The Freedom Collection
Viktor Yushchenko_The Orange Revolution
updated
TRANSCRIPT
I have seen during last 15 month that the girls in Iran, the brave girls, Iranian girls are more active than boys. The brave women of Iran are at the first front of any demonstration. And the-- the real army of the Freedom Movement in Iran are women of Iran.
So this is the reason that sometimes I say that in-- in next regime of Iran a secular regime, the first President should be a woman. Naturally it will be a woman because-- these are the women which are more active than men and the-- they deserve it…
The women are more active because, first of all, they have been under suppression more than men during last 30 years. And the-- because of the religious rulership of Iran and they-- backward I can say, they medieval-- religious orders-- the women have become-- the-- you know, the-- the second-hand citizens of Iran.
So naturally they fight for their-- their rights more than men because their rights have been-- abused more than men. But besides to that, I-- I think that-- as you know-- you know-- Iran in-- in-- in Iran universities, 62 percent of the students are women-- are-- are girls.
And they're more educated than boys sometimes. They are-- and, you know, new generation in Iran that-- are-- more educated, more concerned, and they're more active-- for-- modernity, for new road, modern road. And, so, you know, in any freedom movement like Green Movement naturally they are more active than boys.
So this-- this is a very, very good signal in-- from the society of Iran, you know, because the women are the mothers of the society, and the next generation will be grown up by these brave and knowledge-- knowledgeable women. So it's a very, very good signal for the first time from the society of Iran.
TRANSCRIPT
The first-- big demonstration happened-- on Monday, three days after the election day. June 15-- if I'm not wrong. And 3.5 million people came to the streets and-- they-- they-- they made it silent demonstration. Nobody shouted anything. Just as a protest, they started to just march on the streets without saying anything.
Because-- not Mousavi and Karoubi, but-- many activists-- invited the people for non-violent actions. For peaceful resistance. Peaceful protestors. And after that-- you know, two big-- demonstrations in that week. But-- on Friday praying, the leaders started to threat the nation, and said that, "I don't tolerate anymore. Everybody should go home." And because that the day after, that Saturday-- again was a demonstration on the streets, they opened fire to the people.
That's the day that Nidal Sultan was killed. And-- anyway, our estimation shows that totally we have lost about 200 lives on the streets. And-- the prisoners toll is about 15,000. Some of them are released, but still we have about something between 4,000 to 5,000 prisoners in jail.
That was the strategy of regime. I mean, to create fear. And the strategy of the movement was to delegitimize the regime first, keep the unity of the opposition, stay on the non-violent tactics, and-- after street protests-- enough street protests, then going for the other tactics of non-violent movements.
TRANSCRIPT
The government has used the technology, the new technology-- in two ways. First, they have used these-- these technologies, too. I mean, I'm sure that, you know, for instance, the cameras which are-- the traffic cameras in Tehran, which are everywhere, was-- and it's a control room was used by Revolutionary Guard to control the protests in Tehran-- in Tehran. Or for their own communications as well.
But the other part of-- use of the new technologies was-- was right on the other side. I mean, filtering the websites-- slowing down the internet speed in Iran, and the-- the cyber army of Revolutionary Guard. This is the name of the division in-- special division in Revolutionary Guard, which was formed-- with $500 million budget. I don't know how much they have spent so far.
But to-- confront the movement, the cyber part of the movement, they started to attack the websites, for instance. My website was attacked by cyber arm of Iran, and once it was toppled down. They-- they-- you know-- took it over.
So the government has used new technologies, and as far as we know, they have hired some experts from outside Iran as well, some hackers from Brazil, from China, some-- yeah, some experts from-- some Russia companies. And-- and some Iranians. They started to use the new technologies to confront the new technologies.
TRANSCRIPT
You know, the reaction of the regime, which they could forecast that. I mean we knew that before the election, they had some news that they have talked to each other. That we go for-- you know-- that coup d'état and we will kill 200 people and imprison 2,000 people, and Iranians will sit down and everything will be suppressed.
This is what they calculated. But what they didn't know about the tactics of the movement was-- Iranians started to, you know, go ahead and come back. You know, one step ahead, two steps back. The first stage, the movement started to use the days of the regime. When I say "days of the regime," are the ceremony days of regime, which, you know, regime invites the people for governmental marches. For instance, Quds Day, the last Friday of Ramadan to support the Palestinian against Israel.
Movement used these days to come to the street to shout for the movement slogans. After awhile these days were not safe for the people. You know, at the first actions, the days of regime were safe because they didn't want to attack to the people, because they invited the people come to the streets.
But after three or four two or three month, regime started to not to respect even it's own days. So, it was an agreement inside the movement not to go for any strict protests anymore. But save the lives and mobilize the people for other types of tactics. Non-cooperative tactics. Not to cooperate with regime. Boycotting, going for strikes. And wearing out the regime. Especially the suppression machine of regime, which is Revolutionary Guard.
And now we are in this stage of the movement. So I think that the impact of regime's brutality was the legitimation of regime ins-- inside Iran and in international community. And growing up, a kind of hatred against regime. The poll shows-- the independent researchers-- in Iran, that in summer 2009-- about 68 percent of people believe that this regime should go-- 64 percent. But right now the last poll shows that 94 percent of the people say that this regime should go.
You know, huge in very steep slope for the graph of the-- you know-- growth of unpopularity of regime, the legitimation of the regime. That was the main result of 15 month of brutality of regime. And I believe that in nonviolent movements-- the legitimation is very important. The most important step, like Russian dolls. The other tactics and the other strategies will come out of this most important step. I mean the legitimation of the regime.
Non-cooperative tactics are boycotting the goods. Not paying the taxes. Not going to work. Civil disobedience. There are lots of tactics in this category. But the movement on these days is, first of all working on non-cooperative tactics, which will be based on first the economic crisis of the country.
Because as you know, the government of Ahmadinejad has created-- because of the mismanagement, they have created lots of troubles in the economy of the country. A corrupted economy-- many of the-- many parts of the Revolutionary Guard-- are corrupted now. They are involved in more than 800 big companies of Iran and more than 1,500 big projects of the country.
And this qualification, you know, has created lots of corruption in Iran. A kind of economy chaos in Iran. And international sanctions, which has started, especially that part of the sanctions which is targeted to Revolutionary Guard. It has been useful for the movement to squeeze the Revolutionary Guard to create cracks and some fissures inside Revolutionary Guard.
So, in this stage of revol-- movement-- we are thinking about-- the tactics, which will be based on economy crisis in Iran, and from inside Iran is targeted toward Revolutionary Guard. I think that-- the next move now-- it's November 5. November 5th, 2010. But-- during not more than a month, the next stage of the movement will be started-- which is going to-- protest-- of-- increase of some governmental goods, like gasoline in Iran.
Because the government is going to increase the price of gasoline, increase the price of bread, electricity, gas, and several other-- goods. So the tactics will go toward boycotting them, to protest them, to-- not cooperate with the regime. And especially target on the goods, which are at the hands of Revolutionary Guard.
TRANSCRIPT
I started hunger strike…That was first time I was arrested after-- by minister of intelligence of Iran. After five days, I was released. But after that-- after three month, I was arrested again, this time by its parallel successor, vis-- which was under control of the revolutionary guard. This time I was in prison for 114 days. Again I started hunger strike. I was on hunger strike for totally 79 days. First, I said that immediately I should be released, "I am just an opposition prisoner of conscience. So, according to the constitution, you don't have any right to arrest me." But they don't listen to you any way. Second, my second demand was everybody who was arrested with me, including my son, totally about 800 students, university students, were arrested on 2003, so my second demand was to release all the students who were arrested.
And third demand was that Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader, should apologize to the nation of Iran because of the judicial power of Iran, which is appointed by him. I knew that the third demand-- was-- of course, he-- he doesn't go for that. But I just wanted to launch the idea.
My wife knew about my demands, so when they arrested me she started to announce these demands every of them in five days. Every five days, she announced them, "This is his first demand, second demand and third demand."
At last, I was released because of several things. First the death of Zahra Kazemi the Canadian Iranian journalist. I didn't know while I was in jail but it was effective because she was killed in prison and there was a big scandal in Iran and in the world. Second, because of the pressure of some politicians, reformists and student groups.
And third, I think that I was very close to dieing you know, especially after the second hunger strike. After 56 days they promised me that, "Okay, you are free and everybody's free now. And so, break your hunger strike." I believed when Mr. Mortazavi, the general prosecutor of Tehran told me.
But after 20 days I found out that he lied and they don't want to release me. So, I started the second hunger strike, which took 23 days. You know, because of that I have heart problem, I already had heart surgery. And I stopped all my medicines.
Anyway-- totally they decided to release me by $600,000 bail. And when I was released I was hospitalized. My eye doctor and my heart doctor told me that, "You need surgery. And it would be better if you go out of Iran for medical treatment." So, I called my interrogator, I had his cell phone number, and told him that this is what my doctors have told me. "You have bail from me. And if I were you, you let me to go out because of my medical treatments. And if I come back again, I will be at your hands. And if I don't come back here, you will be lucky because one of the dissidents is outside Iran."
He told me that this is more than my authority, I should check with top officials, that we believe that they check with the-- the leader. It took about 40-- 42 days. Then he called me after 42 days-- he called me and said that, "Okay, we agree that you can go out of Iran so we will send you back your passport," because when they arrest you, they take everything. Your passport. Your bills. Your books. Everything. Your tapes, your computer, first.
And on January 2004, I left Iran. I went to England for eye surgery. I had two surgeries on my right eye. And it took about one year. But after that, for my heart treatments, everybody, recommended me that it's a good idea if I go to the United States.
So I had an invitation from Washington Institute for Near East Policy. And because that they had very good insurance for medical treatments, I accepted that s—three month fellowship. And I came to Washington, D.C. And I was hospitalized in Washington Hospital. But while I was in the United States after that three month, which was extended to more three month, totally six month-- I wanted to go back to Iran. I made a mistake on telephone. I talked to my mother and tell my friends that, "Okay, everything is finished and I'm on the way back."
In less than one week, they sentenced me to six years jail in absentia. Again, I announced that I don't care. I will come back. And if you arrest me, again I'll go on hunger strike. That was after Mr. Ahmadinejad first term election. Many of my friends recommended me that it would be better if I stay for a while because this time if they grab me, they will kill me.
TRANSCRIPT
The changes inside schism clerical system not only during last 15 months after election period, but-- during last 30 years-- I mean, after-- Islamic revolution-- you know, because that Shia clerics, they were against any-- ruling establishment. They got their money and their salary from the hands of the people, not from the governments. And they kind of tradition civil society in Iran, especially the stuff from 19th century that-- they were against the-- rulers of Iran. But after victory of Islamic revolution, a part of Shia-- Shia clerics became the new rulers of Iran.
So the first crack started right after victory of revolution. Some grand Ayatollahs-- who are the sources of emulation of the people, started to propose-- Ayatollah Khomeini, the-- the leader of revolution. And especially after death of Ayatollah Khomeini, when Ayatollah Khomeini, the present leader of Iran, took power.
Because he was not the high rank clergy, the high ranked clerics started to oppose him. And gradually, Ayatollah Khomeini changed or transferred the Islamic republic into a military and security regime instead of a clerical regime, a clergy regime. Because he did not have, you know, good reputation amongst the-- the clerics. He was not a high ranked-- clergy. So he didn't-- he was not able to use the Shia clergy as a source of power for himself.
So he searched-- source of power amongst the military men. This is the reason that gradually, Revolutionary Guard became the main source of power, base of power of Ayatollah Khomeini. And right now that we are talking, the majority of the Shia clergy in Iran, they are not satisfied with this regime. They-- they prefer to be out of politics, like you know, clerics of any clergy of any other religion. They prefer to do their religious job for the people.
I can say about 80 to 90 percent of the clergy in Iran, they are neutral. They-- they don't want to be involved in any type of politics. But amongst those ten percent to 15 percent-- clergy who believe in, you know, political Islam, again, there is a very big-- rift. There are two sides. One side are regime supporters. They have, you know, good positions in the regime. And the other part is-- the opposition clerics. They are political, but against the regime.
One of the most important one was Ayatollah Multezari-- source of emulation, who passed away last year. And he opposed not only Khomeini, but all the-- the regime, and he supported Green Movement very much. He was famous as the-- the spiritual father of the Green Movement.
And some other-- top clergy, like Ayatollah Sofsani, Ayatollah Tazanjani-- even some of them have been attacked by the-- you know, white shirts-- forces of regime. This is what people call them in Iran. The civilians-- apparently civilians who, you know, attack to mosques, attack to-- to clergy, attack to any mob. So amongst the-- political clergy, they have two big groups: opposition and supporters. What happened during last 15 month was some new rifts inside the supporters of-- support clerics of the regime.
For instance, in judicial power, many of the judges are-- clerics. And right now, many of them are not satisfied with the regime. They don't like to be-- I've received several-- messages from-- from them-- that-- we don't want to be-- like those few judges who sentence the journalists, who sentence the ordinary people to death, to prisons. And we are not with them.
Or some other supporters of regime amongst the clergy, like-- the representatives of the leader in universities, in every ministry. Many of them are now against the-- establishment. One of the most famous one is Hoshimira Sanjoni, who is now-- he's the ex-president of Iran. And-- he was very close to the leader. And after death of Ayatollah Khomeini, he was the first person in Iran, and became the president. And now he's head of the expediency council.
But he's not in a position, not totally in a position. Most of the time he's silent, but he doesn't support-- Ayatollah Khomeini and-- the coup d’état and the government of Ahmadinejad. So I mean, for instance, with Mr. Karroubi, who was the ex-- the head of the parliament of Iran, and he was a political clergy with the regime, but now he's at the-- the-- you know, head of the opposition. He's one of the leaders of Green Movement. I mean-- this is another-- crack inside the-- clergy in Iran.
TRANSCRIPT
I posted some of the Farsi translations of some good books and articles about nonviolent movements, for instance, from Dictatorship to Democracy written by Gene Sharp, which is translated to Farsi or Anti-Coup written by Gene Sharp.
One of the best books which is 50 Points About Nonviolent Struggle, nonviolent movement [Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points] is written by three leaders of Serbia, student organization. It's like the dummy books-- better to say nonviolence for dummies. And it has been translated to Farsi by the Freedom House in a very good Farsi translation. I can say very skillful translator has translated this book to Farsi.
And some other books, gradually so far I have attached to daily program, ten books and articles. Unfortunately we don't have anymore in English. And these days I'm working on the Letters From Prison written by Adam Michnik. Because I think that the Polish experience, solidarity experience is really useful for Iran's struggle because they were quite different from the other eastern Europe countries. They fought with the Stalinist regime more than ten years and they are quite different from Velvet Revolution that you are in just in two or three weeks or two or three month, you know, the regime collapsed.
And during last nine month, every night I have taped ten minutes on video explaining the experiences of other countries, some news, very brief news, assessments every night and discussing about the tactics, the actions, nonviolent actions, informing the people. I post it on my website, YouTube, my Facebook pages, tweet it on twitter.
And totally 14 people, including my son and my wife are helping me voluntarily from all around the world, most of them are students, you know, prepare this every day, ten minutes on video with the text because they write on whatever I say. Twenty-four hours later, it's ready and it will be up, it's attached to the next day program. And this is what I'm-- it takes about four to five hours per day for me.


