation of this aircraft. Failure to adhere to its provisions or to take proper flight instruction can have fatal consequences. Minimum pilot weight is 144 pounds (65 Kg) in the front seat. Maximum power at minimum takeoff weight can cause an abrupt climb rate in standard conditions that, if not corrected, may cause climb angles of greater than the placarded maximum. Approximately 80% of maximum takeoff power is considered comfortable for a minimum weight takeoff.”
00:00 Intro 00:07 Witness video 00:53 Witness video, cropped 01:25 Surveillance video #1 and #2 01:57 Surveillance video #3 (with audio) 02:28 Photos 03:20 Airframe & Engine Examination Report 04:59 Electronic Flight Instrument System Device Factual Report 05:32 Investigative records; statements 08:54 POH Excerpts 09:33 Rotax 915iS Datasheet 09:47 Toxicology 10:02 SilverLight employee statement 11:16 Witness statementsTwo Planes Collide During LandingWhat You Havent Seen2022-10-03 | On November 25, 2020, at 0009 EST, a Cessna 172, N8125U, was substantially damaged when it collided with an Aero Commander 500 ("AC"), N777CM, during landing at Dekalb-Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, GA. There were no injuries.
According to the Cessna pilot, while en route to PDK, his home base, he deviated around fog, which delayed his arrival until after the control tower had closed. Upon arrival near PDK, he listened to the ATIS and reported that he "wrote down the radio channels and headed in, thinking how much (he) hated being without air traffic control." As he neared the airport, he activated the lighting and runway lights, and saw green lights at the approach end of what he believed to be runway 21R. He stated that these lights indicated the direction he was supposed to land on the active runway (they actually indicated the displaced threshold for runway 21L).
He stated that he then "switched radio channels" and made "routine calls." He did not hear any radio transmissions of other traffic operating at or near PDK. He reported that he had his landing lights and navigation lights on while on approach. During landing on runway 21L, about 200' past the runway numbers at an altitude of about 10-15' above the runway and at 65 knots, the Cessna pilot saw a "tiny white light approaching extremely fast." About 3 seconds later, he heard a "bang" and the airplane "pitched hard" to the right. He maneuvered the airplane back to the runway centerline and landed. He stated that he exited the runway at taxiway F, did not make any further radio calls, and taxied to his parking spot. An airport security guard met him and informed him that he had collided with another airplane.
According to the AC pilot, he opted to land on runway 3R "because other aircraft were landing on 3R." He followed an EMS helicopter that was landing on runway 3R. He entered a right downwind traffic pattern leg and "made the appropriate CTAF calls" on 120.9. He turned to a right base and entered a ½ mile final for runway 3R, announcing each leg on the CTAF. He reported that he typically does not adjust the intensity of the runway lights when landing at PDK, and he noticed that the light intensity increased while on approach. After landing, he saw "some lights" and was initially unsure what they were. He subsequently "realized it was an oncoming aircraft landing on runway 21L." He reported that both airplanes swerved, and the right wingtip of the Cessna contact the right outboard wing section of the AC.
A review of ADS-B data revealed that the Cessna flew a straight-in approach to runway 21L.
A review of FAA CTAF recordings revealed that at about 0005, the pilot of the AC initially announced that he was on a left downwind for runway 21L. About 2 minutes later, the pilot of an EMS helicopter, advised that he was on a modified base leg for runway 3R. The AC pilot then advised he was on final for runway 21L. The EMS pilot then advised that he had the AC in sight, acknowledged the potential conflict, and offered to approach the "shorter runway" (3L) instead. The AC pilot acknowledged and told the EMS pilot that he would instead go-around and enter a right downwind leg for runway 3R. The AC subsequently transmitted his position as he entered the downwind leg and again as he made the turn to the final approach leg. Just after his turn to final, the EMS pilot announced that he was clear of the runway and hovering over the ramp. The AC acknowledged and advised he had the helicopter in site.
FAA tracking data show that at the time the AC pilot advised that he had the helicopter in sight, the Cessna was on final, about ½ mile from the displaced threshold of runway 21L. There were no radio calls from the Cessna.
Examination of both airplanes revealed that the Cessna sustained substantial damage to its right wingtip, including the outermost wing rib, and bending of the right aileron. Post-accident testing of all of the airplane's lights revealed no anomalies. Post-accident ground testing of the single communication radio revealed successful transmission and reception. Examination of the AC revealed minor scrapes/paint transfer to the underside of the right wing near the outboard edge of the wing flap, and minor damage to the right-wing flap. According to the FAA airport/facility directory, the CTAF frequency at PDK is published as 120.9, which is the same frequency for the ATC tower when it's operating. When the tower is closed, the high intensity runway lights are turned on and preset to medium. The pilot-controlled lighting system uses a separate radio frequency, which can 1) increase intensity of edge lights, 2) activate approach lights, including green lights marking threshold, and 3) activate taxiway lights. The green threshold lights denote the location of the runway threshold. They are not an indication of the active runway.
00:00 Accident video 00:32 Radar playback 04:44 Photos 04:53 Pilot's report 05:42 Investigative recordsF-16 Landing Gear Failure & Ejection (HUD Footage)What You Havent Seen2022-10-02 | At 1537 hours local time on 2 December 2019, an F-16CM Block 40, tail number 90-0714, crashed in between Runway 36 and Taxiway P on Kunsan Air Base (AB), South Korea. The Mishap Pilot (MP) was an instructor-pilot assigned to the 80th Fighter Squadron. The MP was returning to Kunsan AB for landing after completing a local continuation training sortie. Upon initial contact with the runway, the mishap aircraft's (MA) right main landing gear (RMLG) collapsed. The MA departed the runway and the MP successfully ejected. There were no casualties and no loss of civilian property. The MA, valued at $19.4 million, was completely destroyed. The MA was assigned to the 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea.
When the MA initially touched down on the runway, the RMLG collapsed and the MA yawed to the right. The MP attempted to keep the MA on the runway and take the MA airborne again, but was unsuccessful. The MP safely ejected from the MA suffering only minor injuries. The MA remained upright and skipped across the infield intermittently becoming airborne and settling back onto the field. The MA eventually stopped approximately 2,200 feet from the initial touchdown point, and the MA rotated 150 degrees from the initial runway heading. The engine continued to run for more than one hour after the mishap.
The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of evidence, this mishap was caused by a failure of the RMLG downlock actuator, causing the RMLG to collapse, making the aircraft uncontrollable during the landing phase of flight. Specifically, the tension on the main landing gear was great enough to overcome the force of the downlock actuator, resulting in a collapse of the RMLG. This is a known issue for F-16C/D blocks 40/42/50/52 and is addressed by Time Compliance Technical Order 1F-16-2855.
00:00 Mishap video 01:50 Photos 02:22 AIB report excerptsF-16 Loss of Electrical Power and Ejection (HUD Footage)What You Havent Seen2022-09-29 | On 8 October 2019, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CJ, tail number (T/N) 91-0340, assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron, "the Warhawks," 52d Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, conducted a routine training sortie as part of the wing's local readiness exercise SABER FURY. Shortly after take-off, at 15:10:42 hours local time, the MP ejected from the mishap aircraft (MA) with no injuries. The MA was destroyed upon impact in a forested area at 15:11:24L 8 nautical miles south of the base. The mishap resulted in zero military or civilian casualties and the loss of a $25,551,000 United States government asset.
The mishap flight was planned and authorized as a suppression of enemy air defenses training mission within the local training airspace. The MP was flying as number two of a scheduled 4-ship formation, but which departed as a 3-ship. The prevailing weather at the airfield, and in the surrounding area, was a ceiling at 500 feet with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) up to 15,000 feet. Approximately 13 seconds after take-off, during the transition to IMC, the MA experienced a power disruption causing a partial electrical power loss (also known as an electrical "brownout") which failed the MP's primary flight and navigation instruments without corresponding fault or failure indications. This power disruption also caused the embedded global positioning and inertial navigation set (EGI) to lose power and remain off-line. The subsequent degradation and mismatch in data between the primary and standby instruments caused the pilot to become spatially disoriented at low altitude and in IMC. After two failed attempts to activate the pilot activated recovery system, following two instances of visually acquiring trees below the 500-foot ceiling, the MP successfully egressed the aircraft.
The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the combination of two factors. First, the MA experienced a partial electrical power loss (brownout). The power loss caused a cascading failure of the EGI and the MP's primary flight and navigation instruments. Due to the EGI's loss of power, the primary attitude direction indicator continued to display unreliable data without fault or failure indications and prevented the MP from transitioning fully to the standby attitude indicator for attitude reference. Second, the weather conditions at the time of the power disruption caused the MP to rely on his primary and standby flight instruments to maintain aircraft control during a critical phase of flight. The mismatch in data provided by the primary and standby attitude indicators, due to the power disruption, caused the MP to become spatially disoriented and unable to maintain aircraft control in the weather and at low altitude. The absence of either factor may have prevented this mishap.
00:00 HUD Video #1 03:24 Mishap Pilot's HUD 04:17 Photographs 04:36 Impact site ground video 04:55 For Official Use Only (Animation)Military helicopter wake turbulence destroys small planeWhat You Havent Seen2022-09-28 | On December 5, 2014, about 1428 MST, a Cirrus SR20, registration N407ND, impacted terrain during approach at the Fort Collins-Loveland Municipal Airport, near Fort Collins, Colorado. The solo student pilot was seriously injured* and the aircraft was substantially damaged. The aircraft was being operated as an instructional flight.
The student pilot stated that he entered the traffic pattern at FNL for a full stop landing on runway 33. He observed a Sikorsky UH-60 helicopter on downwind and delayed his turn to base until the helicopter was on final, abeam his position. While on final, the student pilot adjusted his aim point to land long, as he was concerned with wake turbulence and wanted to land beyond the helicopter's touchdown point. Just prior to landing, he encountered turbulent air, entered into an uncommanded steep left bank, and attempted to go around. The pilot was unable to maintain control and the airplane subsequently impacted terrain and cartwheeled, which resulted in damage to the fuselage and both wings.
At 1435 the weather observation station at FL reported the following conditions: wind 110 degrees at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear sky, temperature 14 degrees C, dew point 4 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.22 inches of mercury.
In February 1996, the FAA Technical Center released a flight test report on the hazards of rotorcraft wake vortices in forward flight. The flight test utilized a laser Doppler velocimeter (LDV) to measure helicopter wake vortices. Four helicopters, with weights ranging from 7,600 to 70,000 pounds, were utilized as the wake vortex generating aircraft. The maximum duration for vortex life, as measured by the LDV, was 75 seconds for the UH-60. The FAA flight test report made the following conclusions:
-Medium weight helicopters, such as the S-76A and UH-1 can leave active, potentially hazardous vortices for up to 90 seconds. Separations for small aircraft behind these rotorcraft should therefore be in the 90-second range.
-Larger helicopters, such as the CH-47D and CH-53E, were observed to have longer hazard times. A 120-second separation should be adequate for operations behind these rotorcraft.
-Information on the wake vortex hazard behind these rotorcraft, including delineation by class, should be included in the Airman's Information Manual and the Wake Vortex Advisory Circular.
Current FAA airman information manual and advisory circular (AC) 90-23G on aircraft wake turbulence do not recommend an in-trail distance or timing separation for an airplane following a helicopter. The AC contains a general wake turbulence statement: "pilots should avoid helicopter vortices since helicopter forward flight airspeeds are often very low, which generate strong wake turbulence."
AmSafe airbag seatbelt assemblies were mounted in the two front crew seats of the accident aircraft. Neither of the two airbag seatbelts deployed as the airplane cartwheeled, as the minimum threshold for triggering — a longitudinal G input of at least 6 G's, simultaneously loading both sensors for 40-50ms — did not occur during the accident sequence.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident to be the student pilot's failure to comprehend the significance of the wake turbulence that a preceding helicopter would generate during departure, which resulted in a loss of airplane control during landing. Contributing to the accident was the lack of FAA wake turbulence separation criteria for a small airplane following a helicopter.
*Note: "seriously injured" is defined by statute. Serious injury means any injury which: (1) Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date of the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface. Based on the accident pilot's description of his injuries, he broke his hand.
00:00 Accident video 01:24 Photos 01:33 Pilot accident report 02:43 Pilot's supplement 04:34 FAA Advisory Circular on wake turbulence 10:40 Vortex avoidanceTrain Crashes Into BargeWhat You Havent Seen2022-09-25 | On November 13, 2021, about 2343 local time, the towing vessel Baxter Southern had pushed its tow of four empty barges against the shoreline of the Upper Mississippi River at mile 372 near Galland, lowa, when a BNSF coal train transiting the track along the shoreline struck the bow rake of a forward barge that was overhanging the railroad track. Two locomotives and ten hopper cars (loaded with coal) derailed, and six of the derailed hopper cars entered the river. A sheen was observed in the river following the derailment. The two train personnel sustained minor injuries. Damages to the locomotive and freight cars were estimated at $1.9 million. The barge sustained minor scrapes.
As the Baxter Southern and its tow of four empty barges moved southerly on the Upper Mississippi River, they encountered strong wind gusts. The wind made it unsafe for the tow to continue, and in the dark of night, it was also unsafe for the captain to try to turn around the tow and head upriver.
It is considered normal for tug and barges transiting on the inland waterways of the United States to push up against the riverbank — whether to wait for river traffic to decrease, bad weather to pass, for lock openings, or to conduct maintenance. While searching the electronic chart on the ECS for an area to push the tow against the shoreline, the captain and pilot stated that they assumed the area marked by a magenta dashed line next to the right descending bank near mile 372 was a fleeting area-where towing vessels and barges would be able to push up against the riverbank. However, the magenta dashed line actually represented a caution area, which warned of the risk of embankment erosion and of train collision due to the channel's proximity to the railroad trackbed.
The pilot was familiar with the area and stated that he had previously seen towing vessels and barges push up along the right descending bank near the caution area identified on the ECS. Neither the pilot nor the captain queried the exclamation point near the area on the ECS as a part of their navigational assessment to gather further information related to the dashed magenta line. Thus, they missed the cautionary information that stated the area presented a "Railroad Collision and Trackbed Erosion Risk."
The captain and pilot each had over 20 years of experience on the Mississippi River and had extensively used Rose Point over the last several years; they also had completed training in the operation of Rose Point and interpreting its information. They should have been familiar with the magenta dashed line identifying the caution area and how to query the chart to see additional information about marked areas.
After the casualty, Coast Guard Sector Upper Mississippi River issued Marine Safety Information Bulletin 08-21, which advised towing vessel operators to use caution in all river water level conditions when pushing up against the shoreline where railroad tracks were located near the water's edge to avoid encroaching on the railroad track.
As the Baxter Southern tow prepared to push up against the riverbank, the captain determined that, due to the nighttime conditions and high wind gusts, it was unsafe to send a lookout forward on the lead barge, STC 3020. Instead, the captain had three crew members proceed up to the bow of STC 3020 after the barge was pushed up against the riverbank to determine the location of the barge in relation to the railroad track. Due to the train's approach within a few minutes of pushing up, the crew members did not reach the bow of the STC 3020 before the collision.
After the pilot, who was in the wheelhouse, and the crew of the Baxter Southern, who were out on deck, saw the light of the approaching train as it came into view about 2,000 feet away from the tow, they had about 35 seconds to respond.
On the train, the conductor and engineer did not have any indication that the Baxter Southern tow was pushed up against the riverbank before they visually saw the tow about 1,000 feet away. In addition, they did not realize that the bow of the STC 3020 had encroached on the tracks until the train was about 300 feet from the barge and still traveling about 37 mph. At that point, the train's engineer activated the train's emergency brake on the three locomotives and all the hopper cars at 2343:42. After the Baxter Southern's pilot saw the sparks from the train and realized that the train was not going to be able to stop, he put the tug's engines in full astern to move the tug and barge away from the riverbank. However, the engines took 4.5 seconds to respond because of the pneumatic throttle control, delaying the movement of the towing vessel and barges from the riverbank at a time-critical moment. With only seconds to respond, the activation of the train's emergency brake and the placement of the tug's engines in full astern occurred too late to avoid the collision.
00:00 Accident video 01:07 Investigative informationDouble Fatal Crash of T-38C Air Force Fighter Trainer (HUD footage)What You Havent Seen2022-09-21 | In today's exclusive: on February 19, 2021, a T-38C, T/N 68-8099, impacted the terrain short of Runway 28 while performing an instrument approach at Dannelly Field, Montgomery, AL. The instructor pilot and Japanese student pilot, assigned to the 14th Flying Training Wing, were fatally injured.
Due to a recent winter storm, the flight was the first sortie flown by the instructor and student in 9 days. The crew planned to fly to Dannelly Field, execute a circling instrument approach, and then continue to Tallahassee for a full stop landing. The student flew the downwind leg of the circling approach, and was 18 kt above final turn speed and 0.4 NM wide when he began the turn to final. Due to undershooting the final turn, the instructor directed the student to roll out on an approximately 40° intercept heading to final approach, and to slow down. The student retracted the throttles to idle and started a 30-35° left bank turn to align with the runway.
As the aircraft decelerated through 164 KCAS, the instructor took control and initiated recovery. At this time, the throttles had been at idle for 18s, decelerated to 155 KCAS, and was descending through 250’ MSL at 1,100 fpm. The aircraft impacted the ground seconds later.
The cause of the mishap was the instructor pilot's loss of situational awareness on final approach, and failure to take timely and necessary actions as a dangerous situation developed. It was further found that the student pilot substantially contributed to the mishap after becoming task saturated in the traffic pattern and placing and leaving the throttles in idle. As the circling approach progressed, the instructor failed to recognize the aircraft's deteriorating performance caused by the excessive length of time the throttles were in idle. This undetected and uncorrected action, coupled with the student's additional flight control inputs to align with the runway, resulted in insufficient airspeed and altitude and an increased angle of attack and sink rate, and placed the aircraft outside the parameters for safe flight.
The flight had been identified as high-risk, requiring the Squadron Commander to approve the sortie.
For unknown reasons, the mishap crew did not plan an alternate airfield, as required.
Cockpit recordings reveal the student had difficulty understanding and responding to ATC radio calls. The instructor assisted the student several times and directly intervened with ATC on one occasion to ensure safety of flight.
At 2239:00Z, the student initiated a 40° left bank level final turn at 210 KCAS. Due to the wider than normal runway displacement, the student undershot the final approach.
At :30Z, as the aircraft passed through 328° and 830’ MSL, the instructor directed, "You can roll out right here.”
At :39Z, the instructor stated, "Slowing down to green speed," directing the student to slow from 209 KCAS to the final approach speed of 172 KCAS. The student reduced both throttles to idle.
At :41Z, the instructor stated, "Leveling off," and the student began reducing the aircraft’s descent rate to 600 fpm.
At :44Z, the instructor stated, "Hold that good wire, fly those PAPIs" directing the student to fly the aircraft on a 2.5° to 3° glidepath.
At :47Z, the instructor stated, "See the runway, there you go," and the student started a 30-35° left bank to align with RWY 28 as the aircraft decelerated through 192 KCAS at 400 fpm sink rate.
At :55Z, the instructor calmly stated, "Just a little bit..." and truncated the end of his statement. At this point, the aircraft was on heading 278, at 450’ MSL, in a 36° left bank, throttles in idle, decelerating through 164 KCAS at 1,400 fpm sink rate. The setting sun was in the crew's FOV, likely affecting the student's ability to discern the information displayed on the HUD.
At :56Z, the instructor stated, "Ooof, start climbing.” This was the last point in time when a safe ejection was possible.
The instructor took control of the aircraft at 2239:56.5Z and attempted to recover the aircraft after recognizing the excessive sink rate and low airspeed.
At :57Z, the instructor advanced the throttles to maximum afterburner while continuing the attempted recovery.
At 2240:04Z, the aircraft struck 70’ tall power lines, a 50’ tall approach lighting system tower, and entered a grove of trees before impacting the ground approximately 1,800’ from the approach end of the runway. The aircraft impacted the ground at 138 KCAS, 5° nose-low pitch attitude, 8° downward flight path, 1,700 fpm sink rate, 50° right angle of bank, throttles in max afterburner, gear down and locked, and 60% flaps.
Neither pilot initiated ejection.
00:00 Last four minutes of HUD footage 04:07 Photos 04:37 Complete HUD footage 10:44 Taxi out 15:52 Takeoff 51:27 Mishap Analysis & Animation Facility Accident SequenceNavy T-45 Goshawk Crashes in Texas Field, Crew EjectsWhat You Havent Seen2022-09-16 | On March 24, 2021, a United States Navy T-45C Goshawk trainer aircraft crashed in Orange Grove, Texas. There were no serious injuries. Subsequent investigation by the Navy revealed that the crash was due to mechanical problems.
The aircraft, assigned to Training Air Wing 2 out of NAS Kingsville, Texas, was participating in a regularly scheduled training mission when its hydraulic system caution light alarmed as its flight crew were practicing landing pattern procedures.
The accident occurred approximately 45 minutes after takeoff, when the aircraft experienced an "abrupt and rapid right roll soon after a hydraulic system 1 (HYD1) failure." Because of the aircraft's low altitude at the time of hydraulic failure, the aircrew had no option but to eject.
According to the final investigation report, “This mishap was the result of a mechanical failure undetectable during normal flight operations, not due to pilot misconduct. No supervisory negligence or malpractice was causal to this mishap.”
00:00 Video #1 01:54 Neighbors 02:24 Video #2 03:51 PhotosUnited Express jet lands between runway and taxiway, destroying planeWhat You Havent Seen2022-09-13 | Bet you've never seen landing gear like that before...
On March 4, 2019, at 1129 EST, CommutAir flight 4933, an Embraer EMB-145XR, N14171, d.b.a. United Express, landed between Runway 1 and Taxiway A in moderate snow at Northern Maine Regional Airport, Presque Isle, Maine. This was the second approach to Runway 1 after having conducted a missed approach during the first approach. Radar track data show that the airplane was aligned right of the runway during both approaches. Of the 31 passengers and crew onboard, two passengers and one crew member received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The flight was operating as a regularly scheduled Part 121 domestic passenger flight from Newark International Airport to PQI.
The first ILS approach to Runway 1 appeared to be proceeding normally until the first officer - the pilot flying - transitioned from instrument references inside the flight deck to outside references. During a post-accident interview, the first officer stated that he expected to see the runway at that time but instead saw "white on white" and a structure with an antenna that was part of the runway environment but not the runway itself. The captain - the pilot monitoring - stated that she saw a tower and called for a go-around. Both flight crew members were most likely seeing the automated weather observing system wind sensor pole, which was located about 325' to the right of the Runway 1 centerline and about 870' beyond the runway threshold, and the damage to the lightning arrester at the top of the wind sensor pole was likely due to contact with the accident airplane as it flew over the pole. According to the CVR, after the go-around, the first officer asked the captain if she saw the runway lights during the approach. The captain responded that she saw the lights but that "it's really white down there that's the problem."
Airport personnel stated that snow plowing operations on the runway had finished about 10 minutes before the first approach. The CVR recorded the flight crew's discussion about turning on the pilot-controlled runway lights and sounds similar to microphone clicks before and after the discussion. However, the PQI maintenance foreman stated that, after the first approach, the runway lights were not on.
The captain thought that the airplane had drifted off course when the first officer transitioned from flight instruments to the outside, so she instructed the first officer to remain on the instruments during the second approach until the decision altitude (200' agl). The second approach proceeded normally with no problems capturing or maintaining the localizer and glideslope. During this approach, the captain asked airport maintenance personnel to ensure that the runway lighting was on, and the PQI maintenance foreman replied that the lights were on "bright." Thus, the flight crew had a means to identify the runway surface even with the reported snow cover at the time.
As the airplane approached the decision altitude, the captain instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot, which he did. About nine seconds later, the airplane reached the decision altitude, and the captain called, "runway in sight twelve o'clock." This callout was followed by the first officer's statement, 'I'm stayin' on the flight director 'cause I don't see it yet." A few seconds later, while the airplane was below 100' AGL, the captain and the first officer expressed confusion, stating "what the ****" and "I don't know what I'm seein'," respectively, but neither called for a go-around.
The airplane subsequently impacted the snow-covered grassy area between Runway 1 and a parallel taxiway. During a post-accident interview, the FO stated that, when he transitioned from flight instruments to the outside during the second approach, he again saw "white on white" as well as blowing snow and that the airplane touched down before he could determine what he was seeing. The maintenance foreman estimated that, at the time of the accident, the runway had about 1/8 inch of snow with about 20% to 25% of the runway visible.
The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident to be the flight crew's decision, due to confirmation bias, to continue the descent below the decision altitude when the runway had not been positively identified. Contributing to the accident were the first officer's fatigue, which exacerbated his confirmation bias, and the failure of CommutAir pilots who had observed the localizer misalignment to report it to the company and air traffic before the accident.
There is much more to the story, and it is presented in the video, however there is a character limit to video descriptions. See pinned comment.
Extensive investigative information regarding this accident is linked in the pinned comment. I particularly recommend the Human Factors and Operational Factors factual reports.
00:00 Accident footage 01:45 Post-accident photos 02:18 Accident reportCrash of Piper ComancheWhat You Havent Seen2022-09-03 | On October 20, 2019, about 8:45 a.m. local time, a Piper PA-24, N7742P, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Angel Fire, NM. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured.
According to friends of the pilot who stated they had helped with the refueling and preflight of the accident airplane that morning, this was his first time flying into Angel Fire Airport (AXX). The pilot stated to his friends that he was going to depart to the south and then head back toward the airport because of the winds and to gain altitude. The pilot started the engine and let it warm up for about 10-15 minutes. The airplane taxied to the departure end of runway 17 where the pilot performed an engine run-up and magneto checks. The pilot's friends watched as the airplane started its takeoff roll and became airborne a little a past halfway down the runway. Shortly thereafter, they saw the airplane's landing gear retract and soon lost sight of the airplane behind the parallel taxiway, which rises in elevation above the runway. An eyewitness was driving north when she saw the airplane flying south from the airport which was located on the east side of the highway. The airplane was very low and it appeared to be struggling to remain in flight. The airplane turned right to fly over the road and toward the eyewitness, who subsequently drove her vehicle into the ditch alongside the highway. As the airplane was descending, it appeared to the eyewitness that the airplane was preparing to land on the road. The eyewitness noticed a section of power lines that cross the road in front of her location and hoped that the airplane was going avoid hitting them. As the airplane approached the power lines, the airplane pitched up and turned to the west, impacting trees, a building, and the terrain. Several other witnesses saw the airplane as is departed the airport and described the airplane as unstable.
The 65-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with rating for multiengine land, single engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent third-class FAA medical certificate was issued on 3/7/19. At that time, he reported 1,000 total hours of flight experience and 15 flight hours in the last 6 months. The pilot's logbooks were not located during the investigation. There was no evidence found that showed that the pilot had any mountain flying training or experience.
The airplane's two fuel tanks had a total capacity of 60 gallons. According to airport personnel, on the morning of the accident flight, the airplane was fueled with ~20 gal, which filled both tanks. Published manufacturer performance data for takeoff distance exists for altitudes from sea level up to 6,000' based on standard temperature and pressure. The expected takeoff ground roll could not be determined for the accident takeoff as the environmental conditions exceeded those used in the calculations provided by the manufacturer when the airplane was manufactured. Approximate weight and balance requirements were calculated and were found to be within the normal operating envelope. According to pilot's operating handbook's crosswind component graph, the airplane would have experienced about a 9 kt crosswind and about a 2 kt tailwind.
A weather study using the approximate airport elevation, temperature, dew point temperature and altimeter from AXX, calculated density altitude at 845 at the surface to be 9,360' msl.
At 845 MDT, about the time of the accident, AIRMET TANGO was issued for moderate turbulence below FL180, strong surface winds and LLWS potential for areas that included the accident site.
AXX is situated at an elevation of 8,379' msl. It has one runway, 17/35, which is 8,900' x 100'. Runway 17 has an average uphill gradient of .64% and a difference of about 57' between its ends. Signage before entering the runway area cautions pilots about the field elevation and reminds pilots of their airplane's performance at that elevation. The airport directory describes the airport as in a mountain valley, with rising terrain in all directions, strong gusty crosswinds possible, and high-density altitude probable.
There was no evidence of in-flight airframe, engine, or flight control malfunction or failure.
According to the pilot's autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt trauma and the manner of death was an accident.
The autopsy identified moderate-to-severe multivessel coronary artery disease with two coronary artery stents present. There was an area of old heart muscle scarring and microscopic changes consistent with old heart attack. Amlodipine, metoprolol, and atorvastatin were detected in heart blood and urine, as well as clopidogrel in urine.
The NTSB investigation is ongoing.
00:00 Accident video 01:04 Body camera 08:07 Friends, Witness 10:40 Crime scene 11:49 Witness 18:00 FAA interview 24:47 Video #2, investigatory material 36:52 Scene photos
The title sequence misidentifies the aircraft as a Cherokee. It is a Comanche.Crash of Bellanca 8GCBC ScoutWhat You Havent Seen2022-08-25 | The accident airplane was conducting a glider tow flight. These video recordings of the accident sequence reveal that the tow airplane became airborne about midway down the runway and proceeded to make a shallow climb with the glider in trail at a similar altitude. After the tow airplane became airborne, the glider pitched upward and ascended to a higher altitude while the tow airplane remained in a shallow climb. Shortly afterward, the tow airplane began a shallow descent. Both aircraft then leveled off, with the glider still at a higher altitude than the tow airplane. As the glider began to descend and then ascend, the tow airplane pitched downward in a nose-low attitude, impacted the runway, and nosed over. A post-impact fire ensued. A pilot-rated witness stated that the tow airplane was at an altitude of about 100 ft above ground level at the time that the glider began to ascend after descending.
The pilot of the glider reported that, shortly after takeoff, the canopy began opening and closing rapidly. The glider pilot also reported that, as he attempted to secure the canopy while maintaining control of the glider, he became briefly disoriented. The glider pilot turned back toward the airport and saw that the tow airplane had crashed. The glider landed uneventfully. The glider pilot stated that part of his preflight check was to ensure that the canopy was closed and locked. Postaccident examination found no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction with the glider canopy latching mechanism. It is likely that the pilot did not successfully lock the canopy before takeoff.
The open canopy likely distracted the glider pilot, and he allowed the glider to ascend to an excessive altitude behind the tow airplane, which forced the tow airplane into a nose-down attitude while at a low altitude.
Post-accident examination of the tow airplane revealed no mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operations. The tow rope-cutting mechanism was engaged; thus, the tow pilot likely cut the tow rope at some point during the flight. (The tow rope was located about 80 ft beyond the main wreckage of the tow airplane in the grassy area adjacent to the runway.) However, the airplane was at an altitude that precluded recovery from the nose-down pitching moment that was induced by the high altitude of the glider.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable causes of this accident to be the tow airplane pilot's loss of control resulting from the glider pilot's failure to maintain a proper altitude behind the tow airplane, which caused the tail of the tow airplane to be lifted upward and the tow airplane to pitch nose down while at a low altitude. Contributing to the accident was the glider pilot's distraction when the canopy opened in flight.
00:00 Video #1 02:08 Video #2 02:49 Video #3 04:23 Photos 04:47 Investigatory materialHelicopter Landing Dance Interrupted by Fenestron DestructionWhat You Havent Seen2022-08-23 | On July 19, 2022, a Eurocopter EC-135 P2+, registration N228MT, owned and operated by by Air Evac Lifeteam, was substantially damaged when rotor wash blew a cloth fire extinguisher cover into the helicopter's Fenestron tail rotor. The incident occurred during landing at Mount Vernon Outland Airport (KMVN), Mount Vernon, Illinois.
As described by Tony Bonham, Vice President for Aviation at Air Evac Lifeteam:
"Upon return-to-base after a transport flight, after hover taxi[i]ng the helicopter to the normal parking position, the aircrew experienced a large jolt to the tail of the aircraft just as it was being lowered to the ground. The pilot continued the landing from the hover position (with no perceived loss of tail rotor control authority).
Upon shut-down and post-flight, it was found that the tail fenestron (enclosed tail-rotor) had ingested a red, cloth fire-extinguisher cover bag from the adjacent fuel farm (portable fuel bowser). The metal fenestron hub cover was detached and torn into multiple metal shards; some impacting the fenestron frame and others being scattered as debris. There were no injuries to flight crew or around personnel."
00:00 Landing Dance (Version 1.0) 01:53 Damage photos 02:27 Communications 03:59 NTSB Safety Alert 06:00 NTSB Report Form 07:46 Landing Dance (Version 2.0)Cessna 180 Takeoff Ends in TreesWhat You Havent Seen2022-08-18 | On March 30, 2022, a Cessna 180, registration N4738B, was involved in an accident at Lampasas Airport (KLZZ), Lampasas, Texas, when the pilot, Robert Earhart, attempted to take off in high winds and crashed into trees.
According to Mr. Earhart, when he landed at Lampasas, the landing was "rough" and right at the edge of the airplane's crosswind capabilities. Due to the strong crosswind, Earhart thought that he would be better off taking off from the perpendicular taxiway that was oriented more into the wind.
Earhart reported that the wind was not as strong as he had thought and he wasn't able to clear the trees in the departure path. When asked if there were any mechanical problems with the airplane, he stated that there were none. Earhart further noted that he had owned the airplane since 1983. His intended destination was the Lakeview Airport in Dallas, Texas (30F).Richard Russell Steals a Bombardier Q400 | The AftermathWhat You Havent Seen2022-08-13 | As most of you know, two months ago, I obtained and published exclusive, never-before-seen footage of Richard Russell stealing a Bombardier Q400 airplane from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Every major media outlet in the United States had previously attempted to obtain the footage that I published. None had succeeded.
Two weeks ago, someone calling themselves "Coffee Now" commented on that video, asking about the provenance of the same footage subsequently published by "the CBS affiliate." Good question, Coffee Person, but I do have to clarify something: there is nothing wrong with a media outlet reporting a story that was first reported elsewhere. Even an investigative story.
There is, however, a catch: when that happens, ethical journalism requires attribution. It is wrong to pretend that someone else's original work is the product of your own investigative reporting.
Fortunately, I never have to worry about violating that principle, as I don't publish stories that have already been published elsewhere. Unfortunately, on a number of - okay, many - occasions, my original reporting has been republished by other media outlets as if it was the work product of their "I-teams."
In one particularly egregious case, instead of providing attribution, ABC 7 included a factually incorrect statement in their story: "The footage was released recently by the NTSB." In reality, the NTSB had released the footage six years prior, only no one had noticed until I secured a copy and published it. Rather than acknowledge that someone else was first to the story, ABC made up their own version of reality. The AP news wire then distributed ABC's story in its entirety. Including the part that ABC had invented.
A few weeks after my publication of the original Richard Russell footage, national media woke up to the video that over one million of you have seen. In the case of the "CBS affiliate," on June 23, 2022, KOIN investigative reporter Dan Tilkin submitted a request for public records to the Port of Seattle:
"I am a reporter with KOIN TV in Portland, Oregon. I am making a request for materials which have already been released June 8, 2022 - mirroring Request 22-259 by Jay Horowitz."
Tilkin then copied and pasted the text of my request, word-for-word, legal arguments and all. He even included the part of my request in which I told the Port that if they ever have a security concern about material that I have published or may publish, they should call me. I had assured the Port that every such request I have received has been resolved to mutual satisfaction, and closed by reminding the Port that they have my phone number. Tilkin's request included all of that — even the reference to my own phone number.
Tilkin and KOIN then published the results of Dan Tilkin's groundbreaking investigative reporting:
"PORTLAND, Ore. (KOIN) – Nearly 4 years after a Horizon Airlines baggage handler casually stole a passenger plane from SeaTac before intentionally crashing on a small island, KOIN 6 News obtained surveillance video that shows how he managed to do it without anyone noticing."
Oh, wow! Great job, KOIN!
Dan Tilkin would later email me, telling me that I had done "Nice work!"
I replied to that email two days ago, copying KOIN's editorial leadership. I did that because I actually care about ethical journalism, and it requires that you give people an opportunity to respond to negative coverage. I wrote:
"Thanks, Dan.
Before I call you and your station out on this publicly, I want to give you both an opportunity to respond:
[[The above quote from his story]]
I assume that you care about ethical journalism. I do, too. Why did you not provide attribution to my original reporting? You know better than anyone that you – and KOIN – never would have obtained that footage had I not obtained and published it first.
There is nothing wrong with reporting a story that was uncovered by another media outlet. That happens every day. It is wrong, however, to pretend that someone else’s work is the product of your own investigative reporting. I would never do that, and I would like to understand why you thought that it was okay.
There is another chapter to the Richard Russell story, and I intend to publish it soon. As of now, the text accompanying that video is an explanation of what I wrote above, along with any response you choose to provide."
KOIN and Dan Tilkin have refused to comment. Shocker.
Ethics before profits. Without audience trust, your reporting is worthless.
~~~
This is the rest of the Richard Russell story. It's the story of the aftermath, and the story that every other media outlet also missed. Let's see how long it takes before someone claims to have obtained this material, too, as the product of their own groundbreaking investigative reporting.
00:00 Intro 01:40 Recon 04:39 Debris field 17:10 Metal fire 17:52 Hose lay 26:46 Fire line 28:45 Recon east side 43:47 Select radio traffic 01:02:47 PhotosFatal Crash of Air Tractor AT-802A (Emmett, Idaho)What You Havent Seen2022-08-10 | A flight of three airplanes departed to conduct firefighting operations; the accident airplane was number two. After establishing contact with the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS), the pilots were briefed on the target description and identified the steepness of the drop and the rising terrain on the exit. After the first airplane completed its pass, the ATGS requested that the accident airplane adjust his flightpath to the left to reinforce the line closer to the burned vegetation. The accident pilot confirmed his gate was armed, on the correct line and was subsequently cleared to proceed and drop the fire retardant. Witnesses reported that the airplane crossed over the intended target ridge, descended into the valley, and passed the proposed drop area without releasing any retardant. No mechanical failures or malfunctions were revealed with the firegate system, and it was undetermined why the accident pilot did not accomplish the retardant release. The accident airplane initiated a climb; however, it impacted terrain about 40 ft below the opposing ridge line. A video provided by a witness showed the accident airplane descend into the valley, without releasing any retardant. The airplane did not begin its climb out of the valley until 3 seconds before impact with rising terrain. The NTSB's performance study determined that there was an insufficient amount of time and distance for the airplane to gain enough attitude to clear the rising terrain.
The pilot had orbited the area at least 3 times from about 2,000 ft above the ground before initiating the drop run. This would have provided an opportunity to assess ground features, including terrain, that could aid in conducting the run. However, environmental conditions in the area at the time may have made terrain features more difficult to discern from the lower altitude of the drop run because of the uniformity of the vegetation on the ridges and flat light conditions; and would have made accurate assessment of height above and distance from terrain more difficult. This may have led the pilot to believe he had greater clearance from terrain than what was available. Had the pilot initiated a climb at the GPS point prior to the impact location, there would have been sufficient altitude to clear the rising terrain. However, the airplane continued to descend into the valley and the pilot initiated the climb too late for the airplane to clear terrain. Post-accident examination of the recovered airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident to be the pilot's descent below surrounding terrain and his delayed decision to initiate a climb which resulted in impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident were terrain and lighting conditions that affected the pilot's ability to accurately assess terrain clearance.Sinking of the Proassist IIIWhat You Havent Seen2022-08-05 | On December 24, 2020, the towing vessel Proassist III flooded and sank near Puerto Yabucoa, Puerto Rico. The towing vessel was transiting northbound off the coast of Puerto Rico when its stern compartments began flooding during severe weather. The three crew members on board attempted to pump out the water, but were unable and eventually abandoned the vessel. No injuries were reported, and the vessel was declared a total loss at $968,000.
Shortly after departing Laguna de las Mareas, Guayama, the Proassist III encountered worsening weather conditions and seas began washing on deck. More than two hours after their departure, the crew noticed the vessel was down by its stern, and found about 3 feet of water in the flanking rudder compartment. Roughly 40 minutes after the crew discovered the water and attempted to pump it off, the flanking rudder and steering rudder compartments were filled with water.
A post-loss examination of the vessel showed openings in the vessel’s watertight bulkheads and a lack of gaskets and securing mechanisms for flush hatches and door openings on the deck, however there were no structural defects in the hull that could have accounted for the significant flooding. Investigators concluded that a cover for an aft deck opening had not been secured, thus allowing the 4" - 6" of standing water on the deck of the vessel to flood into vessel compartments.
Recently implemented regulations for towing vessels required all openings to be secured when operating offshore. The regulations also require maintaining the watertight and structural integrity of the vessel. However, deficiencies found in the post loss examination of the Proassist III indicated that the vessel was not adequately maintained. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Concentrated Inspection Campaign found three other vessels owned by the Proassist III owner had hull and deck integrity issues, signaling the company did not have an effective maintenance program.
Specifically, ,the post-casualty examination of the vessel showed holes in the vessel’s watertight bulkhead and a lack of gaskets and securing mechanisms for openings on the deck. These deficiencies can be seen in the underwater video shown here. The Proassist III had not been issued a COI under the new Subchapter M regulations, but regardless of the vessel’s COI status, the Coast Guard required operators to comply with the requirements in Subchapter M by July 2018, almost 1.5 years before the casualty.
Compliance included maintaining the watertight and structural integrity of the vessel. The watertight and structural integrity deficiencies in the postcasualty examination of the Proassist III indicate that the vessel was not adequately maintained. Additionally, as a result of the Coast Guard’s Concentrated Inspection Campaign after the casualty, hull and deck integrity issues were identified on three of the Proassist III owner’s other vessels, indicating that the company did not have an effective maintenance program. An effective maintenance and hull inspection program would have proactively sought to minimize the wastage of steel on the Proassist III (and other company vessels) and made any corrosion issues easier to identify and flag for repair.
Before 1996, the Proassist III had been regularly examined by the Coast Guard as part of the process for obtaining a load line certificate exemption. However, in 1946 the vessel’s tonnage was reduced to 148 GRT so it would no longer be subject to these examinations. Had the owner not reduced the vessel’s tonnage, it would have had its structure and deck openings examined regularly by Coast Guard inspectors or load line examiners, who likely would not have allowed the vessel to operate unless the structure and deck openings were in satisfactory condition. By reducing the tonnage, the owner eliminated regulatory oversight. Given the demonstrated lack of overall hull and watertight integrity, the owner did not maintain his vessels that had not yet been issued a Coast Guard COI in a suitable condition for offshore service, opting to maximize periods between dry docking, which would have identified hull and watertight integrity deficiencies.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the sinking of Proassist III was unsecured or open aft deck hatches, which resulted in the flooding of the vessel’s aft compartments from water on deck and progressive flooding to other compartments through openings in watertight bulkheads. Contributing to the flooding of the vessel was the owner’s lack of an effective hull inspection and maintenance program.Southwest Airlines 737 vs. Catering TruckWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-31 | On May 1, 2022, a Boeing 737-800, registration N8580Z, was involved in an incident at Los Angeles International Airport when, during pushback from the jetway, aircraft struck a catering truck with its left lower winglet. The aircraft was being operated by Southwest Airlines as flight SWA313.
00:00 The incident 03:47 The earlier, zoomed-out footage, a bit slower (general interest)Cessna 421 Golden Eagle Crashes into LandfillWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-20 | On January 10, 2021, about 1301 eastern standard time, a Cessna 421B, N421DP, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Old Bethpage, New York. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that he departed runway 32 at Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, New York about 1300 hours. During the initial climb out, about 1,000' above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane impacted a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of FRG.
This surveillance video captured the airplane during the final seconds before the crash. The airplane approached the ground at a nearly flat pitch angle and struck the ground left wing first. There was no visible smoke, vapor, or mist trailing the airplane. The wing flaps and landing gear were in their retracted positions. One of the first responders, a firefighter, reported that upon arrival at the accident site after the accident, he did not see or smell any fuel on the ground. During his travels back and forth to the wreckage, the firefighter saw no pooling or buildup of fuel anywhere. Another first responder reported that when he approached the wreckage, fuel was dripping from the fuselage, but "it was a minimal leak." He estimated the drip rate to be 5 drops per minute, and stated that after about 5-10 minutes, the leak stopped. He inspected the wreckage and could visibly see that there was no fuel in the left wing. The right wing was too damaged to view its tank fuel level.
An FAA inspector who traveled to the scene reported that the airframe sustained "major damage" to the nose and both wings and the fuselage came to rest at a 70° angle. He did not observe any signs of fuel under the wreckage, nor did he smell any fuel near the wreckage. There were no signs of fuel spillage on the street adjacent to the wreckage. There were no blue streaks or signs of fuel leaks on the wings, engines, and fuselage. All fuel tanks were checked and found to be empty of fuel. There was a localized area of post-accident fire damage inside the right engine compartment, immediately forward of the turbocharger. The wreckage was recovered to a secure storage facility where a more complete examination was performed.
All major structural components of the airplane were accounted for. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit controls to the elevator and rudder. Aileron continuity was established from the cockpit controls to the center cabin bell crank. All five fuel filler caps were observed installed at their respective positions. The right, main fuel tip tank was observed to be intact and no signs of hydraulic deformation were evident. The forward section of the left main tip tank was separated from its attachment fittings. Both tip tank center baffles were intact. Both wing auxiliary (bladder) tanks were compromised from impact forces. The left-wing nacelle locker tank was intact and empty. Examination of the left engine revealed no external damage, cracks, or oil leakage from the engine case. The engine was turned through manually, and compression and suction were observed on all cylinders. No mechanical issues were identified that would have precluded normal flight.
Examination of the right engine produced the same results, except for the engine oil filter. The outside of the filter was discolored due to post-accident fire damage. The filter was opened, and the element was free of particulates. The airplane was equipped with a Shadin fuel management system. The cockpit display unit was removed from the wreckage and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for examination and data download. The unit recorded the accident flight. The "FUEL REM" (fuel remaining) indication at the time of the accident was 36.1 gallons. The "FUEL USED" indication was 0.0 gallons, however the accuracy of the fuel remaining value was dependent on proper input from the operator. The pilot reported that he departed FRG with 112 gallons of fuel on board. He was requested, through his attorney, to provide documentation of the airplane's last refueling, including time, date, location, and amount. He did not provide the requested documentation to the NTSB or the FAA.Aircraft Carrier Mishaps (Historical PLAT Footage, 1970s)What You Havent Seen2022-07-19 | Presenting the United States Navy's finest in terrible camera technology.
In the order presented on the film information card:
May 1970, F-8J Bureau Number: 149177 Pilot's name: TRIONE Description of accident - Nose gear failure during carrier landing; A/C boltered, nose gear inner barrel and tire were observed to enter water after bolter. A/C diverted ashore.
June 1970, F-8U Bureau Number: 150678 Pilot's name: TRIONE Description of accident - Nose gear failure during carrier arresting landing; nose gear, inner barrel and tire ware observed to continue up angle deck and enter water.
Title: Film record of an F-8J mishap aboard wing down landing aboard USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) May 1970, F-8J Bureau Number: 150859 Pilot's name: LCDR C.R. COLLICOTT Description of accident: This accident is significant in that it is the first F-8J wing down arrestment aboard a carrier. The F-8J NATOPS recommends an approach at 17 units angle of attack, resulting in a speed of about 160 KIAS for a 22,000 pound aircraft. The pilot flight-checked the aircraft (23,400 pounds) at 17 units but the corresponding speed was 210 KIAS. In order to reduce the approach speed, the pilot flew at 19 units with a resultant 180 KIAS. The additional weight should have increased the speed by only 5 knots. The accident board has recommended further investigation into the F-8J wing down characteristics.
Title: F-8J mishap aboard USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) May 1970, F-8J Bureau Number: 150888 Pilot's name: CDR A.L. ALEXANDER Description of accident: During a night arrestment, the starboard main landing gear assembly separated from the aircraft.
Minor AAR 4-70A April 29, 1970, F-4B Bureau Number: 153915 Pilot's name: CDR J.A. DICKSON, USN No further.
00:00 Intro 00:19 First F-8J wing down arrestment 01:22 F-8J Nose gear failure/"You lost your gear on that pass" 02:30 F4B Blown tire, structural damage to wing 03:47 F-8J Loss of starboard main landing gear 05:33 F-8J Nose gear failureCrash of Robinson R44 Raven IIWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-18 | On April 6, 2020, about 1410 Pacific daylight time, a Robinson R44 Raven II helicopter, N725GT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Hillsboro Airport near Portland, Oregon. The pilot was not injured. The helicopter was operated as a Part 91 flight. The pilot reported that, during takeoff, about 30 to 40 ft above ground level, he heard a loud "bang," followed by the illumination of the low rotor RPM light and the sound of the low rotor horn. In response, he lowered the collective and performed an autorotation on the paved taxiway. As a result of the hard impact, the skids spread, and the helicopter tail boom received substantial damage.
Initial examination of the engine revealed that the fuel servo induction air inlet duct had partially collapsed. The inner rubberized fabric liner of the duct had partially delaminated and separated from the outer rubberized fabric, obstructing the interior of the duct. The duct was retained, and further examined. The outer layer of the duct appeared normal with no damage or anomalies. The inner layer exhibited several areas of what appeared to be bubbles. The bubbles were .5" - .75" wide and varied in length running down the length of the duct.
The duct was flexed 90° and a crinkling sound was heard. The sound was heard and again as the duct was straightened. The duct was installed on the fuel control unit of an exemplar R44 and was then bent 90° and secured to the airbox. The engine was started, and the power was gradually increased to 102 percent; the collective was raised to 20 inches of manifold air pressure (MAP). The engine ran smoothly with no anomalies for 74 seconds, then the MAP fluctuated slightly and within one more second it increased as the engine stalled. From inside the cockpit a cough sound (after fire) was heard.
The cowling was removed, and the hose was unclamped from the airbox. The hose was pulled away from the airbox just enough to see the inside of the hose, reducing the bend in the hose from 90° to approximately 75°. Examination of the inner layer revealed bubbles that had reduced the inside diameter of the duct significantly. The air intake duct tube was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination. The tube was dissected to examine the condition of the internal surfaces of the inner and outer layers and the steel wire. Visual examination of the internal surfaces indicated that there were few, if any, areas where the inner and outer layers had apparently cured to one another. As the outer layer was peeled back, it appeared to be bonded primarily to the helical wire.
Examination of the exposed wire surfaces indicated that there were areas where the silicone rubber separated in a cohesive manner, leaving remnants of rubber on the wire. Conversely, in other areas the separation occurred at the rubber / wire interface, consistent with either no bond or a weak bond between the rubber and the wire. The outer and inner layers had not cured to one another as indicated by the smooth appearance of the internal surfaces.
The inner and outer layer internal surfaces were examined with the aid of a binocular stereomicroscope and two unidentified substances were observed. One substance consisted of discrete spots of gray particulates, distributed at random across the internal surfaces. The second, a friable translucent substance, was observed in some areas, typically in steel wire impressions in the rubber layer and adjacent tented regions.
The chemical composition of the gray particulates was analyzed with the aid of a scanning electron microscope (SEM) equipped with an energy dispersive X-ray spectrometer (EDS). The spectrum of the gray particulate sample consisted primarily of iron with traces of manganese, consistent with the composition of a low carbon steel. The second spectrum exhibited primarily aluminum, silicon, and calcium, with traces of iron, consistent with primarily silicate minerals. No traces of bromine, lead, aluminum, or calcium were observed on the intralayer gray particulate sample.
The friable translucent substance was analyzed and was similar to that of a water-based mold release agent used by the manufacturer. A spectral search using an online library of reference spectra returned matches for silicone-based materials.
A similar accident occurred on April 4, 2019. Following this accident, Robinson issued SB-97 on 4/11/19, requiring all inlet duct tubes installed on certain R44 II helicopters to be inspected for indications of layer separation. On 7/5/19, the FAA made compliance with SB-97 mandatory. Because SB-97 did not cover all inlet duct tubes in the R44 II fleet, as a follow up, Robinson issued SB-100 on 7/3/19, expanding the inspection to essentially all R44 II helicopters.
The accident helicopter was not subject to SB-97, however, SB-100 did apply. Maintenance records for the helicopter made no mention of compliance with SB-100.Washington Metro Arcing Leads to Fatal Smoke Event (L’Enfant Plaza, 2015)What You Havent Seen2022-07-16 | The NTSB has been concerned with the safety of the Metro rail system since 1970, when it conducted a special study of the proposed transit rail system while it was still under construction. The resulting report resulted in one safety recommendation to WMATA to “develop the capability within WMATA for system safety engineering and apply system safety principles to all aspects of the proposed [rail] system to identify, assess, and correct those deficiencies identified by the analysis.”
This accident was the 13th Metro accident investigated by the NSTB since Metro began operation in 1976. The NTSB has issued 101 safety recommendations to WMATA since 1970.
The safety issues and conditions identified in this accident, which illustrate WMATA’s lack of a safety culture, are Metro's response to smoke reports, tunnel ventilation, railcar ventilation, emergency response, and oversight and management of WMATA.
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the NTSB made safety recommendations to the Federal Transit Administration, the mayor of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Office of Unified Communications, the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, and WMATA.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the WMATA L’Enfant Plaza station electrical arcing and smoke accident was a prolonged short circuit that consumed power system components resulting from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) ineffective inspection and maintenance practices. The ineffective practices persisted as the result of (1) the failure of WMATA senior management to proactively assess and mitigate foreseeable safety risks and (2) the inadequate safety oversight by the Tri State Oversight Committee and the Federal Transit Administration. Contributing to the accident were WMATA’s failure to follow established procedures and the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department’s being unprepared to respond to a mass casualty event on the WMATA underground system.
This video shows the arcing only. Shortly after the arcing began, the station began to fill with smoke as components of the third rail electrical system were consumed. In response to a recent request, WMATA claimed that this video does not exist. Unfortunately for them, I had obtained a copy through other means.Pilot loses consciousness during takeoff, crashesWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-15 | On August 9, 2017, at 0926 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Pietenpol Air Camper, N709HR, was substantially damaged following a loss of airplane control during takeoff at Bendigo Airport (74N), Tower City, Pennsylvania. The private pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot as Part 91 test flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and no flight plan was filed for the flight to Deck Airport (9D4), Myerstown, Pennsylvania.
According to this airport surveillance video, the pilot initiated the takeoff roll on runway 5 and the nose of the airplane veered to the left. The takeoff continued, and the airplane pitched up into a steep, nose high attitude, rolled to the left, then descended toward the ground. The airplane contacted the ground left wing first in a steep, nose-low attitude. The propeller was turning throughout the accident sequence.
An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the airplane came to rest in the grass, adjacent to the runway. The fuselage and wings were structurally damaged. There was no fire. The wooden propeller blades were broken off and splintered at the blade roots. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit controls to the control surfaces. The pilot reported that he was flying the airplane on its first flight away from 74N, still within the phase test period. He flew the airplane locally the day before and all aircraft systems were normal. Preflight, ground operations, and the engine runup were uneventful.
He began the flight with a full fuel tank of fuel (12 gallons) on board. He taxied to the end of the runway for a takeoff on runway 5. He specifically recalled seeing his hand push the throttle forward to initiate the takeoff roll. He saw the gauges "come to life" and the takeoff commenced. He felt the tailwheel rise, and then "the lights went out." He did not recall any subsequent events pertaining to the accident. He reported that there were "absolutely no mechanical issues" with the airplane prior to the accident.
The total time on the airframe at the time of the accident was 9.8 hours and within the Phase I test period in accordance with 14 CFR part 91.319(b). The pilot was the registered airplane builder and held a FAA experimental aircraft builder certificate.
The pilot reported in an interview that he had allowed his medical, last issued in 2010, to lapse because he had been treated for thyroid cancer. The pilot's post-accident medical treatment records were obtained and reviewed. At the time of the accident, the pilot was 60 years old. His injuries included a fracture of the occipital condyle with dissociation of the altanto-occipital joint associated with epidural hematoma of the spinal cord, a traumatic brain injury, pulmonary contusions bilaterally, damage to the left retina, a mediastinal hematoma, a large laceration of the chin including arterial damage and bleeding that required embolization, multiple broken teeth, fracture of the thyroid cartilage, a laceration of the right hand, a clavicle fracture, and fractures of the left scaphoid and radial styloid.
The pilot was intubated before being flown to the trauma center for emergent care. Once extubated, he reported having a history of hypertension, hypothyroidism resulting from a thyroidectomy to remove a thyroid cancer in 2009, and migraine headaches. In addition, he immediately reported that he believed he had fainted during takeoff which resulted in his crash (sudden unexplained fainting is known as syncope).
An extensive evaluation for the source of the pilot's syncope was performed and he was eventually diagnosed with severe aortic regurgitation. The condition was so severe he underwent an aortic valve replacement several months after the accident. Although no arrhythmias were identified during the pilot's hospitalization and aortic regurgitation does not commonly cause syncope, two cardiologists documented in hospital notes or letters to the NTSB that the severity of the aortic regurgitation was enough to put him at risk of syncope from poor cardiac output or as result of an arrhythmia.Pilot and flight instructor survive crash of Great Lakes biplaneWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-14 | On September 24, 2020, at 1624 Pacific daylight time, a Great Lakes 2T-AI-2, biplane, N3617L, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near San Diego, California. The flight instructor sustained serious injuries and the pilot receiving instruction sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Part 91 instructional flight.
The flight instructor reported that the airplane underwent a preflight and was fueled before the first flight of the day with the pilot receiving instruction. The pilot receiving instruction was on the flight controls for the takeoff and the airplane was climbing at 70-80 mph when he noticed a lack of climb about 350 ft above ground level. The flight instructor took control and started to troubleshoot by checking that the throttle, mixture, and propeller controls were full forward. The fuel shutoff valve was in the ON position.
Due to obstructions straight ahead, he initiated a steep turn back to the runway and established a 75-mph glide. The flight instructor saw trees and tried to turn inside of them toward the runway while not departing controlled flight or getting too slow. The airplane subsequently collided with a tree and crashed in a parking lot outside of the airport perimeter. The airplane came to rest upright with significant damage to the engine compartment, and substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.
A video surveillance camera captured the airplane in a steep descent after the impact with the tree. A witness at the airport reported that he heard the engine sputtering and looked to see the airplane on takeoff, level-off at about 300 ft agl while making a right turn. The airplane slowed dramatically, and the nose of the airplane started going down. By the time the airplane had completed a 180° turn, the nose of the airplane was pitched down about 40°. The airplane recovered enough airspeed to bring the nose up when it hit a tree.
The engine was partially torn from its mounts and suffered significant impact damage. The exhaust system sustained crush damage, and the fuel servo broke away from the oil sump. The propeller separated from the crankshaft, about 1 inch aft of the propeller flange. Both blades were intact and straight and did not exhibit evidence of chordwise scratches or leading-edge nicks.
The fuel selector valve sustained impact damage and was found in the OFF position; however, fuel was found in the fuel lines and components downstream. The engine and electrically driven fuel pumps were intact. The crankshaft was rotated, and accessory gear and valve train continuity was established. All eight spark plugs were removed and displayed normal operating signatures. Magneto-to-engine timing was confirmed, and both magnetos sparked with the impulse coupling. A drill was used to rotate the magnetos to speed, and spark was produced on each remaining undamaged ignition lead. Examination of the engine and fuel servo revealed no anomalies.
Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.Fatal Crash of SIAI Marchetti 1019-B, Part IIWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-10 | The pilot was attempting an intersection takeoff about midfield when, shortly after the airplane became airborne, it pitched up aggressively, rolled left, and descended into the ground in a nose-down attitude. Examination did not reveal any evidence of pre-accident malfunctions or failures of the flight control system, and there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot’s seat had moved. Both the engine and propeller exhibited damage signatures consistent with high engine power at impact.
The airplane was equipped with a flight control locking system that comprised a pivoting, U-shaped control lock tube mounted permanently to the rudder pedal assembly and a forward-facing locking arm mounted to the pilot’s control stick. The control lock immobilized the aileron and elevator controls but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel.
The cabin floor, where the control lock tube should have been mounted for flight, was severely deformed and compressed. Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor. The locking arm on the control stick also showed no evidence of deformation or impact damage but had rotated about 90° to the right of its normal position, as if forced into that position on impact while the control lock was still attached.
It is likely that the control lock was installed on the flight control stick during takeoff and impact. High-resolution security camera footage of the accident revealed no discernible movement of the elevators or ailerons, further suggesting that the flight controls were immobilized by the control lock.
Although the control lock is painted red, its orientation when engaged results in the pilot viewing it directly down its length, at its narrowest profile. A pilot who owned a similar airplane stated that he had once become distracted during preflight checks and was able to taxi, initiate takeoff, and become airborne with the control lock engaged. He stated that, once he realized his mistake, removal of the lock was a struggle due to the forces imposed on the control stick during takeoff.
The pitch trim was found in an almost full nose-down position, suggesting that the pilot may have been attempting to use the trim to arrest the airplane’s increasing nose-up attitude due to the locked control stick. Whether the pilot recognized that the control lock was engaged or believed he had a flight control problem could not be determined.
Regardless, after takeoff during a dynamic and transitional phase of flight, there would have been minimal time to accurately diagnose the issue and disconnect the control lock. The intended purpose and destination of the flight was routine and there was no apparent time pressure present. The pilot was reported to be extremely thorough about performing preflight checks, and according to his wife, the expected duration of his normal preflight activities would not have allowed him to depart when he did. The pilot had limited experience in the accident airplane, which could explain why he did not remove the control lock during the preflight inspection.
There was no video evidence to provide insight into the duration and scope of the pilot’s preflight inspection; however, omission of the preflight control check was uncharacteristic given his extensive flight experience, and the reason it was not performed could not be determined. While omission of the control check is consistent with a pilot rushing or distracted, and the short duration from taxi to takeoff would have reduced this pilot’s opportunity to detect his error, the investigation was not able to determine the reason it was not performed. Had the pilot completed a functional check of the controls before initiating takeoff, the presence of the lock would have been detected and the accident would have been prevented.
Although the pilot’s autopsy found the presence of heart disease, which posed an increased risk of an incapacitating cardiac event, heart disease is unlikely to have caused inattention. It is also unlikely that the pilot was incapacitated by a cardiac event because his final radio transmission showed that he was aware and speaking after the onset of loss of control.
The pilot was a retired naval aviator, and current air show performer, with extensive flight experience in a broad range of aircraft. At the time of his last medical examination, he reported 6,500 hours of civilian flight time.
The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident to be the pilot’s failure to remove the flight control lock before departure, which resulted in a loss of control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was his failure to perform an adequate preflight inspection and flight control check before takeoff.Triple-Fatal Crash of V-22 OspreyWhat You Havent Seen2022-07-02 | As with everything on this channel, none of the videos you are about to see have even been shown publicly.
On August 5, 2017, a United States Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, took off from the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard and headed for the USS Green Bay as part of an exercise when, with almost no warning, everything went sideways. The Osprey struck the USS Green Bay and crashed in Shoalwater Bay on the east coast of Australia. Although a heroic effort resulted in the rescue of twenty-three personnel, there had been twenty-six aboard the accident aircraft. By the end of joint-US and Australian Navy recovery operations, three marines were confirmed dead.
This video presents two cell phone camera videos of the tragic mishap, video of the accident aircraft's recovery, and new photographs from a number of other MV-22 Osprey mishaps.
The mishap report is available at https://rwp.yt/v22jagman
00:00 First video 00:57 Slow motion 01:44 Second video 02:05 Slow motion 02:31 Osprey recovery 04:31 Imagery from Okinawa mishap 05:18 Imagery from Morocco mishap 05:43 Recovery operations imagery 06:07 Osprey vs. Twin OtterMcDonnell Douglas MD-83 Main Landing Gear FailureWhat You Havent Seen2022-06-29 | On April 20, 2018, at about 1420 central daylight time, a Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc., dba World Atlantic Airlines, MD83, N807WA, experienced a right main landing gear failure during its landing roll at Alexandria International Airport (KAEX), Alexandria, Louisiana. Due to the gear failure, the aircraft's right wing dragged on the runway, creating a friction fire which was quickly extinguished by airport rescue and firefighting personnel. The airplane was substantially damaged and there were no injuries to the 101 passengers and crew aboard. The L1 emergency slide was activated but did not deploy during the evacuation. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 121 as a domestic passenger flight from Chicago-O'Hare International Airport (KORD), Chicago, Illinois, to KAEX.
The takeoff, climb, cruise, and descent portions of the flight were uneventful. The first officer was the pilot flying for the visual approach and landing on runway 14 at KAEX. Examination of the flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that the airspeed, attitude, and descent rate for the landing were similar to previous landings. After landing, the right main landing gear (RMLG) cylinder fractured and collapsed aft and the airplane settled onto the right wing and flaps. The crew was able to stop the airplane on the runway about 7,000 feet from the approach end and called for an emergency evacuation due to a suspected fire on the right wing.
The flight attendants opened the two forward and two aft doors for the evacuation. The escape slide at the left forward door (L1) did not deploy or inflate for the evacuation due to the depletion of the gas charge in the reservoir. The reservoir depleted due to a leak in the valve assembly and was not caught during multiple inspections since installation of the slide assembly in the airplane. The landing gear cylinder fractured under normal landing loads due to the presence of a fatigue crack on the forward side of the cylinder in an area subject to an AD inspection for cracks. The most recent AD inspection of the cylinder was performed 218 landings prior when the fatigue crack was large enough to be detectable. A previous AD inspection performed 497 landings prior to the accident also did not detect the crack that would have been marginally detectable at the time.
The passengers and crew evacuated the airplane using the three doors with inflated slides. There were no injuries reported by the passengers or crew during the evacuation.
00:00 Matt learns a lesson, the incident 01:24 Post-accident photographs 03:33 Investigatory materialCrane recovery of Airbus helicopter from hospital helipadWhat You Havent Seen2022-06-23 | Accident footage @ https://rwp.yt/hard
On January 28, 2018, about 1400 central standard time, an Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2, N894GT, incurred minor damage when it experienced an uncommanded takeoff and subsequent hard landing incident in Memphis, Tennessee. The pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic, and patient were not injured. The helicopter was operated as a Part 135 air ambulance flight.
The pilot reported that he was approaching the rooftop heliport to land at the Regional One Health Medical Center. While on a long final approach to the heliport, there was a left crosswind present and he had to reduce collective pitch control friction three times in order to move the collective as fast as he felt he needed to. He brought the helicopter to a hover as he reached the heliport, then turned the helicopter to the right and landed.
After landing, he started the after-landing portion of the checklist, then turned the throttle twist grip on the collective from "FLY to "IDLE," believing that he had engaged the collective lock. He then turned the horn mute switch to mute, grabbed the cyclic pitch control with his left hand, and reached for the clock start button with his right hand. As he was reaching for the clock button, the collective "popped up," and the helicopter became airborne. He immediately grabbed the cyclic with his right hand, the collective with his left hand, and twisted the twist grip to "FLY." The helicopter then landed hard, and the emergency locator transmitter activated. After exiting the helicopter, the flight nurse advised the pilot that there was damage to the sheet metal of the helicopter.
The security camera video linked above shows the incident sequence in its entirety. The pitch of the rotor blades is seen changing as the helicopter becomes airborne, and rotor coning is visible.
According to FAA and pilot records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter, and private privileges for airplane single-engine land. The pilot attended an EC 130 pilot transition class at Airbus Helicopters from November 6 to November 10, 2017, and completed his Part 135 Proficiency Check on January 17, 2018. He reported that he had accrued 6,267 total hours of flight time, about nine of which were in the incident helicopter make/model.
The helicopter was designed to be convertible from a dual-pilot configuration, for activities such as training, to a single-pilot configuration - for activities such as air ambulance.
The helicopter was equipped with an engine data recorder that exclusively recorded data sent by the FADEC for maintenance purposes. For both channels, engine parameters, logical words, and failure flags were recorded. It also was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 unit, which recorded images, audio, and parametric data.
Review of the onboard video depicted a series of events consistent with the pilot's statement. Review of EDR data indicated that, during the incident portion of the flight, the recorded transducer position for the collective showed the collective rising from an unlocked position with the helicopter's engine transitioning from "Idle" to "Flight."
Examination of the helicopter revealed minor damage. The skid type landing gear was spread out, and both landing gear cross tubes were deformed. The forward belly panels were dented from contact with the forward landing gear cross tube, and the aft closeout panels were dented from contact with the aft landing gear cross tube.
On January 31, 2018, an FAA inspector traveled to Air Evac's Jackson, Tennessee, helicopter operations base to determine if the collective system had been properly balanced in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual. Two days before the incident, a mechanic at the base had removed the right seat flight controls and had configured the helicopter for single-pilot operation.
The collective was placed in the full-down position to attach a spring scale to the twist grip to measure the force required to pull it through its upward travel; however, once the mechanic removed his hand from the collective prior to attaching the spring scale; the collective immediately climbed unassisted to approximately the mid-travel position, indicating that the collective was improperly balanced for the single-pilot configuration. It was determined that the spring force was much greater (approximately twice that required) than it should have been in the upward direction.
After the incident, as an additional risk mitigation factor, Air Evac EMS, Inc. changed their abbreviated checklist for the EC130T2, SO that the first item on the checklist after landing is to roll the twist grip to "IDLE" and then place and confirm the collective pitch is "Down/locked." A "NOTE" was also added to "Visually and verbally confirm collective is locked."Neil Armstrong Ejects From Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (Restored)What You Havent Seen2022-06-21 | Like you've never seen it before.
On May 6, 1968, astronaut Neil A. Armstrong, then assigned as backup commander for the Apollo 9 mission, took off on a simulated lunar landing mission in Lunar Landing Research Vehicle #1 (LLRV-1) at Ellington Air Force Base near the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, his 22nd flight of the test vehicle.
Armstrong had been airborne about five minutes when he suddenly lost control of the vehicle. About 200 feet above the ground, he chose to eject. While the LLRV crashed and burned on impact Armstrong parachuted safely to Earth and was not injured.
MSC Director Robert L. Gilruth appointed an accident investigation board, chaired by Aircraft Operations Office chief Joseph S. Algranti, an experienced LLRV pilot.
The crash investigation showed that a loss of helium pressure caused depletion of the hydrogen peroxide used for the reserve attitude thrusters. The vehicle’s instrumentation did not provide adequate warning about the adverse situation.
Engineers corrected the problems before flights resumed in October.
The historical overview above was written by Melanie Whiting, NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center. Unfortunately, I only read it carefully after the title sequence read "Lunar Landing Training Vehicle." Oh well.
Regarding the inevitable "this is not 4K" comments: rendering in 4K was necessary for both the "before" and "after" versions to be displayed side-by-side without any loss of spatial resolution. Deal with it. Alternatively, if you feel like paying for a 4K scan of the original film, be in touch. We can probably make that happen.
00:00 Ejection flight 01:05 Action begins around hereBellanca Cruisemaster gear-up landing and fire | Helmet camWhat You Havent Seen2022-06-16 | On May 19, 2022, a 1957 Bellanca 14-19-2 Cruisemaster, registration N7655B, was destroyed by fire after a gear-up landing at Gainesville Municipal Airport (KGLE), Cooke County, Texas. There were no injuries reported.
Gainesville Fire Department responded and extinguished the fire.
(Yeah. Pretty short description, compared to the last video.)