Uploaded August 2024 | Updated September 2026, 18 hours ago
Today, we explore the conceivability argument against materialism.
Linktree https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
I primarily drew from three sources: Philip Goff’s Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017), Hedda Hassel Mørch’s Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness (2023), and the SEP entry on Zombies written by Robert Kirk.
Goff: amazon.com/Consciousness-Fundamental-Reality-Philosophy-Mind/dp/0197766390/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
Mørch: amazon.com/Non-physicalist-Theories-Consciousness-Elements-Philosophy/dp/1009317334
Kirk: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
Here are two David Chalmers papers that were very useful:
Chalmers on different types of physicalism: consc.net/papers/nature.html
Chalmers on different kinds of conceivability and possibility and the links between them: consc.net/papers/conceivability.html
Also referenced:
Erik Hoel - Consciousness is a great mystery. Its definition isn’t. theintrinsicperspective.com/p/consciousness-is-a-great-mystery
Philip Goff - A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong philpapers.org/rec/PHIAPP-2
Kane B on conceivability and possibility youtu.be/BYsT1Bk1_8Q?si=k5gzXXqSqSm4DLV3
00:00 Housekeeping
00:56 Where I stand currently & some common confusions
04:03 Intro
05:32 Clarifying Conceivability
14:06 What is physicalism?
19:16 Consider the Houseplant
25:09 What the zombie is missing
32:38 Are zombies conceivable?
39:04 Metaphysical Possibility
42:42 A Posteriori Necessity
54:38 Phenomenal Transparency
1:03:56 Goff Interview
Today, we explore the conceivability argument against materialism.
Linktree https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
I primarily drew from three sources: Philip Goff’s Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017), Hedda Hassel Mørch’s Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness (2023), and the SEP entry on Zombies written by Robert Kirk.
Goff: amazon.com/Consciousness-Fundamental-Reality-Philosophy-Mind/dp/0197766390/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
Mørch: amazon.com/Non-physicalist-Theories-Consciousness-Elements-Philosophy/dp/1009317334
Kirk: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
Here are two David Chalmers papers that were very useful:
Chalmers on different types of physicalism: consc.net/papers/nature.html
Chalmers on different kinds of conceivability and possibility and the links between them: consc.net/papers/conceivability.html
Also referenced:
Erik Hoel - Consciousness is a great mystery. Its definition isn’t. theintrinsicperspective.com/p/consciousness-is-a-great-mystery
Philip Goff - A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong philpapers.org/rec/PHIAPP-2
Kane B on conceivability and possibility youtu.be/BYsT1Bk1_8Q?si=k5gzXXqSqSm4DLV3
00:00 Housekeeping
00:56 Where I stand currently & some common confusions
04:03 Intro
05:32 Clarifying Conceivability
14:06 What is physicalism?
19:16 Consider the Houseplant
25:09 What the zombie is missing
32:38 Are zombies conceivable?
39:04 Metaphysical Possibility
42:42 A Posteriori Necessity
54:38 Phenomenal Transparency
1:03:56 Goff Interview

![Has Physics Debunked Panpsychism? Answering Sabine Hossenfelder
Theoretical physicist Sabine Hossenfelder recently published a widely-cited critique of panpsychism. Hossenfelder argues that physics has ruled out panpsychism. However, her article is mired in confusion, and one doesn’t need to be a panpsychist to notice.
Read her criticism, Electrons Don’t Think, here: http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/01/electrons-dont-think.html
“Why do the Deniers ignore a long line of distinguished materialist predecessors and ally themselves with Descartes, their sworn enemy, in holding that experience can’t possibly be physical—thereby obliging themselves to endorse the Denial? The answer appears to be that they share with Descartes one very large assumption: that we know enough about the physical to be certain that experience can’t be physical.”
- Galen Strawson
“What a physiologist sees when he examines a brain is in the physiologist, not in the brain he is examining.”
- Bertrand Russell
“[M]aterialism ... is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself in his calculation.”
- Schopenhauer
Transcript: https://emersongreenblog.wordpress.com/2020/03/30/has-physics-debunked-panpsychism-answering-sabine-hossenfelder/
Listen to Walden Pod: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/walden-pod/id1474408172
Follow on Twitter @waldenpod
Support the podcast at Patreon.com/waldenpod
https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
/ timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
01:47 Hossenfelders critique
04:12 Two interpretations of her critique
09:47 Unfalsifiable or falsified?
11:29 Further points of confusion evident in Hossenfelders critique Has Physics Debunked Panpsychism? Answering Sabine Hossenfelder](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/BUIWW_2afBU/mqdefault.jpg)

![11 Objections to Panpsychism - Answered
We respond to eleven common objections to panpsychism.
Listen to the podcast here: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/walden-pod/id1474408172
[References and further links are in the show notes of each episode]
Check out our sister show, Counter Apologetics, here: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/counter-apologetics/id1273573417
/ / / / / / /
00:00 Introduction
05:20 (1) “The incredulous stare,” or an argument from strangeness, which appeals to our common sense and argues that panpsychism is forbiddingly counter-intuitive.
8:54 (2) Falsifiability. Isn’t panpsychism unfalsifiable?
11:03 (3) Isn’t physics entirely on the side of materialism?
17:33 (4) Wouldn’t panpsychism force us to add a particle to the standard model?
24:50 Interlude — a few advantages of panpsychism
27:13 (5) Pan-nifty-ism. Dan Dennett’s reductio cuts to the heart of the issue: is Nagelian consciousness reducible? Is what-it-is-like-ness analogous to élan vital or fluidity?
29:38 (6) Mysterianism. Should we even expect consciousness to be rationally intelligible?
33:36 (7) The woo accusation
35:29 (8) Is [insert inanimate object here] conscious?
36:19 (9) Won’t science eventually solve consciousness?
38:47 (10) Doesn’t panpsychism open the door to parapsychology and other pseudoscience?
42:31 (11) The Combination Problem. Widely considered to be the most serious difficulty facing panpsychism, the Combination Problem deserves a little extra time. The exact nature of the problem depends on your view of fundamental reality (the parts that are being combined) and the self (what is being formed through combination). We also discuss Galileo, the fusion view, Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory, and a few other related issues. 11 Objections to Panpsychism - Answered](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/CVquyZepZxM/mqdefault.jpg)






