DEFCONConference
DEF CON 21 - Melissa Elliott - Noise Floor Exploring Unintentional Radio Emissions
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In both cases, an efficient file system separation should be provided. On one hand, each container should be able to access system files and write changes that will not affect the host. On the other, copying the entire main volume on each container launch will be storage-inefficient and not practical.
In this presentation, we will cover the basics of windows containers, break down its file system isolation framework, reverse-engineer its main mini-filter driver, and see how it can be utilized and manipulated by an actor to bypass EDR products in multiple domains. Eventually, we will provide an open-source tool based on these findings.
This technology caught my attention for several reasons:
Containers and virtualization solutions are everywhere, and their internal workings are not well documented.
Actors often search for ways to escape containers. The idea of intentionally entering into one in order to evade security products has yet to be explored.
This framework doesn't require any prerequisites and comes as default in every modern Windows image! (the part which we will abuse, at least).
Placing these items in context reveals a far more troubling picture.After reviewing the capabilities of Amezit and Scan-V, we can see glimpses of historical programs in the advertised efficacy of these projects. We will consider other items that have leaked over the years offering similar capabilities, albeit in different circumstances.Examples include Russia’s SORM framework for domestic operations,China’s Great Firewall and (more significantly) Great Cannon programs, and items that emerged in the Snowden leaks such as the US’s alleged “Quantum” program.
By analyzing these additional projects, we will observe a decade’s long trend in the systematization and scaling of cyber programs, especially with respect to automated exploitation and infrastructure management. Vulkan and related items, as significant as they are, represent a culmination of operational evolution and an example of the proliferation of capabilities following disclosure. With programs such as Scan-V exposed, we should anticipate other entities seeking to mirror such capabilities, progressing beyond botnets and other distributed systems to effective management of dispersed capabilities for signals intelligence and cyber operations.
The evolution of public transportation payment systems has been driven by the need for faster, more convenient, and more secure payment methods, and this trend is likely to continue in the years to come, But how secure are mobile payment solutions for public transportation?
In this presentation, we will examine the security risks associated with transportation applications, using Moovit as a case study. Moovit is a widely used transportation app operating in over 100 countries and 5000+ cities. Through our investigation of the app's API, including SSL-encrypted data, we discovered specific vulnerabilities, which we will discuss. We will also demonstrate a custom user interface that can obtain a "free ticket" and cause someone else to pay. Furthermore, we will explain how an attacker could gain unauthorized access to and exfiltrate Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of registered users. Our findings offer practical recommendations to improve the security of transportation apps.
Do you dislike Boston (the city) and love Satan?
If you answered yes to any of those questions you should come to this talk!
I'll be showing you how to spoof emails from 2 million+ domains (while also “bypassing” SPF & DMARC!) by (ab)using a partnership between Cloudflare and the “biggest transactional email service” on the interwebs. We'll be diving into "edge" serverless applications and the magical world of email security where everything is (still) held up by duct tape, pasta, and marinara sauce. Finally, I’ll be dropping code and releasing a tool that demonstrates how to impersonate emails from 2million+ domains.
In this talk, we propose efficient way to perform USB fuzzing to actual vehicles. We describe how to perform USB fuzzing to kernel area fuzzing as well as media fuzzing by directly connecting the fuzzer and the car with a USB cable. By this method, we found real-world vulnerabilities in Volkswagen Jetta, Renault Zoe, GM Chevrolet Equinox, and AGL.
Like anything which deals with untrusted user input, it has an attack surface. 20 years ago HD Moore wrote a paper on terminal vulnerabilities, finding multiple CVEs in the process. I decided it was time to revisit this class of vulnerability.
In this talk I'll look at the history of terminals and then detail the issues I found in half a dozen different terminals. Even Microsoft who historically haven't had strong terminal support didn't escape a CVE. In order to exploit these vulnerabilities they often need to be combined with a vulnerability in something else. I'll cover how to exploit these vulnerabilities in multiple ways.
Overall this research found multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities across nearly all platforms and new unique ways to deliver the exploits.
When the internal offensive security research team was analyzing one of the NVIDIA hardware, they detected several remotely exploitable bugs in AMI MegaRAC BMC. Moreover, various elevations of privileges and "change of scope" bugs have been identified, many of which may be chained together resulting in a highest severity security issue. During this talk we would like to take you on the journey of the whole attack sequence: from having zero knowledge about a remote AMI BMC with enabled IPMI (yeah, right) to flashing a persistent firmware implant to the server SPI flash. The chain will be about a dozen bugs long, so buckle up.
After waiting more than 1 year and a half once we disclosed it to all the affected vendors, we are ready to disclose all the technical details to the public. This research was covered in the media by wired.com but without the technical details that we can share now wired.com/story/atm-hack-nfc-bugs-point-of-sale
Some of the affected vendors are: IDtech - idtechproducts.com Ingenico - ingenico.com Verifone - verifone.com CPI - cranepi.com BBPOS - bbpos.com Wiseasy - wiseasy.com Nexgo - nexgoglobal.com
In this presentation we will describe the vulnerabilities and also demo how the readers can be compromised, using a special Android app we created, by just tapping an Android phone to the reader. We will discuss the consequences such as financial impact in reader’s users/owners and card data stealing once the firmware is compromised. Also, we will show how to compromise the host that is connected to the reader through USB by manipulating the reader’s firmware, chaining stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the SDK provided by the vendor that is running in the host machine.
Finally, since one of the affected vendors (IDtech) is present in most ATM brands in the world, the talk will cover different scenarios of how possible can be jackpotting ATMs just tapping a smartphone into the reader of the ATM. We have many years of experience jackpotting all brands of ATMs in multiple different ways and we will show how this is technically possible.
While understanding and reversing malware is a highly skilled procedure, attacking the C2 itself rarely requires a lot of technical skills. Most of the C2 servers have the same typical HTTP problems that can be detected by off-the-shelf vulnerability scanners.
By exploiting low-hanging fruit vulnerabilities, an attacker can obtain unauthorized access to administrative functions, allowing them to command thousands of devices and further explore other attack vectors. This can give them access to administrator panels and malware source code, and result in the identity of threat actors being exposed.
We will review the relevant Windows API, the practicalities of this feature, look at popular VPN software; we will then consider ridiculously complex exfil methods and... finally bypass it with unexpectedly trivial tricks. We will exploit design, implementation and configuration issues to circumvent this control in offensive scenarios. We will then learn how to fix or harden VPN Always-On deployment to further limit the risks posed by untrusted networks.
In this talk I’ll show you how an attacker can take advantage of the Custom GitHub Actions ecosystem by infecting one Action to spread malicious code to other Actions and projects by showing you a demo of POC worm.
We will start by exploring the ways in which Actions are loosely and implicitly dependent on other Actions. This will allow us to create a dependency tree of Actions that starts from a project that we want to attack and hopefully ends in a vulnerable Action that we can take control of.
We will then dive down to how GitHub Actions is working under the hood and I’ll show you how an attacker that is in control of an Action can utilize the mechanism of the GitHub Actions Runner to infect other Actions that are dependent on their Action and eventually infect the targeted project.
Finally, after we’ve gained all of the theoretical knowledge I’ll show you a demo with POC malware that is spreading through Actions and we will talk on how to defend against this kind of attack.
We will survey the discovery and disclosure of a family of industry-wide vulnerabilities in various UEFI implementations, affecting more than eight major vendors, making billions of devices vulnerable to our attack. Then, we will deep-dive into the innards of SMM exploitation and discuss methods to use and abuse various functionalities and properties of edk2 to gain code execution. We will unveil both our futile and fruitful quests of crafting our way to SMM, and detail both the paths that lead to dead-ends, and the route to success.
We will give a detailed overview of different ways to elevate this kind of attack to user-land both on Windows and Linux by chaining multiple vulnerabilities together.
Finally, we will show RingHopper hopping from user-space to… SMM.
The Idaho National Laboratory is integrating the next-generation XR capabilities into the various projects that support Nuclear, Integrated Energy and National and Homeland Security missions. They use a suite of tools for the visualization of capabilities to capture and analyze digital twins. Digital Engineering delivers semi-autonomous design, autonomous operation, and real-time anomaly detection as well as integrates threads of data, visualizations, AI/ML, and physics models into a cohesive digital twin.
The primary benefit of incorporating XR with signal analysis is to allow for simple interpretation and representation of complex data. Current techniques or trends rely on certain subject matter experts to collect, examine, and report anomalous data manually. By allowing the operator to spatially view the captured data, the process of identifying and plotting data is anticipated to be greatly simplified. Data and anomalies will become engaging, allowing the operator to easily identify unknown signals in real-time or near real-time.
Today, there are multiple offensive tools in the wild that can execute code as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM” (Meterpreter, CobaltStrike, Potato tools), and they all usually do so by duplicating tokens and manipulating services in some way or another. This talk will show an evasive and undetected privilege escalation technique that abuses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). This platform processes network traffic and allow configuring filters that permit or block communication.
It is built-in component of the operating system since Windows Vista, and doesn’t require an installation. My research started from reverse-engineering a single RPC method in an OS service and ended with several techniques to abuse a system kernel component, that allow executing programs as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”, as well as other users that are logged on the the machine without triggering any traditional detection algorithms.
The various components of the Windows Filtering Platform will be analyzed, such as the Basic Filtering Engine, the TCPIP driver and the IPSec protocol, while focusing on how to abuse them and extract valuable data from them.
This project uncovered a systemic vulnerability present in numerous signature validation implementations, enabling attackers to exploit valid certificates in an unintended manner. Vulnerable implementations mistakenly perceive files signed with incompatible certificates as legitimate, violating their respective specifications and allowing threat actors to sign untrusted code at little to no cost. In this talk, we will explore the problem at all levels, ranging from the fundamental theory to its application across multiple formats and real-world situations.
Portions of this vulnerability have been released publicly, but several pieces were omitted to provide Microsoft time to remediate the issue and not put Azure B2C environments at unnecessary risk. New details in this talk include steps to reverse engineer and discover the crypto vulnerability along with details of a novel attack for crypto key recovery.
For background, Microsoft Azure B2C is an identity and access management service for customer-facing apps. Thousands of organizations use this service, including national/state/local governments, professional societies, and commercial companies. The service is also used in the public Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) web portal as the main method for researchers to disclose vulnerabilities as part of Microsoft's bug bounty programs. The full exploit chain was effective against the MSRC and would have allowed an attacker to enumerate details of disclosed but not-yet-patched Microsoft zero day vulnerabilities.
We wondered if we could achieve similar capabilities running as an unprivileged user without possessing a rough certificate, instead we aimed to turn the original Windows Defender process to our full control.
In this talk we will deep dive into Windows Defender architecture, the signature database format and the update process, with a focus on the security verification logic. We will explain how an attacker can completely compromise any Windows agent or server, including those used by enterprises, by exploiting a powerful 0day vulnerability that even we didn't expect to discover.
We will demonstrate Defender-Pretender, a tool we developed to achieve neutralization of the EDR. allowing any already known malicious code to run Fully Un-Detected. It can also force Defender to delete admin’s data. OS and driver files, resulting in an unrecoverable OS. We will also explain how an attacker can alter Defender's detection and mitigation logic.
REFERENCES: The content we will present was generated by the speakers. Tiffany will present anonymized case studies from the “Citizen Clinic” at UC Berkeley and Austin will share case studies his organization has generated regarding human trafficking. Our only bibliographic reference at this moment is a reference to open source/free software tools we use at UC Berkeley. We will also reference a tool to make VPNs safer created by Berkeley’s students called “Ghost Prtcl.”
Using the above framework, our international experiments in commercial networks revealed exploitable inconsistencies in traffic metering, leading to multiple data "phreaking" opportunities ("free-ride"). We also expose problematic IPv6 firewall configurations, hidden SIM card communication to the home network, and fingerprint dial progress tones to track victims across different roaming networks and countries with voice calls.
After an overview of the classes involved, we will explore the full syntax of NSPredicate and cover how it can be used to script the Objective-C runtime and even call any C function. It will be shown that PAC can still be bypassed 100% reliably with NSPredicates in order to execute any function with arbitrary arguments. A new tool will be unveiled to help craft complex NSPredicates to execute arbitrary code and inject those predicates in any application. Additionally, a demonstration will be given which executes arbitrary code in the highly privileged Preferences app.
Finally, the talk will cover a bypass of NSPredicateVisitor implementations which allows a malicious process to evaluate any NSPredicate within several system processes including coreduetd, appstored, OSLogService, and SpringBoard. Next there will be a live demo of exploiting SpringBoard to steal a user’s notifications and location data. The presentation will end with some discussion about what can still be done with NSPredicates now that these issues have been fixed, including bypassing App Store Review, and what app developers should know to keep their own apps safe.
Researches on RouterOS were mainly against jailbreak, Nova Message in IPC, and analysis of exploits in the wild. Especially researches against Nova Message have reported tons of post-auth vulnerabilities. However, the architecture design and the lower-layer objects, which are closely related to the functionality of Nova Binary, were being neglected due to their complexity, causing some details to be overlooked for a long time. Starting by introducing the mechanisms of the socket callback and the remote object, we will disclose more about the overlooked attack surface and implementations in RouterOS. Moreover, we will discuss how we, at the end of rarely visited trails, found the pre-auth RCE that existed for nine years and can exploit all active versions and the race condition in the remote object. We will also share our methodology and vulnerability patterns.
Delving into the design of the RouterOS, attendees will have a greater understanding of the overlooked attack surface and implementation of it and be able to review the system more reliably. Additionally, we will also share our open-source tools and methodology to facilitate researchers researching RouterOS, making it less obscure. , Ting-Yu Chen, aka NiNi, is a security researcher at DEVCORE and a member of the Balsn CTF team. He won the title of the "Master of Pwn" at Pwn2Own Toronto 2022 with the DEVCORE team. NiNi has also made notable achievements in CTF competitions, including placing 2nd and 3rd in DEF CON CTF 27 and 28 as a member of HITCON⚔BFKinesiS and HITCON⚔Balsn teams, respectively. NiNi is currently immersed in vulnerability research and reverse engineering, continuing to hone his skills. You can keep up with his latest discoveries and musings on Twitter via his handle @terrynini38514 or blog at http://blog.terrynini.tw/.
Despite many vulnerabilities in that mechanism found in the past, using 0-days during red teaming engagements is impractical. Apple fixes TCC vulnerabilities but red teams still have to get access to files saved on the victim’s desktop or be able take a screenshot.
What if I tell you that there are many open doors to resolve all the TCC problems that are already installed on your target machines?! Electron apps are everywhere. And you probably heard the joke that: ‘S’ in Electron stands for security.
In this talk I will share a new tool that, by abusing Electron default configuration, allows executing code in the context of those Electron apps and thus inherit their TCC permissions.
The audience will leave with a solid understanding of the macOS privacy restrictions framework (TCC) and its weaknesses. The part of the audience interested in macOS red teaming will also get to know my new, free and open source tool. Blue teams on the stage will also see some ideas regarding detections.
Along with this presentation, we provide a C library for making microcode changes and documentation on the reverse-engineered microcode.
We show that vendor updates to the microcode, which cannot be verified by the user, impose a security risk by demonstrating how a Linux system can be compromised through a backdoor within a CPU core's microcode.
We have been researching during the past two years dozens of OPC-UA protocol stack implementations being used in millions of industrial products. We focused on two main attack vectors: attacking OPC-UA servers and protocol gateways, and attacking OPC-UA clients. The research yielded unique attack techniques that targeted specific OPC-UA protocol specification pitfalls that enabled us to create a wide range of vulns ranging from denial of service to remote code execution.
For example, we explored OPC-UA features such as method call processing, chunking mechanisms, certification handling, complex variant structures, monitored items, race-conditions, and many more. For each part of the specification, we tried to understand its caveats and exploit them to achieve RCE, information leaks, or denial of service attacks.
In this talk, we will share our journey, methods, and release an open-source framework with all of our techniques and vulnerabilities to exploit modern OPC-UA protocol stacks. , Noam Moshe is a vulnerability researcher at Claroty Team82. Noam specializes in vulnerability research, web applications pentesting, malware analysis, network forensics and ICS/SCADA security. In addition, Noam presented in well-known Hacking conferences like Blackhat Europe, as well as won Master of Pwn at Pwn2Own Miami 2023.
In this talk, we present tools and techniques to identify weak keys at scale, by checking issued certificates obtained from passive monitoring, active network scans, or certificate authority logs. Our tools use efficient multithreaded implementations of network monitors, scanners, certificate parsers, and mathematical tests. The batch greatest common divisor test (BGCD) identifies RSA public keys with common factors, and outputs the corresponding private keys. The common key test identifies distinct devices that share identical keys. We report on findings from both tests and demonstrate how to audit HTTPS servers, run BGCD on 100M+ keys, identify RSA keys with common factors, and generate the corresponding private keys. Because nothing convinces like an attack, we show how to produce and use PEM files for factored keys.
In our research, we reviewed the pairing mechanism of NAS devices with the WD and Synology cloud platforms. To our surprise we discovered that devices authenticate to the cloud using a hardware identifier which is later used by users to remotely access their devices. Using this, we were able to impersonate any given NAS device and perform phishing attacks that yielded us admin rights on any targeted WD or Synology device.
In this talk, we will explain the pairing process of WD and Synology NAS. We will elaborate on the overall architecture of their cloud offering and focus on the vulnerabilities we found including ways to enumerate and impersonate all edge devices using certificate transparency log (CTL), and steal cloud proxy auth tokens. This enabled us to download every file saved on the NAS devices, alter or encrypt them, and bypass NAT/Firewall protection to achieve full remote code execution on all cloud-connected NAS (and to gain $$$ from Pwn2Own).
We will begin by providing an overview of the unique challenges faced in these limited environments and discuss the reasons behind their increasing prevalence. Next, we will explore how attackers can exploit vulnerabilities within these constraints and demonstrate several novel methods for manipulating Linux memory.
Throughout the presentation, we will showcase real-world examples and provide step-by-step explanations for each technique, enabling attendees to gain a deeper understanding of how they can be employed by adversaries. Additionally, we will discuss potential countermeasures and mitigation strategies to help security professionals better defend against these emerging threats.
By attending this presentation, participants will gain valuable insights into the latest advancements in Linux memory manipulation and acquire the knowledge needed to anticipate and counter stealthy attacks in constrained environments. Whether you are a security researcher, a system administrator, or an ethical hacker, this session will equip you with the expertise necessary to stay ahead of the curve in the ever-evolving world of cybersecurity.
It doesn't have to be this way. Enshittification occurs when companies gobble each other up in an orgy of mergers and acquisitions, reducing the internet to "five giant websites filled with screenshots of text from the other four" (credit to Tom Eastman!), which lets them endlessly tweak their back-ends to continue to shift value from users and business-customers to themselves. The government gets in on the act by banning tweaking by users - reverse-engineering, scraping, bots and other user-side self-help measures - leaving users helpless before the march of enshittification.
We don't have to accept this! Disenshittifying the internet will require antitrust, limits on corporate tweaking - through privacy laws and other protections - and aggressive self-help measures from alternative app stores to ad blockers and beyond!
Viasat will share the story of how it responded and performed a rapid forensic on several impacted terminals to determine within 36 hours that the terminal flash memory had been overwritten with a distinctive pattern in the attack. This presentation will explain details around the forensic analysis as well as the process of reverse engineering the malicious toolkit to verify it would produce the observed flash memory effects. Viasat will also share technical details of over-the-air network attacks that were used to attack the KA-SAT network.
America’s adversaries are sophisticated, and TSA needs help from the hacking community to think creatively about future attacks, to identify new vulnerabilities, and to provide innovative new ways of measuring success. This talk will tell you what TSA is seeing, gives you a chance to offer us advice, and to learn specific ways in which you can contribute to new projects. Because always in motion the future is.
In this talk, we'll give an overview PBX/UC systems, what kind of attack surface they have, as well as several bugs that we recently found in two popular PBX/UC products. The journey includes deep-diving Java's Runtime.exec(), decrypting encrypted PHP, bypassing license restrictions, pretending to be a phone, and (of course) getting some shells.
TLS allows communicating parties to uniquely authenticate each other by validating each other's certificate. However, many TLS libraries and frameworks have insecure default settings or allow for the developers to skip important aspects of certificate validation in their client implementations.
This talk explores issues in TLS client certificate validation and the underlying reasons why developers still fail to implement TLS correctly. Most importantly, we hack all the things with a new TLS mitm tool: certmitm.
certmitm automatically discovers and exploits insecure certificate validation vulnerabilities in TLS clients. Let's use the tool to hack iOS, Windows 11 and more while we deep dive into the world of insecure TLS certificate validation.
Bypassing DEP via ROP is typically straightforward, using WinAPIs such as VirualProtect and VirtualAlloc. We demonstrate an alternative: using Windows syscalls. In fact, ROCKET provides automatic ROP chain construction to bypass ROP using Windows syscalls. While extremely trendy, Windows syscalls are only very rarely used in ROP.
One problem with automatic chain construction is bad chars or bad bytes. We demonstrate how ROCKET allows us to use virtulally any gadget whose address contains bad bytes. With this approach, automatic ROP chain construction is far less likely to fail. Thus, we overcome one of the major obstacles when creating a ROP chain: bad bytes, which reduces the attack surface needlessly. In fact, if one wanted, they could use ROCKET to "obfuscate" any gadget, obscuring what is being done.
This presentation will do the seemingly impossible - and surprise even veteran users of ROP.
In this presentation, we'll demonstrate over a dozen vulnerabilities, concerning problems, and general "WTF"s in the OSDP protocol that let it be subverted, coerced, and totally bypassed. This ranges from deeply in-the-weeds clever cryptographic attacks, to boneheaded mistakes that undermine the whole thing. We will also demonstrate a practical pentesting tool that can be inserted behind an RFID badge reader to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Get your orange vest and carry a ladder, because we're going onsite!
The modem — or baseband — is considered a fundamental component of smartphones, and is at high risk because it is a privileged system component that accepts data from an untrusted remote source (cell towers). A vulnerability in the modem exposes end-users to scalable attacks carried out remotely, which may lead to many kinds of compromise on a phone.
Modem security is currently a hot topic of research, attracting growing interest from security researchers, both in the industry and in academia. This wasn’t the case up until recently for a couple of reasons: most modem code is closed source, and testing it requires expensive hardware equipment. With some of these barriers being removed in recent years, due the invention of software-defined radio (SDR) devices and public toolkits, the entry level into baseband security analysis has become more affordable. In this session the Android Red Team will be describing some findings from its offensive evaluation of modems used in Pixel devices.


