DEFCONConferenceAdventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units CHARLIE MILLER SECURITY ENGINEER, TWITTER CHRIS VALASEK DIRECTOR OF SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AT IOACTIVE, INC.
Automotive computers, or Electronic Control Units (ECU), were originally introduced to help with fuel efficiency and emissions problems of the 1970s but evolved into integral parts of in-car entertainment, safety controls, and enhanced automotive functionality. This presentation will examine some controls in two modern automobiles from a security researcherís point of view. We will first cover the requisite tools and software needed to analyze a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Secondly, we will demo software to show how data can be read and written to the CAN bus. Then we will show how certain proprietary messages can be replayed by a device hooked up to an ODB-II connection to perform critical car functionality, such as braking and steering. Finally, weíll discuss aspects of reading and modifying the firmware of ECUs installed in todayís modern automobile.
Charlie Miller (@0xcharlie) is a security engineer at Twitter. Back when he still had time to research, he was the first with a public remote exploit for both the iPhone and the G1 Android phone. He is a four time winner of the CanSecWest Pwn2Own competition. He has authored three information security books and holds a PhD from the University of Notre Dame. Charlie spends his free time trying to get back together with Apple, but sadly they still list their relationship status as "It's complicated".
Chris Valasek (@nudehaberdasher) is the Director of Security Intelligence at IOActive, an industry leader that offers comprehensive computer security services, where he specializes in attack methodologies, reverse engineering and exploitation techniques. While widely regarded for his research on Windows heap exploitation, Valasek also regularly speaks on the security industry conference circuit on a variety of topics. His previous tenures include Coverity, Accuvant LABS and IBM/ISS. He is also the Chairman of SummerCon, the nationís oldest hacker conference. He holds a B.S. in Computer Science from the University of Pittsburgh.
DEF CON 21 - Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek - Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control UnitsDEFCONConference2013-12-20 | Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units CHARLIE MILLER SECURITY ENGINEER, TWITTER CHRIS VALASEK DIRECTOR OF SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AT IOACTIVE, INC.
Automotive computers, or Electronic Control Units (ECU), were originally introduced to help with fuel efficiency and emissions problems of the 1970s but evolved into integral parts of in-car entertainment, safety controls, and enhanced automotive functionality. This presentation will examine some controls in two modern automobiles from a security researcherís point of view. We will first cover the requisite tools and software needed to analyze a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Secondly, we will demo software to show how data can be read and written to the CAN bus. Then we will show how certain proprietary messages can be replayed by a device hooked up to an ODB-II connection to perform critical car functionality, such as braking and steering. Finally, weíll discuss aspects of reading and modifying the firmware of ECUs installed in todayís modern automobile.
Charlie Miller (@0xcharlie) is a security engineer at Twitter. Back when he still had time to research, he was the first with a public remote exploit for both the iPhone and the G1 Android phone. He is a four time winner of the CanSecWest Pwn2Own competition. He has authored three information security books and holds a PhD from the University of Notre Dame. Charlie spends his free time trying to get back together with Apple, but sadly they still list their relationship status as "It's complicated".
Chris Valasek (@nudehaberdasher) is the Director of Security Intelligence at IOActive, an industry leader that offers comprehensive computer security services, where he specializes in attack methodologies, reverse engineering and exploitation techniques. While widely regarded for his research on Windows heap exploitation, Valasek also regularly speaks on the security industry conference circuit on a variety of topics. His previous tenures include Coverity, Accuvant LABS and IBM/ISS. He is also the Chairman of SummerCon, the nationís oldest hacker conference. He holds a B.S. in Computer Science from the University of Pittsburgh.DEF CON 31 - A Broken Marriage Abusing Mixed Vendor Kerberos Stacks - Ceri CoburnDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | The Windows Active Directory authority and the MIT/Heimdal Kerberos stacks found on Linux/Unix based hosts often coexist in harmony within the same Kerberos realm. This talk and tool demonstration will show how this marriage is a match made in hell. Microsoft's Kerberos stack relies on non standard data to identify it's users. MIT/Heimdal Kerberos stacks do not support this non standard way of identifying users. We will look at how Active Directory configuration weaknesses can be abused to escalate privileges on *inux based hosts joined to the same Active Directory authority. This will also introduce an updated version of Rubeus to take advantage of some of these weaknesses.DEF CON 31 - Staying Undetected Using the Windows Container Isolation Framework - Daniel AvinoamDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | The use of containers became an integral part of any resource-efficient and secure environment. Starting from Windows Server 2016, Microsoft released its version of this solution called Windows Containers, which offers either a process or Hyper-V isolation modes.
In both cases, an efficient file system separation should be provided. On one hand, each container should be able to access system files and write changes that will not affect the host. On the other, copying the entire main volume on each container launch will be storage-inefficient and not practical.
In this presentation, we will cover the basics of windows containers, break down its file system isolation framework, reverse-engineer its main mini-filter driver, and see how it can be utilized and manipulated by an actor to bypass EDR products in multiple domains. Eventually, we will provide an open-source tool based on these findings.
This technology caught my attention for several reasons:
Containers and virtualization solutions are everywhere, and their internal workings are not well documented. Actors often search for ways to escape containers. The idea of intentionally entering into one in order to evade security products has yet to be explored. This framework doesn't require any prerequisites and comes as default in every modern Windows image! (the part which we will abuse, at least).DEF CON 31 - Contextualizing The Vulkan Leaks & State Sponsored Offensive Ops - Joe SlowikDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | In March 2023, journalists and investigators released analysis of “the Vulkan files.” Consisting of documents associated with a Russian company working with intelligence and military authorities, the papers revealed a variety of ambitious programs such as “Scan-V” and“Amezit.” Both programs, in the sense that they offer capabilities to acquire, maintain, and task infrastructure for cyber and information operations at scale, are deeply concerning, indicating a significant advancement in Russian-linked network warfare and related actions.
Placing these items in context reveals a far more troubling picture.After reviewing the capabilities of Amezit and Scan-V, we can see glimpses of historical programs in the advertised efficacy of these projects. We will consider other items that have leaked over the years offering similar capabilities, albeit in different circumstances.Examples include Russia’s SORM framework for domestic operations,China’s Great Firewall and (more significantly) Great Cannon programs, and items that emerged in the Snowden leaks such as the US’s alleged “Quantum” program.
By analyzing these additional projects, we will observe a decade’s long trend in the systematization and scaling of cyber programs, especially with respect to automated exploitation and infrastructure management. Vulkan and related items, as significant as they are, represent a culmination of operational evolution and an example of the proliferation of capabilities following disclosure. With programs such as Scan-V exposed, we should anticipate other entities seeking to mirror such capabilities, progressing beyond botnets and other distributed systems to effective management of dispersed capabilities for signals intelligence and cyber operations.DEF CON 31 - How Vulns in Global Transportation Payment Systems Cost You - Omer AttiasDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | Public transportation payment systems have undergone significant changes over the years. Recently, mobile payment solutions have become increasingly popular, allowing passengers to pay for their fare using their smartphones or other mobile devices.
The evolution of public transportation payment systems has been driven by the need for faster, more convenient, and more secure payment methods, and this trend is likely to continue in the years to come, But how secure are mobile payment solutions for public transportation?
In this presentation, we will examine the security risks associated with transportation applications, using Moovit as a case study. Moovit is a widely used transportation app operating in over 100 countries and 5000+ cities. Through our investigation of the app's API, including SSL-encrypted data, we discovered specific vulnerabilities, which we will discuss. We will also demonstrate a custom user interface that can obtain a "free ticket" and cause someone else to pay. Furthermore, we will explain how an attacker could gain unauthorized access to and exfiltrate Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of registered users. Our findings offer practical recommendations to improve the security of transportation apps.DEF CON 31 - SpamChannel - Spoofing Emails From 2M+ Domains & Virtually Becoming Satan - byt3bl33d3rDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | Ever wake up and ask yourself: “Damn, how could I make email security suck even more today”? Tired of your Red Teams phishing emails not landing in your targets inbox?
Do you dislike Boston (the city) and love Satan?
If you answered yes to any of those questions you should come to this talk!
I'll be showing you how to spoof emails from 2 million+ domains (while also “bypassing” SPF & DMARC!) by (ab)using a partnership between Cloudflare and the “biggest transactional email service” on the interwebs. We'll be diving into "edge" serverless applications and the magical world of email security where everything is (still) held up by duct tape, pasta, and marinara sauce. Finally, I’ll be dropping code and releasing a tool that demonstrates how to impersonate emails from 2million+ domains.DEF CON 31 Car Hacking Village - Automotive USB Fuzzing - Euntae Jang, Donghyon Jeong, Jonghyuk SongDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | Recently, automotive industry is performing USB fuzzing in an inefficient way for automobiles. Usually, fuzzing is performed by commercial media fuzzers, but the fuzzers are not directly connected to the vehicle during fuzzing. So, it requires much manual efforts of testers.
In this talk, we propose efficient way to perform USB fuzzing to actual vehicles. We describe how to perform USB fuzzing to kernel area fuzzing as well as media fuzzing by directly connecting the fuzzer and the car with a USB cable. By this method, we found real-world vulnerabilities in Volkswagen Jetta, Renault Zoe, GM Chevrolet Equinox, and AGL.DEF CON 31 - Terminally Owned - 60 Years of Escaping - David LeadbeaterDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | It is 60 years since the first publication of the ASCII standard, something we now very much take for granted. ASCII introduced the Escape character; something we still use but maybe don't think about very much. The terminal is a tool all of us use. It's a way to interact with nearly every modern operating system. Underneath it uses escape codes defined in standards, some of which date back to the 1970s.
Like anything which deals with untrusted user input, it has an attack surface. 20 years ago HD Moore wrote a paper on terminal vulnerabilities, finding multiple CVEs in the process. I decided it was time to revisit this class of vulnerability.
In this talk I'll look at the history of terminals and then detail the issues I found in half a dozen different terminals. Even Microsoft who historically haven't had strong terminal support didn't escape a CVE. In order to exploit these vulnerabilities they often need to be combined with a vulnerability in something else. I'll cover how to exploit these vulnerabilities in multiple ways.
Overall this research found multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities across nearly all platforms and new unique ways to deliver the exploits.DEF CON 31 - Breaking BMC The Forgotten Key to the Kingdom - Alex Tereshkin, Adam ZabrockiDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | The Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) is a specialized microcontroller embedded on the motherboard, typically used in servers and other enterprise-level hardware. The security of the BMC is critical to the overall security of the system, as it provides a privileged level of access and control over the hardware components of the system, including the ability to perform firmware updates, and even power the system on and off remotely.
When the internal offensive security research team was analyzing one of the NVIDIA hardware, they detected several remotely exploitable bugs in AMI MegaRAC BMC. Moreover, various elevations of privileges and "change of scope" bugs have been identified, many of which may be chained together resulting in a highest severity security issue. During this talk we would like to take you on the journey of the whole attack sequence: from having zero knowledge about a remote AMI BMC with enabled IPMI (yeah, right) to flashing a persistent firmware implant to the server SPI flash. The chain will be about a dozen bugs long, so buckle up.DEF CON 31 - Contactless Overflow Code Execution in Payment Terminals & ATMs - Josep RodriguezDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | We conducted a research to assess the current security of NFC payment readers that are present in most of the major ATM brands, portable point of sales, gas stations, vending machines, transportation and other kind of point of sales in the US, Europe and worldwide. In particular, we found code execution vulnerabilities exploitable through NFC when handling a special application protocol data unit (APDU) that affect most NFC payment vendors. The vulnerabilities affect baremetal firmware devices and Android/Linux devices as well.
After waiting more than 1 year and a half once we disclosed it to all the affected vendors, we are ready to disclose all the technical details to the public. This research was covered in the media by wired.com but without the technical details that we can share now wired.com/story/atm-hack-nfc-bugs-point-of-sale
In this presentation we will describe the vulnerabilities and also demo how the readers can be compromised, using a special Android app we created, by just tapping an Android phone to the reader. We will discuss the consequences such as financial impact in reader’s users/owners and card data stealing once the firmware is compromised. Also, we will show how to compromise the host that is connected to the reader through USB by manipulating the reader’s firmware, chaining stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the SDK provided by the vendor that is running in the host machine.
Finally, since one of the affected vendors (IDtech) is present in most ATM brands in the world, the talk will cover different scenarios of how possible can be jackpotting ATMs just tapping a smartphone into the reader of the ATM. We have many years of experience jackpotting all brands of ATMs in multiple different ways and we will show how this is technically possible.DEF CON 31 - The Art of Compromising C2 Servers A Web App Vulns Perspective - Vangelis StykasDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | C2 servers of mobile and Windows malware are usually left to their own fate after they have been discovered and the malware is no longer effective. We are going to take a deep dive into the rabbit hole of attacking and owning C2 servers, exposing details about their infrastructure, code bases, and the identity of the companies and individuals that operate and profit from them.
While understanding and reversing malware is a highly skilled procedure, attacking the C2 itself rarely requires a lot of technical skills. Most of the C2 servers have the same typical HTTP problems that can be detected by off-the-shelf vulnerability scanners.
By exploiting low-hanging fruit vulnerabilities, an attacker can obtain unauthorized access to administrative functions, allowing them to command thousands of devices and further explore other attack vectors. This can give them access to administrator panels and malware source code, and result in the identity of threat actors being exposed.DEF CON 31 - Defeating VPN Always On - Maxime ClementzDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | VPN Always-On is a security control that can be deployed to mobile endpoints that remotely access corporate resources through VPN. It is designed to prevent data leaks and narrow attack surface of enrolled end-user equipment connected to untrusted networks. When it is enforced, the mobile device can only reach the VPN gateway and all connections are tunneled.
We will review the relevant Windows API, the practicalities of this feature, look at popular VPN software; we will then consider ridiculously complex exfil methods and... finally bypass it with unexpectedly trivial tricks. We will exploit design, implementation and configuration issues to circumvent this control in offensive scenarios. We will then learn how to fix or harden VPN Always-On deployment to further limit the risks posed by untrusted networks.DEF CON 31 - The GitHub Actions Worm - Asi GreenholtsDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | GitHub is the most popular platform to host Open Source projects therefore, the popularity of their CI/CD platform - GitHub Actions is rising, which makes it an attractive target for attackers.
In this talk I’ll show you how an attacker can take advantage of the Custom GitHub Actions ecosystem by infecting one Action to spread malicious code to other Actions and projects by showing you a demo of POC worm.
We will start by exploring the ways in which Actions are loosely and implicitly dependent on other Actions. This will allow us to create a dependency tree of Actions that starts from a project that we want to attack and hopefully ends in a vulnerable Action that we can take control of.
We will then dive down to how GitHub Actions is working under the hood and I’ll show you how an attacker that is in control of an Action can utilize the mechanism of the GitHub Actions Runner to infect other Actions that are dependent on their Action and eventually infect the targeted project.
Finally, after we’ve gained all of the theoretical knowledge I’ll show you a demo with POC malware that is spreading through Actions and we will talk on how to defend against this kind of attack.DEF CON 31 Car Hacking Village - Abusing CAN Bus Spec for DoS in Embedded Systems - Martin PetranDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | The CAN bus is a traditional communication standard used (not only) in automotive to allow different components to talk to each other over reliable connection. While one of the primary motivators for CAN bus introduction was to reduce the amount of wiring inside vehicles, it became popular for its robustness, flexibility, and ease of implementation for which it is now used in almost every vehicle.As with any other protocol, it is a well-defined standard that enforces all aspects of the communication from the physical media to the message format and its processing. The formal protocol specifications like this are often seen as the source of the absolute truth when working with various transfer protocols. Such specifications are very strict on the format of the messages that belong to the given protocol and thus it is natural that developers that are familiar with it are often relying upon this information when developing their applications.In this talk, we will look at what happens when the attacker decides not to adhere to the protocol specification and uses the available metadata fields within the well-defined message in their own way. Would libraries provided by the device manufacturers handle this situation or is it left to the developer? And could a wrong assumption about the message format lead to a vulnerability?DEF CON 31 - Ringhopper - How We Almost Zero day’d the World - Benny Zeltser, Jonathan LuskyDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | Last year we almost zero-day’d the world with the publication of RingHopper. Now we can finally share some juicy details and invite you for an illuminating journey as we delve into the realm of RingHopper, a method to hop from user-land to SMM.
We will survey the discovery and disclosure of a family of industry-wide vulnerabilities in various UEFI implementations, affecting more than eight major vendors, making billions of devices vulnerable to our attack. Then, we will deep-dive into the innards of SMM exploitation and discuss methods to use and abuse various functionalities and properties of edk2 to gain code execution. We will unveil both our futile and fruitful quests of crafting our way to SMM, and detail both the paths that lead to dead-ends, and the route to success.
We will give a detailed overview of different ways to elevate this kind of attack to user-land both on Windows and Linux by chaining multiple vulnerabilities together.
Finally, we will show RingHopper hopping from user-space to… SMM.DEF CON 31 - There Are No Mushroom Clouds in Cyberwar - Mieke EoyangDEFCONConference2023-09-17 | This presentation will discuss the history of cyberwarfare, highlighting the misconceptions between nuclear deterrence and the nature of cyber conflict. It will shed light on this association in popular culture, including in movies like "WarGames," which influenced then President Ronald Reagan and fed his concerns about potential hacking into U.S. weapons systems. These concerns and other influences helped to shape early perceptions about the cyber domain, which immediately became intertwined with notions of strategic weapons and catastrophic effects. In subsequent decades, continued theorizing about cyberwarfare envisioned strategic cyber attacks that could cause decisive effects, stoking fears of a "Cyber Pearl Harbor." However, the reality is that cyber operations are ephemeral and cyber effects are hard to attribute and are rarely decisive. The turning point in U.S. cyber strategy occurred in lead up to the 2018 midterm election, with the adoption of a new approach focused on defending forward, which involved actively disrupting malicious cyber activity before it affected the U.S. Homeland. This strategy was further informed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which demonstrated how cyber capabilities may be used in large-scale conventional conflict. Looking ahead, in terms of protecting Americans and strengthening our global Allies and partners, we know that private industry and individual volunteers will play a critical role, including many of the participants at DEF CON. This recognition acknowledges that cyberwarfare is pervasive and requires collective engagement.DEF CON 31 XR Village - Push All the Buttons Digital Twinning w Idaho National Labs - Kolton HeapsDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Extended Reality (XR) is an umbrella term that involves virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), and mixed reality (MR) capabilities. VR describes an environment in which a user’s physical environment is completely replaced with a virtual one. This allows the user to view any digitally created content but separates the user from interacting with the physical world. On the other hand, AR enhances the user’s physical environment with virtual overlays but offers little interaction with digital content. Lastly, MR is a blend of the physical and digital worlds, unlocking natural and intuitive 3D human, computer, and environmental interactions. Using these technologies, analysts, operators, and stakeholders will be able to interpret radio frequency data effectively and efficiently.
The Idaho National Laboratory is integrating the next-generation XR capabilities into the various projects that support Nuclear, Integrated Energy and National and Homeland Security missions. They use a suite of tools for the visualization of capabilities to capture and analyze digital twins. Digital Engineering delivers semi-autonomous design, autonomous operation, and real-time anomaly detection as well as integrates threads of data, visualizations, AI/ML, and physics models into a cohesive digital twin.
The primary benefit of incorporating XR with signal analysis is to allow for simple interpretation and representation of complex data. Current techniques or trends rely on certain subject matter experts to collect, examine, and report anomalous data manually. By allowing the operator to spatially view the captured data, the process of identifying and plotting data is anticipated to be greatly simplified. Data and anomalies will become engaging, allowing the operator to easily identify unknown signals in real-time or near real-time.DEF CON 31 - Closing Ceremonies & Awards - The Dark Tangent, DEF CON Senior StaffDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | DEF CON 31 Closing CeremoniesDEF CON 31 - Fantastic Ethertypes and Where to Find Them - Ricky LawshaeDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Beneath the mundane world of TCP/IP exists the magical and mysterious realm of ethernet. There are many different types of ethernet protocols in use today, known as ‘ethertypes’, that run the gamut from the boutique to the ubiquitous. In this talk, we will delve into some of the more interesting and obscure ethertypes that exist. We will discuss the network protocols themselves, where they can be found in the wild, what you can do with them, and how they could be abused in the wrong hands. We will explore wide-ranges of networking environments including industrial/facilities, transportation, and medical, and will include several live demos. Attendees will leave this talk with a greater understanding and appreciation for the unseen networking world that exists all around them.DEF CON 31 - #NoFilter Abusing Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation - Ron Ben YizhakDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Privilege escalation is a common attack vector in the Windows OS.
Today, there are multiple offensive tools in the wild that can execute code as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM” (Meterpreter, CobaltStrike, Potato tools), and they all usually do so by duplicating tokens and manipulating services in some way or another. This talk will show an evasive and undetected privilege escalation technique that abuses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). This platform processes network traffic and allow configuring filters that permit or block communication.
It is built-in component of the operating system since Windows Vista, and doesn’t require an installation. My research started from reverse-engineering a single RPC method in an OS service and ended with several techniques to abuse a system kernel component, that allow executing programs as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”, as well as other users that are logged on the the machine without triggering any traditional detection algorithms.
The various components of the Windows Filtering Platform will be analyzed, such as the Basic Filtering Engine, the TCPIP driver and the IPSec protocol, while focusing on how to abuse them and extract valuable data from them.DEF CON 31 - Clocks Have Ears - Timing/ Browser Based Local Network Port Scanner - Dongsung KimDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | ...DEF CON 31 - A SSLippery Slope - Unraveling Hidden Dangers of Certificate Misuse - Bill DemirkapiDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Digital signatures are fundamental for verifying the authenticity and integrity of untrusted data in the digital world. They ensure that software, firmware, and other digital content are not tampered with during transmission or at rest. Code signing certificates are significantly more challenging to obtain when compared to alternatives like SSL or S/MIME certificates. The latter only has a single criterion- proof of control over a domain, while the former requires significant validation of the publisher itself.
This project uncovered a systemic vulnerability present in numerous signature validation implementations, enabling attackers to exploit valid certificates in an unintended manner. Vulnerable implementations mistakenly perceive files signed with incompatible certificates as legitimate, violating their respective specifications and allowing threat actors to sign untrusted code at little to no cost. In this talk, we will explore the problem at all levels, ranging from the fundamental theory to its application across multiple formats and real-world situations.DEF CON 31 - Contest Closing Ceremonies & Awards - Contest GoonsDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | DEF CON 31 Contest Closing Ceremonies and AwardsDEF CON 31 - Azure B2C 0Day - An Exploit Chain from Public Keys to Microsoft Bug Bounty - John NovakDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | This presentation will cover a complete exploit chain in Azure B2C, starting with a discovery of cryptographic misuse and leading to full account compromise in any tenant as an unauthenticated attacker.
Portions of this vulnerability have been released publicly, but several pieces were omitted to provide Microsoft time to remediate the issue and not put Azure B2C environments at unnecessary risk. New details in this talk include steps to reverse engineer and discover the crypto vulnerability along with details of a novel attack for crypto key recovery.
For background, Microsoft Azure B2C is an identity and access management service for customer-facing apps. Thousands of organizations use this service, including national/state/local governments, professional societies, and commercial companies. The service is also used in the public Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) web portal as the main method for researchers to disclose vulnerabilities as part of Microsoft's bug bounty programs. The full exploit chain was effective against the MSRC and would have allowed an attacker to enumerate details of disclosed but not-yet-patched Microsoft zero day vulnerabilities.DEF CON 31 Packet Hacking Village - Death by 1000 Likes - Will KayDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | As lonely Aussies attending our first Defcon last year, we were frequently drawn to the hilarity/uniquness of the Wall of Sheep board. One of our group suggested people leaking at the con was super entertaining, but what about throughout the rest of the year? We decided to use the time between DC30 and DC31 scraping the r/defcon subreddit to create the Wall of Sheep - online edition.DEF CON 31 - Defender Pretender When Windows Defender Updates Become a Security Risk -Bar, AttiasDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | The signature update process is critical to EDR's effectiveness against emerging threats. The security update process must be highly secured, as demonstrated by the Flame malware attack that leveraged a rogue certificate for lateral movement. Nation-state capabilities are typically required for such an attack, given that signature update files are digitally signed by Microsoft.
We wondered if we could achieve similar capabilities running as an unprivileged user without possessing a rough certificate, instead we aimed to turn the original Windows Defender process to our full control.
In this talk we will deep dive into Windows Defender architecture, the signature database format and the update process, with a focus on the security verification logic. We will explain how an attacker can completely compromise any Windows agent or server, including those used by enterprises, by exploiting a powerful 0day vulnerability that even we didn't expect to discover.
We will demonstrate Defender-Pretender, a tool we developed to achieve neutralization of the EDR. allowing any already known malicious code to run Fully Un-Detected. It can also force Defender to delete admin’s data. OS and driver files, resulting in an unrecoverable OS. We will also explain how an attacker can alter Defender's detection and mitigation logic.DEF CON 31 - Civil Cyber Defense - Tiffany Rad and Austin ShamlinDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Civil Cyber Defense volunteers and students challenge high-risk adversaries and threats such as human traffickers, authoritarian regimes, and surveillance being conducted on journalists. By utilizing academic resources, OSINT skills, and free/open-source tools, civil cyber defenders are supporting vulnerable non-profits, protecting volunteers, journalists, and activists while defending human rights. There is a need in the cybersecurity industry for more civil cyber defenders. Recommendations will be made as to how your organization can support and/or volunteer your time and tools to provide protection to vulnerable organizations who have high risks, face advanced and persistent adversaries, but have modest resources.
REFERENCES: The content we will present was generated by the speakers. Tiffany will present anonymized case studies from the “Citizen Clinic” at UC Berkeley and Austin will share case studies his organization has generated regarding human trafficking. Our only bibliographic reference at this moment is a reference to open source/free software tools we use at UC Berkeley. We will also reference a tool to make VPNs safer created by Berkeley’s students called “Ghost Prtcl.”DEF CON 31 - Using SIM Tunneling to Travel at Light Speed - Adrian Dabrowski, Gabriel GegenhuberDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Cellular networks form large complex compounds for roaming purposes. Thus, geographically-spread testbeds for masurements and rapid exploit verification are needed to do justice to the technology's unique structure and global scope. Additionally, such measurements suffer from a combinatorial explosion of operators, mobile plans, and services. To cope with these challenges, we are releasing an open-source framework that geographically decouples the SIM (subscription) from the cellular modem by selectively connecting both remotely. This allows testing any subscriber with any operator at any modem location within seconds without moving parts. The resulting measurement and testbed platform "MobileAtlas" offers a scalable, controlled experimentation environment. It is fully open-sourced and allows other researchers to contribute locations, SIM cards, and measurement scripts.
Using the above framework, our international experiments in commercial networks revealed exploitable inconsistencies in traffic metering, leading to multiple data "phreaking" opportunities ("free-ride"). We also expose problematic IPv6 firewall configurations, hidden SIM card communication to the home network, and fingerprint dial progress tones to track victims across different roaming networks and countries with voice calls.DEF CON 31 - Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security - Alejandro MayorkasDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | The Secretary of US Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, joins DEF CON for a fireside chat. Secretary Mayorkas will lay some foundational groundwork on some of DHS' priorities in cybersecurity and how they address pressing IS and global issues, then sit down to talk with The Dark Tangent, in a casual conversation with thousands of their closest hacker friends.DEF CON 31 - Apples Predicament - NSPredicate Exploitation on macOS and iOS - Austin EmmittDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | In 2021 the FORCEDENTRY sandbox escape introduced the usage of NSPredicate in an iOS exploit. This new technique allowed attackers to sidestep codesigning, ASLR, and all other mitigations to execute arbitrary code on Apple devices. As a result, Apple put in place new restrictions to make NSPredicate less powerful and less useful for exploits. This presentation will cover new research showing that these added restrictions could be completely circumvented in iOS 16, and how NSPredicates could be exploited to gain code execution in many privileged iOS processes. This technical deep dive will be a rare instance of iOS security that anyone can comprehend without years of experience.
After an overview of the classes involved, we will explore the full syntax of NSPredicate and cover how it can be used to script the Objective-C runtime and even call any C function. It will be shown that PAC can still be bypassed 100% reliably with NSPredicates in order to execute any function with arbitrary arguments. A new tool will be unveiled to help craft complex NSPredicates to execute arbitrary code and inject those predicates in any application. Additionally, a demonstration will be given which executes arbitrary code in the highly privileged Preferences app.
Finally, the talk will cover a bypass of NSPredicateVisitor implementations which allows a malicious process to evaluate any NSPredicate within several system processes including coreduetd, appstored, OSLogService, and SpringBoard. Next there will be a live demo of exploiting SpringBoard to steal a user’s notifications and location data. The presentation will end with some discussion about what can still be done with NSPredicates now that these issues have been fixed, including bypassing App Store Review, and what app developers should know to keep their own apps safe.DEF CON 31 - Review on the Less Traveled Road - 9 Yrs of Overlooked MikroTik PreAuth RCE - NiNi ChenDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | MikroTik, as a supplier of network infrastructures, its products and RouterOS are adopted widely. Currently, at least 3 million+ devices are running RouterOS online. Being the target research by attackers actively, the exploits leaked from the CIA in 2018 and the massive exploits that followed are samples of the havoc that can be caused when such devices are maliciously exploited again. Therefore, RouterOS also attracts many researchers to hunt bugs in it. However, there are rarely high-impact vulnerabilities reported over a long period. Can the OS become perfect overnight? Of course not. Some details have been missed.
Researches on RouterOS were mainly against jailbreak, Nova Message in IPC, and analysis of exploits in the wild. Especially researches against Nova Message have reported tons of post-auth vulnerabilities. However, the architecture design and the lower-layer objects, which are closely related to the functionality of Nova Binary, were being neglected due to their complexity, causing some details to be overlooked for a long time. Starting by introducing the mechanisms of the socket callback and the remote object, we will disclose more about the overlooked attack surface and implementations in RouterOS. Moreover, we will discuss how we, at the end of rarely visited trails, found the pre-auth RCE that existed for nine years and can exploit all active versions and the race condition in the remote object. We will also share our methodology and vulnerability patterns.
Delving into the design of the RouterOS, attendees will have a greater understanding of the overlooked attack surface and implementation of it and be able to review the system more reliably. Additionally, we will also share our open-source tools and methodology to facilitate researchers researching RouterOS, making it less obscure. , Ting-Yu Chen, aka NiNi, is a security researcher at DEVCORE and a member of the Balsn CTF team. He won the title of the "Master of Pwn" at Pwn2Own Toronto 2022 with the DEVCORE team. NiNi has also made notable achievements in CTF competitions, including placing 2nd and 3rd in DEF CON CTF 27 and 28 as a member of HITCON⚔BFKinesiS and HITCON⚔Balsn teams, respectively. NiNi is currently immersed in vulnerability research and reverse engineering, continuing to hone his skills. You can keep up with his latest discoveries and musings on Twitter via his handle @terrynini38514 or blog at http://blog.terrynini.tw/.DEF CON 31 - ELECTRONizing MacOS Privacy - A New Weapon in Your Red Teaming Armory - Wojciech RegułaDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | MacOS is known for an additional layer of privacy controls called TCC - Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) that restricts access to sensitive personal resources: documents, camera, microphone, emails, and more. Granting such access requires authorization, and the mechanism's main design concern was clear user consent.
Despite many vulnerabilities in that mechanism found in the past, using 0-days during red teaming engagements is impractical. Apple fixes TCC vulnerabilities but red teams still have to get access to files saved on the victim’s desktop or be able take a screenshot.
What if I tell you that there are many open doors to resolve all the TCC problems that are already installed on your target machines?! Electron apps are everywhere. And you probably heard the joke that: ‘S’ in Electron stands for security.
In this talk I will share a new tool that, by abusing Electron default configuration, allows executing code in the context of those Electron apps and thus inherit their TCC permissions.
The audience will leave with a solid understanding of the macOS privacy restrictions framework (TCC) and its weaknesses. The part of the audience interested in macOS red teaming will also get to know my new, free and open source tool. Blue teams on the stage will also see some ideas regarding detections.DEF CON 31 - Making The DEF CON 31 Badge Mar WilliamsDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Badge Designer Mar Williams explains the inspiration, process and challenges of creating the DEF CON 31 Badge.DEF CON 31 XR VIllage - Augmented Reality and Implications on Mobile Security - Whitney PhillipsDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | A discussion of the privacy and security implications of Augmented Reality, especially in the context of Mobile Security.DEF CON 31 - Backdoor in the Core - Altering Intel x86 Instruction Set at Runtime - Krog, SkovsendeDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | In this work, we present the novel results of our research on Intel CPU microcode. Building upon prior research on Intel Goldmont CPUs, we have reverse-engineered the implementations of complex x86 instructions, leading to the discovery of hidden microcode which serves to prevent the persistence of any changes made. Using this knowledge, we were able to patch those discovered sections, allowing us to make persistent microcode changes from userspace on Linux. We have developed and improved microcode tracing tools, giving us deeper insight into Intel Atom microcode than was previously possible, by allowing more dynamic analysis of the ROM.
Along with this presentation, we provide a C library for making microcode changes and documentation on the reverse-engineered microcode.
We show that vendor updates to the microcode, which cannot be verified by the user, impose a security risk by demonstrating how a Linux system can be compromised through a backdoor within a CPU core's microcode.DEF CON 31 - Welcome to DEF CON 31 - The Dark TangentDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | DEF CON Founder The Dark Tangent kicks off DEF CON 31!DEF CON 31 - Exploiting OPC UA - Practical Attacks Against OPC UA Architectures - Moshe, BrizinovDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | OPC-UA is the most popular protocol today in ICS/SCADA and IoT environments for data exchanges from sensors to on-premises or cloud applications. OPC-UA is therefore the bridge between different OT trust zones and a crown jewel for attacks attempting to break security zones and crossover from the industrial to corporate networks.
We have been researching during the past two years dozens of OPC-UA protocol stack implementations being used in millions of industrial products. We focused on two main attack vectors: attacking OPC-UA servers and protocol gateways, and attacking OPC-UA clients. The research yielded unique attack techniques that targeted specific OPC-UA protocol specification pitfalls that enabled us to create a wide range of vulns ranging from denial of service to remote code execution.
For example, we explored OPC-UA features such as method call processing, chunking mechanisms, certification handling, complex variant structures, monitored items, race-conditions, and many more. For each part of the specification, we tried to understand its caveats and exploit them to achieve RCE, information leaks, or denial of service attacks.
In this talk, we will share our journey, methods, and release an open-source framework with all of our techniques and vulnerabilities to exploit modern OPC-UA protocol stacks. , Noam Moshe is a vulnerability researcher at Claroty Team82. Noam specializes in vulnerability research, web applications pentesting, malware analysis, network forensics and ICS/SCADA security. In addition, Noam presented in well-known Hacking conferences like Blackhat Europe, as well as won Master of Pwn at Pwn2Own Miami 2023.DEF CON 31 - Assessing Security of Certificates at Scale - David McGrew, Brandon Enright, Andrew ChiDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | The security of digital certificates is too often undermined by the use of poor entropy sources in key generation. Flawed entropy can be hard to discover, especially when analyzing individual devices. However, some flaws can be detected when a large set of keys from the same entropy source are analyzed, as was dramatically demonstrated in 2012 and 2016 by the detection of weak HTTPS keys on the Internet.
In this talk, we present tools and techniques to identify weak keys at scale, by checking issued certificates obtained from passive monitoring, active network scans, or certificate authority logs. Our tools use efficient multithreaded implementations of network monitors, scanners, certificate parsers, and mathematical tests. The batch greatest common divisor test (BGCD) identifies RSA public keys with common factors, and outputs the corresponding private keys. The common key test identifies distinct devices that share identical keys. We report on findings from both tests and demonstrate how to audit HTTPS servers, run BGCD on 100M+ keys, identify RSA keys with common factors, and generate the corresponding private keys. Because nothing convinces like an attack, we show how to produce and use PEM files for factored keys.DEF CON 31 - A Pain in the NAS Exploiting Cloud Connectivity to PWN your NAS - Moshe, BrizinovDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Have you ever wondered how you can access your family pictures on your home network-attached storage (NAS) device remotely from your mobile? Do you know how this magic works? At Pwn2Own Toronto 2022, we chained multiple bugs to exploit both Synology and Western Digital NAS devices by abusing vulnerabilities in the device, cloud and the mutual trust between them.
In our research, we reviewed the pairing mechanism of NAS devices with the WD and Synology cloud platforms. To our surprise we discovered that devices authenticate to the cloud using a hardware identifier which is later used by users to remotely access their devices. Using this, we were able to impersonate any given NAS device and perform phishing attacks that yielded us admin rights on any targeted WD or Synology device.
In this talk, we will explain the pairing process of WD and Synology NAS. We will elaborate on the overall architecture of their cloud offering and focus on the vulnerabilities we found including ways to enumerate and impersonate all edge devices using certificate transparency log (CTL), and steal cloud proxy auth tokens. This enabled us to download every file saved on the NAS devices, alter or encrypt them, and bypass NAT/Firewall protection to achieve full remote code execution on all cloud-connected NAS (and to gain $$$ from Pwn2Own).DEF CON 31 - Exploring Linux Memory Manipulation for Stealth and Evasion - Polop, GutierrezDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | As cyber threats continue to evolve, attackers constantly develop new methods for exploiting system vulnerabilities and evading detection. In this presentation, we will delve into cutting-edge techniques for manipulating Linux memory in highly constrained environments, such as read-only, no-exec, and distroless setups. These techniques can be utilized by sophisticated malware to remain stealthy and evade traditional security mechanisms.
We will begin by providing an overview of the unique challenges faced in these limited environments and discuss the reasons behind their increasing prevalence. Next, we will explore how attackers can exploit vulnerabilities within these constraints and demonstrate several novel methods for manipulating Linux memory.
Throughout the presentation, we will showcase real-world examples and provide step-by-step explanations for each technique, enabling attendees to gain a deeper understanding of how they can be employed by adversaries. Additionally, we will discuss potential countermeasures and mitigation strategies to help security professionals better defend against these emerging threats.
By attending this presentation, participants will gain valuable insights into the latest advancements in Linux memory manipulation and acquire the knowledge needed to anticipate and counter stealthy attacks in constrained environments. Whether you are a security researcher, a system administrator, or an ethical hacker, this session will equip you with the expertise necessary to stay ahead of the curve in the ever-evolving world of cybersecurity.DEF CON 31 - An Audacious Plan to Halt the Internets Enshittification - Cory DoctorowDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | The enshittification of the internet follows a predictable trajectory: first, platforms are good to their users; then they abuse their users to make things better for their business customers; finally, they abuse those business customers to claw back all the value for themselves. Then, they die.
It doesn't have to be this way. Enshittification occurs when companies gobble each other up in an orgy of mergers and acquisitions, reducing the internet to "five giant websites filled with screenshots of text from the other four" (credit to Tom Eastman!), which lets them endlessly tweak their back-ends to continue to shift value from users and business-customers to themselves. The government gets in on the act by banning tweaking by users - reverse-engineering, scraping, bots and other user-side self-help measures - leaving users helpless before the march of enshittification.
We don't have to accept this! Disenshittifying the internet will require antitrust, limits on corporate tweaking - through privacy laws and other protections - and aggressive self-help measures from alternative app stores to ad blockers and beyond!DEF CON 31 - Defending KA-SAT - Mark Colaluca and Nick SaundersDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | In February 2022, the Viasat owned KA-SAT network experienced a significant cyberattack that resulted in a partial outage of services for thousands of users in Ukraine and tens of thousands of users in other parts of Europe. This presentation will provide detailed background on the attack, which involved the deployment of malware against terminals on the network, as well as several distinct network-based attacks that appeared focused on further denying connectivity to KA-SAT users. These network-based attacks needed to be characterized and responded to by Viasat’s operational teams in real-time, and the attacks continued with intensity for many weeks after the original malware incident.
Viasat will share the story of how it responded and performed a rapid forensic on several impacted terminals to determine within 36 hours that the terminal flash memory had been overwritten with a distinctive pattern in the attack. This presentation will explain details around the forensic analysis as well as the process of reverse engineering the malicious toolkit to verify it would produce the observed flash memory effects. Viasat will also share technical details of over-the-air network attacks that were used to attack the KA-SAT network.DEF CON 31 - All information looks like noise until you break the code - Pekoske, Lyngaas, EasterlyDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Just like there's more than one way to peel a banana, there’s more than one way to protect a computer network from being pwned. Cyber threats against America’s pipelines, railroads and aviation system are increasing, and the Transportation Security Administration – with support from the White House, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Congress – is hacking traditional cybersecurity policy to improve resiliency for the growing connected transportation sector. How? TSA isn’t telling regulated parties exactly the ways they should secure their own systems. Instead, the agency is asking them to produce and provide plans for ensuring they protect their critical assets.
America’s adversaries are sophisticated, and TSA needs help from the hacking community to think creatively about future attacks, to identify new vulnerabilities, and to provide innovative new ways of measuring success. This talk will tell you what TSA is seeing, gives you a chance to offer us advice, and to learn specific ways in which you can contribute to new projects. Because always in motion the future is.DEF CON 31 - Calling it a 0 Day - Hacking at PBX UC Systems - good pseudonymDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | PBX (Private Branch Exchange) and UC (Unified Communications) servers are the big communication brokers in enterprise environments where they love on-prem. They do everything to enable internal and external communications including voice, video, conferencing and messaging. But a broader scope also means a broader attack surface.
In this talk, we'll give an overview PBX/UC systems, what kind of attack surface they have, as well as several bugs that we recently found in two popular PBX/UC products. The journey includes deep-diving Java's Runtime.exec(), decrypting encrypted PHP, bypassing license restrictions, pretending to be a phone, and (of course) getting some shells.DEF CON 31 - certmitm Automatic Exploitation of TLS Certificate Validation Vulns - Aapo OksmanDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | TLS is the de facto way of securing network connections. It provides an easy way of ensuring confidentiality, integrity and authentication for any type of communication. However, like most things in life, this is also too good to be true.
TLS allows communicating parties to uniquely authenticate each other by validating each other's certificate. However, many TLS libraries and frameworks have insecure default settings or allow for the developers to skip important aspects of certificate validation in their client implementations.
This talk explores issues in TLS client certificate validation and the underlying reasons why developers still fail to implement TLS correctly. Most importantly, we hack all the things with a new TLS mitm tool: certmitm.
certmitm automatically discovers and exploits insecure certificate validation vulnerabilities in TLS clients. Let's use the tool to hack iOS, Windows 11 and more while we deep dive into the world of insecure TLS certificate validation.DEF CON 31 - Advanced ROP Framework Pushing ROP to Its Limits - Brizendine, KusumaDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | This research provides innovative contributions to return-oriented programming (ROP), not seen before. We introduce ROP ROCKET, a cutting-edge ROP framework, to be released at DEF CON. With ROCKET, when attacking 32-bit applications, we can switch between x86 and x64 at will, by invoking a special ROP Heaven's Gate technique, thereby expanding the attack surface. We will discuss the ramifications of this novel approach.
Bypassing DEP via ROP is typically straightforward, using WinAPIs such as VirualProtect and VirtualAlloc. We demonstrate an alternative: using Windows syscalls. In fact, ROCKET provides automatic ROP chain construction to bypass ROP using Windows syscalls. While extremely trendy, Windows syscalls are only very rarely used in ROP.
One problem with automatic chain construction is bad chars or bad bytes. We demonstrate how ROCKET allows us to use virtulally any gadget whose address contains bad bytes. With this approach, automatic ROP chain construction is far less likely to fail. Thus, we overcome one of the major obstacles when creating a ROP chain: bad bytes, which reduces the attack surface needlessly. In fact, if one wanted, they could use ROCKET to "obfuscate" any gadget, obscuring what is being done.
This presentation will do the seemingly impossible - and surprise even veteran users of ROP.DEF CON 31 - DC101 Welcome to DEF CON - PanelDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | DEF CON 101 began as a way to introduce n00bs to DEF CON. The idea was to help attendees get the best experience out of DEF CON (and also tell them how to survive the weekend!). The DEF CON 101 panel has been a way for people who have participated in making DEF CON what it is today to share those experiences and, hopefully, inspire attendees to expand their horizons. DEF CON offers so much more than just talks and the DEF CON 101 panel is the perfect place to learn about DEF CON so you can get the best experience possible. Come watch us talk about what we love about DEF CON, give you tips and tricks, and maybe even make some new friends!DEF CON 31 - Badge of Shame Breaking into Secure Facilities with OSDP -Dan Petro, David VargasDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | Breaking into secure facilities used to be possible by inserting a listening device (such as an ESPKey) behind an RFID card reader and sniffing the unencrypted Wiegand badge numbers over the wire as they go to the backend controller. The physical security industry has taken notice and there's a new sheriff in town: The encrypted protocol OSDP which is starting to be rolled into production. Surely encryption will solve our problems and prevent MitM attacks right? ... right?
In this presentation, we'll demonstrate over a dozen vulnerabilities, concerning problems, and general "WTF"s in the OSDP protocol that let it be subverted, coerced, and totally bypassed. This ranges from deeply in-the-weeds clever cryptographic attacks, to boneheaded mistakes that undermine the whole thing. We will also demonstrate a practical pentesting tool that can be inserted behind an RFID badge reader to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Get your orange vest and carry a ladder, because we're going onsite!DEF CON 31 - Attacking And Securing the Pixel Modem - Karimi, Xing , Gong, RodionovDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | To ensure Google Pixel devices are always at their most secure, the Android Red Team continuously attacks the riskiest areas of the phone. This allows us to proactively get ahead of bugs and protect the phone, before it’s even shipped to users.
The modem — or baseband — is considered a fundamental component of smartphones, and is at high risk because it is a privileged system component that accepts data from an untrusted remote source (cell towers). A vulnerability in the modem exposes end-users to scalable attacks carried out remotely, which may lead to many kinds of compromise on a phone.
Modem security is currently a hot topic of research, attracting growing interest from security researchers, both in the industry and in academia. This wasn’t the case up until recently for a couple of reasons: most modem code is closed source, and testing it requires expensive hardware equipment. With some of these barriers being removed in recent years, due the invention of software-defined radio (SDR) devices and public toolkits, the entry level into baseband security analysis has become more affordable. In this session the Android Red Team will be describing some findings from its offensive evaluation of modems used in Pixel devices.DEF CON 31 Policy - Beyond the Breach Cyber Policy + Hacker Perspectives - PanelDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | The field of cybersecurity policy is constantly evolving, and as such, the need to think innovatively and critically about policy solutions to address new and emerging threats. “Beyond the Breach: Exploring Cybersecurity Policies with Hacker Perspectives” is a panel that will bring together experts to explore the role of cybersecurity policy hackers in responding to cyber policy challenges that governments and organizations face in this rapidly evolving landscape. The discussion will delve into ongoing processes of elaborating global, regional, and local cyber policies that engage the hacker community. Globally, those discussed in the ICRC Delegation for Cyberspace; regionally, in OAS member states in the Americas; and locally, those in the public and private organizations, such as Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in Latin America. Additionally, it will explore initiatives to create platforms for hackers’ participation and encourage innovation in cybersecurity policymaking. Furthermore, the panel will also discuss the role of cybersecurity policy hackers in the ongoing evolving landscape of digital investigations and the associated challenges across different regions.DEF CON 31 - Route to bugs - Analyzing the Security of BGP Message Parsing - dos Santos, GuiotDEFCONConference2023-09-15 | This talk discusses an overlooked aspect of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security: vulnerabilities in how its implementations parse BGP messages. Software implementing BGP is relied upon for Internet routing and for functions such as internal routing in large data centers. A lot of (deserved) attention is given to aspects of BGP protocol security discussed in RFC4272, which can be mitigated with the use of RPKI and BGPsec. However, recent BGP incidents show that it might take only a malformed packet to cause a large disruption. We will present a quantitative analysis of previous vulnerabilities in both open and closed-source popular BGP implementations and focus the talk on a new analysis of seven modern implementations.