Perun
End of the Tank? - ATGMs and shoulder fired anti-tank weapons in Ukraine
updated
Attrition is intrinsically linked to war, as men and equipment are ground down by the effort and by enemy action. In this episode we look at loss estimates, discuss the challenges of attrition, and update on the efforts of both sides to make up losses and generate new offensive potential.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats/Corrections:
At one point I make a reference to 'combat deaths' when i mean military deaths (hard to have non-combat-combat casualties) I also refer to pilots flying hundreds of hours per year, I meant per month in that example.
I also incorrectly conflate Desert Storm and Shield - There are a number of other small errors of that type
Rebuttal of statements/estimates advanced by others are general in nature and should be taken as merely my personal opinion on the matter
I would also take my usual warning about data quality and limitations and multiply it as far as it will go on this one - attrition is hard to externally assess and, as noted, the data is tightly controlled and highly politically charged
Sources/Reading:
Credits to Oryx and Wartranslated as always
Indian Standing Committee on Defence - March 2023
https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/lsscommittee/Defence/17_Defence_36.pdf
UA repair figures
ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3686694-ukroboronprom-has-repaired-more-than-3000-armored-vehicles-in-combat-areas.html
RUSI - the air war in Ukraine
static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf
GAO/NSIAD-91-304 (Costs of Desert Storm/Shield)
gao.gov/assets/nsiad-91-304.pdf
Testimony in response to Desert Storm/Shield cost projections
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1176252.pdf
RU 400,000 contractors
businessinsider.com/russia-recruiting-contract-soldiers-april-reports-2023-3
tass.com/defense/1048138
3:1 Rule
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA302819.pdf
Loss estimates
csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition
https://zona.media/casualties
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-23/russia-180000-dead-wounded-soldiers-ukraine-conflict-norway/101883272
washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/13/ukraine-casualties-pessimism-ammunition-shortage
ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3626014-presidents-office-says-ukrainian-army-lost-up-to-13000-soldiers-since-war-started.html
https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/21/russian-defence-minister-shoigu-5937-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-news
UA Offensive Guard
kyivpost.com/post/12095
UA troops train on Leo2
euronews.com/2023/02/14/ukrainian-troops-train-on-leopard-2-tanks-in-poland#:~:text=Ahead%20of%20a%20highly%20anticipated,to%20be%20sent%20to%20Ukraine.
GAO/NSIAD-92-20 Operation Desert Storm
gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-20.pdf
NSIAD-92-94 Abrams performance in Desert storm
gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf
Wagners's odd recruitment choices
rt.com/russia/573045-wagner-pornhub-recruitment-ad
Russia HIMARs claims in media:
aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/22/russia-says-it-shot-down-4-himars-launchers-in-ukraine
TASS on t-54/55
tass.com/pressreview/1593845
Ukrainians repairing Russian vehicles
rferl.org/a/ukrainian-mechanics-refurbish-captured-russian-tanks/32280903.html
EU training efforts:
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-eu-wants-to-train-30-000-ukrainian-soldiers-mass-media/
WW1 casualties per Library of Congress
loc.gov/collections/world-war-i-rotogravures/articles-and-essays/events-and-statistics/mobilized-strength-and-casualty-losses
CIT on T-54/55
notes.citeam.org/t-54?s=1
Selected loss graphs from leedrake5
github.com/leedrake5/Russia-Ukraine
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Attrition & the winter war in Ukraine
00:01:05 -- WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?
00:02:09 -- CASUALTIES & ATTRITION
00:04:22 -- the real drivers of losses
00:06:59 -- historical deviation or return to mean?
00:08:10 -- ESTIMATING CASUALTIES
00:11:40 -- mixed methods
00:15:01 -- illustrating the point: Russian estimates
00:19:54 -- THE COST OF THE WINTER FIGHTING
00:23:17 -- UKRAINIAN ACTIONS & RESPONSES
00:27:23 -- RUSSIAN ACTIONS & RESPONSE
00:33:13 -- OBSERVATIONS & ENDURANCE
00:37:57 -- EQUIPMENT LOSSES
00:38:05 -- combat loss claims
00:42:14 -- visually confirmed loss data
00:43:34 -- what it shows?
00:45:29 -- DEPRECIATION & CONSUMPTION
00:45:39 -- attrition is more than just combat losses
00:48:50 -- scale drives consumption
00:54:04 -- the capacity & readiness problem
00:57:33 -- Indian evidence?
00:58:40 -- DEALING WITH THE EQUIPMENT CHALLENGE
00:58:47 -- the Russian approach & the T-54 thing
01:03:19 -- Ukraine's foreign lifelines and trophy systems
01:07:47 -- estimating endurance
01:08:39 -- CONCLUSIONS
01:09:58 -- CHANNEL UPDATE
The Russian invasion of 2022 began with a multi-pronged winter invasion of Ukrainian territory. After a series of reverses in late 2022, the Russian effort to reclaim the initiative in Ukraine seems to have begun...with another multi-pronged winter offensive.
In this episode, I look at the way that offensive has played out, what observations and lessons might come out of the last three months, and what that may mean for the war to come.
Also we're going to talk about the shovels story, because we have to do better than that.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Corrections:
As a video covering military matters - be aware that the fog of war is much thicker on this issue that it is with things like economics and finance.
As such - I'd advise attaching a responsible level of certainty to any of the ideas put forward here. For example, the use of artillery deployed mines at Vuhledar is widely reported - but has not been confirmed by any on-the-ground figures.
I also want to point out that when I talk about the Ukrainian military being opened to lessons learned - that's a relative statement (with the point of comparison being Russia). It's also true that all militaries need to put in place systems of discipline and due process, so it's important to take published commentary, complaints and theorising into context - understand that it's not all that's being said, it's just the sample that makes it into the public sphere.
Sources & Reading:
Vuhledar Satelite Imagery:
twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1621815960075116544
Strelkov on the offensive:
twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1633410034951438339
wartranslated.com/i-girking-frontline-update-on-19-february
Khodakovsky on ammo and Vuhledar:
twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1628354732053131265
Muradov Promotion
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1627545013386084352?lang=en
Kyiv independent on Bakhmut:
kyivindependent.com/national/ukrainian-soldiers-in-bakhmut-our-troops-are-not-being-protected
kyivindependent.com/national/bakhmut-bound-infantry-assault-troops-we-are-holding-on-ready-for-any-scenario
Comentary on RU Assault unit tactics:
twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1630089568195313669
twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502
(Tatrigami's channel is generally worth looking at twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA)
Commentary on potential lessons learned in the UA Army:
By Lieutenant Colonel Glen Grant
twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1636589579183575040
Visually confirmed loss data and graphics:
Oryx:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
War Mapper:
twitter.com/War_Mapper?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
Warspotting:
ukr.warspotting.net
Jomini of the West
twitter.com/JominiW
Mapping per deepstatemap:
https://deepstatemap.live/en#13/47.7566/37.2158
Credit as always to Dimitri at Wartranslated
twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1637130923027095556
How the ebattle for the Donbas shaped Ukraine's success
fpri.org/article/2022/12/how-the-battle-for-the-donbas-shaped-ukraines-success
Casualties of 14th Spetznaz Colonel Sergey Polyakov
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1622340987350564866
Kofman on the winter offensive:
twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1627309427907854336
Shoigu visit to Muradov:
twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1632063279664181249
Russian official commenting on Bakhmut
reuters.com/world/europe/no-signs-ukraine-is-withdrawing-troops-bakhmut-russian-installed-official-2023-03-16
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — INTRO
00:00:57 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:01:59 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
00:03:02 — BEFORE THE WINTER
00:04:12 — The Surovikin Strategy?
00:05:52 — Pressure Applied & Received
00:07:28 — The New(old) Boss
00:08:20 — Ukraine Secedes The Initiative
00:08:55 — WINTER OFFENSIVE
00:11:08 — OVERVIEW OF THE OFFENSIVE
00:12:39 — A Sense Of Perspective
00:15:36 — WINTER BATTLEFIELDS
00:16:02 — Kherson
00:17:25 — Luhansk
00:18:12 — Svatove-Kreminna
00:19:21 — Kupyansk
00:19:43 — Donetsk
00:20:54 — Avdiivka
00:22:56 — Marinka
00:25:00 — Bakhmut
00:31:06 — Vuhledar
00:37:05 — Culture Can Kill
00:38:36 — OBSERVATIONS
00:39:52 — Shovels And Sticks
00:44:49 — Attacking Fortified Positions Is Difficult
00:46:12 — Entrenchments & Defensive Tactics
00:47:17 — Certain Systems Have Been Noteworthy
00:49:06 — Changing Force Quality
00:50:53 — EVOLVING TACTICS & FORCES
00:53:45 — Ukraine's Lessons
00:57:15 — EVALUATION & WHAT NEXT
00:59:24 — The Russian Costs And Gains
01:02:35 — Implications For Ukraine
01:05:37 — Was There An Alternative?
01:06:38 — Losses & Force (re)generation
01:07:21 — CONCLUSIONS
01:08:44 — CHANNEL UPDATE
A year on - I want to look at how successful these competing economic campaigns have been. Setting the stage to look at battlefield developments, attrition, and force regeneration in the near future.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats/Corrections:
As always - unless very explicitly otherwise stated everything said should be considered to have a 'reportedly' or 'seemingly' tag attached.
I also note that my comments on survey, financial, and other data are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
Sources/Reading:
LNG around the world:
dw.com/en/lng-european-thirst-for-natural-gas-puts-bangladesh-and-pakistan-in-the-dark/a-63401354
IPSOS polling:
ipsos.com/en/war-in-ukraine-january-2023
Europe gas prices hit low:
edition.cnn.com/2023/02/17/energy/europe-gas-price-18-month-low/index.html
EU Gas storage:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/gas-storage-capacity/
LNG Terminal 3 in Germany
dw.com/en/third-floating-lng-terminal-arrives-in-northern-germany/a-64462246
Seymour Hersh's article on Nord Stream
seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream
Hersh on Russia Today:
rt.com/russia/571690-hersh-ukraine-nato-corruption
Russia switching oil tax calculations:
reuters.com/business/energy/russia-may-switch-brent-based-oil-taxes-kommersant-2023-02-03
Russia planning one-off contributions:
reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-eyeing-one-off-budget-contribution-around-3-bln-business-three-sources-2023-02-08
Russia plan for foreign owned assets
reuters.com/business/russia-outlines-plan-unfriendly-investors-sell-up-half-price-2022-12-30
Sonnenfeld on Russian economy estimates:
fortune.com/2023/03/06/imf-naively-parroted-putin-fake-statisticsand-botched-economic-forecast-russia-ukraine
Russia produced economic figures :
https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43430/forecast_221028.pdf
https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/ea2fd3ce38f2e28d51c312acf2be0917/prognoz_socialno_ekonom_razvitiya_rf_2023-2025.pdf
https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/ddkp/mo_br/
Carnegie Endowment on Deficit:
carnegieendowment.org/politika/89009
Jamestown Foundation on RU DIB
jamestown.org/program/russias-defense-industry-growing-increasingly-turbulent
Borisov on labour shortages:
https://vpk.name/news/613140_borisov_deficit_kadrov_na_predpriyatiyah_opk_v_rf_budet_sostavlyat_okolo_400_tys_chelovek.html
Shadow fleet:
edition.cnn.com/2023/03/01/business/russia-oil-shadow-fleet/index.html
Oil Sanctions:
cnbc.com/2023/02/16/sanctions-on-russian-oil-are-having-the-intended-effect-iea-says.html
themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/02/russian-gas-exports-outside-ex-soviet-states-fell-455-in-2022-a79863
barrons.com/articles/vietnam-markets-economy-e5c19acf
Defence Production:
euronews.com/my-europe/2023/03/08/eu-defence-ministers-discuss-joint-procurement-for-ammunition-to-replenish-depleted-stocks
businessinsider.com/german-arms-giant-build-a-tank-factory-in-ukraine-rheinmetall-2023-3
euromaidanpress.com/2023/01/10/ukraine-finally-launches-domestic-ammunition-production-how-will-this-impact-the-war
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-is-using-guided-rockets-with-more-range-than-himars-launched-ones
dtek.com/en/media-center/news/52-transformatori-dlya-ukraini---gumanitarna-dopomoga-vid-grupi-dtek-ta-hitachi-ener
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:18 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?
00:02:49 — FREEZING EUROPE
00:03:48 — The Euro Response
00:05:59 — Climate & Culmination
00:07:20 — Cost To The Eurozone
00:09:46 — EU: Are Citizens’ Lives Heading The Right Direction? (graph)
00:11:21 — The External Costs
00:13:17 — Evaluation
00:14:02 — Side Note On Nord Stream Claims
00:17:45 — BREAKING UP UA's SUPPORT
00:20:37 — Support levels
00:21:43 — US Public Opinion
00:24:10 — More Global Opinion?
00:27:23 — Evaluation
00:27:51 — THE ECONOMIC WAR (ON RUSSIA)
00:29:02 — Energy Markets & Exports
00:34:10 — Follow On Sanctions And Induced Competition
00:35:43 — The Dispute Over Stats
00:37:23 — The Picture From Russia
00:39:01 — The Russian Budget
00:43:26 — Evaluation
00:44:26 — THE STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN
00:46:57 — Economic Impacts
00:48:46 — The GBAD Problem
00:50:57 — THE PRODUCTION RACE - UKRAINE
00:53:25 — Strategic Imperative
00:56:28 — THRE PRODUCTION RACE - THE WEST
01:03:23 — THE PRODUCTION RACE - RUSSIA
01:06:25 — Defence Spending Is Surprisingly Low
01:08:17 — The Impact Of Sanctions & Inflation
01:14:52 — CONCLUSIONS
01:15:43 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Wagner doesn't follow that example. A force tens of thousands strong, Wagner has helped spearhead the Russian offensives around Bakhmut, and taken on international prominence.
In this episode, I look at the evolution of PMCs, Russia's modern employment of them, and the implications of Wagner's role in Ukraine and its public spats with the Russian MoD.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats and comments:
The usual caveats here apply, but with an extra layer of severity - Russian PMCs do not keep good, reliable public records of their activity.
All information presented should generally be considered qualified even where an appropriate words (e.g. 'reportedly') are not included.
Sources & Reading:
As a policy I do not directly link to Russian Government or Wagner materials, but this episode utilises material from telegram channels owned by or linked to both
CSIS - Russian PMCs
russianpmcs.csis.org
Russian PMCs - CRS
sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11650.pdf
War on the Rocks - Russia in Libya
warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-pendulum-how-russia-sways-its-way-to-more-influence-in-libya
Russian State Media - Putin on the value of PMCs
https://ria.ru/20120411/623227984.html
CSIS - Wagner and the Russian State
csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state
Anna Borshchevskaya - Russian PMCs
fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/rfp4-borshchevskaya-final.pdf
The Conversation - On Russian PMCs
theconversation.com/russias-reliance-on-mercenaries-in-ukraine-points-to-the-weakness-of-its-military-and-putins-strategy-of-deflecting-blame-190612
Testimony on Russian PMCs
csis.org/analysis/putins-proxies-examining-russias-use-private-military-companies
Serbian Police close down Racoon base
balkaninsight.com/2018/08/17/serbia-police-closes-controversial-military-style-children-s-camp-08-17-2018
Wagner prisoner recruitment ceases
reuters.com/world/europe/russias-wagner-mercenaries-halt-prisoner-recruitment-campaign-founder-prigozhin-2023-02-09
Prigozhin on ammo
rferl.org/a/prigozhin-wagner-mercenaries-ammunition-supplies-army/32284809.html
Mangushev shot dead:
bbc.com/news/world-europe-64566582
"Implausible Deniability" - Carnegie Endowment
carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954
Decree on Gazprom - PSC
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302060031
Jamestown foundation - Vega Strategic Services
jamestown.org/program/vega-strategic-services-russian-pmcs-as-part-of-information-warfare
Jamestown Foundation - Russian PMCs
jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts
A deeper look at Vegacy by the Atlantic Council DFRL:
medium.com/dfrlab/a-deeper-look-into-vegacy-strategic-services-ltd-8985ba3eac52
Wagner in Mozambique
themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/31/7-kremlin-linked-mercenaries-killed-in-mozambique-in-october-sources-a67996
Wagner declared a transnational criminal organisation
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220
Ukrainian claims RE Patriot PMC
twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1608131037099425793
Reporting on Wagner deployment in March 2022
usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-28/russia-deploys-wagner-group-to-eastern-ukraine-in-risky-attempt-to-break-stalemate
Wagner - sledgehammer execution
rferl.org/a/telegram-vagner-sledgehammer-killing-ukraine-defector/32128961.html
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening
00:03:21 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:04:34 — MERCENARIES, PMC & VOLUNTEERS
00:06:58 — HISTORY
00:12:42 — European Golden Age: Condottieri
00:16:25 — DECLINE OF THE MERCS
00:22:35 — EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN PMCs
00:26:04 — State Sponsorship
00:28:22 — Roles & Duties
00:36:17 — GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS PRE-2022
00:36:34 — Syria 2015+
00:41:01 — Libya 2015+
00:42:45 — Central African Republic
00:45:04 — A Global Footprint
00:46:11 — WAGNER IN UKRAINE
00:51:25 — Understanding The Why
00:53:04 — WAGNER VS THE MINISTRY
00:53:40 — The Politics Of Wagner Success
00:58:24 — Ammunition & Recruitment
01:02:56 — Wagner Humbled?
01:04:28 — TO EVERY LORD, AN ARMY
01:04:36 — The Proliferation Of Russian PMCs
01:05:25 — Patriot & Vuhledar
01:06:16 — WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
01:08:19 — War, Motives, Stability
01:10:02 — CONCLUSIONS
01:10:52 — CHANNEL UPDATE
But all those things have something in common - they cost immense amounts of money, and for most nations, keeping up with the USAF or the shipbuilding efforts of the PRC just isn't on the cards.
So following a vote by my patrons I decided to look at the question of how smaller (both in terms of population and/or economic power) nations can try to defend themselves in a world dominated by larger powers.
It's a bit of a light-hearted return to some defence 101 concepts, and I hope you enjoy.
We'll be back next week with a deeper look at Wagner, Blackwater, and the historical and modern role of PMCs.
For my recent interview on "The Red Line" see either:
theredlinepodcast.com/listen/episode/3fbb957d/89-european-rearmament-are-we-preparing-for-the-wrong-war (podcast format)
or
youtube.com/watch?v=5gncQ3x9_lo (youtube format)
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Comments:
This video is intended as a bit of a walk back into the world of defence concepts 101, as a result, it may be a bit on the basic side for those in the industry. I also fully admit to blurring the lines of the stages between the development of a strategic concept and fielding and sustainment for the sake of brevity and simplicity.
I have also deliberately over-simplified the concepts and force designs in each of the examples for illustrative purposes.
Also - several typos made it into the slides, apologies
Sources & reading:
Defence in a Competitive Age (Defence contribution to the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy)
gov.uk/government/publications/defence-in-a-competitive-age
UK Defence and Security Industry Strategy 2021:
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/971983/Defence_and_Security_Industrial_Strategy_-_FINAL.pdf
UK Defence Industrial Strategy 2006:
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272203/6697.pdf
Finnish army headcounts:
https://maavoimat.fi/en/about-us
Netherlands Defence Vision 2035:
https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/publications/2020/10/15/defence-vision-2035
Netherlands Defence White Paper 2022:
https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/publications/2022/07/19/defence-white-paper-2022
What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? - RAND 2017
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1820.html
Defence Capability Manual (2021)
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/defence-capability-manual
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:52 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:02:44 — DEFENCE 101
00:02:55 — Military Spending Should Serve A Purpose
00:03:49 — Defining A Defensive Concept Or Strategy
00:05:18 — Force Design
00:06:38 — Procurement & Industry Strategy Follow
00:07:43 — A Few Themes Of Small Nation Defence
00:08:41 — MEET KIWILAND
00:09:29 — Starting From Scratch
00:10:03 — Understanding The Enemy
00:11:00 — MACRO STRATEGY TOTAL DEFENCE
00:11:53 — The Threat
00:12:44 — The Concept
00:14:22 — Designing A Force
00:18:00 — Specialised Equipment
00:20:14 — Preparing Society
00:21:59 — Fortress Kiwiland
00:26:17 — MACRO STRATEGY DOMAIN DOMINANCE
00:26:30 — Kiwiland At Sea
00:26:44 — The Threat & Concept
00:27:50 — Making The Ocean Dangerous
00:30:37 — Kiwiland Rules The Waves
00:33:30 — (Sea) Fortress Kiwiland
00:35:24 — MACROSTRATEGY WMD DETERRENCE
00:35:46 — When War Changed
00:37:33 — Cost & Consequences
00:39:57 — Threatening Armageddon
00:41:23 — The North Korean Nuclear Program
00:43:19 — Kiwiland Goes Nuclear?
00:48:14 — MACROSTRATEGY ALLIED INTEGRATION
00:48:35 — You Do Not Exist In A Vacuum
00:50:05 — Being A Better Ally
00:51:03 — Becoming Part Of An Alliance Architecture
00:53:28 — Designing A Force
00:54:08 — Greater Than The Sum Of Parts
00:54:55 — Kiwiland Partners Up
00:56:09 — DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL SPECIALISATION
00:56:33 — Self-reliance And Strategic Autonomy
00:58:13 — Kiwi-industrial Policy
00:58:50 — HARD & SOFT POWER
00:59:05 — Defence Without Deterrence
01:00:26 — Would You Invade This Guy’s Home?
01:01:35 — CONCLUSIONS
01:02:16 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Those things matter, but wars are not generally fought to take individual trenches or solely to inflict casualties. They are fought for strategic objectives.
In this episode I dig into Russia's history of Empire, its modern strategic objectives, and try to assess whether or not the war in Ukraine represents a success or failure by Russia's own chosen metrics (as far as they can be determined). My suggestion is that in repeating a number of the mistakes previously made by leaders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, it can be argued that Putin has already condemned the Russian federation to a strategic reverse.
What remains to be seen, is whether Ukraine can win a victory from Russia's defeat, or if it will be left to lose as well.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Corrections/Caveats:
This content represents an attempt to divine Russian Strategic intent in Ukraine on the basis of public statements, official media and published Western research - but it is impossible to definitively prove what Putin's goals were in invading Ukraine. Many of the presented opinions have a relatively low confidence level.
At one point I refer to this invasion as an event which has done more to galvanize Ukrainian nationalism than any of the past 100 years - that was unjustified hyperbole - the statement should instead be "of the post Soviet era" or words to that effect for reasons that I hope are obvious.
Sources & Reading:
Russian State Media highlighting the role of the Primakov Doctrine:
tass.com/russia/756973
Russian State Media on the annexation of Kherson and other regions:
tass.com/politics/1517899
Carnegie Endowment on the Doctrine:
carnegieendowment.org/files/Rumer_PrimakovDoctrine_final1.pdf
William C. Wohlforth - The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance
jstor.org/stable/2010224
UN Statistics on Donbas civilian casualties:
https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/conflict-related-civilian-casualties-ukraine-december-2021-enruuk
DNR figures on losses as a result of military activity (civilian and military)
https://eng.ombudsman-dnr.ru/the-overview-of-the-current-social-and-humanitarian-situation-in-the-territory-of-the-donetsk-peoples-republic-as-a-result-of-hostilities-in-the-period-17-and-23-december-2022/?__cf_chl_tk=D.CE95NCUbzAikL1zEk8.Mj8MKlv3wsbLFN1_N3Eux8-1676799261-0-gaNycGzNC_s
References to visually confirmed losses are references to Oryx Data
Pew Research on opinions of Russia among selected European political party voters:
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/23/among-european-right-wing-populists-favorable-views-of-russia-and-putin-are-down-sharply
Pew Research on opinions on Russia by selected national populations
pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/ratings-for-russia-drop-to-record-lows
New Czech president on NATO expansion:
bbc.com/news/world-europe-64455121
EGF Poling on opinions on the US as leading global power:
axios.com/2022/06/16/countries-prefer-us-china-superpower-poll
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Russian Grand Strategy
00:01:56 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:03:03 — A NATURAL SUPERPOWER
00:04:04 — A Strong Hand
00:06:10 — The Same Old Errors
00:06:46 — LOSING THE EMPIRE
00:07:26 — A Power On The Rise
00:10:41 — BROKEN SICKLE
00:11:48 — History Rhymes
00:13:57 — What Held It Together?
00:15:09 — THE LOST 90s
00:15:16 — Russia's Potential
00:15:50 — Oligarchisation & Decay
00:17:04 — RUSSIAN GRAND STRAT & EURASIANISM
00:18:16 — From Dugin To Primakov
00:20:39 — The Primakov Doctrine
00:25:41 — THE ROAD TO CRIMEA
00:26:18 — It Was A Different Time
00:28:33 — The Cost Of Crimea
00:29:56 — THE LAST CHANCE
00:30:08 — The State Of Play 2022
00:32:10 — Throwing The Dice
00:32:29 — UKRAINE & STRATEGIC DISASTER
00:36:25 — Defining The Goals
00:37:36 — RUSSIAN VICTORY AS DEFEAT
00:39:05 — Halting NATO Expansion & Weakening The Alliance
00:41:04 — A Statement Of Intent
00:45:11 — How's That Influence In The Post Soviet Space
00:45:50 — "protecting The Donbas"
00:48:21 — Demilitarising Ukraine & Repressing "nationalism"
00:50:49 — A "neutral" Ukraine?
00:51:53 — Value Of The Annexed Regions
00:53:11 — Russia's Economic Future
00:54:50 — Russia's Military Potential
00:58:02 — THE RISK OF CATASTROPHE
00:58:25 — All Of That Assumed Russia Won
01:00:06 — Destabilisation & Exhaustion
01:00:29 — Russia Diminished
01:01:11 — THE FINAL ROLL OF THE DICE?
01:01:16 — Russia Has Always Bounced Back?
01:03:30 — THE WAR CONTINUES?
01:04:39 — Russia Losing Does Not Mean Ukraine Has Won
01:06:02 — The Fight For The Future Isn't Settled
01:06:52 — CONCLUSIONS
01:07:59 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Description:
While the news often focuses on the role of large, expensive systems in the Ukraine war (think of the attention given to tanks, aircraft, or MLRS and SAM systems in recent weeks and months) some of the most omnipresent and disruptive systems have actually been terrifyingly cheap and accessible.
Off-the-shelf commercial drones converted for military use have been deployed by the truckload, while some of Russia's more successful weapons have been comparatively cheap loitering munitions and kamikaze drones like the Iranian Shahed and Russian Lancet. Videos of equipment destroyed by drones that might cost a thousandth of the price have become image of the war across social media.
In this video, I examine the use of these (often civilian) systems in the war in Ukraine, look at international developments, and ask what lessons we can take from the terrifying rise of cheap sensor and cheaper precision on the battlefield.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats and corrections:
I mispronounce "Shahed" on several occasions
I refer to the Mavic 2 and 3 together - they are not comparable, with the 3 being far more common as a drone supplied to lower level units in Ukraine
I call the Norwegian Black Hornet Drone Danish (big oof)
I refer to to the saturation of drones across the front - I should clarify that the reporting on that point is anecdotal and may only relate to specific sections of the front where drone activity is that its most dense.
I also wish to be clear that I do not at all endorse the modification or use of drones for purposes other than those legally allowable in your jurisdiction.
Sources & Further reading:
RUSI - Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-202
JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE (JAPCC) - A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems
japcc.org/books/a-comprehensive-approach-to-countering-unmanned-aircraft-systems
japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Comprehensive-Approach-to-Countering-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems.pdf
JAPCC - Denial of Spectrum Denial
japcc.org/essays/denial-of-spectrum-denial
Department of Defense Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration
defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration
UK on drone developments
defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/07/14/royal-air-force-chief-says-drone-swarms-ready-to-crack-enemy-defenses
My thanks to those in Ukraine and elsewhere who consulted in relation to this episode.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS
00:01:23 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:04:09 — MEET THE UAS
00:04:17 — Classifying Drones
00:07:59 — Another Take On The Divide
00:08:32 — SYRIA AND THE DONBAS
00:09:53 — The War In The Donbas
00:11:54 — WEAPONS OF THE UKRAINE WAR
00:12:15 — "Mavics"
00:13:47 — Thermal & Heavier Drones
00:15:25 — Loitering Munitions
00:16:23 — "FPVs"
00:18:03 — CAUTION AND CAVEATS
00:18:13 — A Very Public Side Of War? 00:19:03 — Publication Biases
00:20:06 — Security & Secrecy
00:21:13 — A Personal Warning
00:22:13 — DRONE USAGE
00:22:18 — Employment At All Levels
00:23:17 — Reconnaissance
00:24:55 — Artillery Correction
00:27:30 — Coordination
00:28:41 — Strike Role
00:34:18 — Whet It Goes Wrong - RU & UA Drops
00:36:11 — Fear & Isolation
00:38:07 — THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE
00:40:33 — LOITERING MUNITIONS
00:40:43 — The Lancet Threat
00:41:35 — The Shahed Campaign
00:42:22 — Ukrainian Loitering Munitions
00:43:09 — LOGISTICS & SUPPLY
00:43:18 — The Role Of Volunteers
00:44:35 — Artisanal Work At Industrial Scale
00:46:15 — COUNTERS & EFFECTIVENESS
00:47:23 — Electronic Warfare
00:48:51 — New Problems, Old Solutions
00:49:54 — The Very Old (and Odd)
00:51:34 — Counter-operator Operations
00:52:39 — GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
00:52:55 — Tactical Tools
00:53:54 — Swarm Technology
00:55:27 — Deployability
00:56:02 — Networking And Going Solo
00:57:15 — A THREAT PROFILED
00:57:22 — Extreme Accessibility
00:58:18 — The Shot Exchange Problem
00:59:16 — Nowhere To Hide
01:00:07 — LESSONS & NEXT STEPS
01:00:17 — The Battle For Awareness & Precision
01:01:24 — Availability & Attritability
01:03:25 — The Drones Will Get Better
01:04:12 — Need For Efficient Countermeasures
01:05:08 — Training & Doctrine
01:06:19 — Evolving Threats
01:06:57 — CONCLUSIONS
01:07:41 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Aid to Ukraine has evolved dramatically since February 2022, and there are few topics that have attracted more constant press coverage away from the battlefield itself. So today I try and set out how aid has evolved, who the major contributors are, and the impact aid has had - and may have in 2023.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Corrections:
In this episode I refer to the White House announcing periodic age packages for Ukraine - I meant to refer to the DoD
I also refer to percentages of Russian artillery in storage being towed/122mm - this is a reference to 'reserve' Russian artillery systems per MB2021 as stated on the slide.
I also wish to emphasise again that I deliberately included extreme examples of Western escalation options to illustrate a point, not as advocacy.
Sources & Further Reading:
German military support for Ukraine
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992
CSIS - US Security Assistance to Ukraine
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040
Ukraine supplemental FY2023
appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Ukraine%20Supplemental%20Summary%20FY23.pdf
Kiel Institute for World Economy figures on Ukraine support:
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/
Oryx: Answering the call - heavy weapons to Ukraine
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
EU Training Mission Targets
euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-ramps-up-military-support-doubles-training-mission-targets-for-ukraine
Ukraine FOREX reserves
reuters.com/markets/ukraines-foreign-reserves-hit-2795-bln-topping-pre-invasion-level-2022-12-06
US plans combined arms training
defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3248075/us-plans-combined-arms-training-for-ukrainian-soldiers
Poland repairing Ukraine equipment
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/poland-launched-large-scale-repairs-of-the-equipment-of-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine/#:~:text=Poland%20launched%20a%20large%2Dscale,AHS%20Krab%20self%2Dpropelled%20guns.
Estonia handing over all its 155mm howitzers
kyivindependent.com/news-feed/estonia-to-give-ukraine-all-its-155-mm-howitzers-in-largest-aid-package-so-far
https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/879537.html
Reznikov: Ukraine needs 300 tanks, 600-700 IFVs, 500 howitzers for specific operation
TASS on Escalation Risk
tass.com/politics/1570233
CSIS on Ukraine Aid:
cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts
Olaf Scholz steers clear of commitment to supply of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine
theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/18/olaf-scholz-steers-clear-of-pledging-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraine
U.S. funds not misused in Ukraine, U.S. Treasury says amid corruption crackdown
reuters.com/world/us/us-treasury-says-no-indication-that-us-funds-were-misused-ukraine-2023-01-31
UK Tanks to Ukraine
bbc.com/news/uk-64274755
M113s to Iraq
https://www.army.mil/article/106646/excess_armored_personnel_carriers_benefit_u_s_foreign_partners
Paper system counts for elements like Russian and US reserve artillery are per Military Balance 2021
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:43 — What Am I Talking About?
00:03:21 — From Korea to Afghanistan
00:04:47 — AID PRE-2022
00:05:00 — The Ukrainian Military of 2014
00:08:27 — Made in Ukraine (with some help)
00:09:41 — THE AID ESCALATION
00:10:05 — Phase 1: Stop the Tanks
00:11:08 — Phase 2: Light & Heavy
00:12:10 — Phase 3: Keeping the Lights On
00:12:45 — Phase 4: Enabling Manoeuvre
00:14:31 — Phase 5: Reach
00:15:18 — HOW MUCH AID HAS GONE?
00:20:25 — What is a Thing Worth?
00:21:54 — Personal View - Focus on Type & Qty.
00:22:55 — NATIONAL AID PROGRAMS
00:23:07 — The VANGUARDS
00:23:12 — Leading the Charge
00:23:35 — Leading on Heavy Weapons
00:25:02 — Accepting Risk
00:26:42 — Pushing the Boundaries
00:27:58 — THE CAUTIOUS GIANT: US AID
00:32:11 — The Source of Deterrence
00:33:13 — LET'S TALK ABOUT GERMANY
00:36:04 — German Military Aid
00:37:08 — Messaging & Authorisation
00:39:58 — IMPACT & SCALE
00:40:06 — Finances
00:41:06 — Humanitarian & Refugee Costs
00:42:02 — Military Aid by the Numbers
00:46:36 — OTHER AID TYPES
00:50:40 — CAN IT BE ENOUGH?
00:57:07 — The Numbers are the Numbers
01:00:28 — The Trend So Far
01:01:29 — WHAT IS NEEDED?
01:01:44 — The Ukrainian Requests
01:02:49 — Solution 1: New maneuver
01:04:18 — Solution 2: Fight Like Ukrainians
01:08:35 — THE WEST IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT
01:10:25 — CONCLUSIONS
01:11:40 — CHANNEL UPDATE
But it is equally important not to underestimate Russian strengths and capabilities. From information warfare to ammunition production and mobilisation potential, Russia has a suite of resources and capabilities that it can leverage.
Following a popular vote, in this episode I look at Russian military performance and capabilities in Ukraine, and why I believe it remains a major threat for Ukraine in 2023.
As you might expect, there won't be quite as many punchlines in this one.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
Many, many, many caveats - some of which I capture in this video.
My big ask is that this presentation not be taken out of context. A sober assessment of Russian capabilities is not the same as an assessment that Russia is likely win. Instead it represents a set of challenges that Ukraine will have to overcome - something I will look at further next week.
Sources:
RUSI - Preliminary Lessons in conventional warfighting...
rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022
RUSI - The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence
rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence
"I live, I fight, I win" - a guide by the Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan and Special Military Operations (machine translation)
docdroid.net/5avzOQK/i-live-i-fight-i-win-the-rules-of-living-in-war-pdf
Work of Covert Cabal counting Russian tanks in depots:
youtube.com/watch?v=ZNNoaRp5lz0&t
youtube.com/watch?v=eHhgVrKJJoA
FMSO - The Russian way of War
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
Paper figures for RU military equipment are per MB2021 as always for consistency (though the omission of T-62 from paper reserve list is yet another point that causes me to raise a questionmark with that source)
TC 7-100.2 OPFOR tactics
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdf
Variety of public statements and interviews given by officers and troops involved in the fighting in Ukraine. Examples include:
Interview with Ukrainian artillery officer at Bakhmut
youtube.com/watch?v=-5hmhU5LvC8
Interview with Ukrainian pilot by thedrive
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-mig-29-pilots-inside-account-of-the-changing-air-war-over-ukraine
I would also like to extend a personal thanks to those who consulted directly on the preparation of this presentation, including those Ukrainians who agreed to provide input on the challenges they still face.
I hope to receive permission to credit at least some of these in the future.
Credit to social media and OSINT based sources as normal, in particular Julia Davis of Russia Media Monitor for her work monitoring and translating Russian media, and, of course, loss aggregators and geolocators.
Timestamps
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:57 — What Am I Talking About?
00:02:47 — A Note on Sources
00:03:39 — RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE
00:03:53 — Contradictions
00:06:52 — What Does This Achieve?
00:08:58 — Leveraging Legacy?
00:10:14 — BELARUS
00:11:23 — COMBAT PERFORMANCE
00:11:53 — The Poor Mobik Trope
00:13:53 — Russia's Hard Edge
00:18:26 — Let's Not Get Ahead of Ourselves
00:19:29 — FIRE SUPERIORITY
00:19:44 — Russian Artillery Retains the Advantage
00:26:24 — STRATEGIC LOGISTICS
00:26:35 — Wait What? Russia & Logistics?
00:27:27 — Logistics at the Strategic Level
00:34:23 — Adaptation
00:35:35 — Enabling Strategic Manoeuvre & Sustainment
00:36:40 — TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE
00:36:48 — The Product of Modernisation
00:38:10 — Ukraine Is Not All Bling
00:39:02 — THE EDGE IN THE AIR
00:39:24 — An Asymmetric Fight
00:42:08 — BVR
00:43:57 — A Realised Advantage
00:45:01 — NAVAL EDGE
00:45:09 — The Black Sea Situation
00:46:09 — A Strategic Handicap
00:46:45 — AN ASYMMETRY OF REACH
00:46:50 — Russia's Long Reach
00:48:22 — From Lancet to Iskander
00:50:10 — A One-Way Tax
00:50:56 — RUSSIA CAN LEARN
00:51:12 — Evidence of Adaptation
00:53:29 — ENDURANCE
00:53:40 — Regeneration & Reconstitution
00:53:58 — Casualty Tolerance
00:55:43 — The Manpower Pool
00:57:21 — Equipment Reserves
01:00:53 — Industrial Mobilisation
01:01:58 — Adaptation
01:02:53 — Regression and Output
01:04:50 — CONCLUSIONS: The Threats to Ukraine
01:05:55 — CONCLUSIONS: Russia is Not a Broken Force
01:06:31 — CONCLUSIONS: Overcoming Russian Advantages
01:08:03 — CONCLUSIONS: An Enduring Threat
01:08:17 — Channel Update
Description:
Militaries, like any organisation, share a basic vulnerability - they're made up of people. And wherever there are people, there is an organisational culture.
Culture can shape the way a military performs just as much as the capabilities of its weapons or the count of its personnel. Having all the tanks in the world only means so much if the system maintaining them is weakened by corruption and false reporting - factors we've explored before.
But there's a third part of this story, the component that helps explain why systems adopt inefficient structures, struggle to coordinate or become filled with mutual distrust and self sabotage. Politics. Where the political interests of individuals deviate from the interests of the collective, bad things happen, and where leaders begin to put more focus on loyalty than on competence, then a system will never live up to its full potential.
This episode serves as the third episode in the trilogy that began with "How corruption destroys armies" so I would advise watching those first if you have not already
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Comments:
Under normal circumstances, Kremlin power games would not normally be played out in public - contests like those now being seen between Wagner and Shoigu for example that play out in public are relatively new phenomena. As a result, there is a recency bias in the examples used.
Also note that as much of this topic is evidenced by competing, self-interested claims by various parties - examples should be considered illustrative or with low confidence levels.
Further Reading:
Information drawn from the Telegram channels of relevant figures - as a rule I do not directly link to content by these sources but relevant extracts are contained in this presentation.
Drach's video on the IJA's Navy (recommended)
youtube.com/watch?v=mZ9AFbnY4To&t
Russia’s defence reform Assessing the real ‘Serdyukov heritage
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/fiia/0027951/f_0027951_22760.pdf
Russia’s New PMC Patriot:
jamestown.org/program/russias-new-pmc-patriot-the-kremlins-bid-for-a-greater-role-in-africa
Russia’s (not so) Private Military Companies
https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206653
Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State
csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state
The Russian Way of war
armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
The Best or Worst of Both Worlds?
csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/best-or-worst-both-worlds
Shoigu survives reshuffle
jamestown.org/program/russias-defense-minister-sergei-shoigu-survives-government-reshuffle
Shoigu sells Russias military success story
https://icds.ee/en/defence-minister-shoigu-sells-russias-military-success-story/
theconversation.com/chechens-fighting-in-ukraine-putins-psychological-weapon-could-backfire-179447
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:42 — What Am I Talking About
00:02:47 — SPONSOR: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS
00:04:21 — POWER & INCENTIVES
00:04:33 — The Problem of Incentives
00:06:15 — System Self-Select & Perpetuate
00:08:34 — The Personalist Structure
00:09:04 — The Autocrat's Incentives
00:12:09 — The Boyar's Incentives
00:13:34 — COMPETENCE, REFORM & THE RUSSIAN ARMY
00:13:48 — The Post-Soviet Decline
00:14:18 — Yeltsin's Praetorians
00:15:23 — Grachev
00:16:55 — The Serdyukov Reforms
00:19:29 — Rebellion & Replacement
00:20:14 — Remember Sergei?
00:21:14 — The Shoigu Years
00:22:19 — Sergei's Failures
00:23:25 — Sergei's Successes
00:24:54 — DUPLICATION & EMPIRE BUILDING
00:25:05 — Efficiency is Sleek
00:25:54 — Empire Building & Divided Rule
00:26:37 — Building an Ideal Military
00:27:44 — German Military Feudalism
00:28:56 — Waffen SS or HEER
00:29:14 — An Organisational Melee
00:31:11 — FRAGMENTATION IN RUSSIA (DRAMATIS PERSONAE)
00:31:17 — The Regular Army
00:31:49 — Rosgvardia
00:32:59 — The DNR & LNR
00:34:59 — Russian Law
00:35:49 — Kadyrov
00:37:25 — Kadyrovtsy
00:37:55 — Loyal to Whom?
00:38:38 — Yevgeniy Prigozhin
00:40:29 — "Volunteer" Units
00:41:22 — Other Players?
00:42:16 — The Costs of Fragmentation
00:43:53 — COORDINATION & COHESION
00:44:05 — There is no "Team"
00:45:12 — IJA: The Rivalry
00:46:07 — IJA: Organisation
00:46:44 — IJA: Coordination
00:47:51 — The MoD v Wagner
00:49:51 — Duelling Narratives
00:50:54 — The Narrative?
00:53:03 — Meanwhile, in Wagner World
00:55:10 — DIRECT "COMPETITION"
00:55:17 — Unit "Friction"
00:56:12 — Rogozin
00:58:59 — POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
00:59:25 — When Politics Trumps Military Logic
01:00:52 — THE AGGREGATED IMPACT
01:00:59 — An Ending (To This Act)
01:02:00 — CAN IT BE FIXED?
01:02:08 — This is Not Unique
01:02:55 — Antidotes and Controls
01:04:13 — The Russian Issue
01:05:35 — Cultural Factors
01:07:57 — Conclusions
While tanks and fighters tend to win public attention, the fighting in Ukraine has done a lot to remind us of the critical role played by the infantry. And to survive and thrive on the battlefield, the infantry in Ukraine rely on their armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to enable to enable movement and provide fire support.
Those vehicles, so critical to both sides have, however, been lost in extreme numbers - with no vehicle on the Russian side having suffered more visually confirmed losses than the BMP-2.
Now, it seems, the floodgates are opening on the supply of Western IFVs to Ukraine. In this video I look at these vehicles, their employment in Ukraine, and suggest that despite being lost in large numbers - that they will remain critical in the fighting to come.
Special thanks to those consulted for this video.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Comments:
I mispeak and call RUSI the "uniform services institute" - It is correctly (and has for the better part of two centuries) been the "united services institute."
As always, keep in mind that while visually confirmed loss data is among the best data we have for setting loss baselines, it is limited and should be interpreted with care.
To enable some of the analysis in this video, some data treatment was done - for example, entries for destroyed BMPs where the variant could not be determined were divided, pro-rata
Regarding the narrative - while the BMP-1 had a major impact, I should note that other IFV type vehicles preceded it - with perhaps the most significant being the German HS.30.
In this video, I call the Stryker an American vehicle due to its service. The vehicle has Canadian DNA and is built there
Notes/further reading:
pre-war equipment levels are as per Military Balance 2021 for consistency.
Loss and resupply data as per Oryx as noted:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
War for Ukraine - First Conclusions from 2022 and New Challenges 2023
youtube.com/watch?v=54daqNraMxE
Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
TASS - on the Bradley
tass.com/defense/1561793
TASS - on BMP-2 Production
https://tass.ru/interviews/15445983?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com
On the pledge of Marders and BMPs to Ukraine
defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/01/05/us-and-germany-pledge-infantry-fighting-vehicles-for-ukraine
Russian MoD claim of destroyed Bradleys is as per their official TG channel - September 4 2022
GAO assessment of Bradley and Abrams in Desert Storm
gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:57 — What Am I Talking About?
00:02:36 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
00:03:43 — IFVs: History & Doctrine
00:03:52 — The Combined Arms Problem
00:05:17 — VARIETY OF RESPONSES
00:06:36 — Halftracks & APCs
00:08:05 — The BMP-1
00:10:14 — IFVs & Modern Mechanised Infantry
00:11:06 — Related Vehicles
00:12:08 — PRE WAR FORCES
00:12:13 — The Russian Arsenal
00:14:02 — The "Cutting Edge"
00:15:57 — Fossils
00:17:08 — Shortage Conditions
00:17:51 — The Primary Force
00:19:14 — The Ukrainian Armoury
00:20:07 — The Soviet Inheritance
00:20:28 — New Gen. Vehicles
00:21:28 — Western Systems
00:22:19 — LOSSES: AND WHY THEY AREN'T EVERYTHING
00:23:02 — Assessing Losses
00:23:59 — Overall Trends
00:25:54 — Visually Confirmed Losses
00:27:20 — ORYX IFV & APC Visually Confirmed Losses
00:29:07 — Russian Losses
00:31:24 — Analysing Ukrainian Losses
00:33:15 — Highlighting Outliers
00:36:08 — Three Common Potential Misconceptions
00:36:53 — ORYX Implied Net IFV Loss
00:38:18 — Colonel Reisner
00:39:27 — EMPLOYMENT & EXPERIENCE
00:40:11 — Infantry Support and Early Losses
00:41:50 — Vulnerability
00:43:15 — Relationship with Survivability
00:45:20 — Dispersion & Concentration
00:46:09 — A Critical Tool
00:48:07 — Static Warfare
00:49:03 — Through the Fog of War
00:49:49 — Potential Lessons
00:50:19 — RESUPPLY & REPLACEMENTS
00:50:28 — The Need to Replenish
00:51:40 — Russian Efforts (and Debates)
00:53:28 — Western Resupply
00:55:17 — The Shift To Heavier Materiel
00:55:59 — A Note on Quantities
00:57:19 — MEET THE CANDIDATES
00:57:24 — Marder
00:58:18 — M2/M3 Bradley
00:59:24 — Moving the Needle?
01:01:06 — STRYKER (+MGS)
01:01:44 — THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE
01:02:07 — 1: Gross Escalation
01:02:37 — 2: The System is Terrible
01:03:09 — 3: They Were Destroyed
01:03:51 — WHAT NEXT?
01:03:55 — The Resupply Effort & Losses
01:04:47 — Force Evolution: Russia
01:05:55 — Force Evolution: Ukraine
01:06:39 — Conclusions
01:07:35 — Channel Update
There are few things people have been keener to predict throughout history than 'quick' wars. Pro Russian commentators after February 24th 2022 expected a rapid victory - while Western media was quick to suggest that Russia's economy was collapsing soon after sanctions were implemented.
Instead, both Ukraine and Russia show signs of increasing their wartime production and scaling up their armed forces. That should not come as a surprise. Historically, the process of converting from a civilian to a wartime economy has yielded more than enough results to overcome even significant trauma inflicted on the industrial base (for example, strategic bombing attacks).
Russia's economy is suffering, it's long term economic prospects have been badly wounded by a collapse in international trust, market denial, and a barrage of sanctions. Ukraine's economy is likewise under immense pressure - primarily from physical attacks by the Russian armed forces.
But it would be naïve to think that either is likely to collapse in the coming weeks and months. As long as the will to go on (and foreign support) remains in play, there is every reason to think that both nations will find a way to keep their economies going.
In this episode, we look at the basics of war-economics, industry conversion, and try to understand why 'short wars' are so hard to win between peer opponents, once the economic struggle begins in earnest.
This video is obviously not financial advice - and a discussion of certain economic ideas or techniques should not be taken as an endorsement of them.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats/Comments:
A few major ones on this video:
Economic data coming out of Ukraine and Russia is obviously suspect (I have covered the issues with official RU statistics before) and external statistics are highly uncertain - all figures should be taken as just indicative as a result.
Describing techniques does not equal endorsement of them - Just because I can explain why you might be able to spend 40% of GDP on defence, doesn't mean I think that is a good idea.
All jokes at the expense of particular careers or product categories are just that, jokes, and very much not meant.
Finally - this is an exploration of historical experiences and the economic status of Russia and Ukraine - it is is focussed on the economic element of endurance while at war and makes no findings as to the point where political or social endurance might fail.
Further reading/sources:
To be included post publication (apologies, source list held locally on a different computer, it'll follow shortly).
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS
00:03:28 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?
00:04:07 — War Economics 101
00:04:21 — Prior Planning
00:06:08 — The Demand for Materiel
00:06:55 — Productive Resources
00:08:12 — Illustrating the Point
00:09:02 — Mobilisation & Conversion
00:09:17 — Ploughs to Swords
00:11:04 — Conversion Models
00:12:26 — Productivity & Coordination
00:13:56 — Resource Prioritisation
00:14:55 — Informal Conversion
00:16:22 — The WW2 Exp
00:18:23 — ENDURANCE
00:18:50 – Gains Under Pressure
00:19:50 — Pushed to the Extreme
00:20:58 — What is a Collapse
00:21:34 — Endurance: Non-essentials
00:24:16 — Expanded Resources
00:25:33 — Expended Resources
00:26:44 — Will to endure
00:29:18 — "You Will Grow Tired of It"
00:32:05 — Temporary Measures
00:33:01 — Hard Choices
00:33:07 — Even Harder Choices
00:34:20 — Funding a war: Business as Usual
00:35:58 — Funding War: Mortgaging tomorrow
00:39:33 — Funding War: Money Printer go BRRRRR
00:41:44 — Papering Over the Cracks
00:42:34 — Currency Tanking
00:45:25 — Critical Resources shortages?
00:46:57 — Out of Cash?
00:48:07 — Inflation Out of Control?
00:50:23 — Ever Heard of the Office of Price Administration (OPA)?
00:51:22 — So Why Do They Fail?
00:51:31 — Failure Mode 1: Overrun
00:51:57 — Mode 2: Functional Collapse
00:52:43 — (Mode 3): Capitulation or revolution
00:53:53 — RUSSIA
00:54:06 — The Russian Economy 2021
00:55:03 — Escalating Spending
00:55:48 — Russian Assumptions
00:56:29 — Economic Hardening
00:57:34 — Options & Endurance
01:00:50 — A Brief Word on Ukraine
01:02:18 — CONCLUSIONS
01:03:58 — CHANNEL UPDATE
With contested airspace both side have turned to the big guns to support their operations - and both have consumed ammunition at a prodigious rate (albeit Russia many times faster than Ukraine).
In this episode - I look at the question of production and supply and ask the question - are Russia or Ukraine going to run out of shells in 2023
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Reading/Sources:
Russian Ammunition Consumption:
https://news.err.ee/1608800317/edf-intelligence-chief-russia-has-used-up-two-thirds-of-its-ammunition
defensenews.com/smr/reagan-defense-forum/2022/12/04/russia-burning-through-ammunition-in-ukraine-at-extraordinary-rate
Translation of Murz article - original linked (use wayback machine?)
wartranslated.com/russian-volunteer-murz-on-why-russia-is-not-ready-to-defend-ukrainian-winter-offensive
Production Levels:
thedefensepost.com/2022/11/17/uk-bae-artillery-shell-production
defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/12/05/army-plans-dramatic-ammo-production-boost-as-ukraine-drains-stocks
reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-ammunition-csg-idINL8N32R4T9
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/call-for-munitions-investment-to-turbocharge-our-defence-preparedness/news-story/634788501d744eb5f9aaed960af76af2
rheinmetall.com/en/rheinmetall_ag/press/news/latest_news/index_35904.php
thedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukraine-first-operator-precision-bomb
https://ubn.news/germany-is-building-its-own-munitions-factory-which-ukraine-needs/
bdnews24.com/world/europe/fdo6merjyc
https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/11/29/ukraine-has-an-insatiable-need-for-ammunition-but-the-us-doesnt-have-an-endless-supply/
US Stocks & Cluster:
GAO Report - '95
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89.htm
US Army Ammo Procurement justification books
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2020/Base%20Budget/Procurement/04%20Procurement%20of%20Ammunition%20Army.pdf
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/Base%20Budget/Procurement/AMMO_FY_2021_PB_Procurement_of_Ammunition_Army.pdf
US Army Demil program
media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/21/2001860132/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-052.PDF
CRS - Cluster
sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdf
edition.cnn.com/2022/12/07/politics/ukraine-cluster-munitions-us-war-russia/index.html
http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/united-states/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx#ftn52
Others:
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA416944.pdf
Caveats/correction:
The nature of reporting on an ongoing war limits the confidence/accuracy of the information presented. Please regard the content of this video accordingly.
At one point I state that the US will hit 20,000 rounds of 155mm produced per month in summer, it's in fact by Spring.
This video is no financial advice, and should not be relied upon/may contain errors in all respects. Please don't go making financial decisions because of what you see in a YT video.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:03 — What Am I Talking About
00:02:39 — HISTORY
00:02:44 — The Scandal of 1915
00:04:12 — The Korean Crisis
00:04:44 — Cold War Ruggedisation
00:05:37 — Post Cold War Atrophy
00:06:56 — Russia's Close Calls
00:07:35 — Storage & Production
00:08:37 — FEEDING THE GUNS
00:08:45 — Everyone is Running Out
00:09:05 — Everyone has Plenty of Ammo
00:09:30 — RUSSIA
00:09:33 — The Artillery Army
00:10:44 — Dueling Narratives
00:11:36 — Systems & Consumption
00:12:57 — Shell Hunger?
00:14:27 — FIRMS Returns
00:16:29 — Why?
00:18:02 — Production
00:19:43 — Stretching Production
00:21:26 — Options?
00:23:01 — Conclusion
00:25:08 — UKRAINE
00:25:21 — Doom and Gloom?
00:26:02 — Crashing Out the Rainy-Day Fund
00:26:31 — No NATO Shells?
00:27:22 — Why Did This Happen?
00:29:02 — Overly Focusing the View
00:30:48 — CONSUMPTION
00:31:21 — Putting a Number on the Need
00:32:18 — Filling the Requirement
00:33:12 — PRODUCTION
00:33:23 — Atrophied Industry
00:33:52 — Describing Production
00:35:07 — The Production Picture
00:36:22 — Surge Capacity?
00:37:12 — The Production Picture: US
00:38:53 — The Production Picture: EUROPE
00:40:44 — Production Slack (EU)
00:42:40 — The Production Picture: Asia-Pacific (APAC)
00:44:06 — The Korean Option
00:46:32 — The Production Picture: The Extras
00:48:10 — LEGACY AMMO
00:48:19 — Legacy Ammo Production
00:49:09 — MAKING IT WORK
00:50:06 — Politics & Patience
00:52:20 — Wide Sourcing
00:52:41 — The Great Ammunition Purchase Tour
00:53:58 — Substitution...
00:55:29 — ... & Precision
00:57:39 — Emergency Options
00:58:16 — Cluster Munition
01:00:09 — The Cluster Option
01:03:41 — What Are We Seeing?
01:05:24 — CONCLUSIONS
01:07:05 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Taking a quick break from the horrors of trench war and artillery combat in Ukraine for a week, we instead try to gaze forward towards the 2030s and the future of air combat.
Fighter jets are among the most expensive, complex platforms that any nation builds and maintains (losing out to submarines and warships mostly because of the scale of the latter).
For years, the US was the undisputed leader in the fighter domain, having introduced the 5th Generation F-22 Raptor in 2005, while challengers like the SU-57 would have to wait until the 2020s (and rise to fame a little thanks to the new Topgun film).
But technology moves on; drones, engine technology, sensors, stealth...it all improves, and eventually countries are left with the choice to either build something new or fall behind.
Many have chosen to compete, and in this video I introduce some of the projects pushing for next generation fighters, including the British-Japanese-Italian GCAP, Franco-German-Spanish FCAS, and two American programs.
Whether I look at those in any detail in the future (or at the Russian, Chinese, and other programs) will likely depend on how this video goes.
Recent interview with Jake Broe:
youtube.com/watch?v=nWAkUWqdfBY&t
Patreon
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
While sources are listed, information on 6th Generation fighters in the public domain is generally a mixture of extreme speculation, carefully calibrated marketing speak, and rumour.
Please regard this video as what it is, a fun, speculative look at what is involved in producing the next generation of fighter aircraft (and their associated systems).
Relevant Reading:
Congressional Research Service Report on USAF NGAD:
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11659
Reporting on existence of an NGAD demonstrator:
defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/09/15/the-us-air-force-has-built-and-flown-a-mysterious-full-scale-prototype-of-its-future-fighter-jet
BAE Tempest site:
baesystems.com/en/product/military-capability
USAF wargame reporting:
defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-off-or-win-against-china-in-2030
XA-100:
geaerospace.com/propulsion/military/xa100
Dassault Airbus deal:
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/32827-dassault-airbus-fcas-agreement
Questions with Spain's FCAS lead:
defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/05/5-questions-with-airbus-spains-fcas-lead
USN future plans reporting:
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40007/navys-aviation-boss-lays-out-big-vision-for-drone-packed-carrier-air-wings-of-the-future
GCAP:
news.usni.org/2022/12/09/japan-italy-u-k-enter-collaboration-to-develop-next-generation-fighter
There is No Spoon: _The New Digital Acquisition Reality (formatting was not what I would have gone with)
https://software.af.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/There-Is-No-Spoon-Digital-Acquisition-7-Oct-2020-digital-version.pdf
F-35 Information fusion presentation (credit Lockheed Martin)
https://swiss-f35.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PIRA-F-35-Sensor-Fusion-Brief-for-Switzerland.pdf
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS
00:02:28 — SPONSOR: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS
00:03:45 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?
00:05:18 — FIGHTER GENERATIONS
00:05:22 — The Naming Game
00:06:18 — 1st Gen.
00:07:05 — 2nd & 3rd Gen.
00:07:48 — 4th Gen.
00:08:33 — 4th Gen. Plus
00:10:02 — 5th Gen.
00:11:16 — Networking & Sensor Fusion
00:13:12 — A Three Horse Race?
00:14:19 — WHAT MAKES 6TH GEN?
00:14:30 — The Next Steps?
00:15:21 — Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
00:16:28 — Adaptive Cycle/Variable Cycle Engine (ACE/VCE)
00:17:33 — Directed Energy
00:18:14 — Why Build Them?
00:20:58 — The Challenge
00:21:01 — A Development Starshot
00:22:02 — The Combination Problem
00:22:34 — Directed Energy Weapon Testing
00:23:05 — Single Features are Easy
00:23:28 — Enabling the Requirements
00:26:18 — Counting the Costs
00:29:01 — Solution 1: A New Way to Design Aircraft
00:31:08 — Solution 2: Fleet Size
00:32:08 — Solution 3: Mega Projects
00:34:06 — GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAM (GCAP)
00:34:38 — The Tempest (UK and Italy)
00:37:25 — The F-X (of Japan)
00:40:42 — GCAP Merger
00:42:21 — Program Goals
00:44:29 — What to Expect?
00:45:28 — F/A-XX (of the US Navy)
00:45:36 — A New Generation Carrier Group
00:46:40 — Tipping The Balance
00:48:06 — What to Expect?
00:49:12 — FCAS (of Germany, France, Spain)
00:49:21 — A new European Fighter
00:49:57 — The Requirements
00:50:37 — The Concerns
00:53:28 — Carrier Capability
00:55:32 — NGAD (of the US Air Force)
00:55:53 — A Different Beast
00:57:26 — Growing Challenges
00:59:11 — Refusing Parity
00:59:55 — Rumoured Requirements
01:01:02 — A Tall Order
01:02:53 — Next Gen. Dominance
01:05:46 — Questions
01:07:47 — Conclusions
01:08:45 — Channel Update
For months now, a city with a pre-war population of 70,000 has been the focus of relentless artillery and infantry attacks by the Russian military and the "Wagner PMC."
For many commentators, the attacks seem nonsensical. At a time when Russia is pivoting to defence just about everywhere else along the line, why keep pouring men and materiel into a city that simply doesn't have value relative to the effort expended trying to take it.
In this video I zoom in on the battle for Bakhmut, and explore its history, implications, and some of what we have heard about the tactics there.
At the same time, we also look at Russia's campaign of fortification building across much of the rest of Ukraine (and Russia). As the world focuses on Russia's Bakhmut attacks, Russia is throwing up belts of defences that...for now at least...seem to have some of the hallmarks of typical Russian defence procurement.
Many thanks to the people who provided input into this episode, with a special thanks to Sgt. Kates - USMC, for giving the kind of input only a combat engineer can (I do not have any idea how to clear a minefield)
As always, this video represents merely person views based on imperfect information gathered during an active war.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
While I have attempted to discuss the factors I consider when evaluating casualty claims - the reality is that the error bars around any estimates are still extremely wide. Estimates of 1:10 ratios in some sectors at certain times are paired with claims consistent with very different situations elsewhere.
Even that Ukrainian Govt estimate on Russian losses may be low - simply because of when the estimate was made and the limited territory it may have covered. This is the problem of uncertainty when viewing a war from afar.
While I am confident in the analysis of matters at the overarching strategic level - be aware that the smaller you get in this war, the less certain things often become.
Notes and further reading:
Thanks as always to various OSINT aggregation channels whose work is critical to analysis like this. A non exhaustive list includes:
twitter.com/oryxspioenkop
twitter.com/UAWeapons
twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1602059972103348225
I do not generally link directly to Russian Telegram channels - but they provide an important source of information on how views of the war are evolving on that side.
"Arty Green" - Ukrainian artillery officer:
youtube.com/watch?v=-5hmhU5LvC8
Examples of constant media coverage:
theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/ukraine-russia-war-cold-donetsk-frontline
theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/10/russia-ukraine-war-bakhmut-meat-grinder-deadlock
youtube.com/watch?v=7kwy5BVTdo4
nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world/europe/ukraine-war-bakhmut.html
youtube.com/watch?v=g51oovaB_Ss
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:40 — What Am I Talking About
00:02:37 — DIGGING TO VICTORY
00:02:43 — Fortification and Entrenchment
00:03:59 — Search for Movement
00:04:47 — Always a Risk of Reversion
00:05:17 — THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE
00:05:22 — The War in The Donbass
00:06:12 — War of Movement
00:07:07 — Transfer of the Initiative
00:08:16 — Russia Digs In
00:08:38 — Even in Russia...
00:09:52 — There's Bakhmut
00:10:49 — TIMELINE
00:10:58 — Core Objective
00:11:36 — "Protecting the Donbass"
00:12:42 — The Donbass Offensive
00:14:06 — It Isn't Just Bakhmut
00:15:16 — Wagner's Verdun
00:17:05 — A Brutal Back and Forth
00:17:14 — Encirclement Plan & Ukrainian Rotation
00:18:57 — FEATURES AND EVOLUTION
00:19:08 — Entrenchment
00:20:03 — Traditional Model
00:21:04 — Wagner Waves
00:21:42 — Wagner Tactics
00:24:47 — War by the Meter
00:25:42 — The Gas Station
00:26:13 — The Garbage Dump
00:26:55 — War Made Small
00:27:46 — Infiltration Assaults
00:28:47 — Myths
00:31:18 — WHY BAKHMUT?
00:31:31 — Road to Sloviansk
00:32:47 — "Smashing Their Foreheads"
00:33:22 — So Why?
00:34:34 — IS IT WORTH IT?
00:34:38 — We're Talking About It
00:35:19 — A1: Offensive Potential
00:36:05 — A2: Attrition
00:37:10 — A3: Politics
00:37:52 — Opportunity Cost
00:38:39 — Other Options?
00:39:04 — Real Cost of Bakhmut
00:40:46 — What if Bakhmut is Taken?
00:42:04 — ASSESSING THE COST
00:42:23 — Illustrating the Point: Causality Scale
00:44:35 — Medium-high Confidence Inputs
00:45:33 — Consistency and Assumptions
00:46:18 — The Picture
00:49:45 — FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONS
00:50:05 — Wat Defaulting to Attrition
00:51:12 — Drone & Artillery Warfare
00:52:45 — "Mines are the Worst"
00:54:53 — Challenges of Breaching
00:55:53 — Sidenotes on Options...
00:56:33 — "Wagner Line"
00:57:25 — The Ugly
00:58:36 — The Significant
00:59:25 — CONCLUSIONS
01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE
01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Description:
In the opening months of the war, Russia's formidable arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles was directed against a wide array of targets, from ground based air defences to military bases and infrastructure. For more information on that stage of the campaign, please refer to my previous video on the subject.
But since October, Russia has turned both these systems and its newly arrived Iranian drones on Ukraine's critical infrastructure instead, particularly its power grid, sending millions into rolling (or total) blackouts.
These attacks have all the hallmarks of strategic bombing, an attempt to destroy the ability and will of a nation to resist by striking targets behind the lines. It seems reasonable to assume that Russia's focus has thus turned from using its best weapons to destroy military units, to coercing the population and Government of Ukraine to surrender.
That is not a new idea, and in this episode I examine the nature of the new Russian campaign, discuss historical strategic bombing campaigns and their outcomes, and try to build a better understanding of these attacks and what they might achieve.
Caveats:
Any attempt to discern exactly what Russia's intention is with these strikes is obviously limited by the fact that information on decision making in the Russian Government is extremely limited. This video is based on attempting to divine their motivation based on their actions.
I also want to stress that announcements by all parties regarding these acts should be scrutinised closely - including all discussion of damage or interception rates.
estimates on production rates and stockpiles is subject to wide error margins.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Sources:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey - summary reports
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0020_SPANGRUD_STRATEGIC_BOMBING_SURVEYS.pdf
RUSI - Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022
Russia declaring various attacks illegal/terrorism
tass.com/politics/1520069
tass.com/politics/1544997
tass.com/russia/1529537
euronews.com/2022/12/06/fire-at-russian-airport-labelled-as-terrorist-attack-by-moscow
Coverage of civilians facing hardship (for illustrative purposes)
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/09/mykolaiv-water-infrastructure-ukarine-war
foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/07/ukraine-is-on-the-edge-of-a-complete-blackout
Energy support to Ukraine (for illustrative purposes)
kyivindependent.com/news-feed/eu-will-give-ukraine-200-transformers-40-heavy-generators-to-support-energy-sector
https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410869/finland-supports-energy-sector-in-ukraine
Credit to Russia Media Monitor for their monitoring of Russian state TV (so I don't have to)
twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS
00:01:46 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?
00:02:33 — SPONSOR: MORNING BREW
00:03:38 — SOURCING
00:04:45 — STRATEGIC BOMBING 101
00:04:51 — What Is Strategic Bombing?
00:05:35 — Initial Experiments
00:06:02 — WWII
00:07:17 — From Pyongyang to Linebacker
00:08:07 — "Precission" Stretegic Bombing?
00:08:43 — Russian Strategic Bombers
00:09:39 — RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN SO FAR
00:09:43 — The Early Missile Campaign
00:12:21 — Targeting Switch
00:13:39 — For What Purpose?
00:15:54 — Why Energy?
00:19:06 — November-December
00:20:42 — The Russian Defence
00:22:18 — The Russian Standard (Crimean Bridge)
00:23:01 — The Russian Standard I (Attacks on Ships in Sevastopol)
00:23:49 — The Russian Standard (Drone Attack)
00:24:53 — Way Forward
00:25:40 — DOES IT DESTROY INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL
00:26:01 — Paralysing Production
00:27:23 — The Oil Story
00:28:48 — The Leuna Saga
00:29:49 — Persistence and Precision
00:30:51 — The Ukraine Problem
00:31:37 — DOES IT DESTROY MILITARY POTENTIAL?
00:31:51 — Mobility & Communications
00:34:15 — The Cost of Defence
00:35:26 — Total Impact
00:36:38 — DOES IT BREAK MORALE?
00:37:08 — Meet Giulio Douhet
00:38:29 — USSBS Findings
00:40:26 — Korea & Vietnam
00:42:04 — Ukrainian Morale
00:44:19 — SUSTAINABILITY
00:44:33 — "Russia is Running out of Missiles"
00:48:31 — Sustaining the Offensive
00:50:48 — Sustaining Air Defence
00:51:45 — The Supply Challenge
00:53:28 — Critical Infrastructure
00:55:12 — ADAPTATION
00:55:26 — The Straight Line Trap
00:56:31 — Target Adaptation
00:57:47 — System Adaptation
00:59:00 — Social Adaptation
01:01:57 — WHAT NEXT?
01:02:04 — A Supply Race
01:02:47 — Adaptation
01:03:54 — Counterstrike Potential
01:05:17 — BUT IN THE END...
01:07:39 — Suffering, not victory
01:09:46 — CONCLUSIONS
01:11:52 — CHANNEL UPDATE
The 2022 phase of the war in Ukraine began in the closing weeks of winter, with a February offensive rapidly coming to face the onset of mud and thawing conditions.
Now, in December, Ukraine prepares for a full winter of full-scale, conventional conflict.
Winter conditions are extremely demanding, both on manpower and materiel, and in this episode we look a little closer at what is involved in operating in cold weather conditions, how cold Ukraine gets, and how prepared both sides seem to be for the onset of their winter war.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
Getting a holistic picture on the quality of supply and training for Ukrainian and Russian units is difficult. Social media and visual evidence are useful sources, but will only ever represent a small sample of overall units. Analysis is based on, and limited by, the available information.
On second listening, this video includes some wording that could have been tightened up. For example, I think I say efficiency regarding battery performance in cold word when 'capacity' would have been more accurate.
When I suggest that both sides are likely to launch offensives, I do not mean that both will likely launch operations at the same scale, simply that both will identify local opportunities to exploit conditions.
Comments on recent publicity around certain sponsors on YT towards the end of this video simply represent me restating what I have heard, and do not constitute an accusation of any wrongdoing by any actor.
Sources/Extra Reading:
ATP 3-90.97 Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations
irp.fas.org/doddir/army/atp3-90-97.pdf
ATP 3-21.50 Infantry Small-Unit Mountain and Cold Weather
Operations
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30234-ATP_3-21.50-000-WEB-1.pdf
Supply of winter equipment:
reuters.com/world/europe/nato-calls-allies-supply-winter-uniforms-ukrainian-army-2022-09-09
telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/22/dead-winter-beckons-poorly-equipped-russian-forces-ukraine
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/latvian-companies-begin-producing-winter-uniforms-for-armed-forces-of-ukraine/
reuters.com/world/canada-announces-new-military-package-ukraine-after-russian-missile-attacks-2022-10-12
UD 6-81-7 E
INSTRUCTION IN WINTER SERVICE
USE AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT
https://www.forsvaret.no/en/organisation/centre-of-excellence-cold-weather-operations/handbook-and-lectures/english-handbooks
Ukraine has enough gas for winter, prime minister says
reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-has-enough-gas-winter-prime-minister-says-2022-11-04
Credit to relevant Twitter aggregators referenced in this video, e.g.
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1596509527293235213/photo/1
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1555002181509586944
twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1595515700810027008
Order of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation dated November 4, 2022 No. 547 "On approval of the List of information in the field of military, military-technical activities of the Russian Federation, which, if received by foreign sources, can be used against the security of the Russian Federation
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211170017?index=0&rangeSize=1
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — *OPENING WORDS*
00:02:54 — *WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT?*
00:04:14 — _*HOW COLD IS COLD*_
00:04:34 — Categorising Cold
00:05:17 — Wet Cold
00:06:33 — Dry Cold
00:07:18 — Intense Cold
00:08:05 — Extreme Cold
00:08:54 — Hazardous Cold
00:09:54 — How Cold Does Ukraine Get?
00:11:12 — _*TACTICAL LEVEL*_
00:11:24 — Concealment and Movement
00:13:57 — Protecting the Person
00:16:30 — Equipment Issues
00:17:46 — Mounting Requirements
00:19:35 — Training and Discipline Premium
00:23:14 — What Does it Mean?
00:25:23 — _*OPERATIONAL LEVEL*_
00:25:42 — Not a Time to Stop
00:27:25 — Historical Engagements
00:28:42 — Enabling Movement
00:29:48 — Pushing Logistics
00:31:12 — The Aerial Dimension
00:32:55 — _*HOW WELL PREPARED ARE THEY*_
00:33:17 — Not Their First Winter War
00:34:56 — The MOBIK Problem
00:36:39 — Gearing Up for Winter
00:38:09 — The Russian Situation
00:39:34 — The Full Spectrum
00:40:58 — Real Solutions
00:41:20 — The Role of Volunteers
00:42:39 — Are They Ready?
00:45:25 — Leadership at All Levels
00:47:18 — Operational Concerns
00:48:40 — The Fuel of War
00:49:38 — So, On Balance?
00:51:10 — _*WHAT TO EXPECT?*_
00:51:24 — Objectives
00:53:23 — Operational Tempo
00:54:13 — Realities at the Front
00:55:31 — _*STRATEGY LEVEL*_
00:55:43 — Winter Economics
00:56:22 — Russian Comfort
00:57:02 — Threats
00:58:45 — The Will Go On
01:00:23 — *CONCLUSIONS*
01:01:55 — *CHANNEL UPDATE*
In the video I'm pretty sure I say you get the Matilda Black Prince - it's actually the Excelsior, which is a decent tank capable of moving faster than walking speed (unlike my TOG II). You also get a bunch of in game currency, seven days of premium, and rental access to three solid vehicles - Tiger, Cromwell, and T-34/85. Only for new players though!
Importantly though - I want to stress the Chieftain is appearing in a personal capacity for his video segment, not as a rep of Wargaming or WoT.
Description:
Military modernisation is a complex task for any state. Individual system selection is usually based on competitive trials and an extensive review and evaluation process.
Usually.
Poland's plans are a little different - ordering what is basically an entire new army's worth of equipment (with more tanks than many other major European states combined) from the Republic of Korea without any sort of extended trials process.
In this episode, I ask the question of why a country in Europe would suddenly buy 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery pieces from a country half way around the world without so much as a trials program for the tank.
To comment on why Poland may have selected the K2 - I've invited back the Chieftain to give a tanker's expert view on the question.
Thank you as always for engaging with this study of defence economics in action, and we'll return to topics examining the Ukraine war next week.
Caveats:
There are two big caveats over this one.
The first is that announcements (as used as a key source here) doesn't always mean a program will deliver on time or as announced. 1,000 tanks ordered could become 500, delivery times might change etc. In fact, I'd go so far as to say they PROBABLY WILL change in many respects. This is a massive block of procurement that will challenge the heck out of any procurement office, let alone one that has not had to deal with this volume in recent years.
The second is that some statements are based on what you might call industry rumour, scuttlebutt, 'common knowledge' or what have you. I have tried to flag these where they come up.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Sources & Further Reading:
2021 platform figures are MB2021 as usual for the sake of consistency between episodes.
NATO expenditure figures are per NATO as normal:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htm
For PPP calculations - see detailed sourcing in my video on European Defence
Polish announcement on domestic production:
https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/himars-and-k239-chunmoo-launchers-will-be-partially-produced-in-poland
RE: Technical modernisation plans
defence24.com/armed-forces/poland-to-spend-133-billion-on-modernization-of-the-armed-forces-new-f-16-to-be-ordered
Polish MoD publications:
https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/defenceconcept-publication
Polish Abrams Procurement announcement example:
defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/05/poland-signs-475-billion-abrams-tank-deal-as-russias-war-speeds-procurements
"USAF plan to Divest to Invest is too risky" - Gen. John Michael Loh (ret.) (presented without either endorsement or critique)
defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/11/16/us-air-forces-divest-to-invest-plan-is-too-risky
K9 production for Poland:
https://www.edrmagazine.eu/hanwha-rolls-out-24-k9pl-howitzers-for-poland
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — OPENING WORDS
00:02:06 — WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT
00:03:04 — SPONSOR: WORLD OF TANKS
00:04:32 — *THE POLISH MILITARY*
00:04:44 — A Cold War Force
00:06:23 — Between East and West
00:07:42 — The Military of 2021
00:08:20 — Designed with Purpose
00:10:32 — Poland's Competing Requirements
00:12:03 — The Polish DIB
00:13:13 — Borsuk & Krab
00:14:12 — *THE BUYING SPREE*
00:15:34 — K2
00:16:10 — K9
00:16:56 — K239
00:19:34 — FA-50
00:19:57 — A "Diverse" Fleet
00:20:54 — *HOW ARE THEY AFFORDING IT*
00:20:58 — Divest to Invest
00:22:34 — Budgets and Margins
00:24:03 — But it is Expensive
00:25:15 — *WHY KOREAN*
00:25:25 — An Extensive Order Book
00:26:12 — *ASSESSING K2*
00:26:22 — Guest: The Chieftain
00:36:55 — *THE INDUSTRIAL DIMENSION*
00:37:27 — More Than Just Speculations
00:38:32 — *KOREAN EXPORT STRATEGY*
00:38:49 — A Growing Player
00:39:29 — RoK Arms Exports (SIPRI TIV 2001-21)
00:39:53 — Competitive Advantages
00:41:21 — Playing to Their Strengths
00:42:20 — The Strategy
00:43:31 — *TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & MARKET PENETRATION*
00:43:42 — S1: Imported Hardware
00:45:52 — S2: Domestic Production
00:48:05 — S3: Joint Development & Marketing
00:49:36 — *TARGET EUROPE*
00:49:54 — The European Market
00:50:57 — Entrenched Actors
00:51:43 — Evolving Tank Fleets
00:53:09 — A Third Competitor
00:55:20 — The Korean Offer
00:56:48 — CONCLUSIONS
00:57:50 — CHANNEL UPDATE
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perun
Description:
While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion centre on the battle for Kyiv and the reverses Russia suffered there, in the South, the Russian invasion was altogether more successful in its opening moves.
Advancing from Crimea, the Russians rapidly secured a number of critical positions in the South of the country, including a regional capital on the right bank of the Dnipro, the city of Kherson.
The fighting to take back Kherson would be some of the hardest for Ukrainian forces. They would face a number of high quality Russian units who were heavily dug in, and they would do it over unfavourable ground.
The fighting would take months and claim many lines before the final Russian withdrawal in November.
This is the story of that campaign - from the city's fall to its liberation, along with some of the lessons and observations that we can (with admittedly low confidence levels) make using the data available so far.
Caveats:
Data quality and certainty will always vary video to video. In the case of this video, the topic in question is battlefield movements and the conduct of operations. As such, there is a considerably lower level of confidence than there are over major economic patterns for example.
I expect that at least some of this analysis will be refuted or augmented by later discoveries or data releases - at which point I will prepare an update. But given the implications of this campaign, I thought it best to try and tell the story now, with the best information we currently have available.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Further Reading/Sources:
Several maps used credit of the Institute for the Study of War, eg.
understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2022
Visually confirmed loss statistics as per Oryx:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html (and Ukr equivalent)
RE: Russian media statements - special credit to the work of people like Julia Davis & Wartranslated
twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
twitter.com/wartranslated?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
Telegram extracts from both the Russian MoD and Russia's Kherson administration are used - as always I do not link directly to these but they are credited here
Regarding the Antonovski campaign - the best thread documenting strikes and inadvertent BDA is maintained by the Twitter User Special Kherson Cat
mobile.twitter.com/bayraktar_1love
twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1558720653347487745?lang=en
Graphics from the videos of Kings and Generals Included:
youtu.be/yBZPE9o2gHU
And as always thanks to other OSINT channels and aggregators, including Ukraine Weapons Tracker twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
....and to all those interviewed or questioned directly in preparation for this video.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:36 — What Am I Talking About?
00:03:18 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
00:04:29 — The Fall of Kherson
00:07:20 — Victory at Mykolaiv
00:09:34 — Steady Transition
00:10:19 — The Shaping Campaign
00:12:06 — Telegraphing the Offensive
00:14:25 — The Himars Campaign
00:16:51 — The Crimean Dimension
00:17:51 — Concentrating Capability
00:20:00 — The Campaign Begins
00:21:44 — The Attack Goes In
00:22:42 — Russia Claim Victory
00:24:52 — Announcing Victory
00:26:04 — Continuing Pressure
00:27:21 — Supply, Attrition, Corrosion
00:28:05 — The Story of a Bridge
00:29:33 — Back and Forth
00:31:45 — Final Days
00:32:55 — The End
00:33:04 — The First Cracks
00:34:42 — The Withdrawal
00:39:03 — Reclamation
00:40:09 — Losses and Military Observations
00:44:39 — New Capabilities...
00:46:06 — ... And Old Ones
00:47:10 — The Cost of Victory...
00:47:52 — ... And of Defeat
00:49:10 — Interrogating Losses
00:50:48 — Some Very Old Stuff...
00:53:33 — Reactions & Significance
00:53:52 — Ukrainian Elation?
00:55:35 — Russia - Confusion and Anger
00:57:39 — International Community
00:58:55 — Discrediting "Annexation"
01:01:00 — What Next?
01:01:12 — Reading the Terrain
01:03:55 — Redeployment Opportunities
01:05:23 — Towards a Winter Campaign
01:07:24 — Conclusions
01:10:19 — Channel Update
Sponsored by Morning Brew
A note on враньё "Vranyo" : In this video I use the term "Vranyo" to describe a particular pattern or type of lying. Consulting with many Russian speakers in preparation for this segment, i got many conflicting definitions of враньё with some suggesting it was derogatory, others that there was no difference between it and ложь, while others said it was the perfect term for the phenomenon described.
In the end I have used it because it is a neat term to describe a complex practice/phenomenon, but understand that it is being used as a label, not as an unambiguous code word for these practices of collective, knowing deception.
Description:
The performance of a military system is about more than the sum of its equipment, manpower, and training. Culture and practices are critical.
The Russian army appears to suffer from serious cultural issues. Corruption is a key one, while the practice of making up obvious lies to cover up the real state of affairs (which everyone then goes along with) and telling the boss what they want to hear at all costs - those practices enable corruption to thrive, and seriously undermine battlefield decision making.
In this episode, we look at the culture of deception in the Russian army, explore some of the common complaints, and discuss some ways it may (I am not a Kremlinologist) potentially impact or have impacted Russian decision making in Ukraine.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
As noted below in sourcing, the existence of "Vranyo" is a cultural phenomenon that is hard to measure. While we can find evidence of it at a macro level, attestations for its prevalence are based on interviews, anecdotes, and complaints from former conscripts, serving personnel, and ordinary Russians.
As such this video should be taken as describing a phenomenon and some of the damage it can cause - but I do not make any assertion over exactly how widespread it is.
I also stress that this sort of lying appears in many organisations where people are encouraged 'to 'tell the boss what they want to hear'
I am also not a Kremlin whisperer - so my discussion of how Vranyo at that level is obviously purely hypothetical.
Sources and extra reading:
The Russian Way of War - Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernisation of the Russian Ground Forces (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth)
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
Opposing force tactics, TC 7-100.2
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdf
Composite credits to the work of translators of Russian commentary like Dmitri of Wartranslated
twitter.com/wartranslated?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
TASS on Fake News Laws
tass.com/politics/1416591
Translation of alleged letter by the 155th regarding the incompetence and deception of Rustam Muradov
twitter.com/i/web/status/1589298282085646337
Russian Denial of the above
reuters.com/world/europe/russia-issues-rare-denial-pointless-losses-by-brigade-ukraine-2022-11-07
Discussion of the alleged purge of the FSB 5th Service:
youtube.com/watch?v=6SA5d2JgazM
Kadyrov threatens to brief Putin
theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/11/putin-loyalist-kadyrov-criticises-russian-armys-performance-over-ukraine-retreat
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:31 — What Am I Talking About?
00:02:12 — SPONSOR: MORNING BREW
00:03:21 — "Vranyo" - A Culture of Lies
00:03:33 — What's in a Word
00:05:02 — Rejecting Reality & Substituting Your Own
00:06:33 — History & Collective Participation
00:08:46 — Stocks vs Soldiers
00:09:07 — Motivation
00:10:16 — Involuntary Participation
00:12:55 — Compounding Falsehood
00:14:42 — Militaries as Networked Systems
00:15:03 — War is not an RTS
00:16:37 — Information Flow Enables Decision Making
00:17:46 — Why is the Russian Army so Vulnerable
00:18:02 — The RUssian Way of War
00:18:38 — War as an Equation
00:20:38 — Forces and Means
00:23:33 — Echelonment (aka Leming Attacks)
00:26:06 — Rigidity and Commander Centric Decision Making
00:28:46 – Objective: Fortressgrad
00:30:25 — The Assault on Fortressgrad
00:31:46 — Start at the Bottom
00:33:35 — The Officers Get Involved
00:35:14 — A Fine Airforce Showing
00:36:08 — Garbage In...
00:38:17 — ...Garbage Out
00:40:52 — Smile For the Cameras
00:41:31 — A Doomed Venture
00:42:23 — Pervasive Complaints
00:45:23 — Vranyo All the Way to the Top
00:46:46 — Understanding Ukraine
00:50:07 — Understanding The Russian Army
00:52:12 — Understanding the Russian Economy & the West
00:53:55 — Understanding Progress
00:54:55 — Tragic Results
00:58:02 — Can You Fix It?
00:58:34 — Failure-Safe Systems
01:00:07 — Trust But Verify
01:01:04 — Entrenched Culture
01:02:16 — Conclusions
01:03:51 — Channel Update
Against the backdrop of that assistance, it's easy to paint Russia as entirely isolated, a pariah state without friends to turn to.
While it may not have the allies that Ukraine does, that is obviously not entirely true. From Iranian drones to North Korean shells, there are signs that Russia is turning to friendly or allied powers for the tools it needs to carry on its war - and in this episode we look at those nations and what impact they've had so far...and may have in the future.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Further Reading:
Relating to the DPRK:
Example of the 100,000 claim -
https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/100000-north-korean-soldiers-could-be-sent-to-bolster-putins-forces-fighting-ukraine/news-story/1126782c8c5e6fe08a8ad2d9fa38dff0
US claims on ammunition sales
politico.com/news/2022/11/02/north-korea-is-secretly-supplying-russia-with-ammunition-kirby-says-00064611
DPRK denials:
theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/north-korea-denies-supplying-weapons-or-ammunition-to-russia
Articles relating to Syria:
The Guardian "20,000 mercenaries" claim -
theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/19/russia-deployed-20000-mercenaries-ukraine-donbas-region
Putin approving the use of Middle Eastern fighters -
reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-volunteers-welcome-help-fight-against-ukrainian-forces-2022-03-11
Tracking Syrian losses in the Civil War
bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/03/27/saa-vehicle-losses-2011-2017
Carnegie on the Syrian mercenaries claim -
carnegieendowment.org/sada/87382
RE: CENTCOM statement
al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/russia-not-sending-syrians-ukraine-just-yet-top-us-general-says
Recruitment efforts
aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/in-syria-moscow-leads-effort-to-recruit-fighters-for-ukraine
english.aawsat.com/home/article/3784656/no-syrian-%E2%80%98mercenaries%E2%80%99-russia%E2%80%99s-war-ukraine-%E2%80%98so-far%E2%80%99
Iran:
Stoltenberg statement on the potential supply of ballistic missiles:
reuters.com/world/iran-could-supply-russia-with-ballistic-missiles-nato-chief-says-2022-11-03
Western claims on Iranian missile supply:
theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/18/iran-agrees-to-supply-missiles-as-well-as-drones-to-russia
Iran acknowledging drone shipments:
abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-acknowledges-sending-drones-russia-time-92701301
CSTO:
TASS on Armenian requests for aid:
tass.com/world/1506567
Caveats:
The supply of weapons or troops by Russia's allies is obviously a matter of great secrecy - as a result, conclusions drawn here are based on available open source information and may not reflect any secret movements or aid
Regarding statements on Iranian or DPRK missile systems - these statements are general and based on assumed or projected paper capabilities. Accurate CEP data on all Iranian missiles compared to Iskander for example is not available.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:03:12 — What Am I Covering?
00:03:49 — Not For Today: The PRC & Russia
00:05:01 — Russia's NATO: The CSTO
00:05:56 — The Commonwealth of Independent States
00:06:46 — Russia's NATO cont.
00:08:23 — Capabilities and Recent History
00:09:44 — Erosion
00:12:16 — DPRK (North Korea)
00:15:35 — Songun's Result
00:17:22 — A Deadly Museum
00:19:27 — Kim's Hundred Thousands
00:21:44 — Ammunition Transfers
00:22:41 — What Could Go?
00:25:25 — Impact & What Next?
00:27:50 — Assad's Syria
00:28:53 — An Ugly War
00:30:19 — Russian Intervention in Syria
00:32:29 — The Syrian Arab Army
00:33:36 — Syria & Ukraine
00:35:09 — The Phantom Mercenaries?
00:37:44 — Impact and What Next?
00:41:36 — Their Own War?
00:42:17 — Iran - Russian and the Islamic Republic
00:44:44 — The Web of Iranian Military Structures
00:47:39 — Iran & Ukraine
00:50:37 — War on the Cheap
00:52:50 — Impact & What Next
00:54:55 — Conclusions
00:57:33 — Channel Update
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perun
Intro:
Throughout 2022, implied or explicit Russian military threats to Europe by Russian politicians or media figures have become so common as to be almost ubiquitous.
In many ways, this is a continuation of long historical pattern dating back to the cold war, when much of Western Europe lived in fear that, at any moment, the Soviet army may come storming West with a phalanx of metal and manpower. For many European leaders, the assumption long was that only the USA could serve as a meaningful counterbalance to the Soviet threat.
Even with the end of the cold war, NATO wargames and academic papers alike have often modeled scenarios where Russian forces maul NATO opponents, occupying the Baltic States or Poland in short order, demanding an American response.
But 2022 has also proven the Russian military is not what it claimed to be, and so it is likewise worth taking stock of what Europe has to offer. For while individually, most European militaries have glaring shortcomings, especially compared to the USA (particularly in the area of munitions storages and readiness rates) taken together they represent and impressive military force.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Sources:
System and manpower figures are as per Military Balance 2021.
NATO budget figures for 2021 (est) are as per NATO release:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htm
NATO Strategic Concept (2022)
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
INIOCHOS '22 exercise (illustrative of joint exercise/training)
https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/allied-fighters-increase-combat-readiness-during-exercise-iniochos-22
UK MOD aircraft flight hour figures
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/827297/Military_flying_hours_by_fleet_FY2018-19.pdf
International Comparisons of Real Military Purchasing Power: A Global Database - Peter Robertson
https://api.research-repository.uwa.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/96622664/DP19.13_Robertson.pdf
Russian politicians suggesting Poland is in line for invasion:
https://archive.ph/pG5dj
Polish Official stating Europe cannot defend itself without the USA
apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-poland-united-states-crimea-07647005997157def8aa16b8cf833b53
Polling on NATO and common defence obligations
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196561.htm
RAND - Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html
Caveats & Corrections:
The use of PPP figures is always fraught with different methods often yielding quite different results. They're useful, and almost certainly necessary if you want an accurate picture, but keep in mind the limitations of the figures used here.
Similarly, while I use MB2021 for consistency between videos for all system/manpower figures, they are not perfect, and in particular the definitions used for active/stored equipment or whether a given unit should count as active/reserve/paramilitary or be ignored entirely is occasionally, in my view, up for debate.
There are also, I believe, three locations where I misspeak in this episode while the backing slides are correct. For example, when the stats on screen refer to PSCs, (big ships) I say coastal combatants or words to that effect. If it sounds odd - check the slide.
Timestamps
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:55 — What Am I Covering?
00:02:46 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
00:03:57 — Evolution Of European Security
00:04:04 — A Militarised Continent
00:05:15 — Nato & The Warsaw Pact
00:06:23 — The Peace Dividend & NATO Expansion
00:08:46 — Ukraine and Beyond
00:10:18 — European Forces Today
00:10:29 — What Are We Counting?
00:11:44 — Let's Talk Money
00:12:23 — GRAPH: Estimated Defence Expenditure (NATO fig.)
00:12:52 — The PPP Factor
00:15:25 — GRAPH: Estimated Expenditure (with PPP Premiums)
00:15:52 — The PPP Picture
00:16:46 — Manpower
00:18:14 — GRAPH: Active Reserve Manpower
00:19:36 — Equipment
00:20:41 — The Full Spectrum
00:21:23 — European Strengths (on Paper)
00:21:38 — European Strengths: Land
00:23:30 — European Strengths: Sea
00:25:42 — European Strengths: Air
00:28:02 — European Strengths: Independent Atomic Deterrence
00:30:47 — Fit For Purpose?
00:32:11 — There is No "European" Military
00:33:41 — Challenges of Division
00:36:20 — Can, Would & Deterrence
00:37:45 — Modernisation
00:38:48 — Depth & Resilience
00:39:56 — Readiness and Mobility
00:41:40 — Comparisons & Capabilities?
00:42:33 — Russia as the Yardstick
00:46:16 — Demonstrated Capabilities
00:48:12 — The Aerial Dimension?
00:49:34 — Cognitive Dissonance?
00:50:44 — The US Comparison
00:51:29 — THe Gap - Power Projection & Nuclear Capabilities
00:54:48 — Opportunities to Grow?
00:57:47 — Conclusions
01:00:07 — Channel Update
But when the Moskva sank, the pattern of naval activity changed dramatically. Now, the Russian fleet stays mostly away from the Ukrainian cost, nervous of missile, drone, and air threats posed by an opponent whose own navy is mostly neutralised.
In this episode I look at the evolving war in the Black Sea, the evolution and role of the Russian navy there, the sinking of the Moskva - and what if any lessons foreign observers might be taking from the war at sea so far.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
The sinking of the Moskva, for all that we have learned, ultimately remains a mystery. I have not interviewed any of her crew, and I am not an expert in the field. I have tried to explain why I adopt conclusions on some matters and decline to make any on others - but even the conclusions made are only at a moderate confidence level.
There could have been more missiles, there could just have been some horrible freak accident involved. The comments therein are thus ultimately the best I can make using the evidence available - but as with so many other things in this war, I expect future evidence will reveal twists we do not now anticipate.
I'd also note there are a few typos that snuck through on the slides - forgive these please.
I'd also like to flag that the use of ground based systems at sea is not an unknow - though it is usually intended as an expedient. In some cases the ships involved may also merely have been transporting the systems, though that does not seem to have been the case in all instances.
Russian naval operations are obviously secret and knowledge presented therein is based on open source information - it is, for example, possible that Russia launches secret incursions against the Ukrainian coast, but the situation described is based on the best available information I have access to.
Finally - yes i know it's a stretch giving the Canadians credit for the Brits torching the White House , but the joke was there
Sources/notable articles:
Russian fleet strengths - composite but primarily Military balance 2021
US accelerating deployment of laser weapons for navy ships
news.usni.org/2022/07/26/cno-missile-attack-on-russian-warship-moskva-moved-navy-to-speed-up-laser-defense-for-ships
Weapon supply data drawn from open source aggregators - including Oryx and official sources, E.G for Germany
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992
Russian navy and PLAN recognition Guides
https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia_Ship_Silhouettes_2021.png?ver=hrKOr75XjW5QYQzVwlVkhw%3d%3d
The Sinking of the Moskva by Christopher Carlson
http://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/pdf/His2022_Sinking_of_Moskva.pdf
Russian claims on Moskva's sinking:
tass.com/russia/1438045
Turkey closing the straits:
aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkey
aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkey
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:15 — What Am I Covering?
00:02:07 — Evolution of the Russian Navy
00:03:00 — Land and Sea Powers
00:04:14 — The Rises and Falls of Russian Naval Power
00:06:07 — Gorshkov's Navy
00:07:16 — The "Soviet Style” of Ship
00:10:00 — The Cost of Firepower
00:11:22 — The 90's
00:12:53 — Putin, Modernisation, Syria & "Kalibrisation"
00:14:45 — Pre-War Strength
00:15:46 — Russian Federation Navy Recognition and Identification Guide
00:16:13 — The Early Stages of the War
00:16:22 — Russian Fleet Strength
00:18:31 — The Opening Salvos
00:20:27 — End of the Ukrainian Navy
00:22:22 — From Snake Island to Odessa
00:24:32 — The Moskva Moment: A Moment That Captured Global Attention
00:26:53 — The Soviet Rustbuckets
00:28:36 — How Did It Happen?
00:30:33 — Moskva Under The Microscope
00:32:51 — State of the Ship
00:35:01 — Incompetence or Arrogance?
00:37:16 — What Did It Mean?
00:38:07 — What Happened?
00:40:19 — Emerging Threats
00:40:39 — The Missile Threat
00:43:27 — Drones and Air Threats
00:44:54 — Networked Intelligence
00:46:24 — What Next?
00:47:10 — Unmanned Systems Introduced
00:49:21 — The Crimean Dimension
00:50:15 — Force Regeneration
00:52:13 — Lessons & Observations
00:53:56 — Paper vs Actual Capabilities
00:55:36 — Soft Factors
01:01:19 — Nowhere to Hide
01:02:27 — Conclusions
01:04:01 — Channel Update
In the opening hours, it seemed that those capabilities may be paying off, with paratroopers inserting at Hostomel without interception by Ukraine's integrated air defence system (IADS). At the same time, Russian columns were (seemingly incomprehensibly) being picked apart by slow moving TB-2 Drones.
But things changed quickly, and since the stabilisation of the situation, the airspace over Ukraine has been contested. Aircraft fly low to avoid interception, while new threats periodically emerge to challenge the equilibrium.
Recently, those include HARM missiles, Iranian and Russian loitering munitions, and cruise missile attacks on civilian infrastructure.
In this video I look at the impact of air-defence systems on the Ukraine war, and what lessons observers may be taking based on the available data.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Gaming Chanel:
youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQ
Caveats:
The two big unknowns sitting behind this one should be obvious - accurate loss data and the burn rate on munitions is hard to come by. Visually confirmed losses diverge heavily from claimed losses in every category, but for aircraft in particular.
While an important topic - it is important to remember that the data here is ...flawed to say the least.
Sources:
Figures for arms exports are SIPRI TIVs for 2001-2021
Figures on pre-war weapon inventories are Military Balance 2021
Individual engagement examples like shootdowns are credited to a range of OSINT aggregators including:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
Usage of Gepards and Osa together in Ukraine:
armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_conflict_war_2022/ukrainian_army_uses_together_german_gepard_air_defense_gun_system_and_russian_sa-8_missile_system.html
On Russian EWAR efforts - Colonel (Retired) Jeffrey Fischer
thedefensepost.com/2022/04/13/russia-electronic-warfare-failure-ukraine
"The Russian Victory Everyone Missed" - Military History not Visualised (note that I don't agree with all of the conclusions therein)
youtube.com/watch?v=SooynsCBOr0&t=229s
Slovakian S-300 supply
aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/slovakia-says-it-has-given-s-300-air-defence-system-to-ukraine
Movement of Russian missiles from Saint Petersburg:
https://yle.fi/news/3-12626182#:~:text=Satellite%20images%20obtained%20by%20Yle%20indicate%20that%20Russia%20has%20been,areas%20for%20Russian%20air%20defence.
Russian sources are as previously stated
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:19 — What Am I Covering?
00:03:34 — Soviet Sam Development
00:05:55 — An Integrated Offering
00:06:32 — Long Range Systems
00:09:06 — Mid-Short Range Defence
00:10:14 — SHORAD, Lots of SHORAD
00:12:25 — The Dominant Actor
00:13:55 — Usage In Ukraine
00:14:10 — The Opening Days
00:16:48 — The Line's Steady
00:19:07 — Contested Airspace
00:19:41 — Disruptive Systems
00:21:18 — The Missile Campaigns
00:22:47 — "Traditional Targets"
00:25:53 — A Failure of SEAD/DEAD
00:27:25 — "Unconventional Targets"
00:28:23 — The TB-2 Experience
00:29:40 — The Himars Problem
00:32:40 — The Orlan Problem
00:35:47 — Losses and Statistics
00:37:04 — Confirmed Russian Losses
00:37:50 — Ukrainian Losses
00:39:00 — Resupply and Sustainment
00:40:49 — Western Systems and Their Deployment
00:42:35 — What Has Been Pledged?
00:44:50 — Inventory Problem
00:45:56 — NASAMS and its Significance
00:48:14 — Themes and Observations
00:48:59 — SEAD/DEAD Are Hard
00:50:44 — Drones - The Vulnerable
00:51:28 — Drones - The Problematic
00:53:42 — New Threats, New Defences
00:55:08 — Old Tools, and New Ones
00:56:22 — EWAR & Software
00:57:17 — A Renewed Market
01:00:06 — Conclusions
01:01:26 — Channel Update
In order to assess what impact that may have on the course of the war though Winter and into 2023, it's important to consider the Ukrainian side of the equation. The Ukrainians have been clear on their ambitions for next year, and set out what they believe their force requirements to be.
So the question becomes - what are those requirements and can they meet them.
In this episode, I explore that question, augmented by excerpts from an interview with the former commander of the US Army in Europe - LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & Corrections:
As stated in the video - I cannot thank Ben Hodges enough for agreeing to participate in this video. He has not reviewed the content of the episode and all views expressed by me remain mine and mine alone.
At one point during this video I say that the US conducted a market survey of firms that could produce 16,000 shells per month - the correct figure is 12,000.
I also refer to the supply of aircraft by Bulgaria. that supply was reportedly of aircraft parts. bulgaria has denied supplying full aircraft from inventory and given it continues to fly its aircraft I have good reason to believe that statement
Sources:
Article by Valery Zaluzhnyi & Mykhailo Zabrodskyi
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.html
US market survey of potential artillery producers:
sam.gov/opp/90113cce8c9a452a93fc5c7db958dac2/view
Credit to the regular OSINT channels who collect video and visual evidence of weapon systems, ammunition, and losses in Ukraine:
Oryx - twitter.com/oryxspioenkop
Ukraine Weapons Tracker- twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
1995 artillery shell inventory - intended to illustrate the fact that the USSR was not the only power to stock up on shells
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-89.htm
CSIS piece on US weapons supply bottlenecks to Ukraine
csis.org/analysis/united-states-running-out-weapons-send-ukraine
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:40 — What Am I Covering?
00:03:14 — LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)
00:04:16 — Ukraine Pre-February
00:05:29 — Wartime Evolution
00:07:28 — Force '23 - Ukraine's Military Objectives
00:08:37 — The Force Requirement
00:09:37 — Manpower vs Metal
00:10:46 — Interview pt.I: Ukrn Force Generation
00:11:34 — Interview pt.I: Answer
00:13:23 — Can It Be Done?
00:14:02 — Heavy Weapons
00:14:10 — Warsaw Standard
00:15:47 — Interview pt.II: Equipment
00:16:16 — Interview pt.II: Answer
00:18:51 — Nato Armour?
00:20:56 — Interview pt.III - Nato Armour?
00:21:20 — Interview pt.III - Answer
00:22:33 — Maintenance and Sustainment
00:23:33 — Russia's Own Advantages
00:24:28 — Interview pt.IV: Overcoming Maintenance and Sustainment Challenges
00:24:59 — Interview pt.IV: Answer
00:29:36 — Long Range Capabilities
00:32:12 — Munition & Shell Crisis
00:33:11 — Sustaining the Soviet(+) Systems
00:35:12 — Unconventional Sources
00:35:54 — Iran's Contribution?
00:37:20 — Nato Standard in Quantity
00:38:51 — Feeding The Guns
00:39:32 — Interview pt.V: Feeding The Guns
00:40:16 — Interview pt.V: Answer
00:44:02 — Case Study: US Industry Response
00:45:54 — Case Study: US Ammo Production
00:47:40 — Is Production up to the Task?
00:49:48 — Interview pt.VI: Is the West capable of sustaining Ukraine?
00:50:22 — Interview pt.VI: Answer
00:51:36 — The Force Generation Race
00:52:03 — What About the Russian Effort?
00:52:46 — Interview pt.VII: Russian and Ukrainian Mobilisation Assessment
00:53:10 — Interview pt.VII: Answer
00:54:17 — What About The Russian Effort? - Cont.
00:55:02 — Interview pt.VIII: Likely Failure Point for the Russian Military?
00:55:33 — Interview pt.VIII: Answer
00:59:57 — Who wins the Force Generation Race?
01:00:54 — Interview pt.IX: Final Reflections and Predictions
01:01:21 — Interview pt.IX: Answer
01:04:28 — Conclusions
01:06:42 — Channel Update
For nearly seven months, the war in Ukraine was not really regarded as a genuine war by the Russian government. The fighting would be done not by a fully mobilised Russian force, but by regular units, mercenaries, and Donbass conscripts - Russia's own conscripts would stay at home.
But after seven months the result of that complacency was a crushing shortage of manpower to feed Russian frontline units. Ukrainian mobilisation had made good manpower losses and allowed the formation of entirely new units - while the Russian regular army, still undoubtedly a powerful force, found itself overstretched and forced to trust sections of the front to proxies or Rosgvardia.
The results of that policy were obvious during the Kharkiv offensive.
Now, Russia has decided to double down and recommit to war. Announcing mobilisation, enacting stop-loss, and 'annexing' parts of Ukraine.
In this video, I explore why, how it's going, and what the implication may be.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
All my videos suffer from fog-of-war effects, but this one is especially difficult because it relies on things that are hard to quantify. The morale of Russian conscripts for example, is critical to the impact this mobilisation has, but is difficult to assess from open sources. As such, take my observations in this video as an attempt to surface relevant considerations, rather than any kind of confident or definitive assessment.
I also want to stress that while I focus on some of the difficulties Russia is facing during the mobilisation I want to bring one point home yet again.
Russia may be able to find its feet and generate new units if given time and an absence of battlefield pressure. It would be wrong to write off Russian mobilisation potential - and thus It is reasonable to assess that the importance of Ukraine accumulating additional resources in order to compensate is more vital than it has been in months (in my humble opinion).
Notes on Sourcing:
CSIS piece on Russian force design and manpower issues
csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/best-or-worst-both-worlds
Aljazeera (just as an illustration of media coverage) on Russian recruitment strategies prior to mobilisation:
aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/18/russia-turns-to-trucks-and-big-wages-to-woo-volunteer-soldiers
Full text of the mobilisation order:
https://www.politico.eu/article/text-vladimir-putin-mobilization-decree-war-ukraine-russia/
Many of the DLPR/Russian sources used in this video should be familiar to those on this channel. Given the nature of many of these individuals, I do not directly link their content (and obviously do not endorse their views). But these are easy to find if verification is desired. Often quoted for example is Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of a 'regular' unit of the (now defunct) so called 'DPR.'
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Khodakovsky
Again, credit to Rob Lee and others for their work collecting and reporting on Russian obituaries and unit casualty identification.
twitter.com/RALee85
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:40 — What Am I Covering?
00:02:41 — Sponsor: BLINKIST
00:04:20 — The Problem
00:04:48 — Strategic Inputs
00:06:24 — Russia's 'Unused Strength'
00:08:22 — 1GTA: Instructors and Missileers
00:09:26 — Driving Issues
00:09:37 — I1: Casualties and Attrition
00:11:03 — I2: Contract Lapses
00:13:36 — I3: Recruitment Deficit
00:15:46 — I4: Deployment Restrictions
00:16:58 — Bleeding or Just Fading Away?
00:18:12 — Preparation & Denial
00:19:47 — The Announcement
00:21:07 — The Document
00:22:45 — Reality Might be a Bit Different...
00:23:04 — Stop-Loss & Referenda
00:23:15 — Stop-Loss, Russian Style
00:25:07 — Redefining Russia
00:27:36 — Mobilisation
00:27:51 — Russian Reserves/Resources
00:28:12 — What Are the Russian "Reserves"
00:28:50 — Russian Reserve Readiness
00:29:30 — Who is Being Called Up
00:30:52 — Making Quota
00:32:57 — Training Standards
00:35:42 — Training Failures at the Personal Level
00:37:40 — Equipment Standards
00:39:17 — BYO Kit
00:42:14 — Acknowledging Missteps
00:44:26 — Public Responses
00:45:52 — Motivations for Evasion
00:46:45 — Evaluating the Public Response
00:48:11 — Impacts & Questions
00:48:52 — Q1: Training Pipeline
00:52:27 — Q2: Morale
00:54:26 — Q3: Utilisation
00:56:14 — Stabilising the Situation
00:57:51 — Learning from Ukraine
01:00:44 — A Workable Proxy?
01:03:34 — Inflection Potential?
01:05:23 — Towards General Mobilisation...
01:07:18 — More Painful War
01:09:00 — Conclusions
01:11:43 — Channel Update
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perun
SPECIAL THANKS:
PLEASE CHECK OUT THE CHIEFTAIN:
youtube.com/c/TheChieftainsHatch
Intro:
Captured equipment has been a feature of human conflict going back to the point where one human stole another human's bashing rock.
But normally there are limits on how much it can be used. Supplying, repairing, or training on captured hardware is usually a difficult thing - unless the enemy is using basically the same kit you are.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine involves a contest between two sides using compatible (largely) Soviet or Post-Soviet kit, coupled with a Russian force that seems predisposed towards abandoning equipment to the enemy.
The result is that Ukraine (supplied by its farmers in some cases) has made extensive use of captured kit (as have the Russian aligned proxies). This video looks at some of the data behind that captured kit, discusses some of the challenges involved in recovery and repair (thanks to a guest contribution by everyone's favourite US Officer, Nicholas Moran) and the strategic significance of all this stuff that's been recovered and reused.
Enjoy - and join me next week for a look at Russia's mobilisation announcement...
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
Many caveats are gone over in the video but the regular ones around fog of war and data uncertainty apply. Specifically, I want to point out that while I have a good body of evidence on the 93rd Mechanised and their use of captured equipment, such things a liable to change as equipment is knocked out or rotated and I obviously can't go down and check myself.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:51 — What We're Covering
00:04:08 — Sponsor: GROUND NEWS
00:05:42 — Kyiv Thrust
00:06:59 — Abandoned On Withdrawal
00:08:30 — Kharkiv Reprise
00:10:06 — Putting It In Numbers
00:11:08 — Understanding "Captures", & Challenges With Sources
00:14:54 — Categorisation
00:17:01 — BDAR With An Expert
00:19:00 — BDAR With An Expert: Self Recovery
00:20:57 — BDAR With An Expert: Like-Vehicle Recovery
00:24:06 — BDAR With An Expert: Dedicated Recovery
00:30:42 — BDAR With An Expert: How Russia Categorises Its Repairs
00:34:16 — BDAR With An Expert: Replacement Components
00:38:54 — Like-vehicle Recovery & Self Recovery
00:40:13 — Tractor Brigade
00:42:43 — Specialised Recovery Assets
00:44:18 — Informal Procedures
00:46:52 — Frontline & Informal Repair
00:48:02 — Rear Area Capital Repair - A Significant Challenge
00:49:50 — Primary Contributors
00:50:44 — Calling Out Bulgaria
00:53:10 — Quantities & Significance
00:55:06 — Captured, Abandoned, & Foreign Supplied Equipment (ORYX)
00:56:32 — Evidence Of Deployment
00:59:04 — Ammunition & Smaller Items
01:00:40 — Let's Talk AA
01:02:26 — The Sensitive & Secret
01:04:40 — You All Wanted To Hear About It
01:06:40 — Conclusions
01:08:08 — Channel Update
Extra Reading:
Oryx - Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
Jakub Janovsky - critical to supporting the Oryx work
twitter.com/Rebel44CZ
Counteroffensive: Russian losses - @ragnarbjartur on Twitter
datastudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/dfbcec47-7b01-400e-ab21-de8eb98c8f3a/page/p_gqerfsjkyc?s=tWeosgYXPTU
A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks and Artillery - NYT
nytimes.com/2022/08/30/world/europe/ukrainian-soldiers-weapons-front-line.html
Poland multinational repair hub discussion
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/in-eastern-poland-the-creation-of-a-center-for-the-repair-of-equipment-of-ukraine-is-being-considered/
Czech companies to repair Ukrainian tanksreuters.com/world/europe/czech-companies-repair-damaged-ukrainian-tanks-2022-04-19
Fantastic OSINT complication of interesting vehicle captures/sightings
twitter.com/UAWeapons
Thank you to those sources who contributed to the preparation of this video.
Then suddenly the Ukrainians launched their operation in Kharkiv Oblast, and within less than a fortnight, the Ukrainians would reclaim more territory than Russian forces had gained in months of bombardment and attrition-driven advances.
The war in Ukraine began with desperate defensive operations by the Ukrainian armed forces and population. Russian forces ended the first days pushing on the Ukrainian capital as the Ukrainians called for anyone capable of holding a rifle to stand up to defend the capital.
Now, it sees Ukrainian mobile units launching exploitation operations and forcing storied units like 1st Guards Tank Army to give up its positions at Izium rather than risk encirclement.
It's a heck of a story, one for the history books - and while it's still an evolving situation and data is thin, I thought it was worth asking three questions.
What the heck just happened, how did it happen, and what does that mean for the war to come?
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats & corrections:
On certainty:
As noted in the video, developing situations like this one are covered in just about the thickest layer fog that one can get. I have done my best using the sources available, but be prepared for some of the details to be contradicted in coming days and months.
On losses: The loss data used in this presentation is incorrectly labelled ' in 7 days.' The figures were updated prior to recording to cover more of the offensive period, but the 7 day marker war not.
On the use of Russian language in Ukraine:
At one point I talk about people in the liberated areas greeting Ukrainian troops in Russian. As this is a contentious point I wanted to make clear that I meant that in a majority of the videos I saw, Russian was used. Overall, the Oblast has a diverse linguistic environment, with the distribution between those who use Ukrainian and Russian as a first language varying between cities, towns etc. When I describe Kharkiv as an Oblast that was meant to have Russian sympathies, I mean that from the point of view of the Russian pre-war narrative, not as an objective appraisal.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:01:20 -- What Am I Covering?
00:01:52 -- Caveats
00:03:28 -- War By The Numbers
00:04:34 -- Inputs To Warfighting Capability
00:05:15 -- PHASE 1: To Kyiv And Back
00:05:25 -- Ukraine Before The Storm
00:07:00 -- Putin's Greatest Gamble
00:07:15 -- Critical Points: The Morale Factor
00:08:06 -- Critical Points: Rallying, Not Running
00:08:45 -- Critical Points: Resupply
00:09:26 -- Inputs & Trends
00:11:09 -- PHASE 2: The Grind
00:11:30 -- Advance In The Donbass
00:12:35 -- The Mobilisation Race
00:14:17 -- Ukrainian Fire Capabilities
00:15:15 -- Bakhmut & Pisky
00:17:53 -- The Kherson Telegraph
00:20:02 -- Clues On Unit Preparation
00:22:24 -- Southern Grind
00:27:28 -- Counter Offensive In The Donbas
00:30:06 -- Numbers & Scale
00:32:18 -- There Is No Panic
00:35:48 -- Confusion & Liberation
00:37:04 -- Rout Or Repositioning?
00:40:05 -- Assessed Control Of Terrain In Ukraine
00:41:30 -- Exploitation, Insult & Injury
00:43:21 -- The Materiel Losses
00:46:12 -- A Story of 1GTA
00:51:02 -- Black Mark On The Russian Air Force
00:52:51 -- The Moral
00:57:18 -- Cracks In Russia?
01:00:26 -- The Manpower Problem
01:04:18 -- It's Not Over Yet
01:06:02 -- Pressure To Slow Down
01:07:02 -- Full Range Of Outcomes
01:08:12 -- Trends, Inputs & Outputs
01:10:19 -- The Winter Race
01:10:39 -- Russian Challenges
01:12:39 -- What Ukraine Requires?
01:16:25 -- Steel Over Blood
01:17:30 -- Final Perspective
01:18:45 -- The Political & Personal
01:21:46 -- Political Mobilisation
01:23:37 -- Conclusions
01:25:06 -- Channel Update
Further Reading/Listening:
Discussed article on Ukraine's prospects and needs in 2023
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.html
Credit to Jomini of the West for the Kharkiv battle maps
twitter.com/JominiW?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
"All in!" The Ukrainian Offensives in Cherson and Charkiv - COL. Reisner
youtube.com/watch?v=Q9-NER8aFJ4&t
Visual loss confirmation compilations:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
twitter.com/ralee85/status/1504982786524041221
twitter.com/oryxspioenkop
No panic in Balakleya
twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1567137106006245377
Russian TV discussing Ukrainian nationality and culture
twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1570073307533156353
When we think of major naval powers, we usually think of the big players. The USA, the USSR/Russia & the PRC - but surprisingly enough, in recent times all of them have sold relatively few of their ships and submarines abroad.
How can it be that major naval powers, with significant military shipbuilding capacity, find themselves in this position? Well thanks to the results of the recent topic votes here and on my Patreon, you get to spend the next 56 minutes finding out.
Maximum possible credit to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for making their data freely and publicly available in easy to manipulate formats - it makes covering topics like these much, much easier by providing good, open-source data.
Next week we'll return to Ukraine, but for now, enjoy another dive into defence economics and the arms market.
Caveats:
As always - this video includes only my own personal opinions and does not represent financial advice.
SIPRI data is used as the basis for identifying trends in arms exports, and specific trade register data is also used. As discussed, tracking arms sales, and valuing them all in terms of Trend Indicator Value (TIV) to allow more like-for-like comparisons is difficult. SIPRI data may not be complete (not capturing all transactions) and valuations and national attributions may be made more complicated or difficult based on the structure of a particular deal. As such, it should be treated as informative, but not unambiguously authoritative.
Sources:
Primary data analysis based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Export TIV Registers:
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
US fleet figures sourced from Navy History and Heritage Command:
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html
Commentary on US shipyard capacity
defensenews.com/naval/2021/03/19/the-us-navys-shaky-plan-to-save-its-shipyards-is-getting-overhauled
defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/07/the-us-navys-vaunted-deployment-plan-is-showing-cracks-everywhere
foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/10/us-navy-shipbuilding-sea-power-failure-decline-competition-china
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00 -- Opening Words
02:28 -- What Am I Covering?
04:09 -- Congratulations Mr. President!
05:24 -- Military Ship/Submarine Exports
06:15 -- What is a Competitive Advantage?
08:10 -- The Competitors
08:16 -- The Soviet Union
10:45 -- Meet Sergey
11:33 -- Ship & Submarine Arms Exports - USSR & USA 1970-89
12:10 -- Collapse of the USSR
13:27 -- Renaissance
14:33 -- The Golden Years
15:24 -- Re-collapse & Modern Offering
16:37 -- What do the Russians offer?
18:16 -- What about the Americans?
20:15 -- Market Decline?
20:38 -- Product Problem
23:30 -- The Shipbuilding Challenge
26:31 -- Détente, Not Decay
28:21 -- Second-Hand Dealer
30:53 -- What do the Americans offer?
31:58 -- Made in Europe?
33:24 -- The EU 5
34:54 -- Germany
36:30 -- France
39:36 -- Spain
40:14 -- Italy
41:55 -- The Netherlands
43:25 -- Integrated Offerings
45:09 -- What do the Europeans offer?
46:47 -- Let's Travel to Asia
46:55 -- Korea's Rise
48:01 -- Naval Tradition in Korea
49:26 -- Meet the Big 3
50:54 -- Growing Export Provider
52:54 -- Conclusions
54:42 -- Channel Update
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perun
NOTHING IN THIS VIDEO IS FINANCIAL ADVICE
You asked for a six month update, here it is.
If one thing is clear after six months of fighting in Ukraine, it's that there is little chance of an imminent, overwhelming battlefield victory to end the war.
Instead, the struggle has become (as expected) one of attrition and economics. A question of Russian economic resilience, matched against the will of Ukraine and its allies to carry on the fighting, and Europe's ability to endure rapid and deep cuts in the supply of Russian energy resources.
In this 6 month update on the war, I focus not on the battlefield so much as the politics and economics of the war, and ask the question of how much pain is being inflicted, and if we should expect them to carry on in a way that winning a long war requires.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
In top comment
Sources:
Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey and Tian, Steven and Sokolowski, Franek and Wyrebkowski, Michal and Kasprowicz, Mateusz, Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy
Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=4167193
Putin hikes Russian pensions, plays down Ukraine impact on economy -
reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-announces-10-hike-pensions-minimum-wage-2022-05-25
Timeline of European Sanctions
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/
Financing Putin’s war: Fossil fuel imports from Russia in the first 100 days of the invasion
energyandcleanair.org/publication/russian-fossil-exports-first-100-days
EP Spring 2022 Survey: Rallying around the European flag
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2792
European views on the war in Ukraine:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukraine
Pew Research Centre - views on NATO 2007-2022
pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/international-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-nato-and-russia-in-a-time-of-crisis/pg_2022-07-22_u-s-image_2-02
Poling of Ukraine by NORC at the University of Chicago
https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJ_NORC_Ukraine_Poll_June_2022.pdf
Example of US survey data on Ukraine
static1.squarespace.com/static/5c9542c8840b163998cf4804/t/62f11ac3010ae8217bd58593/1659968203055/MOTN-APMResearchLab-Ukraine%28Aug2022%29.pdf
EU Plans energy market intervention
afr.com/companies/energy/eu-plans-emergency-intervention-in-energy-markets-20220830-p5be0c
Ukraine FOREX reserves
tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/foreign-exchange-reserves
Additional WB aid to Ukraine
worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/08/08/world-bank-mobilizes-4-5-billion-in-additional-financing-for-vital-support-to-ukraine
Ukraine war credit holiday:
reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraines-creditors-agree-two-year-payment-freeze-almost-20-billion-international-2022-08-10
German exports:
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/08/PE22_325_51.html
France restarting reactors france24.com/en/france/20220902-france-to-restart-all-nuclear-reactors-by-winter-amid-energy-crunch
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:01:55 -- What Am I Covering?
00:02:53 -- GROUND NEWS
00:04:27 -- The War and Way Forward
00:04:44 -- A War of Position
00:06:13 -- Look at the Map!
00:07:40 -- How Do You Win?
00:08:23 -- Sanctions & the Economy
00:08:50 -- The Opening Punch
00:10:37 -- Adaptation & The Energy Dividend
00:12:31 -- Where Are We Now? (Officially)
00:13:39 -- Where Are We Now? (Actually)
00:15:43 -- Statistics & Economics Intelligence 101
00:18:57 -- A Moment for Perspective
00:21:21 -- Import Substitution & Demand
00:24:26 -- Capital Flight
00:26:24 -- Stimulus & Reserves
00:29:12 -- What Next?
00:30:34 -- Europe, Ukraine & The USA
00:30:48 -- Ukraine: The War Economy
00:33:14 -- USA: Uncomfortable But Dominant
00:34:53 -- Europe: Holding in There
00:36:32 -- The Energy War
00:36:54 -- Exposed Continent
00:38:22 -- Nervous Beginnings
00:39:43 -- Sanctions: Shots Fired
00:40:59 -- The Squeeze
00:42:19 -- European Response
00:45:27 -- Responses & Options
00:50:19 -- Russian Oil in the Crosshairs
00:54:17 -- The Limits of Coercion
00:58:33 -- The Political Dimension
01:00:33 -- Political Dimension: EU
01:01:56 -- EU Approval Survey
01:02:33 -- Importance of UE Membership Survey
01:03:26 -- Citizens' Positive Image of the EU Survey
01:04:03 -- European Support for Staying the Course
01:05:56 -- Sharp Decline in Favourable Views of Russia
01:08:08 -- American are Hawkish
01:11:38 -- Ukraine & The Will to Resist
01:13:47 -- Ukrainian Determination
01:17:00 -- The Fight Will Go On
01:18:24 -- Conclusions
01:19:59 -- Channel Update
With the fall of the Union, the former Soviet arms industry struggled, but the Russian Federation steadily rebuilt its share of the global market, resting on a reputation as a reliable seller of 'rugged, reliable and affordable' weapons to those in the world without the diplomatic alignment, cash, or desire to purchase Western made equipment.
By 2014, Russian arms exports started to suffer reverses, damaged by sanctions and being cut off from industrial integration with Ukraine. But the industry survived.
Then February 2022 came, and an avalanche of import restrictions, banking and financial sanctions were joined with very public images of missile failures, turret tossing tanks, and an under-performing air-force. With the worst marketing one could hope for, this video explores the potential future for the Russian arms export sector, and its vital role in supporting the sustainability of Russian research and production efforts
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
At several points in this video I say "SU-35" when I mean "SU-75" - in these cases the slides referring to the SU-75 Checkmate are correct, I just misspeak.
I also want to note that SIPRI TIV is obviously not a perfect or the only methodology for estimating arms shipments - but the quantity and quality of the available data makes it a good source for use in my opinion.
Regarding "boomerang" faults in SAMs, I want to be clear that in all cases I have seen, including the Saudi one, the missile does not hit the launcher - I use the term because the missile hooks back In the general direction of the launcher but never hits it obviously.
I also want to stress again the difference between reputational damage and performance damage. In this video I make the case that it appears some Russian systems have underperformed - but that evidence is still needed to fully understand the reasons for those apparent failures. The point from an export perspective is that the reputational damage is more clearly taking place.
I am not, for example, saying that the T-72 was not a great tank for what the Soviets needed when it was designed and produced - only that in Ukraine, the vehicle has done its reputation no favours and that is likely to have impacts for the demand for Russian weapons going forward.
Sources (full source list delayed for a few days):
SIPRI arms registers, e.g. -
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php
SIPRI methodology - sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1212.pdf
Ignoring Ukraine setbacks, Putin touts 'superior' Russian weapons exports
reuters.com/world/europe/putin-boasts-russian-weapons-prowess-says-moscow-is-ready-share-it-with-allies-2022-08-15
Animarchy's video which includes a discussion of Russian IADS
youtu.be/ctfkvpTY5DY
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:00:52 -- Kyiv Arms Expo
00:01:45 -- What Am I Covering
00:02:37 -- History
00:02:39 -- USSR - The Arsenal of Everyone Else
00:04:03 -- No Need for Sticks and Stones
00:04:32 -- Russian Industry Post '91
00:05:36 -- Consolidation & Re-assertion
00:07:33 -- Understanding the Arms Market
00:09:02 -- Production Advantage: German Diesel
00:10:48 -- Diplomatic Advantage: PRC & Pakistan
00:11:55 -- What Does Russia Sell?
00:13:02 -- Russia's Market Share
00:14:13 -- Russian Air-Defence Advantage
00:15:49 -- Russian Aviation
00:17:17 -- The Buyers
00:17:32 -- Politics & Relationships
00:19:31 -- Russia's Main Markets
00:20:41 -- African Influence
00:22:11 -- Product-Purchaser Alignment
00:23:34 -- Recent Trends & Decline
00:25:06 -- Recent Trends & Decline: Line Go Down
00:25:35 -- Recent Trends & Decline: Finances & Bottlenecks
00:27:51 -- Impacts of the War-Product
00:28:13 -- Performance
00:29:41 -- Bad Equipment, Bad Plan, or Bad Army?
00:31:08 -- Reputation
00:32:07 -- WHAT AIR DEFENCE DOING
00:33:47 -- Turret Tossing Tanks
00:35:12 -- Easy Marketing
00:36:52 -- Passive Airforce
00:39:19 -- Does reputation matter?
00:40:50 -- Impacts of the War - Risk Factors
00:41:09 -- Production
00:44:35 -- Availability & Integration
00:45:05 -- Delivery & Sanction Risk
00:46:31 -- Case Studies - India
00:48:15 -- Case Studies - Vietnam
00:50:03 -- But is the Industry Stuffed?
00:52:38 -- Don't Count Russia Out
00:57:02 -- Conclusions
00:58:46 -- Channel Update
The PLA's budget is vastly larger than Russia's but a mere fraction of what the US spends. Despite that, China has gone through an incredibly rapid military modernisation over the last two decades, building new platforms and fielding new technologies so quickly that the gap between its capabilities and the USA has narrowed significantly.
How?
Today I look at the Chinese military budget, industry, and the wonders of purchasing power parity.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00 -- Opening Words
00:07 -- Russia Stronk?
00:41 -- What about the PRC?
01:07 -- Where is all this coming from?
01:39 -- Capability Revolution
02:11 -- What Am I Covering?
03:45 -- Caveats
04:20 -- History
04:23 -- A Revolutionary Army
05:45 -- Contraction and Expansion
07:06 -- Force In Transition
08:21 -- Three Milestones
10:05 -- What's in a Budget?
10:12 -- Inclusions and Exclusions
11:27 -- The Paramilitary Factors
12:23 -- Meet the 中国人民武装警察部队
12:59 -- Chinese Paramilitaries
15:43 -- Inclusions and Exclusions
16:55 -- Building a better budget - IISS method
18:27 -- Getting Closer?
19:12 -- What's a Dollar Worth
22:04 -- Problems with PPP for Military Spending
23:26 -- Creating A defence PPP Index
25:13 -- The Global Picture
27:44 -- Industry
31:10 -- The SOE Problem
33:39 -- Black Holes and Questions
35:47 -- Progress & Momentum
36:06 -- The Spending Balance
37:44 -- Legacy Systems
39:56 -- The Buildup Benefits
41:18 -- Catching up is a curve
42:40 -- Does the line go up forever?
46:53 -- The Closing Picture
47:59 -- Conclusions
49:35 -- Channel Update
50:34 -- Scam Warning
Caveats:
At one point I mention that China was the second nation to field a 5th generation fighter with its J-20. That's lazy wording on my part as the F-35 is a multinational project. I hope my intention in that statement was clear.
As always - this video was produced on the basis of imperfect information, though the sources relied on or discussed are largely captured in the source list below.
This video has been produced to help explain the pace of Chinese military modernisation and give some context to how it has managed to rapidly catch up with other powers. It is my hope that it is taken in the spirit in which it is intended.
I accept that this video, out of necessity, simplifies a range of elements, ranging from the interaction between SOEs in the PRC to the specific budgetary arrangements that are in place in China.
In this video I reference a range of methodologies to try and more accurately compare the value of the PRC defence budget with others (such as Russia or the USA). These examples should be considered approximate, and use methodologies set out in the sources below - I do not personally endorse any given method - they are used to illustrate the concepts involved.
Sources:
PRC 2019 defence white paper:
https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html
Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies (IISS) - iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/assessing-chinese-defence-spending
China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - CRS
sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46808.pdf
Understanding China’s 2021 Defense Budget - CSIS
csis.org/analysis/understanding-chinas-2021-defense-budget
Debating defence budgets: Why military purchasing power parity matters - Peter Robertson - cepr.org/voxeu/columns/debating-defence-budgets-why-military-purchasing-power-parity-matters#:~:text=It%20can%20be%20seen%20that,the%20market%20exchange%20rate%20figure.
A NEW ESTIMATE OF CHINA’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE - SIPRI
sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/2101_sipri_report_a_new_estimate_of_chinas_military_expenditure.pdf
China’s military might is much closer to the US than you probably think- theconversation.com/chinas-military-might-is-much-closer-to-the-us-than-you-probably-think-124487
World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time - SIPRI - sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time#:~:text=China%2C%20the%20world's%20second%20largest,grown%20for%2027%20consecutive%20years.
Measuring Hard Power: China’s Economic Growth
and Military Capacity - Robertson & Sin - ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v28y2017i1p91-111.html
China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress - CRS -
sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
OECD PPP Data (retrieved week of 15/08) -
data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm
The known unknowns of China’s defence budget - Frederico Bartels -
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-known-unknowns-of-chinas-defence-budget/
Previously, I've looked at the way in which Russian force design and political decision-making have left Russian forces with a surplus of heavy equipment, but an inadequate supply of quality infantry.
Today, thanks to a Patron vote, I look at Ukraine's situation. There, the combination of volunteers, popular resistance, and compulsory mobilisation filled the ranks with hundreds of thousands of new troops - but where a shortage of equipment and training has prevented them from realising the true potential of a mobilised, committed nation at war.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
There are three overarching caveats that I want to put forward on this video
- The quality of data on this topic is subject is low and findings generally carry wide error margins
- I do not go into great depth about the distinction between the Ukrainian Army, TDF, NGU, and the many other units that are contributing to the fighting. Please keep in mind the impact these distinctions might have as I go through the presentation.
- This video is not intended to be, in any way, a slight on the fighting power and spirit of Ukrainian troops. I think calling out the issue of equipment shortages as well as the limitations of the mobilisation system in fact attests to what the TDF, Army, and other forces have achieved given their resources.
There are also some smaller ones on terminology that might be worth mentioning:
I use the terms like volunteers and persons 'called up' in a soft fashion. Many of those I describe as 'called up' were called up as a result of voluntary enlistment and registration while largely volunteer formations may include infusions of conscripts.
"Mobilisation" is traditionally associated with the mass call ups of conscripts. The Ukrainian experience is much more of a hybrid, combining popular, spontaneous resistance, the mass enlistment of volunteers, and conscription.
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:01:34 -- What Am I Covering?
00:02:29 -- Today's Sponsor: MORNING BREW
00:03:36 -- Mobilisation - The Concept
00:05:20 -- The Soviet System
00:07:16 -- Ukraine's Reforms
00:09:12 -- The Ukrainian Mobilisation Experience
00:11:22 -- The Opening Callup
00:14:54 -- Evolving Mobilisation
00:17:55 -- Women in Service
00:20:12 -- Demography and Mobilisation
00:23:43 -- Where Are We Now?
00:24:58 -- How Much Materiel Does Ukraine Have?
00:26:25 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures
00:28:16 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures: The Examples
00:30:01 -- The Base-Loss-Replenish Method
00:33:38 -- Observed Equipment Method
00:34:20 -- The New
00:35:13 -- The Old
00:36:06 -- The Ugly
00:37:21 -- Statements/Observations
00:40:30 -- The Combined Picture
00:42:41 -- A Diverse Army
00:43:20 -- So What Needs To Happen?
00:46:28 -- Training & The Training Issue
00:49:43 -- Resolution Methods
00:51:52 -- Earned Veterancy
00:54:11 -- Scale and Sustainability
00:56:06 -- What Does This Mean?
00:58:18 -- Offensive Readiness
01:00:28 -- Future Potential?
01:01:48 -- Conclusions
01:02:54 -- Channel Update
Sources/References:
Ukrainian equipment pre-war:
Military Balance 2021 (as always, for consistency)
Ukrainian loss data:
OSINT visual confirmed:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html
Declared:
odessa-journal.com/it-became-known-what-losses-ukraine-has-suffered-in-military-equipment-since-the-beginning-of-the-war/#:~:text=Since%20the%20beginning%20of%20the%20full%2Dscale%20war%2C%20Ukrainian%20troops,the%20intensity%20of%20the%20war.
Interview with Ruslan Pukhov:
wartranslated.com/russian-defence-research-expert-on-afu-performance-the-effect-of-western-weapon-supplies
Ukraine at War - Paving the Road from Survival to Victory - RUSI (I particularly concur with their contention on priority equipment classes)
ik.imagekit.io/po8th4g4eqj/prod/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web.pdf
Ukrainian Resupply - Pledged or Delivered (estimated)
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
Statements on enrolment of women in Ukraine (in Ukrainian)
ips.ligazakon.net/document/RE37684?an=1
https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou_orders/mou_2021/313_nm.pdf
Visual confirmation on equipment use:
Various, but particular credit to twitter.com/UAWeapons
Original Ukrainian general mobilisation:
dw.com/en/ukraine-president-orders-general-mobilization/a-60908996
NYT piece on some issues with the mobilisation process (I do not share the implied assessment on what realistic standards are during wartime).
nytimes.com/2022/07/25/world/middleeast/ukraine-soldiers-recruitment-draft.html#commentsContainer
Ukrainian mobilisation progress:
bbc.com/news/world-europe-62118953
And so, when the February invasion opened, many observers expected Russia to commence its campaign with a barrage of modern cruise and ballistic missiles, the famous Kalibr and Iskander missiles, destroying Ukrainian command and communications infrastructure. Instead, what followed was a relatively limited campaign the achieved, at best, the temporary suppression of the Ukrainian air forces and air defences.
As the war evolved however, Russia broadened its list of targets and started inflicting a greater toll on Ukrainian targets. For their part, the Ukrainians introduced their own new family of missiles - the GLMRS of HIMARS fame.
In this video I look at that initial missile campaign, the way the campaign evolved subsequently, and what lessons other countries might take from the war to date. I also address the question of sustainability - is Russia running out of these precision munitions, and to what extent do their production facilities have the ability to compensate.
One thing I do want to say as well, is that while I try and take a reasonably detached look at issues like this, I want to make clear that discussing the performance of these systems shouldn't take away from recalling the very real human impact of their use, particularly against civilian targets or in built up areas.
Apologies for the late upload - wasn't well earlier this week and it pushed my recording window back.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:00:31 -- Russia's Most Feared Conventional Weapons
00:01:57 -- What Am I Covering?
00:02:45 -- Doctrine & History
00:03:03 -- Historic Aerospace Talent
00:04:25 -- Soviet Rocketry and Missile Programs
00:05:42 -- Rocketry as a Response
00:08:14 -- A Rocket and Missile Force
00:09:14 -- Doctrine and Usage
00:10:41 -- The Competing Forces
00:10:58 -- The Cutting Edge
00:13:31 -- The Kalibr Showpiece
00:15:11 -- The Old
00:16:34 -- The Improvised
00:18:47 -- Ukraine - the Old, the New, and yet to come
00:22:08 -- Missile Use In Ukraine
00:22:16 -- The Opening Salvos
00:24:22 -- Escalation
00:25:42 -- Send in the Museum Pieces
00:27:52 -- Note on Targeting
00:30:15 -- The Rebuttal
00:33:13 -- Performance Observations
00:33:28 -- Reliability and Performance
00:36:50 -- Targeting and Accuracy
00:41:18 -- Ukrainian use of GMLRS
00:43:59 -- Sustainability?
00:44:08 -- "They're running out"
00:45:39 -- Evaluating the Thesis
00:49:35 -- Production Capacity
00:52:53 -- So is this Sustainable?
00:54:54 -- Lessons for the others
00:55:03 -- ISR is Central
00:57:14 -- Consumption Rates
00:58:42 -- Capability Requirements
01:01:45 -- Potential Importance
01:03:13 -- Conclusion
01:04:34 -- Channel Update
Sources
(incomplete due to late upload, check back in 24-48hrs for more):
Ukrainian and Russian missile strengths:
Various (primarily MB 2021 as always)
Russian doctrine on the use of SSMs:
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdf
Russians claiming use of Onyx ASM against ground targets:
tass.com/defense/1456649
Missed Targets: the Struggles of Russia’s Missile Industry - Maxim Starchak (CEPA)
cepa.org/missed-targets-the-struggles-of-russias-missile-industry/#:~:text=The%20company%20produces%20about%20100,missiles%20for%20the%20Iskander%20system.
Russia and strategic non-nuclear deterrence -Capabilities, limitations and challenges (by Valeriy Akimenko - Chatham House)
chathamhouse.org/2021/07/russia-and-strategic-non-nuclear-deterrence/russias-strategic-non-nuclear-deterrent
Partial compilation of KH-22 strikes:
19fortyfive.com/2022/06/why-russia-is-using-old-kh-22-aircraft-carrier-killer-missiles-to-hit-ukraine
Video of air launch of KH-22 against Ukraine
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/we-may-have-our-first-sight-of-a-russian-bomber-launching-missiles-at-ukraine
Reference to US claims on Russian missile failure rates:
businessinsider.com/us-intel-suggests-many-of-russias-missiles-fail-reports-2022-5
Key Caveat:
There is one golden caveat for this one - as coverage of the ongoing war, this video suffers from all the usual caveats around data and source quality. The only people who fully understand the decisions being made in the Ukrainian and Russian HQs are the people who are there. I am just doing the best I can with the information available to me.
All claims here should be treated as speculative in nature, and may well be displaced as additional information comes to light.
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at: https://www.ground.news/perun
Video info:
In some of my earliest coverage of the Ukraine war, I noted that just comparing defence spending between countries was extremely difficult and not all budgets are created equal.
Today following a Patron vote, I'm going to try and unpack that a little more by diving into the world of defence economics and production 101. In doing so, we're going to try and answer some questions.
Why does America dominate the global arms market?
How can a 5th generation fighter be cheaper than those decades older than it?
And why do so many nations chose to buy in arms rather than build their own despite the fact it leaves them highly reliant on other countries?
Get ready for an "exhilarating" mix of economic theory, budget figures, and many, many stories of countries failing to build a good jet engine and just buying one from General Electric instead.
This video is not financial advice, and I'm not an American, but if you're going to talk about scale in high-tech military production, you have to talk about the US of A.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
Just because I throw up an image of a system when describing challenges - that does not mean I think whatever I've put on the slides is a bad system. The Avro Arrow was a masterpiece - but it's a good picture of risk because it ended up cancelled and a bunch of resources were wasted for example. Arjun is a good example for competitive advantage because, while India was willing to back it domestically, Arjun 1 had nothing like the export successes of the major players (Abrams, Leopard, and the Russian Ts)
Figures from groups like the AIA are taken and presented as is - I obviously have not independently audited Lockheed Martin's annual report or the AIA facts and figures
As mentioned in the video - I have focused on comparing defence spending to other sorts of defence spending. I am not seeking to do opportunity cost analysis against other forms of spending.
I'm also not arguing for higher or lower military spending in this video, I'm just trying to explain why the impact of a procurement budget is highly contingent on where stuff is manufactured, and things like that.
Sources:
Lockheed Martin annual report 2021:
lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/annual-reports/lockheed-martin-annual-report-2021.pdf
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database:
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
F-35 price declines:
Lockheed Martin (graphic)
AIA facts and figures:
aia-aerospace.org/report/2021-facts-figures-u-s-aerospace-defense/2021-facts-and-figures-u-s-aerospace-and-defense
News coverage:
defensenews.com/air/2019/10/29/in-newly-inked-deal-f-35-prices-fall-to-78-million-a-copy
India T-90S procurement:
defensenews.com/land/2019/11/26/india-pays-russia-12-billion-in-technology-transfer-fees-for-t-90s-tanks
Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Growth - RAND
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-2.html
Timestamps:
00:00 -- Opening words
01:33 -- What am I covering?
02:46 -- SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
04:20 -- What's in a defence budget
05:56 -- People Costs
07:03 -- System Costs
09:04 -- System Sourcing
09:36 -- Example 1: Bring it in
12:29 -- Example 2: Domestic production
14:58 -- The make or buy decision
16:49 -- The hard decisions
17:58 -- Foreign Import
19:01 -- Kit Assembly
20:28 -- Licensed/local production
22:22 -- Domestic productions
23:07 -- Why not indigenise
23:28 -- Barriers to domestic production
23:56 -- Complexity and cost of entry
27:03 -- Indigenous fighter programs
29:16 -- Manufacturing scale
31:50 -- Development risks
33:59 -- Competitive advantage
36:55 -- Case Study: The US advantage
37:21 -- Dominant consumer & producer
39:59 -- Production costs
41:13 -- Scale
43:17 -- Learning curves
45:03 -- Risk mitigation
46:54 -- Accumulated advantage
49:40 -- American arms ecosystem
52:42 -- A tale of two aircrafts
55:26 -- A question for another time…
55:57 -- Conclusion
57:13 -- Channel update
For these incredibly capable machines, the Ukraine War has been a challenging environment. After a flurry of aggressive use in the opening days (culminating in the assault on Hostomel Airport) the mass introduction of man portable air defence systems and a rush of early casualties seems to have forced both the Russian and Ukrainian attack helicopters into a much more conservative posture.
This raises the question - if a $200,000 missile can shoot down a helicopter worth tens of millions of dollars, what does that mean for the future of the helicopter on the battlefield (and the procurement budget)
In this video I take a look at the rotary aviation side of the Ukrainian war (with a particular look at the Russian KA-52), try to piece together how the tactics have changed, try and explain some of the weirder things we've been seeing, and examine what the losses and challenges mean for the future of these aircraft.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Sources:
Visually confirmed loss database:
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html (I then went through each of the helicopter listings)
Russian tactics:
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_100x2.pdf
Reimbursable Rates for Airframes (FY2019)
comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2019/2019_b_c.pdf
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening words
00:01:20 -- Not a great war for attack helos
00:02:19 -- How to get this topic wrong
00:03:36 -- What am I covering?
00:04:38 -- Caveats & Preface
00:07:26 -- First days at Hostomel
00:10:36 -- The MANPADS surge
00:12:36 -- Deterioration: March & April
00:15:28 -- Deterioration: May - present
00:18:50 -- KA-52 Losses
00:20:54 -- Strange tactics
00:23:12 -- Pilots/command error?
00:26:03 -- The rocket slinging
00:29:09 -- Chornobaivka
00:32:39 -- "Doctrine" doesn't mean "good"
00:34:05 – Nothing new, helicopters get shot down a lot
00:36:16 -- Novel weapons aren’t novel
00:38:30 -- Evolving enemies
00:42:42 -- A cost problem
00:46:24 -- Survival: Efficiency MANPADS
00:48:35 -- Survival Efficiency: Other threats
00:50:24 -- Offensive efficiency
00:54:05 -- Helicopters are vulnerable
00:58:35 -- Stand-off and survive
01:01:18 -- Tactics and training
01:03:27 -- Consider the mission
01:08:00 -- Conclusion
01:10:50 -- Channel update
Since Russian troops advanced into Ukraine from Belarusian territory in February, speculation has been rife that Belarusian dictator Lukashenko would send his own troops into battle alongside his Russian allies. Practically ever week brings a new series of articles announcing new mobilisation efforts or exercises in Belarus, and a heighted threat to Ukraine's Northern border.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00 -- Opening Words
00:47 -- What am I covering?
01:37 -- How did we get here?
01:52 -- History
06:24 -- Belarus today
08:27 -- Europe's "Last Dictator"
09:53 -- Lukashenko's hold is not complete
14:22 -- Belariusian involvement
15:59 -- The Maybe Invasion
18:26 -- Hunting for a Casus Belli
20:47 -- The Belariusian Army
21:01 -- The "Good": A lot of metal
24:01 -- The "Oh...": Manpower
28:36 -- Intervention scenario
29:00 -- To Kyiv and victory
29:56 -- Fool me twice...
32:08 -- Serving the artery
33:20 -- Cutting off the hand
37:08 -- A grinding distraction
38:19 -- The question is why?
39:16 -- Why the Hesitation?
39:40 -- Internal Stability
46:36 -- The thing about stability
47:18 -- The economy
49:12 -- NATO response
51:09 -- What is there to gain?
53:38 -- The brief warning: "Crap" doesn't mean harmless
55:43 -- Conclusions
56:57 -- Channel Update
Sources:
Example of media coverage around the possibility of Belarus entering the war:
aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/22/will-belarus-join-the-war
theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fears-that-belarus-might-invade-on-russias-side-are-growing-185416
The "Colonel thing" - one example of reporting on this
https://www.sb.by/en/lukashenko-putin-promised-me-the-rank-of-colonel-but-had-not-done-yet.html
Chatham House Survey:
drive.google.com/file/d/12uAiH_gLZAKhbtm_Gb6n2NsH1u7gYrtE/view
Disclaimers and Caveats:
At one point I say "Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv" in reference to cities that are along the "Belarusian front." That's just force of habit from describing cities threatened during the early phase of the war. It would be more accurate to say that Kyiv and Chernihiv are on the Belarusian facing front, Sumy obviously isn't.
I gloss over the importance of Belarus' military industry - Russia is in fact dependent on Belarus for some critical inputs into some of its most sensitive military hardware.
I want to stress again that I have nothing against the people of Belarus - this video is merely an attempt to illustrate the weaknesses the Belarusian military would have to overcome to be genuinely effective in an offensive operation
The section on potential NATO responses should be taken as illustrative, and not a prediction that NATO would resort to any particular policy response or 'harassment' tactics in the event of a Belarusian offensive. It is instead intended to illustrate the vulnerability of the plan to potential escalatory (or debatably escalatory) responses.
**As always - check pinned comment for any additional caveats or comments**
We've talked a lot about the weaknesses of the Russian army in the past, including the difficulties it has faced attempting a war of rapid maneuver in February and March and bringing sufficient infantry forward to support its armoured vehicles.
But one very clear strength of the Russian military is is artillery corps. Russia has guns, lots of guns, and deep stocks of ammo leftover from the old Soviet Union.
In this video we explore the pre-war Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces, look at the way the artillery war has evolved to date, how logistics may impact the sustainability of both forces going forward, and what lessons forces around the world might (tentatively) take from the war so far, based on the information in the public domain.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening words
00:00:56 -- Sponsor: PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS
00:02:14 -- What Am I covering?
00:03:32 -- The competing forces
00:03:38 -- Russia - An Artillery Army
00:06:40 -- Russian Artillery: Cutting edge stuff
00:07:48 -- Russian Artillery: Most is good old soviet artillery
00:09:00 -- Russian Artillery: Most is good old soviet artillery
00:11:07 -- Guns of Ukraine
00:12:47 -- NATO support
00:14:37 -- Artillery in Ukraine
00:14:47 -- The road to Kyiv
00:17:39 -- Shift Towards Static Warfare
00:19:43 -- How the artillery battlespace was born?
00:23:45 -- Russian Artillery usage
00:25:23 -- Weight of fire
00:27:25 -- Ukrainian artillery usage
00:29:29 -- The Himars Effect
00:31:32 -- The Depot Blitz
00:33:28 -- Drone spotting
00:36:24 -- From the Front: The Donbass
00:37:44 -- From the Front: Kherson
00:38:33 -- From the Front: Izium
00:39:59 -- Ammunition and sustainment
00:41:00 -- Barrels and lifespan
00:46:19 -- Accuracy matters
00:52:17 -- Russian Ammo
00:55:33 -- Ukraine’s (old) ammo
00:58:29 -- Ukraine’s (new) ammo
01:01:42 -- Early lessons
01:02:24 -- Ammunition consumption
01:06:04 -- Sensor fusion & transparent battlespace
01:09:24 -- Is NATO outgunned
01:11:30 -- A plan for contested airspace
01:14:42 -- Range, Range, Range
01:15:59 -- Conclusions
01:19:13 -- Channel update
Sources (non-exhaustive due to late upload, will pad these out over the coming days):
Russian and Ukrainian pre-war artillery strength:
iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2021
FIRMS system:
firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@0.0,0.0,3z
Deepstate map (used to integrate FIRMS with frontline data)
https://deepstatemap.live/en#6/49.438/32.053
Examples of OSINT on suspected HIMARS strikes:
twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1546014473416237056?cxt=HHwWgICzmZ7-xfQqAAAA
twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1545937965028876290?cxt=HHwWhICxpe6Yo_QqAAAA
twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1545587963098284033?cxt=HHwWgoC-2YiEhPMqAAAA
When Russia launched its February 24th invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of the nations that experienced a dramatic, near overnight political shift.
Germany turned its eyes to rearmament after decades of reduced defence spending, while outside commenters criticised the limited number of heavy weapons the great Central European industrial power was able and willing to provide.
The reality is that Germany's military is both one of the best funded in the world, and also one of the least prepared for action with much of its military reduced to scrounging from other units while equipment is out for maintenance. It is a military hampered by deep budgeting and procurement difficulties that have caused its readiness rates and equipment to run down to dire levels.
German defence industry is among the world's best. It's capable of developing world beating products (especially when working with other European powers) but it operates at production levels, and in a procurement environment, that mean it has often been foreign militaries, not the Bundeswehr, that benefit most from German military-industrial potential.
In this video, I go through some history of how the Bundeswehr came to be so run down. I go after the myth that the Bundeswehr has been poorly funded (there's both a yes and no answer there) and go through some of the reasons I think Germany's planned 100 billion Euro equipment spend could go horribly wrong if proper reforms and plans aren't put in place.
To my German viewers, please take this as the friendly (if often critical) view of an ally across the sea.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Sources or resources:
Report on material readiness in the Bundeswehr 2021
https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5325364/11a1d50cce70b7b1a8307adc16991f4d/download-bericht-zur-materiellen-einsatzbereitschaft-2-2021-data.pdf
Commentary on 2018 figures:
dw.com/en/limited-number-of-weapons-in-german-military-ready-for-action-report/a-42752070
ukdefencejournal.org.uk/less-third-german-military-assets-operational-says-report
The BAAINBw CPM guidelines (in English) (Only for the very dedicated)
https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/1718386/d21a4f590da15adad3aecd560f3cc5cc/cpm-en-data.pdf
More relevant procurement rules and regs (again, for the dedicated)
https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/equipment/contract-award/foundations-of-procurement
2018 reporting on shortage of tents and basic equipment
dw.com/en/germanys-bundeswehr-lacks-basic-equipment-for-nato-mission/a-42638910
Germany losing a lawsuit with H&K over the G36
dw.com/en/germany-military-loses-legal-battle-with-heckler-koch/a-19522739
DGAP - "Proposals for a new German armaments policy"
dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/vorschlaege-fuer-eine-neue-deutsche-ruestungspolitik
German Parliament blocking armed drones:
dw.com/en/no-armed-drones-for-the-german-army-for-now/a-55936615
German ambition to make the Bundeswehr the most effective army in Europe:
https://www.rnd.de/politik/reaktion-auf-russischen-krieg-lindner-will-bundeswehr-zur-wirksamsten-armee-europas-machen-OR2OM2P5ILDKD7IZMKNQ77B44A.html
BEWARE OF POTEMKIN: GERMANY’S DEFENSE RETHINK RISKS REINFORCING OLD HABITS
warontherocks.com/2022/04/beware-of-potemkin-germanys-defense-rethink-risks-reinforcing-old-habits
DW on the dangers of procurement issues in spending the 100 billion Euro
dw.com/en/germanys-military-upgrade-hampered-by-bureaucracy/a-62046032
RUSI on procurement issues in the Bundeswehr (2019)
rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/germany-calling-bundeswehr-acquisition-and-broken-narrative
Timestamps:
slightly better stamp, I've dropped them in the comments for now:
00:00:00 --
00:00:54 -- What Am I covering?
00:02:20 -- Hey Germans
00:02:59 -- History
00:06:13 -- Cold War Germany - West
00:07:37 -- Cold War Germany - East
00:09:31 -- Armee der Einheit
00:12:09 -- The broken Bundeswehr
00:12:26 -- Germany and France comparison
00:16:45 -- Scrounging and minor ambitions
00:19:16 -- German Advantages
00:19:42 -- German Advantages: German Industry
00:21:55 -- German Advantages: The Sharp Edge
00:23:35 -- What's going on?
00:23:51 -- Where does the money go?
00:26:39 -- The capitalisation issue
00:29:42 -- Procurement
00:30:16 -- Procurement disasters
00:32:16 -- Focking it up
00:36:42 -- The aggregate picture
00:37:56 -- Financial horizons
00:39:16 -- Defence investment is long term
00:44:19 -- Capability
00:45:31 -- Compliance & litigation
00:49:01 -- Politics
00:51:50 -- 100 billion euro
00:52:21 -- Zeitwende
00:54:50 -- The Dangers
00:56:40 -- Stage 1: The gold rush
00:59:02 -- Stage 2: The cracks
01:00:32 -- Stage 3: Strangulation
01:02:51 -- Stage 4: gold plate & decay
01:04:52 -- How to make it work?
01:09:32 -- How to make it work? The social and political change
01:12:09 -- And what of Ukraine
For weeks, the most requested topic from my Patrons and coming in by email to look at some of those claims, ranging from the wacky to the reasonable, and to cast a critical eye on the way the war has been covered in its first four months.
At their request, I'm going to have a look at some of the various claims that have come up, and put forward comments on some of the most pervasive ones (especially those that were nominated multiple times). Because I'm trying to cover a lot of ground, don't expect the same level of deep-dive detail as normal, but hopefully we can have some fun with it.
Sources & Notes:
Reporting on the age of Russian volunteers on short term contracts:
bbc.global.ssl.fastly.net/russian/features-61848550
Coverage by Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces including observations regarding stress and equipment of Ukrainian TDF in the Donbass
youtube.com/watch?v=RpC1kXhW2Lw
WHO confirmation on biolab Pathogen destruction order
reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-who-says-it-advised-ukraine-destroy-pathogens-health-labs-prevent-2022-03-11
Russian leadership changes and firings (these are just a sample):
-twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1540475582173126656
-https://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/152176-putin_sacks_generals/
-thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-purges-150-fsb-agents-in-response-to-russias-botched-war-with-ukraine-lf9k6tn6g?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1649702327-1
Sponsor:
I'm incredibly lucky to have a returning sponsor, Ground News.
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at:
https://www.ground.news/perun
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Mythbusting the Russia-Ukraine War
00:00:35 -- What Am I Covering
00:02:34 -- Sponsor Segment - GROUND NEWS
00:03:55 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies
00:04:06 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs
00:05:43 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs - The "evidence"
00:08:19 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: The Biolabs - The Genius plan
00:10:23 -- The Crazy & Conspiracies: Nato Special Forces in Ukraine
00:12:09 -- Economics: German Aid
00:14:30 -- Economics: all of the Ukrainian economy is in the Donbass
00:18:10 -- Battlefield matters
00:18:16 -- Battlefield matters: "Cannon fodder" and casualties
00:21:40 -- Battlefield matters: Aces and super heroes
00:23:48 -- Battlefield matters: Media Coverage
00:23:58 -- Battlefield matters: "Game changers"
00:27:19 -- Battlefield matters: Every day is change?
00:28:52 -- All according to plan?
00:29:29 -- All according to plan - Russian war aims
00:30:32 -- All according to plan - Assessing the goal
00:31:54 -- All according to plan - Kyiv was a feint?
00:33:44 -- All according to plan - The Donbass is a feint?
00:34:35 -- All according to plan - The war is a feint?
00:39:33 -- All according to plan - A Bad Plan
00:42:05 -- All according to plan - Is the war going according to plan
00:47:13 -- All according to plan - Just look at the map
00:50:40 -- All according to plan - The Narrative
00:54:12 -- What Am I Saying?
00:56:55 -- Expectations
00:59:16 -- Conclusion
01:00:41 -- Channel update
Caveats and corrections:
At one point I refer to German aid 'per capita' rather than 'as a share of GDP'
I also refer to US WW2 dead figures without clarifying that the cited figure is 'combat' deaths.
** Apologies for the iffy sound-quality and double-upload on this one, my regular editor is travelling so I've done the best I can**
When Russia commenced its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, the West responded with a harsh regime of sanctions and measures that were intended to deeply wound the Russian economy.
Now, more than 100 days on, it's hard to find consensus over exactly how well those measures are working. Some will tell you that Russia is on its knees, incapable of carrying on the war much longer, while others will insist that it's Ukraine and Europe that are about to break.
In this video I look at the sanctions measures that have been imposed, what impact they've had, and try to assess how well the Russian and Ukrainian economies are holding up, and what may be next in store as the fighting (and economic pressure) continues.
Notable Sources:
Russian Statistics Service Poverty Statistics
https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/document/157001 - 2021
https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/document/168756 -2022
CRS report on Sino-Russian ties:
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12120
ILO Brief on Ukrainian Job losses:
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/documents/briefingnote/wcms_844295.pdf
Bank of Russia release on interest rates:
https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/keypr/
EU Support for Egypt
english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/06/15/EU-provides-104-million-to-Egypt-to-cope-with-rising-food-prices
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps
00:00:00 — The Price of War II: Economics of the Russo-Ukraine War
00:00:39 — Sponsor Segment: BLINKIST
00:01:57 — What Am I covering?
00:02:59 — War is expensive: Opening Words
00:03:30 — War is expensive: Peloponnesian War
00:04:20 — War is expensive: WW1
00:04:48 — War is expensive: The War on Terror
00:05:09 — War is expensive: The Russo-Ukraine War & be careful with expenditure figures
00:07:27 — The Russian economy: Opening Words
00:07:39 — The Russian economy: Headline details
00:09:54 — The Russian economy: Sanctions
00:12:11 — The Russian economy: Restricting Russian exports
00:13:47 — The Russian economy: The Hydrocarbon Money Cannon
00:14:57 — The Russian economy: The issue with energy sanctions
00:17:33 — The Russian economy: The Long term challenge
00:19:32 — The Russian economy: Let's talk Roubles
00:23:26 — The Russian economy: Restricting imports
00:25:21 — The Russian economy: China, India & Sanctions
00:29:58 — The Russian economy: Industrial impacts
00:33:20 — The Russian economy: The private sector is vulnerable
00:35:27 — The Russian economy: Poverty Rising
00:37:19 — The Russian economy: “The Two Economies”
00:38:02 — The Russian economy: Where to from here for Russia?
00:40:40 — The Ukrainian economy: Health Check
00:42:17 — The Ukrainian economy: A Wartime economy
00:43:21 — The Ukrainian economy: Sustainability
00:46:06 — The resilience of Industrial states: Economic Collapse?
00:47:48 — The resilience of Industrial states: WW1 period France
00:51:04 — What about the world? Europe
00:54:00 — What about the world? The Wider World
00:55:49 — The Conclusion
00:57:17 — Rebuttal of the week
01:00:42 — Channel Update
But, and I know I say this a lot:
Russia is not the Soviet Union.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the kind of conflict the Russian army has prepared for. The army is being asked to fight at essentially peacetime strength, leaving behind its conscripts and not calling up the larger class of its reserves.
That has left the Russian army short staffed and, critically, lacking infantry to support the number of tanks and armoured vehicles it has deployed. How that has influenced the fighting is uncertain, but it does seem to have contributed to the loss of unsupported armour, and a real difficulty in taking urban and fortified areas. In their place, Russia has inserted national guard troops, mercenaries, and huge numbers of proxy-forces from the DPR and LPR.
In this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue.
In doing so, we're also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia?
We're going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and try to answer some of those questions.
I will not be covering Ukrainian mobilisation this episode, if only because it has its own, almost diametrically opposite strengths and weaknesses and a totally different force design behind it.
My thanks to the many sources covering this topic - particularly the venerable Michael Kofman whose work on Russian force structures was critical to this piece.
Interesting reading:
NOT BUILT FOR PURPOSE: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S ILL-FATED FORCE DESIGN - MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ROB LEE
warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Gaming channel
youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQ
Terra invicta E1
youtu.be/QU4E2NtvRlM
TIMESTAMPS
00:00:00 -- The image of military power
00:01:48 -- There are questions to be asked
00:02:59 -- The contention: The Russian Army has too much metal and not enough grunts
00:03:29 -- What am I covering?
00:04:32 -- The jobs only infantry can do
00:08:30 -- The jobs only infantry can do: Armies do know it, including the Russian Army
00:10:51 -- Where are the Russian infantry?
00:13:24 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 1: the Russian Army is too small
00:16:03 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 2: Mobilisation
00:17:11 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 3: Undermanning
00:18:27 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 4: Over-Armouring
00:20:02 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 5: Organisation (Private Conscriptovic returns)
00:22:40 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 6: Early losses
00:24:46 -- Where are the Russian infantry? Recap
00:26:52 -- Russian Solutions: Shadow Mobilisation
00:28:16 -- Russian Solutions: The TikTokers and the Wagner Group
00:29:13 -- Russian Solutions: Training unit cannibalization
00:31:28 -- Russian Solutions: The Donbass Proxy forces
00:31:43 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: What are the DLPR (DPR/LPR)?
00:33:26 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Disclaimer on DPR/LPR sources
00:34:59 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Pre-war forces & subsequent mobilisation
00:36:41 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Verification & Numbers
00:37:52 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Training
00:40:04 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Equipment
00:43:11 -- The Donbass Proxy Forces: Are they the Cannon Fodder?
00:46:03 -- What Russia needs vs what they have
00:47:07 -- The discrepancy between the Russian narrative and and use of DLPR forces
00:47:55 -- Why does this matter
00:49:58 -- Sustainability
00:51:33 -- Channel Update
But support for Ukraine has been a pan-European affair, with some nations going to extraordinary lengths when contrasted with their limited resources. The Baltic and many Eastern European nations stand out in this regard for the willingness they've shown to dig deep into their military reserves in order to get hardware into Ukrainian hands.
In terms of volumes for key heavy equipment like tanks and mobile rocket and artillery systems, Poland stands out as a critical source. Warsaw has emerged as one of Ukraine's staunchest advocates, shipping tanks by the hundred, and allowing its territory to be converted into a logistical hub while opening its doors to Ukrainians by the millions.
In this video I try to give historical context to Poland's decision to throw its resources behind Ukraine and put focus on what this nation, with an economy nominally the size of New Jersey's (ppp-aside), has done to keep the Ukrainian army fighting while preserving the lives and wellbeing of millions of Ukrainian civilians.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00:00 – For our freedom and yours: Poland and the Ukraine War
00:00:57 – Ukraine's most important allies (by GDP figures)
00:01:33 – America has limits
00:02:48 – What am I covering?
00:03:29 – History of Polish-Russian relations
00:04:18 – History: Destruction of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth
00:08:03 – History: Partition and occupation
00:10:26 – History: “The Red Flag” - the Polish-Soviet war (1918)
00:11:27 – History: “The Red Flag” - Soviets are back (1939)
00:13:42 – Poland's strategic situation
00:15:10 – The Stakes for Poland
00:17:06 – Poland's Support: Civilians
00:19:43 – Poland's Support: Arms
00:21:02 – Poland's Support: Armoured Vehicles
00:22:28 – Poland's Support: Small Arms
00:24:44 – Poland's Support: Artillery & Ordnance
00:27:03 – Poland's Support: Scale
00:28:28 – Poland's Support: Logistics
00:32:36 – Russian retribution
00:34:07 – Why does all this matter
00:37:12 – What could have been
00:39:39 – Poland's Military transformation
00:43:03 – Poland's post-war possibilities
00:46:43 – Summary
00:48:13 – Channel update
Russian R&D did its part (mostly), turning out systems that won attention and praise at trade shows, while commentators steadily built the Russian army up as an example of a dangerous foe that proved you could achieve more with less in the military procurement space.
Then they invaded Ukraine, and the image was shattered. I've previously explained this by looking at the Russian Defence budget and their priorities in the lead up to the invasion, but in doing that I refrained from focusing on one key issue.
Corruption in Russia is endemic, corruption in the Russian defence sector (like many around the world) is a catastrophe. From the highest levels of procurement fraud, down to the level of the enlisted personal hawking diesel, copper, and even explosives for petty cash, corruption has been a constant thorn in the side of all efforts to modernise the Russian army and mould it into an effective fighting force.
In this video, I try to take a somewhat light hearted look at how corruption in a military context can (and sometimes does) work, citing examples of actual cases and using hypotheticals to demonstrate the kinds of actions that can rot an institution from head to tail. For those of you in countries that face this problem, it should all seem a little familiar.
Examples are taken from the sources listed below and I make no independent representations on the veracity of any claims. I don't know exactly how much is stolen from the Russian defence budget, I doubt anyone does. But what I can do, is help us understand how a nation capable of producing some of the most advanced defence equipment in the world would be running out of fuel on day 3, and be rolling out museum piece tanks less than three months into a major conflict.
Sponsor:
I am fortunate enough to have a sponsor for this video, Ground News
Compare news coverage. Spot media bias. Avoid algorithms. Be well informed. Download the free Ground News app at:
https://www.ground.news/perun
A majority of proceeds will be directed to the Australian Red Cross Ukraine appeal, which supports Ukrainians displaced by the war.
https://www.redcross.org.au/ukraine/
Key sources:
Corruption in the Russian Defence Sector (Beliakova and Perlo-Freeman)
https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2018/05/Russian-Defense-Corruption-Report-Beliakova-Perlo-Freeman-20180502-final.pdf
Russian statements (albeit old) on defence budget theft
reuters.com/article/us-russia-defence-idUSTRE74N1YX20110524
Russian corruption ranking
transparency.org/en/countries/russia
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- The military Russia wanted us to see
00:01:10 -- Meet Sergei
00:02:11 -- What Am I Covering
00:02:44 -- Sponsor Segment
00:04:11 -- Caveats
00:05:48 -- Corruption in the Russian military
00:07:31 -- What does corruption look like & understanding corruption
00:08:17 -- Corruption at Senior Political Leadership level
00:09:28 -- Corruption at Senior Political Leadership level – who you know
00:11:15 -- Corruption at Senior Military Leadership level
00:12:45 -- Corruption at Senior Military Leadership level – Story of Battlecruiser Pyotr Veliki (Peter the Great)
00:15:03 -- Corruption at lower commanders level
00:16:23 -- Corruption at supply officer level
00:17:57 -- Corruption at "Private Conscriptovic" level
00:18:53 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – a worked example
00:19:02 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 0: R&D
00:20:20 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – Phase 1: Procurement
00:21:49 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 2: production & ordering
00:23:17 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 3: supply phase
00:24:24 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – phase 4: the unit level
00:26:19 -- How to corrupt an Army 101 – Phase 5: the front
00:27:50 -- Why is it so damaging
00:28:03 -- The economics of corruption
00:28:43 -- Not all corruption is "theft"
00:30:07 -- It can destroy research & industry
00:31:42 -- Cultural corrosion
00:33:10 -- Asymmetric cost/benefit
00:35:57 -- The Critical Gear
00:38:54 -- Why are militaries so vulnerable to corruption
00:39:06 -- Public attitude
00:39:53 -- Hierarchy
00:41:34 -- Secrecy
00:43:39 -- Invisibility
00:47:48 -- How to deal with corruption – mechanics and processes
00:50:23 -- Culture
00:52:36 -- Summary
00:54:32 -- Channel updates
In doing so, it convinced the nations of Finland and Sweden to break with long traditions of non-alignment with military alliances (and strong public support for that stance) and apply to join NATO.
In some ways, this must seem like a natural step. Both Finland and Sweden are members of the EU and NATO partners, which hardly made it unclear which side of the metaphorical iron curtain they favoured. There's also reason to suggest this might not change as much as some networks are suggesting, with both nations expressing their lack of desire for permanent NATO bases in their territory or any sort of nuclear weapons sharing.
But in other ways, this move is a tremendous boost to NATO and a disastrous strategic reverse for Russia.
In this episode, I look at the history of Swedish and Finnish neutrality (and shift to non-alignment in the post cold war era), examine what these two nations would bring to NATO, and what that means for Europe, Russia, the USA, and global peace and security.
I want to stress that while I talk about the relevance of these new NATO members in the context of certain military scenarios that have appeared on Russian TV, I don't believe any of those are at all likely. They're used because they help illustrate the point, and because when something appears on Russian TV, you can't argue that there's zero chance of that being on the Kremlin's bucket list.
Also, because I'm aware the word is used differently around the world, please note that when I'm using the term 'liberal' in reference to the post-war order, I'm referring to the system of institutions, rules, and norms the victorious powers put in place after WW2 rather than any contemporary politics.
I'd also ask you to check the pinned comment regarding the question of how large the Swedish army is and what to include or not include in that figure.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Relevant news items:
On Russian energy cuts to Finland:
* aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/russia-to-cut-gas-flow-to-finland-saturday-gasum
* bbc.com/news/business-61442432
Russian TV discussing invasions (anti-Russian posters, but Russian content) I can't get the original Rossiya 1 clips:
* twitter.com/i/status/1506283895771348994
* youtube.com/watch?v=Q5IBevEpVoQ&t=69s
But one recent one stood out as as both particularly strange, and also as a good opportunity to discuss a serious topic. Recently a number of media organisations ran stories suggesting that the shipment of American missiles to Ukraine were dangerously depleting American supplies to the point where urgent measures are necessary or American security would be threatened.
So yes, I'm going to deal with the idea that sending Stingers to Ukraine is a danger to the USA, but I'm also going to talk about how deep American weapon stocks are, what it means to have your security threatened, and why America probably shouldn't rush to crash-manufacture Stingers just because they're finally using the ones that were in storage. Defence procurement decisions have lasting impacts, and while the decision to ramp up Javelin production is an obvious one, I think we should be wary of the idea that Stinger should be resurrected without other options being considered.
This is a shorter video that serves in a stand-in while I edit and re-record the longer video that was originally scheduled for this time (if I'm going to talk about Poland, I want to do it justice). And because I wanted to hold off the video on Finland and Sweden joining NATO until they had formally applied for membership (so expect it soon).
Thanks as always for watching and supporting me and the channel.
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Perun Gaming:
youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQ
Timestamps:
00:00 INTRODUCTION
00:25 What is this???
01:13 What am I covering?
01:43 WHAT'S THE CLAIM?
02:25 Is any of that true?
03:34 Should the West panic?
05:39 Should the West panic? - replacement
06:31 US ARMS STOCKPILE
07:30 That's a lot of metal
07:48 And the real reality check
08:55 There is more than one way to kill a tank
09:37 Direct and indirect substitution
10:50 There is more than one way to kill a tank (cont.)
11:13 America is armed
12:26 WHAT ABOUT EUROPE?
14:54 Impact on Euro forces
16:01 Expenditure is not one sided
17:29 Expenditure is not one sided - UA isn't just throwing these things out
19:01 SO WHAT NEXT?
21:15 _CHANNEL UPDATE_
Lend-lease was one of the pivotal factors in the second world war. It was a mechanism by which the United States shipped tremendous quantities of everything from boots to bullets in order to keep Britain, the USSR, and the other allies in the fight.
On May 9th, President Biden signed an Act bearing the lend-lease name into law, taking on the authority to loan defence articles (that's a fancy way of saying militarily useful stuff) to Ukraine.
Journalists across the internet have been quick to herald the Act as a game changer, one which will fundamentally transforms the flow of assistance to Kyiv.
I'm not so sure.
In this video, I look at what the modern lend-lease Act actually does, assess its significance, and then focus on some of the lesser known, and altogether less dramatic mechanisms that are being used to authorise the ever growing flow of US money and weapons supporting Ukraine.
I'm also rather proud I managed to get the video under 30 minutes. The side effect of that is that I do not have time to delve into each of the individual pieces of legislation discussed. My descriptions of how foreign military financing work for example are necessarily simplistic, but I've tried to make sure the basics of what you need to know are here.
Thanks for your support as always.
Submissions email:
perunsubmissions@gmail.com
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps from the usual legend:
00:00 Introduction
00:40 The buzz around Lend-Lease
01:58 What am I covering
02:35 Historical Lend-Lease was a game changer
04:51 What doesn't it do?
06:03 What does it actually do?
06:52 Condition 1 FAA 1961
07:22 Condition 2 AECA
08:29 So does Lend-Lease matter
10:27 Existing rules
12:56 The "$30B"
15:09 The "$30B" — Analysis
17:26 The debt trap myth
19:45 So where to next?
22:45 So where to next? — Personal view
23:38 Does Lend-Lease have a role?
26:10 Summary
28:20 Close out
Russia's nuclear threats, and warnings of potential nuclear war growing out of the Ukraine invasion, make for great headlines - but how much substance actually sits behind those threats?
Nothing triggers fear quite like the prospect of a world ending nuclear exchange, but that doesn't make the hype true. While we can't relax entirely (the risk isn't zero), I think we can afford to stop hyping the risk of WWIII quite so much, at least for now. So if you'd like some reverse clickbait where I explain why you probably shouldn't be that afraid, let's get into it.
In this video, I take a look at what Russia's been doing that has caused so much concern around the world, both in terms of demonstrating new weapons and issuing warnings and threats. Then I dive into Russian doctrine around nuclear weapons use, as well as the reality of the nuclear taboo, in order to determine how great the actual threat of Russian nuclear weapon use is.
Finally, I talk a bit about what other nations can do if they're determined to avoid any breach of the nuclear taboo, and keep Russian warheads locked up in their storage bunkers where they belong.
A caveat as always that I am not a nuclear strategist by trade, but there are a number of good talks and articles out there if you would like to know more. I come at this from the perspective of someone who has studied and written on cold war era.
I rely on a number of documents in this piece, a few key ones are listed below:
US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF
The Russian Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence - a number of sites host English translations
I found "Nuclear Signalling Between NATO and Russia" by Rear Admiral John Gower, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear & Chemical, Biological) to be an easy read among the papers I looked at preparing for this presentation - though admittedly his work predates the 2020 basic principles.
jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep22136.pdf
The Perun Gaming Channel (I will aim to start shifting and publishing new content there this weekend):
youtube.com/channel/UCPYJiiMoA0yOMHI-aiB44RQ
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps:
00:00 Introduction
01:02 Nukes and the media
02:09 But hold up a moment
02:28 What am I going to cover?
03:33 TLDR
04:40 Caveats
05:28 WHAT IS RUSSIA DOING?
05:34 Capability demonstration
06:21 Rhetoric
07:10 Capability development
10:21 So who is the audience?
11:50 DOES NUCLEAR COERCION WORK?
12:02 Historically? No
14:30 Nuclear taboo
16:34 A simple example
18:59 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
19:08 Doctrine and declaratory strategy
20:03 Why should we care?
21:34 Lavrov quote
21:58 Putin the nuclear warmonger?
25:32 Historical perspective
28:17 The 2020 statement
29:39 The four reasons
32:11 "Escalate to de-escalate"
33:48 SO WILL THEY USE NUKES?
34:10 No doctrinal use case
35:03 Russian media control to the rescue
36:15 No military utility
37:14 Likely response
39:24 WHEN MIGHT NUKES BE USED?
39:39 Nuclear use case?
42:03 HOW DO YOU PREVENT USE?
42:11 Signal and deter
44:30 KEY TAKEAWAYS
47:33 CHANNEL UPDATE
Continuing on from our look at the relative economic power of Russia as compared to Ukraine and its supporters in NATO, today I look a little more at the question of military equipment resupply specifically.
I try to break down the scale of the Russian army's equipment reserve and contrast that with the way we have seen, and can expect to see, the resupply effort evolve on the Ukrainian side of this fight.
I also look at the military industrial capability that sits behind these powers, and the role it might play in the event this conflict stretches to be a matter of months and years, rather than weeks.
I want to stress that this video is not a prediction of a long war, I make no prediction on that point, it's just an attempt to continue looking at a question I have not seen covered in great depth - how might this war evolve if the conflict does go on.
NATO Expenditure data and definitions can be found here:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193983.htm
Corrections:
Since recording this video, I've fallen sick and can't record addenda without holding the release process up, so I include one correction here.
While I reference statements by the US DoD that Ukraine has been supplied with entirely new aircraft (not just parts), those statements have been subsequently retracted. The current line put out by the USA and Ukraine is that, as of the 20th of April, Ukraine has not been supplied with any new fighter aircraft or airframes of that kind.
Contact Email for news and information submissions:
perunsubmissions@gmail.com
Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU
Timestamps (Thanks to NIibblrrr as always!)
00:00 Introduction
00:40 Where are we now?
01:46 A note on the coming offensive
02:55 War is not just a question of materiel
03:47 But materiel is important – particularly in conventional conflict
04:57 How am I going to cover the materiel question?
05:33 Phases of materiel use
06:47 The Russian position
09:34 Russian endurance hinges on reserved equipment
11:23 Russian reserves are deeper than Ukraine's
12:19 Ukraine is not alone
13:24 And that's an issue if this goes long
14:36 Resupply – the limiting factors
16:15 Equipment is not "capability"
17:49 POTENTIAL PHASES OF MATERIEL RESUPPLY
18:55 Phase 1 – Going at it alone
19:34 Phase 2 – Shouldering the burden
21:08 Phase 3 – From Warsaw with Love
24:42 Phase 4 – NATO standard
27:58 Phase 5 – Take it to scale
28:22 PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY — Assessing productive capacity is hard
29:54 The Russian defence industry
31:50 Challenges for Russian defence
34:12 Challenges for Russian defence (pt.2)
35:43 What about NATO?
36:59 So what about our factors?
37:13 Meeting demand
39:57 SO, WHAT NEXT? — What next for the West?
43:06 What does that look like?
44:46 Time for some heresy
46:08 KEY TAKEAWAYS
49:50 ADDITION: What has this looked like?
51:39 capability support
52:36 foreign training
54:00 outro
54:10 CHANNEL UPDATE
55:16 audio, captions
56:02 propaganda best of
56:36 Who are you?
58:09 100k subscribers
58:46 thank you
So apparently hour long presentations on defence investment weren't dry enough, so I'm dusting off the Economics degree (strongly recommended when pairing with military or strategic studies) to ask the question of what the economic situation may be if this war drags on.
Some are insisting sanctions are achieving nothing, and that Russia is well placed to outlast Ukraine. Others are convinced that Russia's war will grind to a halt under the weight of these sanctions.
In this video, I look at some of the tactics Russia has been using to minimise the impact of sanctions, as well as the basic economic disparities between Russia and the Western powers backing Ukraine. Suffice to say, Russia is economically outmatched, but it has a variety of tools and strengths to leverage, including energy exports and a defence sector that has spent years moving towards self-reliance.
Key Contact Points:
Send me data or submissions relevant to the topics I cover:
perunsubmissions@gmail.com
Find me on Patreon:
patreon.com/PerunAU (I will be overhauling rewards soon to better suit the new audience)
A note on calculations used:
Comments on the impact on German GDP of an Oil and Gas Embargo sourced from this interview:
youtube.com/watch?v=lFl4aTIa5aY&t=468s
Most quoted GDP figures are World Bank 2020
Figures used for calculating NATO expenditure and potential expenditure generated using NATO declared 2021 defence expenditure and % GDP data which can lead to significant differences compared to, for example, simply applying spending ratios to the 2020WB figures. In particular, take that $1.4t figure as indicative, different methodologies can produce higher or lower results, varying by potentially hundreds of billions of dollars. None of that changes the core message.
The reason for this potentially odd choice of statistics is to enable clear analysis on equipment spending - something we'll see next video when we unpack the Russian and NATO defence industries and resupply efforts.
Timestamps (Credit not mine)
0:00:00 Introduction
0:00:59 Where we are now
0:01:29 Potential Russian objectives?
0:02:26 Minor problem: What if Ukraine says NO?
0:03:12 Wars end by mutual assent
0:04:41 What am I going to cover?
0:05:29 What am I not covering
0:05:56 TLDR
0:06:47 THIS IS NOT A CLOSED-SYSTEM WAR
0:08:12 The Russian economy since the war
0:09:29 The recovery of the Ruble…
0:10:08 Step by step guide to saving the Ruble
0:14:47 Similar situation on the stock market
0:16:11 In other words, a lot of people are getting screwed here…
0:17:22 And how long can they keep it up?
0:19:43 More reasons to think this isn't OK
0:21:09 Summary: Russian economy
0:21:49 UKRAINE'S SUPPORTERS & THE ECONOMIC BALANCE
0:22:00 The economic balance
0:23:01 NATO economic capacity
0:25:04 What would this look like at the extreme?
0:27:40 So, a quick health check
0:30:35 And it's not just the USA
0:31:43 Financial mobilisation
0:33:24 What about Ukraine?
0:35:35 THE LONGER TERM
0:35:55 Hydrocarbons and Europe
0:40:50 And let's talk about those gas fields
0:44:08 Import substitution
0:46:11 Human capital decay
0:47:59 Ukrainian logistics
0:49:53 Russian sovereign risk
0:52:24 SO, WHAT NEXT?
0:52:43 What can Russia do?
0:56:22 What can the West do?
0:58:54 This doesn't work quickly
1:01:26 And isolation does not need to mean an end for Putin
1:03:02 Nor are the consequences limited to the 'sides' actively involved
1:04:17 CLOSING THOUGHTS
1:07:07 CHANNEL UPDATE